A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WELSH NATIONALISM

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A Sociological Analysis of Welsh Nationalism

Robert Mears

This study deals with the nature, development and consequences of nationalist movements in Wales. In 1973, a Royal Commission on the Constitution recommended the establishment of legislative assemblies in Cardiff and Edinburgh. The study begins with an analysis of the maintenance of a sense of national distinctiveness in Wales and Scotland, despite centuries of political incorporation into the United Kingdom. The thesis shows how the different stages of development of Welsh and Scottish societies at the time of unification with England was crucial in terms of the maintenance of national institutions. Whereas Scotland maintained a series of significant national institutions, in Wales the Welsh language became a major prop of national identity. Part of this work analyses the fate of the Welsh language since unification and its role in religion, education and the formation of political identity. The enduring link between language and nationality is examined, as is the role of the language in the development of Welsh nationalist ideology in the twentieth century. The thesis also examines the changing social, economic and occupational structure of Wales since 1945 in an attempt to explain the growth in support of Plaid Cymru in the nineteen sixties. The proposals to create legislative assemblies were the subject of a referendum in 1979, and the debate over the devolution proposals is also analysed. The thesis concludes with a review of the relevant literature, a discussion of the relative neglect by sociologists of nationalism and nationalist movements and an assessment of the future prospects for the Welsh nationalist movement.
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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER ONE</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Distinctiveness of Wales and Scotland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER TWO</strong></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welsh Society in Developmental Perspective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER THREE</strong></td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language and National Identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER FOUR</strong></td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welsh Nationalist Ideology 1925-1945</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER FIVE</strong></td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Conditions and Vicissitudes of Organised Welsh Nationalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER SIX</strong></td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devolution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER SEVEN</strong></td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APPENDIX</strong></td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BIBLIOGRAPHY</strong></td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

This study deals with the nature, development and consequences of Welsh nationalism. Throughout the nineteen seventies, developments served to bring the 'national question' to greater prominence in Great Britain. In Scotland, the exploitation of North Sea oil fuelled concern about the way in which these resources might be used and controlled for the benefit of Scotland. In Wales, the persistence of the Welsh language, spoken by about a fifth of the population, and the championing of the language by well-organised and articulate elites, led to increasingly pronounced conflict between central government and sections of Welsh opinion.

There was also evidence of glaring differences between Scotland and Wales, on the one hand, and the rest of Great Britain, on the other. Differences in living standards, levels of unemployment, rates of economic activity and marked inequalities of income between these areas, reinforced a sense of grievance. Feelings of neglect may have been experienced in other regions of Great Britain. However, in Scotland and Wales, the persistence of a strong sense of distinctiveness made it more likely that a sense of dissatisfaction with central government would express itself in 'nationalistic' terms. It seemed that, for the first time since each nation had become constitutionally bound with England, there were clear signs that decentralising pressures might prove strong enough to challenge the unity of the United Kingdom.

The Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru (The Party of Wales) were the organisations which articulated and developed this sense of national distinctiveness. Their propaganda emphasised the 'neglect' of Scotland and Wales by central government, and the 'overcentralisation' of government in Great Britain. As a result of
significant electoral successes enjoyed by the nationalist parties, and opinion poll evidence that pointed to more deep-seated dissatisfaction with the size and scale of centralised governmental functions, the Labour Government established, in 1969, a Royal Commission on the Constitution. The 'Kilbrandon' Commission, as it became known, reported in 1973, to the then Conservative Government, led by Edward Heath. That Government was disinclined to take any action which, in their view, would undermine the integrity of the United Kingdom.

After the two General Elections of 1974, and the return of a Labour Government under the leadership of Harold Wilson, there was renewed interest in the question of devolution. In its election manifesto, the Labour Party had promised to introduce legislation based on the majority proposals of the Royal Commission. The subsequent legislation, The Scotland and Wales Bills, envisaged the setting up of elected Parliaments in Cardiff and Edinburgh. As a result of compromises during the Parliamentary passage of the Bills, the measures were to be subject to a referendum, to be held in Scotland and Wales on March 1st 1979. However, the results of the referendum were such as to preclude, one way or another, the expected setting up of devolved national institutions.

Work on this thesis began in earnest two years before the 1979 Referendum. It seemed then as if the establishment of Scottish and Welsh Parliaments was a foregone conclusion, and a sociological analysis of the movement for self-government in Wales was long overdue. In the mid-eighties, the prospects for the creation of devolved assemblies seemed to recede. Yet, the persistence of a strong subjective sense of difference in these regions, supported by a continuing proliferation of Scottish and Welsh national institutions, means that one cannot exclude the possibility that nationalist
movements will reassert themselves with renewed vigour. Under given favourable circumstances they could again become the focus for political dissatisfaction and they could constitute a challenge to the legitimacy and authority of centralising governmental forces.

Initially, I had a general interest in processes of nation building and state formation, and ambitions to write a thesis on nationalism in all its varied forms. Subsequently, Eric Dunning and Ilya Neustadt succeeded in convincing me that I might study the movement for Welsh statehood. They thought that a sociological study of a struggling nationalist movement might highlight some of the salient issues in processes of state formation.

I was born and educated in Wales, spoke some of the language and had relatives and friends involved actively in Welsh politics as members of movements for and against Welsh nationalism. These personal contacts were to prove invaluable in gaining access to the activities of Welsh nationalists. In 1977 and 1978, I attended the Annual Conferences of Plaid Cymru as an observer. This enabled me to tape-record speeches and debates, to meet a wide range of activists, and gather books and pamphlets outlining the nationalist case. Throughout the research I subscribed to Welsh Nation, the regular Plaid Cymru newspaper, and the Western Mail, a Cardiff-based daily newspaper.

With this initial research material and the data gathered at Plaid Cymru Conferences, I began to familiarise myself with the major issues in Welsh politics in the mid nineteen seventies. I also acquainted myself with the major schisms within the nationalist camp. My contacts with members of the Welsh Language Society were limited at first because many of them refused to be interviewed in English. Although I spoke some Welsh, I was not sufficiently fluent to conduct elaborate interviews in the language. Nor did I enjoy the trust of
active members of the Welsh Language Society to begin with. In an attempt to remedy this, I enrolled on a two week crash course in Welsh at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. There, I was able to improve substantially my command of the language, and, incidentally, meet many more people sympathetic to both nationalism and the campaigns to improve the status of the Welsh language. Several participants in the summer school were Plaid Cymru members or supporters from anglicised families, or from English-speaking areas of Wales. For them, efforts to learn the language were synonymous with their commitment to the campaign for Welsh self-government. Of the thirty six detailed interviews I succeeded in carrying out, seven were with adult Welsh learners whom I met at the University of Wales on this course.

The organisational form of this thesis departs, in one particular respect, from that which traditionally prevails. I have avoided the convention of opening the thesis with a chapter reviewing the relevant theoretical literature on nationalism. A chapter of this type could easily have turned into a barren exercise, further perpetuating sterile distinctions between theory, analysis and description. I have tried, therefore, to incorporate considerations of wider theoretical issues in the body of the thesis wherever appropriate, and more systematically in the conclusions.

The theme of Chapter One is the distinctiveness of Scotland and Wales in relation to England, and the likelihood that this will continue and be accentuated. The treatment of Scotish Nationalism is not an integral part of this work, though, for comparative purposes, and wherever appropriate, it will be referred to. This is particularly the case in Chapter One, which examines the background to the establishment of the Commision on the Constitution, and Chapter
Two, which compares Scotland and Wales at the time of their incorporation into the United Kingdom. In Chapter Two I have delineated three significant stages in the development of Welsh society, in the context of sociological explanations of nation-state formation. Only a developmental approach enables one to understand adequately contemporary manifestations of Welsh nationalism.

Chapter Three is devoted to a consideration of the relationship between national identity and language. Because the Welsh language is in decline, as indicated by every Census since 1911, attempts to support the minority language have taken on a sense of urgency. The threatened extinction of the Welsh language serves to heighten the sense of crisis felt by many nationalists. Hence, the language issue acquires a salience which has shaped, and continues to shape the ideology of the nationalist movement in significant ways. This Chapter reviews the relevant sociological and psychological literature on the meaning of linguistic identities, and it draws on official documents relating to the status of the Welsh language. It also refers to the propaganda material of the Welsh Language Society and analyses the interviews carried out with language activists.

In the years immediately after the formation of Plaid Cymru in 1926, nationalist ideologues viewed language and nationality as synonymous. Therefore, they concentrated their efforts on combatting the dissemination of the English language. In all cases they identified it with the undesired spread of urbanism and industry. This theme is explored more fully in Chapter Four in an analysis of the ideology of the nationalist party from its foundation, up to the end of the Second World War. Drawing on a critical discussion of the concept of 'community', this Chapter attempts to describe the main characteristics of the founders of Plaid Cymru, and show the varied strands of thought that combine in an unusual configuration. This is
an amalgam of Christian Socialism, Pacifism, Nonconformity, anti-industrialism, and the concomitant celebration of a romantic and mythical Welsh gemeinschaft. The data derives from an analysis of an extensive collection of nationalist pamphlets and periodicals. These are housed in Aberystwyth at the National Library of Wales, and include *Draig Goch* (Red Dragon), the Party newspaper published in Welsh since 1926, and *Welsh Nation*, its English-language sister paper, published since 1932.

At the 1977 Plaid Cymru Conference I distributed one hundred and fifty questionnaires to party delegates. This is reproduced in the Appendix as it also formed the basis of the semi-structured interviews. The response was not at all satisfactory. The numbers involved did not justify any significant statistical analysis of the data. Nevertheless, the fifteen responses I did receive, provided me with fragments, however impressionistic, which guided me in the longer interviews.

A modest travel grant from the University of Leicester Research Board, which I gratefully acknowledge, enabled me to travel to libraries in Cardiff and Aberystwyth. Aberystwyth houses offices and bookshops owned by Plaid Cymru and the Welsh Language Society. Also, the presence of the University College means that the town has a thriving political and social life in which nationalists are prominent. By the time I returned to Leicester in the autumn of 1978, I had transcripts of interviews, notes from original sources and many observations and impressions gathered from formal and informal meetings with nationalists. My personal contacts in the Llanelli and Carmarthen constituencies were helpful in introducing me to a wider range of grass roots members of the nationalist Party. They were also helpful in directing my choice of whom to interview. I carried out thirty six tape-recorded, semi-structured interviews with active
nationalists from eleven different Party branches. They were not a representative sample, but they did span the age range, were drawn from different wings of the Party, and from branches in both rural and urban areas. Particulars about those interviewed are reproduced in the Appendix. These interviews form part of Chapter Five.

In Chapter Five, I have attempted to link together an analysis of the changing economic, demographic and occupational structure of Wales in order to explain the upsurge of support for Welsh Nationalism after 1966. As the membership of Plaid Cymru expanded very rapidly after 1966, (see Appendix for details) there occurred shifts in its policy and programme. Not content with the themes of cultural regeneration which marked its early years, there emerged new groups to challenge the party leadership. I interviewed several members of the leadership of Plaid Cymru in 1978. These included members of the National Council, a Member of Parliament, and officials of the Party. The views of the then Party President, Gwynfor Evans, were well known to me from his prolific output of books, articles, and newspaper interviews. These interviews revealed areas of dissent within the Party. These included differences about economic policy, language policy and disputes within the Party as to how it should respond to the Government's devolution proposals. Drawing extensively on these interviews, and the tracts produced by different factions within the Party, this Chapter concludes with an analysis of ideological rifts within Welsh Nationalism.

By the time of the Referendum campaign of 1979, it appeared as if the Party had succeeded in uniting its disparate groups. Yet, there were structural limitations to the growth of Welsh Nationalism, and the defeat of the devolution proposals dealt a serious blow to the hopes of the more optimistic activists. It is for this reason that Chapter Six is devoted to a detailed analysis of the Commission on the
Constitution, and the referendum campaign in Wales on the devolution issue. The Chapter makes use of interviews with activists, published material produced by the 'Yes' and 'No' campaigns, and extracts from the political coverage of this campaign by the Western Mail.

This introduction is confined to an account of my exploitation of original sources as well as some field work. Needless to say, it is but one element of my total fund of information which consists of also official reports and secondary sources, the details of which are contained in the bibliography.

The concluding Chapter attempts to do three things. It tries to explain why the subject of nationalism has been relatively neglected by sociologists. It also summarises some of the main conclusions of the study, and it discusses these with reference to more general theoretical considerations.
CHAPTER ONE

THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF WALES AND SCOTLAND

A striking feature of political debate in Britain over the recent past, a feature that transcends the traditional distinction between left and right, is the growing evidence of demands for greater participation in the management and government of large scale organisations. In recent years demands have been voiced by articulate and well-organised groups for greater participation in almost all kinds of large organisations; churches, universities, schools, factories, trades unions and even political parties. In areas such as housing, urban planning and consumer affairs there has been a widespread and generalised movement for greater control by 'ordinary' people over decisions that affect, or are perceived to affect, their interests and well-being. The powerful ideology of democracy is mobilised to support a wide range of different causes. What is of interest about such movements and campaigns, however disparate their particular demands might be, and however varied the arenas in which they operate, is the fact that they are manifestations of a generalised feeling that individuals are increasingly helpless in the face of 'monolithic' organisations and the seemingly 'impersonal' nature of large scale bureaucratic organisations.¹

The long run tendency towards the centralisation of economic and political activities, leads to demands by people for greater individual participation in matters that are thought to affect their lives. Demands for regional autonomy, or even secession from a centralised nation-state, partake of this character. In the past twenty years several European nation states have witnessed campaigns, with varying degrees of intensity, around the question of regional devolution or demands for separation of some minority group from the
nation state. In Britain, France, Spain and Belgium, regionalist political movements have become prominent in Wales, Scotland, Brittany, Corsica, the Basque country and in Alsace. A common element of these 'nationalisms' is the assertion and celebration of a regional ethnic and linguistic culture, which differs from the dominant culture of the nation-state. These movements have certain characteristics in common with the generalised demand for greater 'freedom' and 'participation' of people in the political structures that, it is claimed, loom ever larger in the lives of individuals.

In Britain in the past two decades, there have been movements in response to what became perceived as a threat to the economic well-being, and the minority cultures of Wales and Scotland. The nationalist parties in Wales and Scotland, although their programmes and policies have significant differences, were united in their condemnation of the 'over-centralised' British state. The activists and propagandists in these regionalist movements argued that the highly centralised British state, embracing as it does four different nationalities, was an obstacle to the 'freedom' and 'autonomy' of the people of these regions. The efflorescence of nationalist parties in Wales and Scotland in the late nineteen sixties succeeded in questioning the unitary nature of the state, and the political successes of the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru between 1966 and 1968 were instrumental in leading to the establishment, in 1969, of the Royal Commission on the constitution. The members of the Commission were charged with examining,

...the present functions of the central legislature and government in relation to the several countries, nations and regions of the United Kingdom; to consider, having regard to developments in local government organisation and in the administrative and other relationships between the various parts of the United Kingdom, and to the interests of the prosperity and good
government of our people under the Crown, whether any changes are desirable in those functions or otherwise in present constitutional and economic relationships; to consider also, whether any changes are desirable in the constitutional and economic relationships between the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.  

As far as the Commission was concerned, the political threat to the stability and unity of the United Kingdom that the sudden success of nationalist parties had placed on the agenda, was never mentioned. It was as if the establishment of the Commission bore no relationship to the fluctuating levels of support recorded at by-elections, and in opinion polls, by the nationalist parties. Between 1966 and 1968 the SNP and Plaid Cymru had recorded extraordinary victories in Parliamentary by-elections, and opinion polls in Wales and Scotland had shown such high levels of popular support for 'self-government' that political commentators were discussing, with some alacrity, the impending break-up of the United Kingdom. That this period of growth in support for regionalist and nationalist sentiment was not sustained is not the main concern of this thesis. What is of sociological interest is the fact that such 'peripheral' political parties could ever have achieved such prominence in the first place. The persistence of apparently deeply rooted sentiments of attachment to Wales and Scotland seems to belie the claim that "Britain is still a surprisingly homogeneous country".

Politically and socially, it has been claimed that the United Kingdom is a highly integrated country in which political cleavages, for example, have traditionally followed class lines. Unlike many of Britain's European neighbours there are no political parties that base their appeal on religion. Nor are there political groupings based on agricultural interests. A political scientist wrote:

We are used in Britain, to a model of political conflict based upon socio
economic divisions. Devolution may lead to a new emphasis upon territorial politics, so that the region in which an elector lives may come to prove just as important for the explanation of his voting behaviour as his class background.

This was written in 1978, a year before voters in Scotland and Wales went to the polls to record their verdict on the provisions of the Scotland and Wales Acts. The provisions of this legislation allowed the establishment of legislative assemblies in Cardiff and Scotland, and there seemed to emerge the possibility of future political conflict centring around the regional allocation of resources within the United Kingdom. Up until the sixties, regional or 'ethnic' identity had played a relatively minor part in the political identifications of British voters. With the sudden increase in support for nationalist parties in the period after 1966, it seemed that traditional political loyalties were being cast aside.

In turn, the devolution legislation, and its tortuous passage through the House of Commons, served to place the regional question at the forefront of political debate. Some even thought that the seventies would witness the breakup of Britain. Even though, by the 1983 General Election, support for the SNP and Plaid Cymru had fallen back considerably, the possibility exists that they will again become the vehicle for expressing dissatisfaction with central government policies. Despite the recent setbacks suffered by these nationalist parties, both still enjoy a level of electoral support, membership and internal organisation that is formidable, when contrasted with all other periods since their formation in the nineteen twenties. For most of their existence, the presence of Plaid Cymru and the SNP in the political arena has been a marginal factor in British political life. One of the aims of this thesis is to analyse how, and in what ways, the Welsh nationalist party came to such prominence between 1966
State activity in Britain has had, as its formal goal, the equalisation of opportunity for all members of the national community. In the twentieth century, the idea that the inhabitants of Wales or Scotland had fewer rights or opportunities to participate in the political system, would find little or no support. Indeed the whole concept of citizenship hinges around the notion that all citizens have certain obligations to the political community, in return for rights which allow equal access for all to participate in decision-making via local and national elections.\(^8\) The development of social policy, and of the welfare state itself, had been based on the assumption, usually implicit, that the goal of provision ought to be equality across the whole of the United Kingdom. Although, in practice, there are many regional differences, and some persistent inequalities between the different regions of the United Kingdom, the ideology of equal treatment of the different regions has underpinned many of the actions of central government. When, for example, evidence was recently provided of regional inequalities in health service provision, there was considerable public and political outcry, and attempts were made to establish criteria for resource allocation that would ensure more equitable distribution between the regions of Britain.\(^9\) Although outside direct consideration in this thesis, mention must be made of the complex attempts undertaken to reduce, or at least minimise, inequalities in employment and economic activity. Central Government, under both Labour and Conservative leadership, has experimented with regional employment premiums, settlement grants, relocation inducements and other measures in order to attract employment to regions where it is needed.\(^10\) Government functions themselves have been devolved to offices in Swansea, Cardiff, Newcastle and Glasgow. These, and many other measures, have attempted to iron out some of the
more persistent inequalities between the regions of Britain.

For our purposes the relative success of such policies is of little concern. What is important is that there has been up to the 1979 Conservative Government something approaching a consensus among post-war governments that it is one of their tasks to ensure, as far as possible, that market forces do not operate in such a way as to widen disparities between regions of the country. Evidence from the survey research carried out for the Royal Commission on the Constitution suggests that most respondents felt that the standards and quality of a range of government services, the social services, health service provision, schools etc., were much the same throughout the country, and most thought that the government understood the needs of their region to about the same extent as they did for other regions. 11

Nevertheless, such economic inequalities and differences as do exist, provide the nationalist parties with some of their most compelling and persuasive propaganda. Selectively interpreted data about regional inequalities, became an extremely powerful weapon in the armoury of nationalist parties when they accused central government of neglect. (see Chapter 5) Yet, a significant result of the attitudes survey undertaken by the Commission on the Constitution was that, 'the sentiments which exist in Scotland or Wales are not unique: they are held to almost the same extent in the country as a whole and there are some regions of England where regional feeling is almost as strong'. 12 The report of the survey went on to claim that: 'A major finding is that feelings of regional identification are fairly strong throughout the country. Although they are particularly strong in Wales and Scotland, they are almost as marked in the South West and Yorkshire'. 13

Although the Commission discovered evidence of strong regional
identification in some English regions, as well as in Scotland and Wales, there were some major differences.

The idea of regional self determination as a way of improving things in the area seems to be more to the forefront of the minds of those in Scotland and Wales than in any of the English regions; 20% in Scotland and 9% in Wales spontaneously mentioned this when asked what improvements they would like to see in their region (compared with only 1% in English regions). This greater awareness, however, in Scotland and Wales must in part be ascribed to the fact that such a concept has already been formulated and discussed in these two areas.

In this elliptic fashion the Commission comes close to acknowledging the existence of distinct nationalities, and a subjective awareness of such, within a politically unified nation-state. Despite claims that Britain is still a relatively homogeneous country, then, relatively free of disintegrationist or centrifugal pressures, there is little doubt that in Scotland and Wales there exist definite feelings of distinctiveness. The existence of a separate identity available to the Scots and the Welsh is beyond question. Again the Commission on the Constitution argued that

Those in Scotland and Wales were outstandingly likely to see their region as being particularly proud of its own culture and traditions...Similarly those in Scotland and Wales are a little above average in the extent to which they regard their region as 'feeling strongly that people here are different from the rest of the country.'

These subjective feelings of distinctiveness have persisted, even though both Scotland and Wales have been integrated into the United Kingdom for several centuries. Despite attempted assimilation, and association with England, the vast majority of the inhabitants of Scotland and Wales do not regard themselves as in any way English. The Commissioners appointed to review the arguments for and against
different devolutionary measures, pointed out that their very terms of reference accepted the basis of claims to separate identity in Scotland and Wales.

Our terms of reference refer to the several countries, nations and regions of the United Kingdom and thus appear to accept the claims to separate national identity made on behalf of the Scottish and Welsh peoples. The many discussions we have had with the Scots and the Welsh have given ample evidence of the existence of this sense of nationhood often strongly felt even by those who have no desire to seek much change in the existing arrangement for the government of Scotland and Wales and who are proud also of their British nationality.

One of the sociological problems that must be addressed is, therefore, to explain how the developmental trajectory of the British nation-state, has enabled the Scots and Welsh to retain a sense of ethnic distinctiveness within a highly centralised nation-state.

In the case of members and supporters of Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party, this feeling of distinctiveness has become transformed into an active desire to break away from the union with England. Both these political parties have as their aim, not just a greater degree of regional autonomy. A central tenet of their ideology is the assertion of the right of Scotland and Wales to enjoy full independent status as separate nation states. Their goal is self-government and secession from the United Kingdom. How, and under what circumstances, a generalised sense of regional loyalty or ethnic identity becomes transformed into a full blown assertion of separate nationality, forms one of the major concerns of this thesis. It is a problem that is examined with special reference to Wales. In order to untangle the competing claims of Scotland and Wales to national status, it is necessary to distinguish between such a sense of regional identification and nationalism proper. Several writers
stress that a loyalty to Wales or Scotland, and a recognition of special needs and policies need not imply support for the outright claim for separation. A former Chairman of the Welsh Council, speaking in 1969, made this point.

It is important to recognise the fact that the regional planning machinery appropriate to the English regions may not be the most suitable for Wales ... there has been an increasing political, social and cultural awareness in the regions, notably in Scotland and Wales, accompanied by the demand that the people of the regions should have a stronger voice in determining their own futures. And this is a view shared by all parties, not one exclusive to the Nationalists, or indeed one that has ever been their monopoly. 17

Referring specifically to the situation in Wales, A.B. Philip has made this important point;

Nationalism, defined as the belief in the supreme importance of the interests of the nation has many sources and buttresses in Wales. Nationalist attitudes find support from people in all walks of Welsh life in all parts of Wales ... It is such a nationalism that colours the approach and decisions of politicians and administrators because it is so general a feeling, and because those who feel themselves to be Welshmen often wish to see the individuality and the special needs of the nation recognised. 18

The point that Philip stresses is that one type of nationalism is not the prerogative of any one political party. As will be shown in this thesis, the particular form that nationalist ideology has taken in Scotland and Wales, is explicable only within a developmental framework that examines historically the interrelationships between significant groups in England and its neighbouring nationalities. Indeed the important differences between the policies and programmes of the Scottish and Welsh nationalist parties are in turn explained with reference to the historical circumstances that obtained when each
The resurgence of support for nationalist political parties in the period between 1966 and 1976, and the evidence of the persistence of Welsh and Scottish identifications, despite the unification of the United Kingdom for over two hundred and fifty years, strikes Birch as, 'a paradox'. "In a world which is more interdependent than ever before", he argued, "with instant communication, an explosion of international travel, and a multitude of international agencies, we seem to be experiencing a resurgence of local loyalties".\textsuperscript{19} It is this apparent paradox that we attempt to explain in the forthcoming chapters, for, as Murphy has argued, paradoxes are in the eye of the beholder.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, it is sociologically possible for centralising and decentralising tendencies to co-exist within the same structure. It is a mistake to think of centrifugal and centripetal processes as necessarily incompatible. It is more accurate in a sociological sense, to speak of a balance between them, recognising that localism and centralism reside within the same structure and although, analytically speaking, they involve mutually exclusive characteristics, they are dialectical processes in which the 'final triumph' of one or the other cannot be taken for granted.

Finally, it is important to add that, although the fortunes of the Welsh and Scottish nationalist parties have declined in recent years, we must be aware that the emergent properties of social relationships may transform the situation yet again, and that there may be further attempts to assert the power of regional or national loyalties within the centralised British state. As Drucker and Brown comment: "The development of political parties and loyalties around the differing British nationalities has always been possible".\textsuperscript{21} This possibility exists only because of the persistence of an awareness of Scottish and Welsh identity within the framework of the United Nation was bound in union with England.
Kingdom. These sentiments have survived despite union with England and it is the specific circumstances of the Treaties of Union between Scotland and Wales with England that we now turn.

The Unions between England and Scotland, and England and Wales

Scotland and Wales were both incorporated into the United Kingdom as part of the historical process of nation-building. Although there are some interesting similarities between the two cases, the differences between the experiences and the stages of development of the two societies at the point of union are striking. Whereas Wales enjoyed only fleeting moments as a unified nation (see chapter 2), had no major institutions that survived beyond the seventeenth century, and an Act of Union that was clearly assimilationist in intent, the union of Scotland with England was of a very different character.

England and Scotland were first formally united by the merger of the crowns under James I of England (James VI of Scotland) in 1603. Just over a century later, in 1707, the Scottish Parliament met for the last time to conduct a few routine transactions, and, despite a few protests by Scottish lords, the Treaty of Union was accepted. The independence of Scotland was first compromised by the dynastic struggle that led to the unification of the crowns. Under one monarch the two parliaments retained their separate identities, yet there were several occasions in the hundred years between the joining of the crowns and the treaty of union when the Scots strove for closer union. The convention of the estates, churchmen and merchants demanded a stronger political link with England, although there were also seventeenth century protests against the English whenever attempts were made to impose an English-type liturgy, or when there was any threat to the independence of Scottish institutions. A Scottish
The ambivalent character of Scottish feelings towards England were thus evident at a very early date in the modern period. It is worth noticing, nevertheless, that no explicitly nationalist movement ever appeared in the 17th century, and no unionist one either: the struggles were about religion, dynastic power and trade, and people's attitudes towards England were taken up in relation to these questions, not in relation to the concept of the nation as such.\(^\text{22}\)

The situation in which a single monarch confronted one or more parliaments was not unusual in early modern Europe. H.C. Koenigsberger makes the following point:

Most states in the early period were composite states, including more than one country under the sovereignty of one ruler. These composite or monarchies could consist of completely separate countries, divided by sea or by other states, such as the dominions of the Habsburg monarchy in Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, those of the Hohenzollern monarchy of Brandenburg-Prussia or, indeed, England or Ireland; or they might be contiguous, such as England and Wales, Piedmont and Savoy, or Poland and Lithuania. With the one exception of England and Wales, they would always have kept their separate representative assemblies, as England and Scotland did in the seventeenth century. This was so even where, as in France and the Netherlands, formerly independent countries had been reduced to contiguous provinces. A ruler, therefore, did not normally confront just one parliament only but several and each one of them on quite different terms. These terms depended on the political development of the state or province at the time he acquired it.\(^\text{23}\)

As far as England and Scotland were concerned, the two kingdoms were to be merged and a common parliament established in London. The union of the crowns in 1603 had been the result of dynastic struggles but by the eighteenth century, the gradual pacification and absorption of
Scotland into Great Britain had begun. The judgement of a Scottish historian, J.D. Mackie, was that 'either the monarchies must be separate or the Parliaments must unite'. It would be a mistake to assume that the loss of the Scottish Parliament was of great significance. It had existed for less than twenty years, and the fact that the Treaty of Union specifically protected other Scottish institutions is of much greater importance in explaining twentieth century manifestations of Scottish nationalist aspirations. "In 1707 ... a free Scottish Parliament was not a time hallowed institution but a novelty ... of only seventeen years standing".

What ensured the survival of a sense of Scottish identity was not the maintenance of a separate Parliament, but the fact that the Union was not the absorption of a conquered nation by another. The price that the English paid for the Union of the Crowns and the Parliaments, was an assurance that a number of highly significant Scottish institutions would remain intact. The Scottish legal system was preserved, and this ensured that Edinburgh could remain a centre of the judiciary and the legal profession. The consequences were that,

even during the years when Scotland seemed as 'North Britain' to be assimilated to English norms, Parliament, both in administering and legislating for Scotland, was compelled to take account of the existence of a wholly distinctive system of law. In this way the seeds of devolution were sown by the Scots who negotiated the Treaty.

The Treaty laid down that the Scottish Courts of Great Session, and eleven other Scottish Courts, were to remain untouched by the Union. It was, for example, forbidden for a Scottish lawsuit to be tried before English judges, and English judges were expressly prevented from interfering with, or altering, the acts or sentences of Scottish judges. It has been said that, "The protection of this system of
courts was undoubtedly essential to the approval of the Union agreement in the parliament of Scotland". 28 In fact, the Treaty of Union stated that "the laws which concern public right, policy and civil government throughout the whole United Kingdom" were to prevail. It also stipulated that "no alteration be made in laws which concern private right except for the evident utility of the subjects within Scotland". 29

Another important concession made by the English who negotiated the Treaty, was the recognition of a separate religious tradition in Scotland and the protection of the institutions which embodied it. The Presbytarian Church of Scotland remained the established Church, and, unlike in Ireland or Wales, no attempt was made to impose Anglicanism on the Scottish people. It was a condition of Union that Scottish Protestantism should be maintained with its own Assembly. As a result, over the centuries since it "has served as a forum for the expression of Scottish opinion not only on theological matters, but also on a variety of social and political issues". 30

As well as retaining these highly significant institutions, the Scottish educational system developed along separate lines. Schools were not clearly separated from religious control, and the curriculum reflected the influence of the independent ancient Scottish Universities. The protection of these separate institutions went along with the devolution of many government functions after 1900 to the Scottish Office in Edinburgh, and this meant that the administration of the country was carried out by Scotsmen. This is in striking contrast to Ireland and Wales where administrative control was, until very recent times, largely in the hands of the English.

The maintenance of these distinctive Scottish institutions fostered the growth of Edinburgh as the obvious 'capital city' of Scotland. It had been recognised as such since the eleventh century,
but the centralisation of legal, educational and religious institutions ensured its continuing importance. Subsequently, a number of Scottish-based newspapers and periodicals emerged which, understandably, tended to focus on Scottish affairs. Alongside these institutional 'props' to nationhood, Scotland has been well endowed with various symbolic manifestations of national status. A capital city, a flag, national dress, music, sport, games and literature, all testify to the existence of a distinctive 'national' tradition or way of life. Although Trevor Roper has recently revealed the extent to which many Scottish traditions and customs were 'invented' by romantic Victorians, they have still been remarkably successful in perpetrating and protecting a particular idealised image of the Scots nation and the Scottish people.

A recent study of national symbolism describes the emergence of 'traditional' highland dress as an excellent example of the 'invention of tradition'. It seems that, 'the kilt, bagpipes, tartan and all were conscious inventions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries'. A reviewer of the book went on to show how,

We owe the kilt itself to a Lancashire Quaker industrialist called Thomas Rawlinson, the different patterns of the clan tartans to the opportunism of the textile firm of William Wilson & Sons of Bannockburn. It was Wilson's who equipped many laggard Highland chiefs, panicked by the impending state visit of George IV in 1822, with the next pattern 'off the peg' which tartans their clans proudly wear to this day.

Despite such contemporary exposes, the symbolic and emotional appeal of such national symbols remains potent. Allied with the residual pride in the 'independence' of many Scottish institutions, Scottish nationalism can draw on relatively forceful declarations of loyalty to Scotland's 'separate' history and traditions. As Birch comments, 'in view of all these factors, it is easy to understand why the Scots have
a clear (and constitutionally correct) sense of national identity'.

This firm sense of national identity, buttressed by a native institutional framework and attractive cultural symbols, ensured firm foundations upon which an aspiring nationalist movement might be built.

We can conclude, therefore, that the task facing Scottish nationalists was not to awaken or rebuild a dormant patriotism. Scottish institutions and symbols, and pride in these, had been maintained and developed. This sense of national identity in Scotland had been preserved, albeit unintentionally, as a consequence of the terms and conditions of the Act of Union of 1707. The particular balance of power that existed between Scotland and the English state in 1707 ensured that,

the Scottish Union was negotiated on a firm footing of equality. It had the character of a freely negotiated contract between two consenting parties, and it allowed the Scots to continue to regard themselves as an unconquered people freely participating in the affairs of the new state.

The economic interests of the Scottish middle class, too were left intact, safe from any encroachment by the English; Scottish merchants and tradesmen were left in possession of ancient rights, Scottish economic interests in tobacco, linen, meat exports and yarn were protected, and they benefited from the expansion of markets in the south. The Glasgow tobacco trade was only possible because Scotland was part of the same empire as Virginia. The connection with England was sought because of the economic benefits to Scottish traders, and the judgement of an economic historian was, 'There has never been a period when there is so little doubt that [the Union] worked strongly to the material advantage of Scotland'.

The sense of a 'balanced' or equal relationship between the two
nations was enhanced by the knowledge that neither could afford to inflict permanent military defeat on the other. If the advantages to the Scots lay in more intensive trading relations with England and the colonies, for England the union was politically desirable. The Scots had threatened to challenge the accession of Queen Anne, and England feared the resurrection of the 'auld alliance' between Scotland and France. The growing international power of the French was a source of concern because a renewed link between Scotland and France would have posed an intolerable threat to the English state. The union was acceptable to the Scots for a number of reasons and the 'arguments against going it alone were very strong, and the Ministry at Westminster did not hesitate to use the gum of patronage and bribery to secure its friends to the side of what contemporaries called an "incorporating union". So, unlike Ireland or Wales, the Scots entered the Union with few feelings of humiliation or the stigma of defeat. Scotland had its own major urban centres, and a self-conscious and prosperous capitalist class. Moreover, Scotland had 'developed at approximately the same rate and with the same cadences as the larger society [with which] it was linked, industrial England'.

Although there was some opposition within Scotland at the time of the Treaty negotiations, this was overcome by two of the most compelling arguments advanced in favour of the union with England. It was the only way to guarantee peace with Scotland's powerful southern neighbour, and it was essential if Scottish commercial interests were to gain access to wealthy markets south of the border. In return for accepting a measure of political union and the merging of the parliaments, the Scots would receive, 'full freedom and intercourse of trade and navigation'.

In conclusion, it seems clear that the specific stage of
development of Scottish society, relative to England at the time of unification, ensured that the terms and conditions of the treaty would reflect a more balanced interdependence. The survival of distinct Scottish institutions, which this permitted, was crucial in maintaining a sense of separate development, and the survival of different traditions, upon which patriotic sentiment could build, and later nationalists draw on for inspiration. As Mitchison comments, "Separate institutions have clearly been constant reminders of an independent past as well as foci of current sentiments". 40

If the most telling feature of the Act of Union between England and Scotland was the extent to which Scottish interests were acknowledged, and the institutions which expressed them were recognised and retained, then the absence of such guarantees in the case of the Acts of Union between England and Wales, are revealing. As will be shown in greater detail in Chapter 2, the stage of development of Welsh society at the time of the Acts of Union of 1536 and 1542 was very different. Whereas Scotland was an established nation-state with a recognised central authority and a series of 'national' institutions, Wales had none of these. With the exception of a brief, but unsuccessful, attempt in the fifteenth century, Wales had never been united under a central authority. Unlike in Scotland, there was no significant merchant or trading class who could form the nucleus of an urban bourgeoisie, the traditional 'carriers' of nationalist ideology. Whereas nationalism in Scotland was assisted and supported by the existence of specific political and government institutions of a separate nature, in Wales the Acts of Union of 1536 and 1542 specifically abolished all distinctive political, judicial and administrative bodies. These Acts were deliberately integrationist in intent, and their aim was the total abolition of any meaningful distinction between England and Wales.
The Tudor monarchy was determined to establish its national border and establish a unified administrative system throughout its territory. Consequently, different practices or customs, enshrined in legal codes were abolished.\textsuperscript{41} The assimilationist intent of the Acts of Union between England and Wales, is exemplified in the stated policy towards the Welsh language. Although the vast majority of the Welsh people were monoglot Welsh speakers, the Acts deliberately condemned the foreign tongue and declared that English was, henceforward, to be the only legitimate language of law, government and administration. Although the Welsh language survived into the twentieth century, and is still spoken by twenty per cent of the population of Wales, this is despite all declarations of intent in the Acts of Union. (See Chapter 3.) The only Welsh institution to survive the Union, The Council of Wales, was abolished some one hundred and fifty years after the unification with England.

It seems reasonable to agree with Morgan when he states that, a nation, "maintains itself by a framework of institutions, to foster and develop its interests".\textsuperscript{42} In the absence of Welsh institutions that can be traced back beyond the nineteenth century, it is clear that the historical basis of nationalism in Wales will differ markedly from that in Scotland. Hobsbawn chooses to use the Marxian distinction between 'historic' and 'non-historic' nations with reference to Scotland and Wales. As he expresses it: "in most respects Wales and Scotland are very different countries. Scotland is, to use a nineteenth century terminology, 'a historic nation'".\textsuperscript{43} Because Welsh nationalists cannot trace the survival of a distinctive set of national institutions, nor point to a period when the nation enjoyed stability under a centralised authority, the propaganda of Plaid Cymru must inevitably focus on alternative themes. The protection and celebration of the Welsh language becomes prominent in
Welsh nationalist ideology precisely because it is this alone that can be demonstrated as 'surviving' all attempts by the English to eradicate it. It was not until the rise of an educated and urbanised Welsh middle class in the nineteenth century that there is evidence of a concerted attempt to construct specifically Welsh institutions.

In the nineteenth century, with the evolution of an urban middle class in Wales, there is evidence that the political doctrine of nationalism, espoused by men like Fichte and Mazzini, found an echo in educated circles. Some of these men came to see it as part of their duty to celebrate the distinctiveness of their nationality, and to give this national sentiment some concrete manifestation. Whilst Trevor-Roper has shown how the bagpipes, tartan and kilt were products of the romantic imagination of the Victorian middle class, newly enthused with ideals of national salvation, Prys Morgan has claimed that contemporary stereotypes of Welsh traditional culture also have their roots in the same intellectual soil. He claims that,

Welsh national dress, the Welsh harp, the cult of the Druids, the establishment of the Eisteddfod, the revival of a despised and half forgotten language, the whole concept of Wales as the 'land of song', were the conscious creation of a band of dedicated patriots determined to preserve the identity of Wales as a separate nation. Their success has been outstanding.

In the eighteenth century, it is possible to talk of Wales as lacking in any institutions that could reasonably be described as national, in the sense of fostering or supporting some notion of national integration. The period from the beginning of the nineteenth century saw a marked change. Firstly, and of major significance, the industrial development of areas of north east and south east Wales drew Welsh society more firmly into complex bonds of interdependence with English commercial centres. The relative isolation of Welsh
society was dramatically overturned by the expansion of those towns connected with coal and iron smelting. Movements of capital and labour brought about the rapid growth of towns like Newport and Merthyr, and, for the first time, there was a relatively small, indigenous middle class growing in confidence and wealth. It was this period, from the middle of the nineteenth century onward, that witnessed a growing interest in 'Welshness' by the intellectual and commercial leaders of Wales.

Four institutions have been identified as products of this flowering of interest in national culture, and all reflect, to some extent, the growing awareness of a civic and a national identity.

The Eisteddfod, Museum, Library and University were all part of a growth of self awareness, of growing urbanity and civilisation, of a growing desire to preserve and publicise the traditions of the nation, and of course, they were an indication that because of the Industrial Revolution the nation was able to afford new luxuries.

The campaign to establish the University College of Wales, eventually successful in 1867, is of some interest precisely because it succeeded in mobilising popular opinion across different strata. This campaign aroused widespread support because the majority of the Welsh were zealous converts to the various Nonconformist sects. The Presbyterians and the Methodists, and many others, found their most dedicated followers in the villages and towns of industrial and rural Wales. At this time the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge still excluded Nonconformists. Consequently - the campaign for the establishment of the University of Wales aroused passions far beyond the narrowly secular, and united people on grounds of both nationalistic and religious sentiments. The leading politicians of Radical or Liberal Wales were amongst the sponsors of these educational and cultural institutions, although it would be more
accurate to regard this as part of the fermentation of a patriotism that, up to that point, had not found political expression in demands for separate national status.

What makes the study of Welsh nationalism of interest is the fact that, not only was Wales the first colony of England, and the longest under English control, but also that it never was a nation-state. Max Weber has isolated the crucial sociological features of the modern nation state. He identified monopolies of the legitimate use of force and the power to raise taxes as particularly significant;

A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that 'territory' is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, ... the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence.

In the case of Wales, there was a legislature in the tenth century for only the briefest of periods; the country was unified under Glyndwr in the fourteenth century for only a matter of months, and it has never developed a centralised authority that enjoyed monopolies of violence. As Weber says, 'The monopolistic nature of the state's domination through force is as essential a feature of its present character as its nature as a rational 'institution' and a continuing enterprise'. It would seem, then, that none of the characteristics existed for the renaissance of a legitimate nationalist movement. After five hundred years of unification and acculturation, it seems all the more notable that a sense of national distinctiveness survived at all. Given the absence of the kind of institutions that Scotland continued to evolve, a sense of Welsh nationality had to be constructed around the handful of symbolic and cultural institutions.
spawned by nineteenth century romantic nationalism. Tom Nairn, in a typically lyrical passage, makes clear the foundation of a sense of Scottish distinctiveness.

...the survival of Scotland's 'identity' has never been primarily a question of literature or of a cultivated self-consciousness. The culture it rests upon is a deeper, more articulated social structure, and one not necessarily visible on superficial acquaintance. It is like a set of rock formations, which may be almost underwater reefs from many points of view.

The foundations of Welsh nationalism had to be constructed on less 'solid' ground. Objectively, this was an extraordinarily flimsy basis on which a twentieth century nationalist movement could build. Whereas Scotland was unified by the eleventh century and a nation in its own right long before the Treaty of Union, with a Parliament in Edinburgh, Wales had no such background. Whereas Edinburgh has been the unquestioned capital city for centuries, and the recognised location of centralised authority in the form of the legal system, an ancient University and the home of a well established professional class, Wales did not even have a recognised capital city until 1956. Up till that time the commercial centres for Welsh agricultural and industrial trade had been English border towns, such as Ludlow, Hereford and Chester. A major contention of the following analysis of Welsh nationalist ideology is that Welsh nationalist beliefs are shaped by the history of this unequal relationship between England and Wales.

Hanham is correct to suggest that, 'In Europe, the normal basis for nationalism is ... in a sense always backward-looking, always adverting to past glories, always apparently more conscious of the past than the present'. The cultivation of the past by a self-conscious group takes on some of the features of a mission in
which the lost culture of the people must be retrieved, popularised and is given new life in order to infuse a sense of national pride. The cultural values of the nation are unique, irreplaceable and they are elevated into an almost sacred role in the eyes of nationalist intellectuals. Referring to nationalist ideals, Weber wrote;

The earliest and most energetic manifestations of the idea, in some form, even though it may have been veiled have contained the legend of a providential 'mission'. Those to whom the representatives of the idea zealously turned were expected to shoulder this mission. Another element of the early idea was the notion that this mission was facilitated solely through the very cultivation of the peculiarity of the group set off as a nation ... The significance of the 'nation' is usually anchored in the superiority, or at least the irreplaceability, of the culture values that are to be preserved and developed only through the cultivation of the peculiarity of the group. It therefore goes without saying that the intellectuals ... are to a specific degree predestined to propagate the 'national idea', just as those who wield power in the polity provoke the idea of the state.

This interest in the 'glorious past' of the nation usually involves a literary or pseudo-historical search for the roots of nationhood, even if it means tracing these roots back to antiquity. The rather feeble nature of the institutional framework on which Welsh nationalism could construct its account of the past and its programme for the future, shapes its ideology, gives it its sense of mission and colours the rhetoric of its activists. (Chapter 5).

In conclusion, then, there exists in Scotland and Wales an awareness of national distinctiveness that stands above mere regional identification. Without hesitation, the majority of Scots and Welsh are prepared to embrace this alternative identity. A Strathclyde University survey of perceptions of national identity in Wales and
Scotland carried out in the late sixties found that 69 per cent of the Welsh sample considered themselves Welsh, although the investigators found that the higher up the social scale one went, the less likely people were to consider themselves Welsh rather than British.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Identity</th>
<th>Wales</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welsh</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others/dont know</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: R. Rose; University of Strathclyde. 55

In the case of Scotland, it is relatively easy to understand how this sense of national identification has survived the Union with a larger and more powerful neighbouring state. In the case of Wales the historical circumstances surrounding Union were so utterly different that comparisons have only limited usefulness. Although a majority of Welsh people seem ready to identify themselves as Welsh in opinion polls, this owes very little to its separate treatment by the British state. Indeed it is only in the past seventy years that the practice of even referring to Wales in Parliamentary legislation has been adopted. Up to then, England was understood to include Wales, and a notorious entry in the Encyclopaedia Brittanica once read, 'For Wales - see England'. 56 As far as the state was concerned, the distinction between England and Wales was meaningless and,

...in 1746 it was explicitly stated that in all cases where the kingdom of England, or that part of Great Britain called England, hath been or shall be
mentioned in any Act of Parliament, the same has been and shall from henceforth be deemed and taken to comprehend and include the Dominion of Wales.

The complete absorption of Wales was confirmed in a statement by Gladstone that, 'The distinction between England and Wales ... is totally unknown to our constitution'.

To sum up: whilst Scotland retained officially recognised institutions through which its nationalism could be expressed, which could become the foci for a sense of patriotism, and form the key to a series of claims for legitimate statehood by nationalists in Scotland, the situation in Wales was quite different. Lacking such foci, a sense of Welsh distinctiveness had at best to be built around factors such as language, religion and culture. This meant that the task of constructing and articulating nineteenth and twentieth century nationalist ideology in Wales, fell onto the shoulders of writers, poets and preachers. It is this that gives Welsh nationalism its particular features, and, whilst one of the strengths of Scottish nationalism,

is the history of Scottish statehood and the pride the Scots take in their distinctive institutions. On the other hand, Welsh nationalism derives some of its passion from a feeling of dispossession - not, indeed, of political institutions but of the Welsh language and culture, long in decline and recently threatened with virtual extinction.

It transpires that the standard bearers of Welsh nationalism in the twentieth century are not conventional soldiers or statesmen, but 'cultural' heroes. It was these men and women who constructed, 'the cultural form, the tracery of a nation where no state had existed'.

The judgement of a present day Welsh historian is that, 'The Welsh nation seemed to exist for negative reasons because no one had fully succeeded in wiping it out'. The reason why Wales did not evolve
into a successful nation-state, yet did not become completely assimilated into England, can only be discovered if we attempt an historical and developmental analysis of the relationship between the two societies. It is to that task that the discussion in Chapter Two is devoted.
REFERENCES AND NOTES


2. See Patricia Elton Mayo (1974) for a discussion from a sympathetic perspective of the 'lost' nations of Europe also William Greenberg (1969).


5. Western Mail November 22, 1967. 'Six out of 10 voters in Wales want to see the nation have its own parliament'. This front lead story reported an opinion poll carried out by Opinion Research Centre which gave Plaid Cymru 37% and said "The figures suggest that a landslide of major proportions in political loyalties is on the move following the sensational Nationalist Victory at Hamilton".

11. Royal Commission on the Constitution (1973) p xiv. This survey was conducted in 1970 and sampled 5,000 voters in all regions of the United Kingdom.
12. Ibid. p xiv.
13. Ibid. p xiv.
15. Ibid. p 46.
17. Professor Brinley Thomas, Chairman of the Welsh Council, quoted in R. Harloe (ed) (1980).
27. Ibid. p 79.
32. The Observer 17/4/83.
34. V. Bogdanor (1979) p 80.
36. Ibid. p 9.
39. Ibid. p 152.
41. Hans Kohn (1940) p 69-94.
Prys Morgan (1973) p 57.
For a general discussion of romantic social thought with special reference to nineteenth century nationalist ideology see Howard Becker and Harry Barnes (eds) (1961).
The Observer 17/4/83.
See for example Glamor Williams (1979).
Prys Morgan (1973) p 59.
L. Synder (1964).
Prys Morgan (1973) p 57.
CHAPTER TWO

WELSH SOCIETY IN DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

A recent writer on Welsh political life claimed that nationalism had been a recurring theme in the history of Wales. He states rather boldly that, 'For more than a thousand years the Welsh have sought to preserve and defend their land and language, their culture and their religion'. Such a sweeping assertion raises several problems, most notably the questionable claim that a sense of national consciousness can be adduced from a study of Welsh history. It is acknowledged that the transformation of societies into 'nation-states' is bound up with processes of industrialisation and urbanisation. In what way, then, is it useful or accurate to suggest that 'national consciousness' existed in some primordial state. This approach suggests that the task of the contemporary social analyst is merely to tease out the manifestations of this consciousness. According to Kedourie, however the very idea of nationality is relatively recent, dating from the eighteenth century at the earliest, and forged into a popular political and secular creed with the rise of nation-states in the nineteenth century. To talk of a national consciousness that dates back a thousand years, when Welsh society was essentially tribal, seems more like colourful rhetoric than an attempt to understand sociologically the development of Welsh society.

Nevertheless, we can be certain of one thing. The very fact that today we speak of Welsh society, even though there is, nor never has been a Welsh nation state, points to definite processes of continuation. As Goudsblom has pointed out with reference to Holland, 'The boundaries of society do not shift dramatically from day to day, and in the sense of a collective identity shared by its members is
anchored in past experience - real and imagined'. Yet when viewed in longer term perspective, 'both the boundaries and the sense of identity emerge as having undergone many changes'. Taking Goudsblom's argument and applying it to Welsh society, it may be the case that those elements of 'national culture' that are viewed as unchanging, such as language, religion and territory, will emerge as having undergone fundamental transformations.

One of the aims of this chapter is to attempt to separate the 'imagined' past-experience that, when articulated, forms the basis of a sense of collective identity, from those 'real' aspects of the development of societies. The attempt to disentangle the 'real' from the 'imagined' is crucial if we are to 'rescue' from the historical accounts of nationalists some more adequate account of the course of Welsh society. In the construction and dissemination of national ideologies, the conflation of history and mythology is so pervasive that one of the general aims of this thesis is to draw out these strands and attempt to demonstrate their distinctiveness.

A second aim of this chapter is to place the understanding of contemporary Welsh society in developmental perspective, and, to this end, I will attempt to delineate the major stages in the history of Welsh society. More particularly, I want to distinguish three structurally significant stages in these developments; the period up to the mid-thirteenth century and the imposition by the Normans of a partly feudal system; from the mid-thirteenth century to the sixteenth century when the first attempts were made to incorporate Wales into the expanding English state; and the period from the beginning of the nineteenth century which saw south east Wales become a cradle of the Industrial revolution in the British Isles.
Early Social Organisation: Warring Princedoms and Social Fragmentation

Before the Norman Conquest in 1282, Welsh society had, as now, no state nor even a clearly distinct people, language or boundaries. The area was made up of, 'pagan, warring Celtic speaking tribes'. The difficult and inhospitable terrain made the land economically unattractive to the Romans as well as difficult to defend. Principal centres of Roman control were Deva (Chester), Segontium (Caernarfon), Isca (Caerleon) and Moridinum (Carmarthen). These were connected by an extensive road system and protected by a chain of smaller forts and armed settlements. Gold was the only major incentive for the Roman Conquest of Wales, and, using convict labour, some of what were at the time the most technologically advanced mining methods were developed there.

Even as late as the 6th and 7th centuries it was unlikely that any distinctive Welsh cultural identity had formed, largely because there was never achieved a single political identity. As Davies comments, 'For much of the early middle ages Wales was essentially a land of four kingdoms, each with its lowland focus in one of the four corners of the country'. Politically the land was split between a number of competing princedoms. Gwynedd in the north west, Deheubarth in the west, Powys to the east and Morgannwg in the south. Continuous conflict between the warring princes who ruled them and their neighbouring Saxon tribes led to the construction, in the eighth century, of an earth dyke several hundred miles long to keep apart the battling groups. This earth border, known as Offa's Dyke, is still visible in parts and even today forms the border between England and Wales in some places.

The early history of the British Isles is a succession of invasions by a number of migrating groups, 'Celts, Angles, Saxons,
Picts, Frisians, Danes, and Normans all came to these islands in search of land for settlement. All these groups gradually became submerged but, out of the multiplicity of heterogeneous groups that survived, one in particular became identified as the 'welsh'. They were distinguished as a collectivity by the Saxons, for the term 'welsh' is Anglo-Saxon for foreigner. Various explanations for the survival of the Welsh, as opposed to the Picts, Frisians and others, have ranged from variants of racial purity to ecological, geographic and political factors, although these are ultimately unconvincing. It is likely, though, that a combination of geographic and economic factors made possible divergent processes of social development, which helps to explain the survival into the industrial age of groups that would otherwise be as unremembered as the Picts.

Marc Bloch has graphically described the physical obstacles to travel and communication in feudal and pre-feudal Europe, and others have stressed the constraints that terrain imposes upon possible forms of social organisation at this level of development. Fernand Braudel states, 'Geography helps us rediscover the slow unfolding of structural realities, to see things in the perspective of the very long term'. This observation is particularly appropriate when we consider the nature of the physical obstacles to assimilation and the relative isolation of the westernmost area of the British Isles even in the present day. As Hechter comments, 'Throughout most of human history nature has clearly held the upper hand: man has survived in favourable ecological niches'. Physical inaccessibility and a relatively difficult terrain played an important part in isolating the development of Celtic tribes from wider processes of acculturation in the British Isles. Also, the fact that over three quarters of the land area of Wales was highland militated against conquest and absorption. In general it was the high ground throughout Europe that
was the last to come under the sway of centralised authority, even though trade and commerce between the highlands and lowlands was possible and likely. It is important to add that in no sense is this an argument for some form of geographical determinism, for, we must bear in mind always that the degree of control possible or available to groups over the forces of nature will be affected by the level of social development.

The early Celts were migratory and preferred the more fertile grazing lowlands to the south and east of the British Isles, but, 'the problem for the Celt was that all subsequent invaders of Britain shared this preference for land'. Consequently, 'a great portion of the history of Britain has been a struggle for the control of the fertile lowlands by a series of competing groups'. Because the Roman invaders had little to gain economically from subduing Wales and Scotland, they were content to erect defensive boundaries in an attempt to keep out damaging incursions from local tribesmen. These borders effectively ensured a continuation of divergent patterns of social organisation and the eventual bifurcation of development.

In Wales, pastoral farming and hill livestock farming, with large areas of wasteland and small open fields, meant that hamlets remained small and there was little evidence of manorial control. The ancient system of gavelkind, the Celtic system of partible inheritance, under which land was divided between all sons and occasionally even daughters, kept landholdings small and relatively fragmented. Communities derived their cohesion from interpersonal loyalties to kin, and, according to Davies, there is little evidence in the period before the Norman Conquest, 'of associations other than the family and the warband'.

It is not until the twelfth century that we begin to hear of any urban or work associations ... these are the groupings which might broadly be termed national
and local, and which may have some relationships to the developing political structure of Wales. At the widest level there is a clear consciousness of the community of Christians, 'the baptized', to which the early Welsh belonged. They identified themselves in this way particularly in the face of attack from the pagan English. From the eighth century there is good evidence of their consciousness of themselves as Britons, the original inhabitants of the island of Britain, a consciousness that was repeatedly expressed in the ninth and tenth centuries.

The Danish king, Canute ruled England from 1023 up to 1035 and after his death, nearly all the Anglo-Saxon lands became united for the first time under King Edward the Confessor, but this success was short-lived. Disagreement about the succession enabled William of Normandy to conquer England up to the Northumbrian and Welsh borderlands. The consolidation of the Anglo-French monarchy after the conquest of 1066 acted as a spur to the emergent sense of Welsh distinctiveness.

At first, Norman incursions took the form of piecemeal takeovers of the weaker Welsh kingdoms, but the north and west of the country proved more intractable. The powerful houses of Gwynedd and Deheubarth were able to resist conquest initially and even succeeded in driving Norman adventurers from these territories. Nevertheless Norman influence was assured by their control of the border lands, from Chester in the north to Hereford in the South. These 'Marcher lordships' covered eastern and southern Wales, and by 1100 half the population lived in territory under Norman control. The eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries witnessed the gradual military conquest of the weaker Welsh princes as the Normans built a chain of massive fortresses and walled towns. Just at the time when some awareness of identity, along with the emergence of 'national' leadership in Wales was a possibility, a more powerful neighbour
consolidated its hold over extensive territory and introduced distinctive practices and customs derived from French feudalism, large scale agriculture and the money economy of western Europe. Whereas the Welsh agricultural system was based on the principle of partible inheritance, and the nature of the terrain militated against large landholdings, in England, by contrast, there emerged large manorial settlements, primogeniture, the three field system of co-operative husbandry and the centrality of the manorial system for social control. These structural differences had significant consequences for egalitarian tendencies, but, to sum up, there were, by the end of the thirteenth century, important differences between England and Wales in the nature and extent of social stratification, the agricultural economy and the farming system.  

Nevertheless, early Welsh society was highly stratified with the clear recognition of some groups as noble. Though there might have been some economic basis to it, it seems that 'noble' status was more often determined by birth, family and occupation than wealth alone. As Davies suggests; 'The Welsh valued distinguished birth and noble descent more than anything else in the world. They would rather marry into a noble family than a rich one ... there is absolutely no doubt of the existence of slavery in Wales in the early medieval period'.  

This stands in striking contrast to the romantic and mythological accounts proffered by nationalist historians. They prefer to emphasize the 'egalitarian' and 'democratic' nature of medieval Wales. Those political ideals that tend to be highly valued in the twentieth century are projected into the past to produce an idealised picture of the nation's history. This is a fairly typical example.

The essence of a nation's life are the values embodied in her national tradition... We have in Wales an incomparable spiritual legacy to defend
and transmit to future generations... ours is a Christian tradition ... From this springs the value attached throughout our history to the human person, man or woman, rich or poor ... The concern for social justice and for freedom which run like silver threads through the centuries may come from the same source; certainly they were fortified by Christianity.

Although Wales shared many of the characteristics of early medieval Europe, it did not develop along parallel lines. By the eleventh century there was no noticeable trend towards feudalization, towards the consolidation of monarchy, nor a centralising or sophisticated administrative centre. In the tenth century, one Welsh lord did succeed in subduing the others and was able to assert control over virtually the whole of the country. Hywel the Good codified the ancient laws and customs, including the practice of gavelkind, and established a court which brought together military and clergy. According to one account,

The manuscript of these laws ... record that Hywel called to Hendy Gwyn-ar-Daf (Whitland) six men from every commote in his kingdom. Although the Church was accustomed to summoning synods, this one would have been on a larger scale than anything ever seen before. It included political and ecclesiastical leaders, nobles and bishops, priests and magistrates, lawyers and abbots. Its main purpose was to consider the laws of the land; and calling these men together was the greatest national event that Wales had ever witnessed.

The continued practice of gavelkind, prohibited the further development of centralised military authority. Because no son enjoyed exclusive rights of inheritance there was a tendency for estates to be subdivided. This often led to bitter and prolonged battles between rival sons. Referring to developments in European state-formation processes, Elias comments that, 'the most striking feature of all the larger territories in this phase is their low level of cohesion, the
strength of the centrifugal forces tending to disintegrate them'.

The conflicts between the various noble families in Wales, along with the tendency for landholdings to fragment as a consequence of the laws of inheritance, meant that centrifugal forces had greater momentum. One nationalist historian remarks, ruefully, that the law of portion may have appealed to notions of justice but did little to provide Wales with a political leadership that could have rebuffed the expansionist pressures of the evolving English state. According to Gwynfor Evans;

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Hywel's law excelled from the point of view of justice, but the law of England was possibly sounder from the point of political strength. Welsh law was more civilised but it weakened the state. It was when faced with united and imperialistic England on the attack that the Welsh suffered most from the weakness caused by its civilised character.
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This unsociological use of the term 'civilised' is a consequence of the value position of the author. A committed nationalist and historian, his account of early Welsh society is coloured by his refusal to detach himself from an ideological opposition to the extension of English 'control' into Wales.

**Subjugation and exogenous social control**

By the mid-thirteenth century, Norman feudal barons had overwhelmed the rulers of the small Welsh principalities along the border and in the lowland areas of south east Wales. The first Norman Kings of England paid little attention to Wales, preoccupied as they were with their claims on the French mainland and the establishment of their feudal monarchy. Only in the border towns of Chester, Hereford and the south coast area of Pembroke did the 'marcher barons' establish control. Of the major principalities in Wales, the strongest was Gwynedd in the north, and over a period of half a
century, it was involved in repeated skirmishes with the marcher barons and even the Crown itself. From the mid-twelfth century Norman incursions had established a degree of control over the petty kingdoms of Wales. Every ruler owed allegiance to the English King and did homage to him for their lands, yet the rulers of Gwynedd emerged as relatively independent. It was these rulers who took to themselves the title of 'prince', tried to defy Canterbury and appoint their own bishops, and rejected their new role as tenants-in-chief of the Norman king. The source of this power advantage lay, partly, in the physical location of Gwynedd. Its lands were protected from attack by the three great concentric circles of highland, the impressive mountain ranges of Snowdonia. These afforded a crucial means of defence to the east and south. To the north lay the fertile island of Anglesey, a vital source of grain. As the lands to the south and east slipped more firmly under the control of the Norman Marcher lordships, the leaders of Gwynedd attempted to force lesser Welsh lords to pay homage to them, so that they alone could do homage to the king as a means of asserting a greater degree of independence. By the early thirteenth century there was no disputing the pre-eminence of the Gwynedd rulers, and, as the boundaries of their territory became consolidated, they amended Welsh law to the new feudal state they were creating. It was David (c1208-1246) who was the first formally to give himself the title 'Prince of Wales'.

By 1260, Grufydd ap Llwelyn had established, himself as the foremost Welsh prince, partly because he had militarily held his own against the 'outsiders', but also because he had proved himself superior in battle with other Welsh princes. An alliance with the leader of the English rebels, Simon de Montfort, and pacts with continental European powers put Llywelyn into a position whereby Henry III was compelled to recognise him in the Treaty of Monmouth as the
legitimate Prince of Wales with hereditary rights. On the accession of Edward I to the English throne Llywelyn refused the homage to which the new king thought he was entitled, and, in 1277 Edward invaded and succeeded in reducing Llywelyn's territory and status. For two hundred years there is evidence of continuous border skirmishes between the marcher barons and the Welsh princedoms. The supremacy of Llywellyn over other Welsh princes led to worsening relations between the Welsh and the English, and Edward I pursued policies which aroused discontent leading to a rebellion in 1282. Llywellyn, the 'last Prince of Wales' was killed in a skirmish, and Welsh resistance was crushed by the superior military might of the Norman monarchy. The final military solution was a ring of Edwardian castles which, at first, followed the coastal plain, eventually penetrating the interior. Edward I's conquest was guaranteed when Norman armies struck at the wheat supplies on the island of Anglesey. From 1301 the heir to the English throne was given the title of Prince of Wales and this has remained the custom to this day. (Much to the intense annoyance of Welsh nationalists). From this period, Wales was formally incorporated into the kingdom of England, though for many years after, local government remained in Welsh hands and the language and customs of the Welsh were left quite alone.

Although the effects of English rule were not felt immediately, and at the level of village or hamlet were probably unnoticed, the significance of the conquest of Wales in the course of English nation-building must be stressed. Referring to similar processes in France, Elias writes;

All this already constitutes a mighty complex of lands; but it is not yet a cohesive region. It still has the typical appearance of a territorial family domain .. The separate identity of each region, the special interests and character of each territory, are still very strongly felt. However, their union
under one and the same house and partly under the same administration, does remove a whole series of obstacles in the way of fuller integration. It corresponds to the tendency towards an extension of trade relations, the intensification of links beyond the local level ... Here, in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the struggle for land, the rivalry between an ever smaller number of warrior families, is the primary impulse behind the formation of larger territories. 18

The expansionist pressure for control of land, allied to the need for secure boundaries, goes some way towards explaining the early push towards the integration of England and Wales. From a multitude of relatively small, relatively loosely integrated states of this period, the process of nation building proceeds 'by way of a great number of integration and disintegration spurts, gradually, to larger, more populous and more closely integrated social units'. 19

The conquest of Gwynedd brought all of Wales under Norman control, and it represented a major push towards integration. Leading families soon acquiesced to new rulers and the Statute of Rhuddlan (1284) makes clear the goal of a 'more closely integrated social unit'. The language of the Statute makes the changing power balances explicit.

The Divine Providence, which is unerring in its own Government, among other gifts of its Dispensation, wherewith it hath vouchsafed to distinguish us and our realm of England, hath now of its favour, wholly and entirely transferred under our proper dominion, the land of Wales with its Inhabitants, heretofore subject unto us, in Feudal Right, all obstacles whatsoever ceasing; and hath annexed and united the same unto the crown of the aforesaid Realm, as a Member of the Same Body. We therefore under the Divine Will, being desirous that our aforesaid Land of Snowdon and our other Lands in those parts ... should be governed with due Order ... and that the People or Inhabitants of those lands who have submitted themselves absolutely unto our will, and whom we have thereunto so
accepted, should be protected in security within our peace under fixed Laws and Customs, have caused to be rehearsed before Us and the Nobles of our Realm, the Laws and Customs of those parts hitherto in use: ... We have, by the advice of the aforesaid Nobles, abolished certain of them, some we have allowed, and some we have corrected; and we have likewise commanded certain others to be ordained and added thereto; and these we will shall be from henceforth for ever stedfastly kept and observed in our Lands...

The failure of these early Welsh princes to develop and articulate a sense of 'national' identity perplexes and disturbs contemporary nationalist historians. Sociologically the struggle for the domination of land, and the significance of kinship and 'family bonds' for social organisation and social control is well understood. Yet the nationalist historian looks back longingly and sees 'weakness', and the contemporary tragedy, namely the failure of Wales to develop into a fully-fledged nation-state, is attributed to the 'failures' of these noble families. A not untypical example of such an approach, is provided by A.H. Williams;

One looks in vain for any national consciousness in the Wales of the princes. It is perhaps disheartening to read of Welshmen fighting Welshmen instead of uniting against the Normans or the English but it occurred to no one to act otherwise. It was perfectly natural for the sons and grandsons of the Lord Rhys to fight each other like wild cats; for one of them to sell the strategically important castle of Cardigan to King John from hatred of his own brother; for David, son of Llwellyn the Great to rejoice at the death of his brother .... but personal animosity rather than love of country was the motive once again.

Later, twentieth century Welsh nationalists were to blame the weakness, vacillation and treachery of other generations of political leaders for the failure to develop a centralised political authority that could challenge the English. A fairly typical example elevates
the 'ordinary people' as the saviours of Welsh consciousness, and castigates the leaders who betrayed the cause.

It is the ordinary people of Wales who have been throughout the last four centuries the custodians of the Welsh tradition. It was not the people of Wales that failed, but their leaders. Had they leaders worthy of them, with strength enough to resist the fleshpots of the English parties they would by now have been led to national freedom.

Of the period between 1282 until the ascendency of the Tudors, nationalist writers paint a lurid picture of national subjugation, with the people thirsting for freedom from the English yoke. These colourful accounts must be treated with scepticism because far into the middle ages the tribal system loomed large in Welsh life, and feudal relations were in evidence only in those easily accessible areas in which Norman influence held sway. Under such a system, where descent from a common ancestor and strong ties of kinship are the main organising principles, there was unlikely to be any sense of what we later come to call nationality. The very concept of 'country' or 'nation' could hardly arise in such circumstances. Hobsbawm provides a telling example of the persistence of localist and particularistic loyalties that were apparent in Europe up to the twentieth century. In the Polish censuses taken between 1919 and 1931, the residents of the Pripet marshes, a remote and traditional peasant region, replied to questions about their nationality with the phrase 'from here' or 'local'.

To suggest, therefore, that the Welsh in the Middle Ages were examplars of national zeal, must be regarded as fanciful and an indication of the unreliability of nationalist historians. In the words of Eric Hobsbawm, 'It has proved as disastrous to leave the history of nationalism to nationalists as that of railways to railway enthusiasts.'

There is some evidence of significant changes in the economy and
social structure of Welsh society between approximately 1280 and 1480. The Norman expansion into Wales, and the building of a chain of impressive fortresses around the coastal plain, brought feudal relations to the fore in those areas most immediately affected. By this period there is little doubt that the boundaries of Welsh society were becoming more distinct. There was now a clearly defined boundary, differences of social structure, life style and stratification, and, a language difference with the gradual replacement in England of French by English as the language of society and the court. There were, as yet, no symbols of collective identity or 'national' aspiration.

One of the events of the fifteenth century which was to provide, in a form that was later mythologised, this sense of an emerging Welsh identity, was a rebellion against the Crown led by a military leader, Owain Glyndwr. Welsh historians have drawn attention to the decline of the manorial system in the south and changes in patterns of land tenure; to the appearance of sub-tenantry and the emergence of itinerant workers in the period called 'bastard feudalism'. The ensuing social turmoil, worsened by the ravages of the Black Death, was given a military and a 'national' dimension by the escalation of a dispute between a Norman lord and a Welsh military leader. Owain Glyndwr's rebellion against the Norman/English crown took on the dimensions of a 'national' uprising, although we must be cautious about accepting uncritically the glorious and heroic interpretations placed on it by subsequent chroniclers. The account by Gwynfor Evans, a nationalist politician and historian, is a good example of the projection of present-day ideals and values onto this event, and the interpretation of the uprising in terms of twentieth century nationalist aspirations. As Evans writes: 'to a host of Welsh people he will never die. His spirit lives on like an unquenchable flame, a
symbol of the determination of the Welsh to live as a free nation.²⁵

Another nationalist historian claimed that, 'the Glyn Dwr revolt first powerfully expressed and at the same time strengthened this nascent nationalism.'²⁶

By the end of the fourteenth century old ties were being broken, local loyalties were being weakened and, 'the way was clear for something positive to bind Welshmen together, not as members of a clan or as subjects of a lord, but as members of a nation which embraced the whole of Wales.'²⁷ In fact a more prosaic interpretation of the revolt is possible. Glyndwr was descended from the former royal houses of Powys and Deheubarth, yet his family had regained some of their lands, attained a royal income and a minor title as a result of strategic marriages and association with powerful Marcher lordships. His was one of the families that were part of a burgeoning Welsh gentry. This 'new class' consolidated its position by buying up land unused because of the serious labour shortages resulting from the Black Death. This contributed to the final end of the medieval agrarian system, and led to the firm establishment of the estate system. In 1400 Glyndwr fell foul of a powerful neighbour, Lord Grey of Ruthin, in a quarrel over common land. Because Grey was an intimate of Henry IV, Glyndwr received no support from King or Parliament. For more than a decade English armies were sent to relieve their isolated castles as the 'uprising' took the form of a protracted guerrilla war.

The sheer tenacity of the rebellion is startling. Few revolts in contemporary Europe lasted more than some months; no previous Welsh war had lasted much longer. Owain could put armies of 10,000 into the field ... The rebels maintained themselves partly by sheer pillage ... It was a civil war ... Welsh families were split ... Owain's own cousin Hywel tried to murder him.²⁸
The 'rebellion' against the Crown benefited from English disputes with Scotland and France. Indeed Glyndwr had contacts with Rome, Avignon, Burgos and Paris, and he summoned men to a parliament to ratify an alliance with France, which, although it promised much, led to little in the way of practical support. It is possible then, to see this 'uprising' as one of many disputes between neighbouring territorial dominions, for, as Elias has put it, 'a number of estates placed in competition experience the need to expand if they are not to be subjugated by expanding neighbours...'.

Subsequently, this fifteenth century revolt was elevated into an event of crucial symbolic importance. In the same way that Bastille Day is acknowledged by historians to have been of very little actual significance for the course of the French Revolution, its later interpretation, and the symbolic value placed on it being of much greater importance, so too with the 'uprising' of Glyndwr. What started out as a dispute between a Welsh landowner and a neighbouring English lord developed into a series of bloody battles, which are interpreted as a sign of the stirrings of national awareness. Every nationalist historian, popular tract, school textbook and political activist acknowledges and eulogises the uprising of Owain Glyndwr. A recent newspaper article claimed that, 'Owain's Gold Dragon standard was a reminder to his countrymen of the freedom that was lost with the coming of the Saxon'. It is interpreted as a brave, but short-lived attempt to establish a separate Welsh political authority, to give formal expression to a growing sense of national awareness. There was a brief declaration of a Welsh Parliament at Machynlleth, and, according to one enthusiastic account;

Men flocked to his banner from all parts of the country from England and from France. Welsh labourers left their fields, Welsh students their studies in Oxford. Welsh mercenaries their captains in France, for they saw in him the
incarnation of the Welsh national spirit: a man who had all the trappings of a national leader; a banner, coat of arms, seal, officials, parliament, ambassadors and an army. They saw in him one who could treat with the Kings of France and Scotland as an equal and one who had a national programme.\(^\text{32}\)

The aftermath of the defeat of Glyndwr was forty years of suppression ended only by the involvement of the English nobles in the Wars of the Roses.\(^*\) Welsh involvement in these struggles was inevitable, given that both the Houses of Lancaster and York owned great estates in the borderland. The long term significance of the Glyndwr 'uprising' is that it became a symbol of embryonic national consciousness. The establishment of a parliament, in the teeth of English opposition, however short-lived, became a potent symbol of collective identity, an identity that is forged in opposition to, and distinguished from the developing sense of English national consciousness.\(^\text{33}\)

Despite conquest, there was little evidence of the acculturation or assimilation of dominant groups in Wales at this stage. Processes of centralisation were still relatively weak. The instability of central authority everywhere in this late feudal period contrasts sharply with the relative stability of central institutions in the later Tudor period. The explanation of such centralising and decentralising struggles is located in the changing balances of power between groups and classes. According to Elias;

\[ \text{Growth in the "power" of the central functionaries is, in a society with a} \]

\* Repressive legislation enacted by Henry IV against Welshmen included, the exclusion of Welshmen from the boroughs; a ban on congregations; restrictions on where the Welsh could purchase land; Welshmen were banned from keeping arms; from having castles and no Englishman could be convicted by Welshmen in Wales.
The high division of functions, an expression of the fact that the dependence of other groups and classes within this society on a supreme organ of co-ordination and regulation is rising; a fall in the latter appears to us as a limitation of the former ... the contemporary history of the Western figuration of states, offers examples enough of such changes in the social power of the central functionaries. They are all sure indications of specific changes in the system of tensions within the society at large.

The ending of the Wars of the Roses, and the victory of Henry Tudor in battle, supported by Welsh noblemen and troops, marked a shift in the balance of power in both England and Wales in the direction of central control of the noblemen, and their gradual 'pacification' at the Court in London. That Henry Tudor had Welsh ancestry, and drew much support from Wales, facilitated the gravitation of Welsh noblemen to London. Meanwhile,

There is no doubt that this was regarded in Wales as a Welsh victory. The bards had carefully prepared the ground before the invasion, and his connections with both Anglesey and the South gave Henry Tudor a stronger hold on the loyalty of all the Welsh people than even Glyn Dwr had possessed. The standard of Wales, the red dragon on a white and green background, floated over his army at Bosworth, and accompanied him on his triumphal entry into London. Even an Italian, writing about 1500, considered that the Welsh had now regained their independence through the accession to the throne of a Welsh prince. Henry himself emphasized his connections with Wales. He rewarded his supporters with titles and with offices not only in Wales but in England also. He paid a Welsh bard to trace his descent from the ancient princes of Wales, and called his eldest son Arthur, so that there should once more be a king of that name in Britain.

London was still relatively small, and its weakness, relative to other centres of countervailing power and influence, made it unattractive. The Tudor period altered this state of affairs and the curbs on the
power of the nobles, most importantly the 1487 Statute of Limitations, which forbade the equipping and training of armed forces other than those of the King, represented a step towards the monopolization of legitimate rights to use force. An immediate consequence of the Tudor ascendancy was the rapid movement of the Welsh gentry to London. Some were rewarded by Henry with large estates, Sir Rhys ap Thomas became the Earl of Oxford, while others gravitated to London and the Court as new opportunities arose for material advancement. Hechter claims that

One group in the Celtic fringe did not have to be forced, let alone encouraged to adopt the ways and manners of the English. I am referring to the gentry. Among this class were many who obtained wealth and pretension sufficient to consider themselves upper-class Britons; they went to great lengths to dissociate themselves from their rude and barbaric countrymen.

Within Wales, throughout the fifteenth century there was considerable confusion about the administration of justice. This was a cause of some concern in London. Although vast estates had become the property of the crown, individual Marcher lordships still enjoyed a considerable degree of independence. The problem of 'law and order' loomed large because with each lord exercising his own rights of jurisdiction, a criminal could escape conviction by moving around. The lords also allowed some felons to place themselves under their protection and become their liegemen, thus escaping altogether from the jurisdiction of their former lord. There was also concern about the continuous raids across the border into the fertile valley of the Severn, in which cattle and sheep were stolen and prosperous farmers were kidnapped and held to ransom. By 1471, Edward IV had established in Ludlow Castle a Council of Wales which was intended to reduce the 'lawlessness' of the Welsh, and restrain the 'wilde Welshmenne and evill disposed persons from their accustomed murthers and outrages'.
Even a nationalist historian acknowledges the dire conditions of Wales at the end of the fifteenth century;

As a result of the Glyn Dwr movement, the return of Welshmen from the French wars, the Wars of the Roses, and, above all, the marcher lords, respect for law and order had almost completely disappeared.

The first task of Tudor monarchy was to impose 'order', yet Henry's Welsh origins did not lead him to favour any separate status for the Principality. It is clear that there were sections of the Welsh population who were excited by the fact that, at last, there was a Welshman on the throne of England. Wales in their eyes had won its national fight for freedom. They regarded this victory as a glorious climax to their long heroic campaign. But from the standpoint of securing the crown it was essential to pacify Wales, integrate it into the rest of the country and ensure that it could not be used as a base for any challenge to the legitimacy of the Tudor hold on the throne.

So, the emergence of the national dynastic state in modern times was first manifested in the case of England. The break with Rome subsequently gave a quasi religious basis to growing English nationalism. The expansion of colonial and naval power and the consolidation of Tudor 'absolutism' under Henry VIII marked the rise of the contemporary nation-state. The process of English nation-building involved the absorption of the 'peripheral' territories of Ireland, Scotland and Wales, for, according to Crowson, to bring these lands under one ruler, 'had been the recurrent ambition of Kings in Westminster and Edinburgh; it inspired Edward I's conquest of Wales and invasion of Scotland ... The role which Henry seems to have chosen for England in 1540 was the role of architect and procreator of a 'Unified Kingdom of Greater Britain'.

We would certainly quarrel with the exact formulation of Crowson's argument, particularly his use of the word 'chosen' in the above quote. It
implies a degree of freedom to make choices that is highly voluntaristic, with no acknowledgement of the constraints on action imposed by complex configurations. Also, it is much more likely that this was an unintended consequence of the attempt to establish unified political control. Crowson's error is common, in that he attributes the long term unintended consequences of interdependent social processes to the intentional acts of a single powerful individual. As a result, the individual, Henry VIII in this case, is portrayed as possessing extraordinary prescience and understanding of the configuration of which he forms part, and he comes to appear very far-sighted in this account. Of the Tudor accession, a Welsh nationalist historian commented wrily,

> For England, and for the English people, a bright future of national development opened out under the Tudors. This big nation had the freedom to realise its possibilities, while Wales slipped into the position of a submissive province of England, unpaispersous and insignificant.

One of the immediate consequences of the Tudor accession, briefly referred to earlier, was the gradual anglicisation of the Welsh gentry. By the mid-sixteenth century, with the Acts of Union of 1535-42 having incorporated Wales into England, the Court at London became highly attractive for these noblemen. Some had become wealthier as a result of the consolidation of larger estates made possible by the abolition of gavelkind in the Acts of Union. Although the practice of gavelkind had been in decline in some areas, the Acts of Union specifically outlawed the practice;

> Provided always that all lands, tenements and hereditaments within the said dominion of Wales, shall descend to the heirs, according to the tenor and effect of this act, and not to be used as gavelkind: anything contained in these provisions or any of them to the contrary thereof notwithstanding. (Land) shall descend be taken, enjoyed, used and
holden according to the common laws of this realm of England, and not to be partable among heirs males after the custom of Gavelkind, as heretofore in divers parts of Wales hath been used and accustomed. 41

Many sections of the Acts dealt specifically with the administration of justice, the establishment of sessions, the conviction of felons and the role of sheriffs. The administrative system of English law was imposed throughout the land. Concern about the possible reaction from Catholic Wales to the break with Rome made the control of the 'legitimate means of violence' essential. The acts were comprehensive and the particular language used gives a clear idea of the intentions of the English statesmen who were responsible for them. The opening sections read:

Albeit the dominion, principality and country of Wales justly and righteously is, and ever hath been incorported, annexed, united and subject to and under the imperial crown of this realm, as a very member and joint of the same, wherefore the King's most royal majesty ... is very head, King, lord and ruler; (2) yet notwithstanding, because that in the same country, principality and domain, divers rights, usages, laws and customs be far discrepant from the laws and customs of this realm (3) and also because that the people of the same dominian have, and do daily use a speech nothing like, nor consonant to the natural mother tongue used within this realm, (4) some rude and ignorant people have made distinction and diversity between the King's subjects of this realm, and his subjects of the said dominian and principality of Wales, whereby great discord, variance, debate, division, murmur and sedition hath grown between his possible subjects.

Fears of sedition, and of a challenge to the rule of Henry VIII, were major reasons for the absorption of Wales at this stage. Documents later in the sixteenth century set forth reasons why Ireland should be kept subject to the crown. They described Ireland as the back armour
of England and they added,

It is very certain that, if that part of the armour should miscarry, and be cut off from England (as God forbid it should) it would make the old brutes of Wales to look about them more than they do know.

The imposition of a new shire system and the abolition of the marcher lordships, marked another stage in the gradual struggle of centralised authority to weaken the power bases of those forces that represented the old order. The object of the Acts was to:

reduce them to the perfect order notice and knowledge of his laws of this realm, and utterly to extirp all singular and sinister usages and customs differing from the same, and to bring the said subjects of this his realm, ... to an amicable concord and unity hath by the deliberate advice, consent and agreement of the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, ordained, enacted and established that his said country or dominion of Wales, shall be, stand and continue for ever from henceforth incorporated, united and annexed to and with his realm of England; and that all singular person and persons, born and to be born in the said principality, country or dominion of Wales, shall have, enjoy and inherit all and singular freedoms, liberties, rights privileges and laws within this his realm, and other the King's dominions as other the king's subjects naturally born within the same have enjoy and inherit.

The rapid upward social mobility of the Welsh gentry that followed the Acts of Union had long term consequences for the development of Welsh society. With the 'natural leaders' content to enrich themselves in London, the possibility of Wales again challenging English rule became less and less likely. As long as the gentry succumbed to the anglicising pressures, then the absorption of Wales into England could take place without a challenge from any elite group. The removal of restrictions on Welsh participation in municipal commerce and the
scramble for spoils after the dissolution of the monasteries, enabled some of the Welsh gentry to accumulate large amounts of capital. The disappearance of the monasteries left Wales with no formal educational institutions, so, the sons of the gentry went off to schools in England. In 1571 Jesus College was established at Oxford, largely to cater for Welsh students, and, later, the Elizabethan Grammar Schools in Wales became centres of English cultural education.

The physical removal of the gentry to London also involved an increasing social distance from their Welsh origins. Customs and speech of the 'ordinary' Welsh peasant became more distasteful to the anglicising nobles. In a letter written by a landlord during the seventeenth century to his nephew at school in England, this increasing disapproval of the 'uncivilised' nature of Welsh society is illustrated.

We heare in Anglsey good commendation of the gentleman you live with and by followinge and observinge of him you may gaine learning knowledge and experience, for in England curtisie, humanite and civilite doth abound with generosite as far as uncivilite doth exceed in Wales.

This is an interesting example of one dimension of established-outsider relationships, when the internalisation of negative self and group images goes along with a strong desire to emulate those with greater power resources. Referring to the assimilation of some 'outsiders', Elias says,

One can observe ... characteristics of an early form of rise, not yet of the outsider groups as a whole but of some of its individual members. They undergo a process of assimilation. Their own affect-control, their own conduct, obeys the rules of the established groups. Partially they identify themselves with them, and even though the identification may show strong ambivalences, still their own conscience, their whole super-ego apparatus, follows more or less the pattern of the established groups.
People in that situation attempt to reconcile and fuse that pattern ... with the habits and traditions of their own society with a higher or lesser degree of success. As far as present day nationalists are concerned, it is the heinous crime of the nobility to have turned their back on their land, language and their nationality. Evans describes the 'alienation of the noblemen' as, an act of treason. 'The noblemen who had been the leaders of Wales in the past, were still the country's natural leaders in the time of the Tudors and afterwards. It was these who betrayed the nation'. Again we have an example of Welsh nationalists expecting these men to behave as if they were twentieth century nationalists. Such writers forget a crucial point; the gentry they so despise, owed their loyalties principally to their kin groups. To expect a highly developed sense of national duty or responsibility from such groups at this time is highly unrealistic. A.H. Williams is correct when he recognises that 'the conditions of their prosperity were unfaltering allegiance to the crown and unquestioning obedience to the state. Their offices and their official contacts made them dependent upon London'. The sociologist R.T. Jenkins, in an early analysis of Welsh nationalism claimed that:

This class was chosen by King Henry with the explicit intention of destroying national feeling in Wales. This, in short, was the design of Henry VIII and Elizabeth: to create a new landowning class in Wales, to bind them tightly to the throne and to turn them into Englishmen.

According to David Williams, by 1640 the anglicisation of the Welsh gentry was almost accomplished. Many had married into English noble families and their detachment from Wales was virtually complete. Williams says;

Thus came about the dichotomy which has marred so much of Welsh life. On the one hand was the Welsh-speaking peasantry,
inarticulate but for its bards, who themselves became few through lack of patrons. On the other hand, were the 'natural leaders' of the people who became English in speech, and to this difference in class and in speech there was added, in succeeding centuries, a difference in religion. The position in Wales came to that in Ireland, except that the Welsh gentry were of the same race as their tenantry whereas in Ireland they were of English descent.

The Venetian Ambassador to the Tudor Court predicted that the independence of Wales was assured on account of Henry VII's Welsh origins. Nothing could have been further from the truth. Within two or three generations the Welsh gentry had become fully integrated into the world of the English court. The 'loss' of the gentry, viewed by nationalists as their 'betrayal', militated against the formation of a nationally conscious upper class that could have formed the nucleus of a dominant group committed to Welsh nationhood. For significant groups of privileged Welsh noblemen, their fortunes as well as the fortunes of Welsh society, became tied up with the emerging British state.

Growing interdependence between England and Wales

Although the terms of the Acts of Union formally eradicated all legal and administrative distinctions between England and Wales, and outlawed the Welsh language from use in the Courts and the administration of justice, the Tudor state continued, in practice, to tolerate the language and the 'resistance' of different customs and practices. Although the Acts declare the intention of removing all 'distinction and diversity', the relative weakness of the state made this process much more drawn out. Centralised authorities could certainly make pronouncements about their aims and declarations of intent, but, in reality many of the 'sinister Usages and customs differing from England' persisted for many years after they were
officially abolished. Acculturation and assimilation on a wider scale had to wait the development of the much more powerful central state which was both a precondition for and a consequence of processes of urbanisation and industrialisation.

Whilst Weber stresses the crucial importance of coercion and state monopolisation of the means of violence, Gellner has claimed that the monopoly of legitimate education, 'is now more important, more central than the monopoly of legitimate violence'. At later stages in the consolidation of centralised authority, the provision of state education, and the imposition of a uniform pattern of training and political socialisation may well be much more significant in contributing towards the 'pacification' of the peoples within the nation state, and binding them in certain symbolic ways to membership of a 'national' community. The struggles of the nineteenth century involving the extension of citizenship to 'outsider' groups, reflects not only a narrowing of social distance between dominant and subordinate groups, but is itself a consequence of greater functional interdependence. In the case of Welsh/English relations, the formal absorption of Wales into England made possible greater contact which paved the way for the expansion of trade, the growth of internal markets and growing economic interdependence. It is not until the late nineteenth century that the English state was sufficiently powerful to attempt to impose cultural uniformity on the Welsh through the extension of state education to all parts of the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, the formal integration of the two countries led to more intensive trading relations, even though these were characterised by 'unequal' and 'unbalanced' terms of trade. Thomas Mendenhall, in his detailed study of the wool trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, has shown how the English border town of Shrewsbury rose rapidly in influence as a centre for the wool trade. The Shrewsbury
traders effectively monopolized the lucrative positions as 'middlemen' between the Welsh producers and the consumers in London. Hechter has claimed that, 'as early as the seventeenth century, the English took a disproportionately great share of this interregional commerce ... the character of this trade was particularly disadvantageous to Wales'.

Individual Welshmen profited greatly from the new-found opportunities that came with political integration. They flocked to the English court and some founded wealthy and powerful aristocratic families in England. According to David Williams:

The growing city of London acted as a magnet on them, and by the end of the century there were scores of Welsh lawyers, merchants, shop-keepers, brewers and craftsmen of every sort in London. Many of them made their fortunes ... others had distinguished military careers.

At the same time as prominent families of Welsh origin like the Cecil's and the Myddeleton's (a founder of the East India Company) were establishing themselves in London, Englishmen were moving to Wales to occupy high status positions as managers, land stewards and entrepreneurs. Dodd has claimed that the control by 'outsiders' of, for example, the Welsh woollen trade, led to a situation in which, the Welsh had the labour, and strangers the profit. Much of the money gained by sales was spent outside the country, and the road to advancement for the ambitious weaver lay through Shrewsbury in apprenticeship with the all-powerful company, and not at home.

The ownership and control of shipping by English interests, and their subsequent monopoly of coastal transportation, along with selective migration to Wales of 'intermediate' strata, led Hechter to suggest that a 'cultural division of labour' developed in Britain's Celtic fringe. Certainly the intensification of trade and commerce that
increasingly bound the English and Welsh economies together, created a new middle class which, at this stage, was more likely to be English in speech and allegiance. A nationalist writer commented perceptively: 'the lack of a Welsh court and dynasty was tending to restrict the intellectual horizons of Wales. There were no longer important posts to attract the ablest Welshmen... there was no focus for political discussion'.

The granting of legal equality with Englishmen enabled some Welshmen to expand their horizons and look anew at opportunities for mobility and aggrandisement in the new British state. According to A.H. Williams:

Mountain-land, crown lands, monastic lands, commons and even good pasture were seized by ambitious and often unscrupulous men to line their own pockets. Some of these lands were used to grow corn, some to mine minerals, but most to rear sheep for their wool. Industry and commerce also expanded; Wales was more closely linked with England; Welsh goods were sold in English markets; and English goods found their way to Wales. Pasture increased at the expense of arable land; Welsh cattle (and later pigs and geese) were driven to England; Welsh wool was exported or made into flannel and cloth; iron, copper, lead, coal and slates were all mined on a small scale. It would be unwise to exaggerate the extent of the industrial and commercial development, but it was enough to suggest that the industrial history of Wales does not begin with the growth of Merthyr Tydfil.

Political incorporation led to increased contact and this, in turn, led to the dissemination of improved agricultural techniques, and greater efficiency in the production of commodities for larger and expanding markets. Because the possibility of the development of a Welsh state had now faded, there was also no Welsh mercantilism which could foster indigenous industries and prohibit English 'incursions' into local markets. There emerged a type of regional economic
specialisation which became a complementary, but not a competitive element of the English economy. The wholesale transformation of the economy and social structure of Wales would have to wait a further century or more for the impact of early industrialisation to be felt. It is in this period that bonds of interdependence are strengthened, but it is the drive to absorb the Principality at the end of the fifteenth century which appears to have been one of the fundamental preconditions for later developments.

Industrialisation and incipient national awareness

Throughout the seventeenth century Welsh society was characterised by small scale subsistence agriculture, although there were relatively small pockets where the mining and processing of lead, copper and coal was carried out. Early innovations in the development of the iron industry in Shropshire and other areas of the west Midlands, began to spread into the south east of Wales. It was the iron industry that was first to transform the valleys of Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire. By the 1780's the Merthyr district was the centre of the rapid expansion of iron smelting, and four great ironworks, dominated the area. English entrepreneurs provided the capital and the expertise and, by 1820, the Cyfarthfa Ironworks had become the largest in the world and the Merthyr Valley the foremost iron producing region in Britain.

The crucial advantage that south Wales had, in terms of industrial expansion, was a plentiful supply of good quality steam coal. When coke came to replace wood for the furnaces, the proximity of extensive coalfields proved such an asset, that for the nineteenth century, this corner of the United Kingdom became a powerhouse of the industrial revolution. Whereas it was men like Crawshay from Yorkshire and Guest from Shropshire, who had initiated the
exploitation of iron, it was Welshmen like David Davies of Llandinam who built up an extensive coal industry. Davies's Ocean Coal Company came to dominate mining, railways, shipping and the urban expansion of ports like Cardiff, Barry and Penarth. By the mid nineteenth century, the demand for Welsh steam coal was so great that railways and canals were constructed to reduce transport costs from the valleys and speed up the movement of the coal. The expansion of the railway network from the 1840's and 1850's increased the demand for coal as the railway companies themselves became major consumers. Railways also required iron, and later steel, for the tracks. Consequently the demand for, and the expansion of, the rail, coal and iron and steel industries went hand in hand. The interdependence of these 'foundation stones' of industrialisation, coal, steel and railways, led to the rapid emergence of south east Wales as one of the leading centres of industrial expansion in the world. The fate of each has been inextricably bound up with the others from that day to the present.

Imperial expansion added to the demand for coal and steel for shipping. In the years between 1851 and the outbreak of the First World War, Wales was the world's largest exporter of coal. Cardiff grew from a small country town of less than two thousand people in 1801 to a 'boom' town of 70,000 by the 1860's. Population shifts in the first half of the nineteenth century showed a marked internal migration from the rural areas to the growing towns of the south east. It is likely that industrialisation provided the Welsh peasantry with an alternative to the mass emigration to England, the United States and Canada that was the experience of the Irish and Scottish rural poor. One historian has claimed that the industrialisation of north Wales, around the slate quarrying areas, and in south Wales in the coalfield, provided a Welsh speaking rural population with
opportunities to retain their native language and culture for longer than would have been the case otherwise. In effect, industrialisation may have saved the Welsh language and allowed it to survive into the twentieth century. 59

The earliest railways and canals were built to connect the coal and iron valleys to the ports on the south coast. The construction of Cardiff docks in 1839, followed by 'overspill' developments in Penarth in 1865 and Barry in 1889, all linked by rail, brought the costs of transport down significantly. Railway lines connected the slate quarrying region to England and in the south, major rail routes were built linking Cardiff to London.

It was clear that the years of relative isolation were at an end. Commercial relationships intensified between England and Wales, and Hechter has shown how interregional transactions between England and all Celtic regions increased substantially from the mid eighteenth century. 60 Contacts between England and Wales were intensified but, because 'all roads led to England', nationalists felt that this was not an unmixed blessing, 'since it was feared that a direct result of it would be rift between north and south Wales'. 61 It was south Wales that attracted, not only the rural Welsh, but workers from Ireland and England. Williams has claimed that; 'Before 1841 Monmouthshire and Glamorgan were already running first and third in the growth race among the counties of England and Wales'. 62 Between 1801 and 1861, the population of Merthyr rose from 8,000 to 50,000 with the figures for Monmouthshire showing a 117% increase between 1801 and 1841. According to Baber

Whereas in 1750, the population of Wales was less than half a million and fairly evenly dispersed, by 1911 there were 2,420,000 people living in Wales with over 65 per cent of them in the two coalfield counties of Glamorgan and Monmouth.
Of these nearly half a million had been born outside Wales and in an important sense this was unique.

There were several periods in which there was an outflow of population from the European continent to the United States. The Irish, Italians, and Scandinavians from rural areas formed the majority of emigrants in the periods 1849-53 and 1863-73. In the 1880's, nearly one and a half million people left Germany, half a million left Sweden, and Denmark suffered a near catastrophic collapse in its population. The last great period of Atlantic migration occurred in the ten years up to the start of the First World War when over ten million Jews, Slavs and southern Europeans left Europe for good. According to Williams, the peaks and troughs of mass migration from Britain correspond to the ups and downs of the trade cycle.

The outward pulse of British capital...coincided almost exactly with the peaks of human migration from Europe... to put it crudely, when the British export sector boomed, the displaced rural population of Britain, with others, tended to follow the thrust of enterprise to its new frontier abroad. Conversely, when the British home sector boomed, its export of human beings slowed; the displaced people of Britain could find a life at home... Every single person in the British Isles follows that pattern. With one outstanding exception. Every British people follows that pattern with the startling exception of the Welsh.

The industrialisation of Wales provided a livelihood for the country's own dispossessed peasantry, and this helped to ensure the survival of a Welsh population in its original habitat and hence the perpetuation of a distinctive Welsh language and culture. Furthermore, urbanisation and the emergence of a self conscious and educated middle class, provided structural preconditions which favoured the growth of national ideology. Industrialisation and the interrelated process of
urbanisation, with all the changes in class structure that these terms imply, made possible the nineteenth century manifestations of nationalist sentiment and the institutions which were the product of such feelings. This is so despite the fact that nearly all of the original founders of the Welsh Nationalist Party (Plaid Cymru) regarded the industrialisation of Wales as an unmitigated disaster from the point of view of national self-determination. It is clear that by the 1870's, 'Wales had become an industrial society in the sense that the terrible dominion of the harvest and seasonal cycle had been broken and it was the rhythms of industry which had become the ultimate determinants of social life.'

From Europe the heady appeal of small-nation patriotism and the articulation of ideologies of national self-determination began, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, to influence leading Liberal and nonconformist thinkers. The writings of Herder, Fichte, Mazzini and Garibaldi began to be popularised in the Welsh press. A leading nationalist, Michael D. Jones paid this tribute to Kossuth in 1890:

Kossuth ... had fired many a soul with the immortal doctrine of the right of every nation to self government, and between the influence of the great revolutions of 1848, and the teachings of Kossuth, the conquered nations of Europe are no longer appeased, but look forward hopefully towards the jubilee of oppressed nations and peoples.

Two Welsh language publications, Y Celt and Y Genhin (The Leek) were the vehicles for the popularisation of Jones's amalgam of nationalism, socialism and Christianity. He made explicit reference to the colonisation of India in his regular attacks on British Imperialism, and he campaigned against the exclusion of the Welsh language from public administration, the law and the schools. He claimed that no Welshman could be socially mobile unless he turned his back on his...
language. It was this which led to the tendency for Welshmen to deprecate themselves and their national status.

Because the Welsh are a conquered people in their own country and because they constitute the assimilative element in the colonies they have lost their strength and self confidence. The Welsh don't believe in their ability to achieve on their own and subsequently their achievements are few. Like slaves, they believe that ability is the prerogative of the master, for which reason their national talents collapse. Because they have been oppressed they tend to become deferent ... presently our main weakness as a nation is our servility.67

Jones was also concerned that the official neglect of and active educational campaign against the Welsh language was contributing to the internalisation of a negative self-image on the part of native speakers. The stigma attached to the Welsh language (see Chapter 3) was the product of 'ignorant English people (who) described the Welsh language as a crude peasant language'.68 There are many instances of the English portraying the extension of English laws, customs, institutions and language to the Celtic fringe as a civilizing mission. Wherever there were signs of resistance, it was reacted against as a challenge to English civilisation and a threat to the security of English rule. It has been suggested that

English bias against the Celts was simply a medieval rendition of a continuing theme of world history - the competition of rival cultures, which advocates of one of them dramatized into a collision of "civilization" with "barbarism". The anti-Celtic attitudes of medieval and modern England had their origins in real institutional and cultural differences, which were, however, sharpened, exaggerated, and moralized by English critics attempting to justify efforts to dominate or destroy the Celtic world.

English hostility toward the "barbarous Scots", the "wild Irish", and the "lazy and fatuous Welsh" survived into the modern era. ... The medieval and modern Celt was, of course, never so bad as his
English critics alleged. Nevertheless, image was more compelling than reality; and the picture of the fierce, brutish, unpredictable, and thoroughly detestable foe, deprived of a reasonable law and a rebel against good morals and the true faith, circulated widely in English literature and helped shape public and private, official and popular attitudes toward the Celtic fringe.

Despairing of fighting off assimilatory pressures from England, Jones was to advocate retreat. He founded, in 1865, a Welsh settlement in Patagonia, a remote part of Argentina. There he hoped to avoid the swamping of Welsh language, religion and culture that was inevitable, he thought, as long as Wales remained a part of the United Kingdom.

In tandem with the spread of industrial and urban processes went the gradual religious conversion of the Welsh. The Reformation imposed Anglicanism on the Welsh, but, beginning in the late eighteenth century, the grip of the established Church began to be loosened. The mass proselytising of Nonconformist sects, Methodists, Baptists and Wesleyans had transformed rural and urban Wales through the Sunday School Movement and the Circulating Schools. The 1851 Religious Census confirmed the eclipse of Anglicanism. Dissenting Chapels outnumbered Anglican Churches by two to one as urban and rural communities built their own places of worship. The break with Anglicanism came about for a number of reasons. Apart from the radical and millennial appeal of nineteenth century nonconformism, there was general dissatisfaction with the privileged position of the Established Church. The Church extracted land tithes, even though the majority of the population owed their allegiance to nonconformity. The Church had also come to be closely identified with the landlord class in rural areas. These were often absentee English landlords and the refusal of the Anglican Church to appoint Welsh speaking clergy, conduct services in Welsh or support any Welsh speaking activities,
served to drive a deep wedge between it and the mass of the monoglot population. It seems now almost inevitable that a religious movement that appealed to the masses in a language they understood, with a message that emphasised hope and the need for change in men and social arrangements, would come to predominate.

The great religious revivals of 1859 and, later, in 1904, served to consolidate the link between nonconformity and Welshness. The 1847 Commission into Education in Wales concluded that the Welsh language was a major obstacle to social progress and political harmony. The Commissioners, all English Anglicans, deplored the survival of the Welsh tongue and, by extension, the activities of the nonconformist Chapels in fostering its use. In their view the adherence of the Welsh people to their language was a major obstacle to the modernisation of Welsh society and ought, therefore, to be eradicated as soon as possible (see Chapter 3).

It was clear by the mid century that nonconformity and Welshness were identified one with the other. Again in the 1851 Religious Census, despite the need for caution in interpreting its results, showed the predominance of nonconformity, with over 80% of those at worship on that Sunday attending Chapel. With Anglicanism claiming only twenty per cent of the population, there was a real possibility that the Church in Wales would face the same fate as that in Ireland, where, in 1869 the Gladstone administration had disestablished the Anglican Church. Dissatisfaction with the tithe system and the disdain that most Anglicans felt for the language of Wales led to demands for the disestablishment of the Church in Wales. It was this issue that was to do more than any other to galvanize a conscious movement for change that was 'nationalistic' in outlook. The goal of disestablishment fused religious and political interests and it drew nonconformist ministers, often the leading figures in many
communities, into a political role. As Evans comments, 'Religion and politics were no longer divorced but went hand in hand'.

As the political life of Wales became dominated by nonconformists, the Chapels became the source of a great spate of pamphlets, newspapers and journals. Increasingly it was the Liberal Party that benefited from this politicisation of religious issues. It was the Liberal Party which embraced those issues of most concern to the Chapels; disestablishment, an emergent radicalism on social questions and a nascent interest in the development of separate institutions that could express a sense of Welsh nationality. The 1868 elections revealed the striking success of Welsh Liberalism. The Liberal party returned twenty one members to the Conservatives twelve, and the rule of the great Tory landed families was at an end. From then until after the First World War, the Liberal Party 'had appeared to cast a spell over the political life of Wales'. Further franchise reforms in the 1880's served merely to consolidate the hold of the Liberal Party over Wales. In every general election between 1865 and 1918, the Liberals won the overwhelming majority of seats, and, in the landslide of 1906, only two out of thirty three Welsh MP's were not Liberals.

The expansion of state education after 1870 and the rapid anglicisation of Welsh cultural life occurred alongside a seemingly contradictory efflorescence of interest in Welsh culture and a drive for new institutions that could express this growing awareness of nationality. At the same time as a notorious entry in the Encyclopaedia Britannica read: 'For Wales - see England', there was a growing interest on the part of the new educated nonconformist middle class in the idea of Welsh nationality. It certainly did not take the form of outright demands for self determination or independence, for, the prosperity of industrial and rural Wales was
thought to be bound up with the Imperial expansion of Britain. But it did embody a fairly widespread concern that the particular cultural and religious character of Welsh society should be accorded greater respect and some institutional focus. It was Conservatism and Anglicanism that stood most firmly against any such recognition.

Fairly typical of metropolitan attitudes towards Wales was the view of Bishop Tickell Jones of St. Davids diocese. In 1886 he declared that Wales was merely a 'geographical expression' and, therefore, undeserving of any special consideration in matters of religion, education or political institutions. This view encapsulates the disdain felt by many leading Anglicans towards any recognition of Welsh nationality. As far as the political leaders of the United Kingdom were concerned there was no 'Welsh Question' that need concern them overmuch. There was, all too obviously, an 'Irish Question' that demanded a response, and Scotland had retained distinct and separate institutions. The Scottish aristocracy were themselves 'the most articulate exponents of Scottish nationality'. The United Kingdom was regarded as a union of three nations only, and any Welsh aspirations for special recognition were dismissed as contemptible or absurd. According to one nineteenth century unionist, 'the Welsh are a conquered race, and have very little regard for their conquerors and even some of the most ignorant are so stupid as to entertain the notions of reclaiming their country from the English'.

In the fifty years between 1830 and 1880 there were clear signs of the emergence of a specifically Welsh set of political and social questions which motivated the leaders of nonconformism and their followers. The founding of the first newspaper in Welsh in 1843 - Yr Amserau (The Times) - was the work of a nonconformist Minister, Dr. William Rees. He brought the activities of European democratic and nationalist movements to the attention of the Welsh reading public.
The writings of Fichte and the struggles for national unification and self-determination of the Italians and the Hungarians attracted Rees, and he ensured that such movements and ideas reached the ears of that sector of the Welsh public disenchanted with London rule.

A crucial influence on Welsh opinion was the struggle for Irish Home Rule. A pressure group modelled on the 'Young Ireland' movement was established in 1888 with the aim of gaining some measure of self-government for Wales. The constitution of Cymru Fydd (Wales to be) included the following:

That the main purpose of the 'Cymru Fydd Society' be to secure a National Legislature for Wales, dealing exclusively with Welsh Affairs, while preserving the relations with the British parliament upon all questions of Imperial interest.

That the society shall assist in securing the return to the House of Commons of thoroughly representative men, who will in the meantime advocate Welsh reforms, in accordance with the national aspiration.

That the society stimulate the Welsh Party to more united and energetic action with regard to Welsh reforms and the interests of Wales...

The emergence of Cymru Fydd as a pressure group within the Liberal Party signalled the triumph of the Home Rule factions within the Liberal Party. It was in 1888 that Scottish Liberals were first committed to the creation of a Scottish Parliament and administration, and it seemed as if allyng nationalistic grievances to the Liberal cause was the most effective way of securing change. The issues which were of most concern to Welsh nonconformity in addition to disestablishment, included, Land reform, improved educational provision in Wales, particularly with regard to the Welsh language, temperance and Sunday observance legislation. Not one of these issues was peculiar to Wales, but each had a particular Welsh dimension and served to fuel opposition to unionism.
Concern with Home Rule *per se* in Wales was never as strong as in Ireland. This was partly because the Welsh experience of English rule had never included the horrors of famine or forced mass migration. Nevertheless branches of Cymru Fydd were set up all over Wales, in Liverpool and London. It was in the 1890's that a Welsh Liberal MP, Alfred Thomas, introduced a National Institutions Bill in Parliament. This proposed the establishment of a Secretary of State for Wales and, among other things, an elected assembly for Welsh self-government. Even though this attempt failed, Welsh Liberals did seek to have the particular demands of the Welsh electorate properly recognised and, in 1881, they succeeded in passing the Welsh Sunday Closing Act to regulate the opening of licensed premises. This Act is significant because it was the first time that legislation was passed by the United Kingdom parliament which recognised Wales as a separate entity from England.

The election of Lloyd George to the House of Commons in 1890 gave a further impetus to this attempt to gain greater recognition of Wales's separate status. By 1887, the Liberal Party had accepted disestablishment and Home Rule as part of its programme, and, in the same year, Welsh MP's sought to delete the language clauses of the sixteenth century Act of Union. The Statute Law Revision Act failed to remove the restrictions on the use of Welsh, but it signifies a growing sense of self-confidence on the part of Welsh Parliamentary representatives. At this time, Welsh nationalism did not entail any commitment to separatism; indeed the leaders of Liberal Wales were often keen to reconcile a demand for a greater degree of self government, whilst taking pride in Wales' full participation in the Imperial venture. Lloyd George, who described himself in Dod's Parliamentary Companion as a Radical and Welsh Nationalist, often referred to the contribution that Wales made to the Empire. The
nationalism of Cymru Fydd recognised that Welsh union with England, provides the best opportunity that Wales could have to deliver her mission... to the world. The closer the connection the better it will be for the purposes of Cymru Fydd; for it is by influencing England that Wales can influence the world. The one condition which is insisted upon is that the connection shall not be closer at the expense of Welsh nationality or at the sacrifice of some national qualities. The voices of England and of Wales should be joined, not in unison, but in harmony. 

Tom Ellis, one of the founders of Cymru Fydd and himself a Liberal MP, recognised that there was no particular groundswell of support for Home Rule in Wales. Parliament refused to acknowledge, through special legislation, the strength of religious dissent in Wales and the demand for statutory action on issues that were close to the heart of nonconformity. K.O. Morgan cites Ellis saying, 'it was the nonconformity of Wales that created the unity of Wales, rather than any spontaneous demand for Home Rule'.

The slogan of Cymru Fydd was, 'To raise the old country to its pristine glory'; such a slogan appealed to youthful intellectuals, intoxicated by the ideology of European nationalism, representatives of the Chapel movement who sought to legislate for a nonconformist Wales, and those urban 'outsider' elites who looked for new institutions that would enhance their sense of national identity whilst also providing new opportunities for their own material advancement. In 1887, for example, the Coal Mines Regulation Act was passed and it recommended that Welsh speaking officials be appointed to various managerial posts in the coal industry. The new generation of University graduates, men like John Edward Lloyd, Herbert Lewis, Thomas Ellis and O.M. Edwards, were deeply conscious of their Welsh nationality, yet they were able to reconcile this within the framework of English Imperialism. They wanted Welsh society to become fully
modernised, prosperous and to play a vital part supplying materials and men for the Empire. All that was asked in return was some recognition of the particular religious, linguistic and cultural characteristics of Welsh society.

The campaign for the establishment of a Welsh university attracted those who wanted to see more opportunities for social mobility, and, although there was a great deal of nationalist rhetoric surrounding the campaign, an early Principal of Aberystwyth wrote;

We Welshmen must acknowledge the greatness of the English nation. They are a greater people than we are. They are so much greater that if we live among them before our mental character is fairly formed, we are crushed or absorbed.

Another Principal of Aberystwyth, T.F. Roberts made it clear that he saw the role of a Welsh university as reinforcing bonds of loyalty to the British Empire. In 1896 he said, 'it is not too much to expect that Wales will soon become as Scotland is now - a great nursery and training ground for the teachers of Empire'. In 1896 a Central Welsh Board was established to oversee Welsh secondary schools and, in 1907, Wales acquired a National Library at Aberystwyth and a National museum in Cardiff.

It is interesting to note that the first attempt to write a modern history of Wales was published in 1901, in the 'Story of Nations' series. The author, O.M. Edwards, a leading educationalist, gives full expression to his romantic interest in literature and pays relatively little attention to the profound effects of industrialisation. The short chapter headed 'The Industrial Revolution' is concerned, mainly, with political and educational matters, and, in his neglect of the industrial expansion of Wales and his ambivalent attitude towards industrialisation, his work presages that of twentieth century Welsh nationalists (see Chapter 4).
It is clear that, to varying degrees, the Welsh Liberal MP's were spokesmen for a type of nationalism that stopped short of outright separation from England. Whereas the majority of European nationalisms of the nineteenth century involved a subject people striving for national self-determination, in the case of Wales, Scotland and Brittany, for example, which had all been incorporated at an early stage in nation building, the struggle tended to emphasise opposition only to the most blatant forms of assimilation. Nineteenth century Welsh and Scottish nationalism rarely directly challenged the Union with England.

To sum up, the industrial expansion of pockets of north and south Wales, and the critical significance of slate, coal and iron and steel to the British economy drew England and Wales into closer bonds of interdependence. Commercial contacts, and the ebb and flow of capital and labour across the border began to erode many of the distinctive features of Welsh society. The following chapter will detail the impact that assimilatory tendencies had on the fortunes of the Welsh language, and the reactions of Welsh nationalists to the decline in the proportions of Welsh people who could speak the language. Industrialisation had profound effects on the balance of the population in Wales with nearly seventy per cent eventually concentrated in two counties. It is a seeming paradox that the idea of Welsh nationality should flourish at the same time as the rise of a more conscious and assertive British Imperialism. It was only in the nineteenth century that some of the legislation of the Acts of Union became implemented, for it was only then that the state was sufficiently powerful to impose 'national' standards across the United Kingdom. Processes of urbanisation and industrialisation also created the conditions under which nonconformity could capture the population. One of the consequences of this was a politicisation of religious
questions and the creation of a literate population who, because of their language and religion, were clearly set apart from others in the United Kingdom. The popularisation of ideologies of national self-government and the emergence of an educated Welsh middle class combined to create political movements, almost exclusively surfacing in the Liberal Party, that championed the establishment of special institutions and legislation that treat Wales as a separate entity. Given that the intention of the sixteenth century Acts of Union was specifically assimilationist, the concessions granted to Welsh pressure groups were significant, for, the 'rediscovery' of nationality in the nineteenth century was to be the basis upon which twentieth century Welsh nationalists were to build.

It was possible to be a Welsh patriot whilst also averring to the superiority of British endeavour. It was common for some nationalists of this period and of this class, to share in the more general pride in the legal, social and political institutions of the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the commercial, military and colonial expansion of Great Britain provided markets for Welsh coal, outlets for ambitious men and women, and a source of pride for the common people of Wales. The manifestations of nationalism were tied up closely with religious ideology. The urban educated middle class, loyal to nonconformity, 'were hungry for knowledge, diversion, and above all for identity and reassurance through the medium of their own language and culture'.

It was nonconformity, and a growing sense of Welsh pride, that were to provide many with this sense of purpose and identity. This occurred at the same time as the immensely increased penetrative and assimilatory power of the British state began to draw Welsh society inexorably into its orbit. Centralising tendencies were such that the English presence became felt in nearly all corners of Wales. This
English migration into Wales provided one of the stimuli for an enhanced sense of Welsh national consciousness. Thus they became the 'outsider' element in the 'insider-outsider' equation. Nationalism involves some awareness of one's 'uniqueness'. It is also more or less, a conscious and deliberate assertion of a group's distinctiveness. As such, it requires the existence of the 'outsider', in order to galvanize what would otherwise be a disparate set of emotions into a conscious celebration of the solidarity of a whole people. R.T. Jenkins wrote that nationalism involves, 'a conscious direction of effort towards some external manifestation which is conceived, rightly or wrongly, to be essential to the well being of the nationality.' 84 He went on to argue that nationalism in Wales 'is a very modern thing, little older (apart from an occasional voice crying in the wilderness) than the second half of the nineteenth century'. 85 In this case it is important to be cautious in distinguishing between cultural pride and full-blown nationalism. Pride in one's language or customs is certainly a powerful bond, but it is not nationalism. It may be the basis upon which a nationalist movement can build, but in and of itself cultural pride is not a sufficient basis for nationalism. 'It is important to remember that Nationalism is a commitment to the nation as a whole, not to an aspect of it'. 86

The sentiment of nationalism in Wales was never strong enough to succeed in gaining a measure of Home Rule. Cymru Fydd disintegrated under the pressure of divisions between its branches in different areas of Wales and the ambitions of its leaders. Gradually, the industrial workers of south Wales started to look for political inspiration in other directions. Early Labour movement organisations began to grow in strength, and the first Labour MP, Keir Hardie, elected in the Merthyr constituency, made clear his support for Home
Rule. Indeed the Labour Party had a firm commitment to self-government for Wales and Scotland in its manifestoe's right up until the Second World War. In 1918, the official party programme Labour and the New Social Order declared Home Rule for Wales an urgent necessity, and the South Wales Labour Federation convened a special conference to discuss the issue. Ramsay Macdonald announced 'one of the most important measures of reconstruction after the War should be self-determination within this kingdom'. Keir Hardie, and other early socialists, were able to combine a class appeal to the proletariat of Wales and Scotland, with a concern for their sense of nationality. Hardie wrote,

I am one of the old fashioned people who place considerable value on National life, customs and language. These are all the growths of the ages and, as such are a part of our very being, and not to be lightly regarded or set aside. No better means for retaining all that is best in the life of a nation has yet been devised than that of a National Parliament, through which national sentiment finds expression and embodiment in the laws of the land.

Not only did the infant Labour Party promise full recognition of Welsh identity through the establishment of an elected assembly for Wales. It was also able to capitalise on the dissatisfaction felt by the industrial working class with political and economic matters. At the same time, the strength and appeal of British Imperialism, and the very real advantages of being tied to the most powerful economic and military power in the world at that time, served to limit the demands to the issues we have reviewed.

The spread of industrialism in Wales served also to weaken the pressure for a measure of self government. It opened up a divisive element between different areas of Wales, in particular between the heavily Welsh speaking, mainly rural north, and the mainly English
speaking, industrialised south. The Cymru Fydd organisation floundered on the suspicion that the north would come to dominate the more populous south in any all-Wales legislature. Increasingly, class conflict cut through the alliances that had existed within Welsh Liberalism, between a nonconformist middle class and a growing working class. The idea that Welsh workers had as much in common with English workers' language, life style, working conditions etc. was to prove so powerful that Liberalism was to disintegrate more rapidly in South Wales than in the rest of the United Kingdom. Because industrial organisation and production served to bind the economies of England and Wales closer, for many, nationalism came to be seen as a recipe for economic disaster, and in the words of one commentator, 'sociologically irrelevant'. The gradual decline of nonconformism weakened the appeal of a Welsh dimension to political loyalties. By the time disestablishment was finally conceded, after the delays of the First World War, it had ceased to be the burning issue it once was. The 'British' patriotism inspired by the First World War, and whipped up by Lloyd George, served to bind Welsh and English closer together.

To sum up, the thirty year period between 1890 and 1920 saw the establishment of several Welsh institutions which were the fruit of the nationalistic fervour of the late nineteenth century and, in some cases, they were established as a reward for continued Welsh support for Liberalism. It is debateable whether these institutions were symbols of any kind of independent Wales. They were not viewed as steps towards independent nationhood but as satisfying the aspirations of particular groups in Wales. In return for overwhelming electoral support for the Liberals (in 1889, 390 out of 590 councillors in Wales were Liberals and all of the County Councils except one were under Liberal control) legislation was enacted that seemed to justify Welsh
demands. Nonconformist Wales eventually achieved its long-standing goal, and, in 1922, the Anglican Church in Wales was disestablished. These concessions to Welsh opinion must not be confused with a movement towards greater autonomy. One writer has claimed, 'these institutions were not seen as part of a separate Welsh existence ... they were regarded as symbolising Wales' contribution to the British and, moreover the British Imperial endeavour'.\(^89\) It is generally acknowledged that, 'The onset of the First World War dealt a crushing blow to the last lingering hopes of the nineteenth-century Welsh nationalists.'\(^90\) Industry, wartime recruitment, geographical mobility and the increasing 'nationalisation' of political loyalties, the spread of a national system of state education after 1870, all served to integrate sections of the Welsh population into the idea that, they were, first and foremost, loyal members of the British state.
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2. E. Kedourie (1961)
7. F. Braudel (1972) p 49.
9. Ibid. p 52.
11. Ibid p 81/2.
24. Ibid. p 397.
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29. Ibid. p 110.
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39. P.S. Crowson (1973) p 64.
41. Statutes at Large 1542 Hen 8 Ch 27-28 p 183 and p 191.
42. Statutes at Large 1535 Hen 8 Ch XXVI p 388.
43. Collected State Papers (1598-9) p.462.
44. Statutes at Large 1535 Hen 8 p.388-9.
45. Cited by Ogwen Williams (1964) p 68.
47. G. Evans p 304.
52. Thomas C. Mendenhall (1953).
For a more detailed account of the expansion of Welsh rural industry see A.H. John (1950).

For a detailed account of Jones' plans and an analysis of this Welsh colony see Glyn Williams (1975). There remains to this day in Argentina a population of several thousand descended from the original Welsh settlers. Many are bilingual Spanish Welsh speakers and they have names which reflect this e.g. Pablo Llywellyn.
CHAPTER THREE

LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Introduction

A cursory review of political conflict in societies as diverse as Canada, Belgium, Yugoslavia, India, the Soviet Union and South Africa, reveals that language is often the symbolic manifestation of group identity, and a powerful symbol of ethnicity. While it would be an overstatement to describe the degree and intensity of intergroup conflict as solely dependent on questions of language, there is little doubt that friction between speakers of 'majority' and 'minority' languages is a recurring feature of contemporary societies. There are few nationalist movements that do not value language as a 'marker', that separates the 'insider' from the 'outsider', and many nationalist movements gained their impetus from, and trace their roots to, philological revivals. As Smith comments, 'Language, if not literature, remains an attractive ingredient for nationalists because it is often the least disputable link with the ideal past, the most tangible element of the collective heritage.' For these reasons the defence of a language that is felt to be beleaguered, or the promotion of one language as opposed to another, can be extremely effective in encouraging or facilitating mass support for social movements along ethnic lines. This is not to claim that language alone can buttress or maintain the distinctiveness of a group, although some nationalist writers argue this. Indeed, some nationalities like the Swiss or the Irish, enjoy a secure sense of identity, without a particular language being of great significance. Nevertheless, the link between language and nationality is curiously binding and extremely resilient, and the loss of a language, or the imposition of an 'outsider' language, with possible suppression of linguistic minorities can be the spark that
ignites inter-group conflict. There has been a tendency, since mediaeval times, to equate language and nationality. The part played by language in nationalist movements is so important that at least one prominent sociologist identifies nationality unequivocally with language. In this, Sorokin was echoing the views of nationalist thinkers from several European movements of the nineteenth century. For example, a leading nineteenth century Norwegian nationalist claimed that,

"The language boundary is the boundary of nationality, the people are recognised and judged according to their language, their spiritual independence, their originality, their moral power, in one word: their right to exist."  

The implications of such a position are readily appreciated by those Welsh nationalists whose main political objective is the protection and promotion of the Welsh language, for, without it, national aspirations are meaningless. For the Welsh nationalist, whose primary loyalty is to the language, their views are summed up by a remark frequently encountered, "a nation without a language is a nation without a heart." This sentiment is given some academic support in the work of Joshua Fishman. As far as Fishman is concerned, language spoken is often the major embodiment of a group's ethnicity given the fact that it can be used to attain and maintain cultural distinctiveness.

Contemporary research in the sociology of language has tended to concentrate on the significance of language for group identity. Some researchers are prepared to conclude that: 'Many social groups can be readily categorized by their distinct language varieties, and for many ethnic and national groups, these can be among the most salient dimensions of their social identities.' Similarly, Glazer and Moynihan claim that the rise of ethnicity across the world has been
associated with the 'politicisation' of language issues, precisely because language has emerged as an important marker of such groups. Taylor and his associates, in a series of studies concerning ethnic identity, found that language was a critical dimension of group identity, and the status of language, particularly a minority language, was closely linked with subjective feelings of the group's sense of social importance.

Contemporary research on language loyalty, carried out mainly by social psychologists, has tended to emphasise the subjective dimension of language identification, and in this respect their work updates themes from earlier philosophical speculations about language and group identity. While Smith feels that the identification of language with nationality is an 'abiding myth', he traces the roots of this myth to the influential work of Herder in the early nineteenth century. The equation of language group with nationality has played a significant part in European social thought. Herder, for example, believed that, language was the 'primary social bond'. Herder claimed that, 'Language expresses the collective experience of the group... every nation has its own inner centre of happiness, as every sphere has its own centre of gravity.' The influence of Herder and Fichte, and other Romantic writers, meant that in European nationalism, language tended to be singled out as the basic ingredient of nations, and, in many cases, as the main concern that fuelled and inspired nationalist movements.

Today, most commentators feel that the legacy of Herder, Fichte and other nineteenth century Romantic writers, exaggerates the role played by language in generating 'national' sentiments or ambitions. Examples of social movements in which language barriers have proven minimal (eg. Pan Arabism) are instructive precisely because they demonstrate that a shared language, literary heritage and a common
cultural history are no guarantee of social and political unity. Reviewing the evidence, Smith concludes that, 'Language by itself only rarely performs the task which that legacy attributed to it, that of providing the social cement for populations.' This does not, of course, mean that language and language variants, are insignificant in mobilising group sentiment. A recent attempt by Jeffrey Ross to develop a conceptual schema which acknowledges the varying responses possible, is worthy of consideration.

Ross outlines four main ways in which language can be mobilised by a group to enhance its own sense of identity. A common pattern involves a dead or dying language, perhaps spoken only in rural backwaters by peasants untouched by modernising processes, until an intellectual elite 'discover' it and begin consciously to promote its use. Their aim is to purify it and revive it as a potent symbol of the group's collective past. Via literature, philological research and strident advocacy, the language is elevated into the distinctive and all-embracing feature of group identity. Ireland provides a good example of such a response, because prominent Irish intellectuals, as part of the campaign for an independent Ireland, demanded the restoration of Gaelic in opposition to the continued use of English, the language of the 'oppressor'. Similarly, in Bohemia in the nineteenth century, certain groups of intellectuals abandoned German and adopted Czech as the symbolic language of their ethnic 'rebirth'. The theme of rebirth is also appropriate in the case of the Zionist success in replacing Yiddish with Hebrew as the language of Israel. For them, Yiddish was associated with oppression and exile, while Hebrew came to symbolise a new assertiveness and confidence in their Israeli statehood and continuity with their ancient history.

A second possible reaction occurs when a native language comes under stress and the perceived threat to its survival becomes the
rallying call for group mobilisation. This may involve measures to defend the language from further decline, as well as attempts to prevent 'pollution' (interference) from the dominant tongue. Foreign vocabulary and syntax must be purged in order to keep pure the language of the forefathers. At the turn of the century the Society for the Promotion of Norwegianness was particularly active in opposing Swedish rule. Part of its strategy was to encourage cultural activities that emphasised the differences between Norway and Sweden, and language 'purification' became one of their goals.17

In modern Wales, the status and the 'purity' of the language have been an important political question. Language campaigners have been concerned, not just about the decline in the proportions of Welsh speakers, but also the extent of English encroachment, especially in those specialist and technical areas where the range of Welsh vocabulary is limited. To rectify this, the University of Wales produces a number of specialist dictionaries with technical terms translated into Welsh, in order to limit the growing influence of English. Language campaigners, in their efforts to prevent the 'adulteration' of the tongue, can take this opposition to English terminology to great lengths. There is no equivalent in the Welsh language for the word 'clutch', as in a motor car. Rather than incorporate the English word, some of my respondents used the Welsh word 'crafanc', which is a literal translation of the word for a bird's talon. (Field notes 8.8.77) Similarly, the Academie Francais will issue dire warnings about the dangers to the French tongue from American and English linguistic 'incursions'.

A third, very common pattern involves an ethnic group that mobilizes its sense of identity by using the language of the dominant group. This may be because the indigenous or original language has become of such little significance that pragmatic considerations rule
out making it a political issue. Scottish nationalists have abandoned a commitment to Gaelic since the mid nineteen thirties, and the contemporary movement seems to be emotionally unmoved by the prospect of its virtual disappearance. 18 Other situations arise where the dominant language becomes the lingua franca which unites disparate groups that would otherwise be divided by their different languages. Ross mentions the example of the Indians of North America in this context. 19

Finally, Ross has a category which involves those situations where there evolves an 'ingroup ethnic patois'. This variant of the dominant language, involving different styles, vocabulary and syntax, functions to maintain and re-inforce group boundaries and to promote and strengthen a consciousness of the group's distinctiveness. Types of 'Black' English spoken in the USA and Britain have served this purpose and are related to changes in the social position of these "racial" groups. 20

It is clear then, that the mobilization of group identity or national awareness will have implications for the politics of language. Because language is frequently seen as the main symbol of the group, for 'it serves as a shorthand for all that makes a group special and unique', 21, changes in the balance of power between majority and minority groups will be reflected in linguistic shifts. Moreover, if the linguistic factor is seen as, 'the rough test of nationality', 22 or as the keynote to a 'common community of purpose', 23 then it is inevitable that language affiliation will become politically charged and a potential source of conflict. The fact that language may not always be the crucial determinant of identity or national consciousness, is indicated in those sociological studies which draw attention to the fact that, among minority groups, religion has been frequently used to reinforce in-group awareness and, thereby,
language maintenance. In the case of Wales, this connection between language, religion and nationality is particularly strong, and helps to explain the particular configuration of beliefs and ideals that characterises the contemporary Welsh nationalist movement.

In their evidence to the Royal Commission on the Constitution (1969-73), Plaid Cymru witnesses based their case for the preservation of the Welsh language, which they felt could only be guaranteed in a separate Welsh nation-state, on the fact that it, 'is the main attribute of our nationality'. We are less concerned with the accuracy or the veracity of this statement than simply recalling W.H. Thomas's dictum, 'If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences'. If significant numbers of Welsh language campaigners and nationalists believe, or come to believe through activity in the party and the Welsh Language Society, that the minority language is the main buttress and support of their distinctive identity, then the status and the relative position of the language will become politicised. However much the nationalists may exaggerate or inflate the symbolic significance of the Welsh language, they resonate, in Gouldner's term, certain 'domain assumptions' about the rightful place of the mother tongue. Consequently, the 'claims, tensions and hostility expressed in the rhetoric cannot stop short of political conflict'.

Clearly, the tensions and conflicts surrounding the language question in Wales would not be as intense if all the participants viewed language as merely instrumental, as just 'the clothes in which we wrap our ideas'. Instead, the standing of the Welsh language is 'intimately bound up with traditions, claims, states of mind, interests and pressures which make it a powerful source of political conflict'. Why the language arouses such passions, and why its future is of such concern to many Welsh people, not all of whom are
nationalists, can only be explained historically. The fate of the
language is intimately bound up with the wider story of the
relationship between Wales and her more powerful neighbour, England.
The remainder of this chapter attempts to answer three questions.
What has been the fortune of the Welsh language since unification with
England? What were the forces, and counter forces, that enabled it to
survive at all into the twentieth century? Why does it motivate, and
divide, opinion within Wales. The Acts of Union that formally
incorporated Wales into the United Kingdom are the starting point for
an answer to these interrelated questions.

The Acts of Union and the Fate of the Language

The Acts of Union of 1536 and 1542, which formally incorporated
Wales with England, had as their main objective the removal of all
distinctions between the two lands that might prove an obstacle to
government and administration. The existence of the Welsh language,
spoken by virtually the whole population of Wales at that time, was
perceived as an obstacle to the unification and political integration
of the two countries. There were, of course, many in Wales who did
have knowledge of English, especially among the gentry, but these Acts
placed the English language in a position of formal superiority. The
Acts annexed Wales, and in the opinion of Coupland, were intended 'to
denationalize the Welsh'. It was mandatory that no Welshman could
hold office unless he knew English, and, in his zeal to put an end to
all 'sinister usages and customs', Henry VIII declared that, in
effect, Welsh would cease to be an officially recognised language.
The Acts of Union declared;

'The people of the same dominion have and
do daily use a speech nothing like nor
consonant to the natural tongue used in
this Realm ... (and went on to declare
its intention to) ... utterly extirp all
and singular usages and customs differing
from the laws of this Realm'.

The stated intentions of the Tudor settlement made it clear that the Welsh language was, henceforward, to be viewed as an obstacle to good government. Section 17 of the Act makes the status of the Welsh language clear.

Also be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, that all justices, escheators, stewards and their lieutenants, and all other officers and ministers of the law, shall proclaim and keep the sessions, courts, hundreds, leets, sheriff's courts and all other courts in the English tongue; and all oaths of officers, juries and inquests and all other affidavits, verdicts and wagers of law to be given and done in the English tongue; and also that from henceforth no person or persons that use the Welsh speech or language shall have or enjoy any manner office or fees with this realm of England, Wales or other the King's Dominion upon pain of forfeiting the same office or fees, unless he or they use and exercise the English speech or tongue.

Nationalists today single out the draconian terms of the Acts, especially with regard to language, as the turning point in the fortunes of Welsh independence. One nationalist writer felt that it was this section of the Act of Union that,

has been responsible, not only for the near extinction of the Welsh language, but also for conditioning the minds of generation after generation of Welsh speakers to endure and foster that process. This section has left its mark, not only upon the comparatively narrow field of the administration of Justice, but also upon every hole and corner of our entire society.

A prominent Welsh Judge declared that, in his opinion, 'If this Act had not come into force, Britain today would officially be a bilingual country, as are Belgium and Switzerland. An early seventeenth century book engraving depicted several of the languages of Europe as young women. This dictionary of 1659 pictures the English, Spanish,
French and Italian languages as elegant and attractive young ladies conversing in pleasant outdoor surroundings. In contrast the British (ie Welsh) language is shown as a woman set apart, with helmet and stave a tough warrior maiden unworthy of the company of genteel and sophisticated ladies. Many were convinced that the language was in terminal decline and looked forward to its demise. In 1682 William Richards declared:

The native gibberish is usually prattled throughout the whole taphydome, except in their market towns, whose inhabitants being a little rais'd, and (as it were) pufft up into bubbles, above the ordinary scum, do begin to despise it ... tis usually cashier'd out of gentlemen's houses ... the lingua will be English'd out of Wales.

Given the explicit exclusion of the Welsh language from legal and administrative circles, it is surprising that the language survived into the twentieth century at all. Official policy in the areas of law and government, however, was effectively undercut by the decision to translate the Bible and the Book of Common Prayer into Welsh in 1588 and 1567 respectively. If the Welsh were to be converted from Catholicism, they had to be provided with a Prayer Book and a Bible in a language they could understand. The first printed Welsh book, published in 1546/7, was a translation of the Lords Prayer, the Commandments and the Creed. A Parliamentary Act of 1563 ordered the five bishops of Wales and Hereford to ensure that the Bible and Prayer Book were translated into Welsh by March 1st, St. Davids Day, 1567. Bishop William Morgan, writing to Queen Elizabeth in 1588 is quoted as saying, 'Let them beware lest they obstruct the truth in their eagerness for uniformity ... There is no doubt that likeness in religion is a far stronger bond of union than uniformity of language'.

Most historians of Welsh society are agreed in attributing the
survival of the language to these, apparently, religious decisions. Of course, the motives for translation had little to do with any desire to retain the language. The social control function of religion, and the fear that an imposition of English language worship on the Welsh peasantry would weaken the ties and obligations to the official Church, are more significant factors. The Reformation made it essential that religious teaching made an impact on the ordinary people, who were, of course, overwhelmingly Welsh-speaking. The consensus among historians is summed up by Williams and Roberts.

The Reformation facilitated the position of religion as the ideological fulcrum for the legitimization of the expansion of state interests, and the translation of the Bible into Welsh expanded this ideological function within a country whose population was virtually monoglot. Given that the limited amount of educational instruction was controlled and administered by the church, the potential sphere of its ideological influence was extensive.

As was pointed out in Chapter 2, one of the consequences of the Tudor ascendancy was the gradual anglicisation of the Welsh gentry. The court in London drew to it most of the noblemen and landowners of substance. As these became English in speech and manner, a linguistic and cultural separation was added to the cleavage of class. The need to retain the loyalty of the Welsh to the Crown and its newly adopted Protestant religion, was the major impetus for the dissemination of religious literature in Welsh. In effect, according to Glanmor Williams,

Welsh had become the language of religion. This had profound consequences for the future, it may well have done more than anything else to safeguard the continued existence of the language at all. Quite definitely it ensured its survival as a literary language for the Bible became the standard and safeguard for all future Welsh literary expression.
The translation of the Bible into Welsh was enormously influential for it gave impetus to the language as a written medium at a time when the prospect was of it becoming a purely oral language. The translation certainly reinforced the efforts of those who were spearheading the Protestant Reformation in Wales.

We have the light of the Gospel, yea the whole Bible in our native tongue ... whereas the Service and Sacraments in the English tongue was a stranger to many or most of the simplest sort.

As a consequence, the Welsh Bible became the staple reading of thousands of Welsh men and women, and this made possible the mass religious conversions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the dissemination of many other religious tracts in the native tongue, and the survival of the language into the twentieth century.

This is an example of official policy having far-reaching and unintended consequences, for, developments over the next two centuries after the Act of Union saw little, if any, diminution in the proportions of Welsh speakers. What happened in Wales was that the native language became the language of religion. Not only did religious translations continue, but for a century after the dire pronouncements about Welsh having no official standing or recognition, there occurred the publication in Welsh of a number of grammars, dictionaries and religious and didactic works.

A highly developed literary culture is only likely to be sustained and flourish in a courtly and urban milieu. Since the collapse of Welsh feudalism, and the steady assimilation of the Welsh gentry into the London court, no such fertile ground existed in Wales. It was concern for the religious well-being of the Welsh, reinforced of course by motives of preserving the established order and forestalling social tumult, that accounts...
for the publication of by far the greater majority of Welsh books. It is the same motives that explain the efforts made to circulate books more widely and cheaply and to multiply the number of those able to read them.

Despite the rather sweeping condemnations of the Welsh language in the Acts of Union, the actual effect on the destiny of the language was not immediately felt. Indeed for several centuries after unification, it is likely that the vast majority of Welsh continued to use the 'old tongue' sustained by its legitimate use in religious life.

Language and Religion

Many seventeenth and eighteenth century historical accounts of Welsh society read more like religious histories. The 'great men' recorded are usually not statesmen or politicians but preachers and revivalists. The events commemorated are more likely to be Wesleyian gatherings and the distribution of thousands of religious tracts, rather than battles or victories. The activities of the 'Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge' and 'the Circulating Schools Movement' of Griffith Jones are regarded as the key factors in explaining the drive, and the success, of mass literacy campaigns. For Williams, 'They represent the most striking experiment in mass religious education undertaken anywhere in Great Britain or its colonial possessions in the eighteenth century'. He quotes claims made by the religious educator, Griffith Jones, that 150,000 children were taught to read Welsh and twice that number of adults. Even if we treat these figures with a degree of scepticism, and recognise the difficulty of quantifying literacy at this time with any degree of precision, it is clear that the activities of these popular educators were to result in a Welsh population who were literate, and still speaking their language, three hundred years after it was officially
relegated to an inferior position. The 1847 Report of the Commissioners on the State of Education in Wales - 'especially into the means afforded to the labouring classes of acquiring a knowledge of the English language' was forthright in its condemnation of the Welsh language. Nevertheless the Commissioners acknowledged the impact that religious teaching had on levels of literacy

Cut off from, or limited to a purely material agency in, the practical world, his mental faculties, so far as they are not engrossed by the hardships of rustic, or the intemperance of manufacturing life, have hitherto been exerted almost exclusively upon theological ideas. In this direction too, from causes which it is out of my province to particularize, he has moved under the same isolating destiny, and his worship, like his life, has grown different from that of the classes over him ... the Sunday Schools exhibit the most characteristic development of native intellect, and the efforts of a mass of people, utterly unaided, to educate themselves upon their own model. These schools have been almost the sole, they are still the main and most congenial centres of education. Through their agency the younger portion of the adult labouring classes in Wales can generally read, or are in the course of learning to read the Scriptures in their mother tongue. A fifth of the entire population is returned as attending these schools; half of this number is returned as being able to read the Scriptures.41

It must be stressed that, 'The motive force behind much of this activity was socio-religious - a desire to save souls and make good citizens'. Griffith Jones said that he was not concerned with the fate of the language 'abstractly considered'. His solicitude was centred on the 'myriads of poor ignorant souls who must launch forth into the dreadful abyss of eternity and perish for want of knowledge'.42
Industrialisation and the State of the Language

Although the Welsh language remained the tongue of the vast majority of Welsh men and women for three hundred years after the Acts of Union, events in the nineteenth century were to lead to a steady but inexorable advance of English. The process of industrialisation, which so dramatically transformed the valleys of south east Wales, altered the demographic structure of Welsh society, and, for the first time there was a continuous flow of migrant labour into Wales.

Clearly it was not industrialisation per se which undermined the Welsh language, but the influx of English speaking labourers into formerly Welsh speaking areas. Before the first Census of 1801 it is possible to give only rough estimates of the total population of Wales. Usually, historians estimate the population at around half a million people, scattered fairly evenly throughout the land, more thinly in the hilly areas, more thickly in the valleys. Throughout the nineteenth century the increase in population was relatively greater than any other part of the British Isles. In the ten years from 1801 to 1811, for example, it increased from 600,000 to 670,000 and towns such as Cardiff, Merthyr and Newport grew to a considerable size. By 1851 the population had risen to a million, and by 1921 to two and a half million. As far as the fortunes of the language were concerned, the following table summarises the statistical data for the period 1891 to 1981.
TABLE 1: PROPORTION OF PEOPLE AGED 3 AND OVER SPEAKING WELSH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Welsh speakers as % of total population of Wales</th>
<th>Numbers of Welsh speakers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>898 914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>929 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>977 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>928 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>909 261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>714 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>656 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>547 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>529 200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of Population Census and Surveys.

The inter-census changes expressed as a percentage show a decline of 48.7% between 1911, the peak year for numbers of Welsh speakers and 1981. Of even more concern to language loyalists were the 1981 Census returns of proportions of the population speaking Welsh by age.

TABLE 2: CENSUS DATA ON PERCENTAGES OF WELSH SPEAKERS BY AGE 1961-1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age last birthday</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 and over</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of population Census and Surveys.

The 1961 Census returns showed a seemingly inexorable decline of the Welsh language with, most ominous of all, the proportions of children able to speak Welsh falling dramatically, although the slight percentage rise of 3 to 9 year olds speaking Welsh gave new hope to language campaigners that the long term decline could be halted. This decline is a backcloth to the campaigns and concerns of linguistic
nationalists, and the conviction that Welsh will disappear altogether in the next two or three generations adds urgency to their political agitation on behalf of the language.

Explanations for this decline usually concentrate on the fact, referred to earlier, that the industrialisation of South Wales attracted immigrants from Ireland and England, with the consequence that English rapidly became the lingua franca of the coalfield and the iron-smelting towns. The scale of the 'redistribution' of population was so great that assimilation of English speakers into the Welsh language communities was impossible. Several writers focus on the "deleterious" consequences of industrialisation and urbanisation for the language, and a recurrent theme in Plaid Cymru ideology is an antipathy to industrialism (see Chapter 4). But there is some disagreement about the precise relationship between these wider socio-structural changes and language decline. Brinley Thomas in Welsh Nation claimed that, 'it is a commonplace of the nationalist creed that the economic growth of Wales in the last century was seriously inimical to the nation's culture and language.' However, the validity of this thesis has come under scrutiny. Thomas, for example, claims that 'the Welsh language was saved by the redistribution of a growing population brought about by industrialisation'. In advancing this argument, parallels are made with the situation in Ireland, where agricultural stagnation and rural depopulation were key factors in the decline of the language.

The authors of The Place of Welsh and English in the Schools of Wales stated unequivocally that 'it is true and obvious that industrialism has been an alien factor in the pattern of our lives ... in so far as they are related to industrialism the causes of the anglicisation have been secondary rather than direct; they arose from the manner in which industrialisation was introduced and developed
rather than from the nature of the industrial ethos'. E.G. Millward takes the position that industrialisation did not contribute, in any way, to the survival of the Welsh language. Along with others, he argued that the influx of English and Irish labourers into South Wales, transformed Welsh speaking communities and undermined the culture and the language of Welsh areas. He suggests that;

until the First World War, the period 1850-1913 ... the Welsh society in the industrial areas of South Wales was strong enough to successfully resist anglicising influences and to assimilate the growing numbers of immigrants from England. After the war, the closely-knit, populous Rhondda soon became easy prey for the anglicising influences already close at its heels at the beginning of the twentieth century, and we have witnessed a catastrophic decline in the Welsh language so dreadfully sudden that it is difficult to believe that emigration from rural Wales to England (had the industrial revolution not taken place) would have had a worse effect on the language.

The emphasis placed on the industrialisation of South Wales, as an explanation of the decline of 'traditional' culture and values, is characteristic of Welsh nationalist ideology, although some historians, too, follow this line of reasoning. Williams, for example, argues that the number of immigrants who poured into south Wales was just too large to be assimilated, and he claims that, 'when enough English speakers came in not to have to learn Welsh to maintain normal social existence, a community became bilingual and from there it was but a short step to becoming predominantly English in speech'. Although this argument is plausible, and there is evidence to justify it, the role of state education was of greater and more lasting significance. Unlike other countries, and Ireland is frequently mentioned in this context, Wales's rural exodus did not lead to 'a massive out-migration of people taking with them their
native tongue, culture and consciousness'. Instead, it was the gradual growth of state education in the nineteenth century that had the most lasting impact on the status of the Welsh language. Glanmor Williams concludes that there was nothing specific about industrialisation that encouraged a shift from English to Welsh. He suggests that:

Industrialisation was ... transforming the potentialities of Welsh social and cultural life. It gave rise to a phenomenal internal migration ... most of the inhabitants of the industrial areas were Welsh by origin, speech and culture. In this context there was a marked difference between them and the Irish and Gaelic speakers ... The Welsh in their search for industrial employment were not obliged to abandon their language along with their rural homes. They could take Welsh with them to new industrial towns and villages - they even contrived to do so very successfully in London or Liverpool or Manchester as well as in Wales.

Whatever the judgement of historians, the equation of language loss and industrial development has been remarkably tenacious in nationalist circles. When, in 1926, Plaid Cymru was formed, with the restoration of the language as its central aim, the antipathy towards urban and industrial existence was a recurring leitmotif. (See Chapter 4).

**Language and Education**

By the middle of the nineteenth century in Britain the role of education in socialising the growing urban proletariat into 'respectable' attitudes, and its social control function in innoculating the 'dangerous classes' against the appeal of Chartism, had been recognised. In 1846 a Member of Parliament called for the establishment of a Commission to investigate the state of education in Wales. In his speech he drew attention to the fact that education had
played an important part in eradicating cultural differences between the English and the Scots. In 1840 the Tremenheree Report quoted favourably the fact that,

It should be borne in mind that an ill-educated and undisciplined population exists among the miners in South Wales, is one that may be found most dangerous to the neighbourhood in which it dwells and that a band of efficient schoolmasters is kept at much less expense than a body of police or soldiery.

It had also been suggested that ignorance of the English language had been a contributory factor in the rural disturbance in Wales in the 1830's known as the 'Rebecca Riots'. For five years between 1839 and 1844, South Wales was the scene of sporadic protests against the abuse of the turnpike trust system. Farmers, in particular, objected to the erection of toll gates and the increased revenues charged on the movement of goods and cattle over long distances. The rioters, dressed as women, attacked the toll gates and demonstrated in the towns. Prominent Chartists were involved in the protests and there was rioting in areas across the whole of rural south Wales. The disturbances came to an end after a Government Commission of Enquiry recommended the amalgamation of all the trusts within each county, which led to a reduction in the tolls charged. 52

It was from this point that the measures first propounded in the Acts of Union of the sixteenth century began to be more rigorously applied. The 1846 Commission into the State of Education in Wales was set up as a result of pressure by a Welsh born MP for Coventry, William Williams. A three man commission, all English speaking, were appointed to investigate the state of Education in the Principality. They were charged with examining ways in which a knowledge of the English language might be encouraged amongst the Welsh speaking labouring classes. Given the relatively high level of literacy in
Wales, and the success of Nonconformism in spreading written and spoken Welsh, the terms of the Commission, and their concentration on the state of schooling, were bound to lead to some controversy. In the event, when the Blue Books were published, there was outrage from the leaders of Welsh society. The picture painted of Welsh schooling was, in many ways, quite predictable, and little different from similar studies of state education in England, or, for that matter, the USA. Both schools and teachers were said to be thoroughly unsuitable and the condition of buildings and other resources were condemned as completely inadequate. The reason why the Commission's report became known in Wales as the 'Treason of the Blue Books' (Brad y Llyfrau Gleision), particularly in nationalist and nonconformist circles, was their particular response to the Welsh language. Many of the shortcomings of Welsh education were laid firmly at the feet of the language, and its survival was singled out as the biggest single obstacle to social progress. Nonconformity and the language were the twin causes of educational backwardness and every possible social evil, from sexual immorality to petty theft, was judged the responsibility of the Welsh language. Among some of the comments of the Commissioners Report are:

'The Welsh language is a vast drawback to Wales and a manifold barrier to the moral progress and commercial prosperity of the people... It bars the access of improving knowledge to their minds... Because of their language, the mass of the Welsh people are inferior to the English in every branch of practical knowledge and skill... (and in the administration of justice) the evil of the Welsh language is obviously and fearfully great... It distorts the truth, favours fraud, and abets perjury. (They) are lacking in cleanliness and decency and have a general disregard of temperance, chastity, veracity and fairdealing. (Sexual permissiveness is) the besetting sin... the peculiar vice of the Principality. The unmarried male farm servants range the country at night, and
it is a known and tolerated practice that they are admitted by the women servants at the houses to which they come. I heard the most revolting anecdotes of the gross and almost bestial indelicacy with which sexual intercourse takes place on these occasions.

So grim was the picture painted of Welsh society that there was an outcry from the leaders of Nonconformism, who, had done so much to perpetrate the legitimate use of the tongue in a religious context. Whilst the leaders of the educated and widely read Welsh middle class gloried in the ancient literature of Wales, and prided themselves on the part played by the Chapels in raising 'moral standards', the government report claimed that Wales was 'settling down into the most savage barbarism' and the habits of the people were 'those of animals and do not bear description'. Furthermore, the Report claimed that, 'There is no Welsh literature worthy of the name'.

The depiction of 'outsider' groups as feckless, immoral, dirty, lazy etc. is a common feature of situations where power imbalances are such that the 'insiders' can attribute to themselves those characteristics that are viewed with esteem, and, conversely, condemn less powerful groups and attempt to stigmatise their behaviour. In matters of religion, language, cultural background and social class, the Commissioners, who condemned the Welsh as uncivilised or barbaric, inhabited a different world. They were upper class, Anglican and English commenting on lower class, nonconformist Welsh people. Given the prevailing social norms, it would have been surprising if their judgement had been any different. One commissioner complained,

... I have found no class of schools in which an attempt had been made to remove the first difficulty which occurs to a Welsh child at the very commencement of his course of instruction in consequence of his ignorance of English language. Every book must be written in English; every subject of instruction must be studied in English, and every addition to his stock of knowledge in grammar,
geography, history or arithmetic, must be communicated in English words; The scandal of the Blue Books had different consequences and repercussions in England and Wales. In England, the Welsh language came to be identified firmly with 'peasant backwardness', and an obstacle to assimilation. An 1852 Report revealed official thinking:

Whatever encouragement individuals may think it desirable to give to the preservation of the Welsh language on grounds of philological or antiquarian interests, it must always be the desire of the government to render its Dominions, as far as possible, homogeneous, and to break down barriers to the freest intercourse between the different parts of them. Sooner or later, the difference of language between Wales and England will probably be effaced ... and they are not the true friends of the Welsh people, who, from a romantic interest in their manners and traditions, would impede an event which is socially and politically so desirable for them.

From the vantage point of the administrators and strategists of the English state, the 'uncivilised' behaviour of the Welsh peasantry, their allegiance to a form of religious worship that emphasised millennial hopes, and their use of a foreign tongue, were all interrelated. The proper absorption of the peoples of Wales into the British state had to involve an assault on the language, religion and 'way of life' of these 'outsider' groups. The drive towards the homogenisation of society is part of that process which, according to Elias, involves, 'the establishment of increasingly large, internally pacified but externally belligerent units of integration', which has consequences for the 'change of the pattern of drive control and the social standard of conduct -for the civilizing process'.

Understanding of the way in which state activities grew, and of the expansion of those areas in which a state monopoly comes to be seen as legitimate, forms one of the key insights of sociological
contributions to the study of state formation processes. Elias emphasizes how the centralising process within nation states leads to a reduction in the contrasts within society as within individuals, this peculiar commingling of patterns of conduct deriving from initially very different social levels is highly characteristic of Western society. It is one of the most important peculiarities of the "civilizing process". But this movement of society and civilization certainly does not follow a straight line. Within the overall movement there are repeatedly greater or lesser counter-movements in which the contrasts in society and the fluctuations in the behaviour of individuals, their affective outbreaks, increase again.

At the ideological level, none other than Matthew Arnold was invoked to justify, in educational terms, the integration of the Welsh via the eradication of the Welsh language. Arnold argued,

The fusion of all the inhabitants of these islands into one homogeneous, English-speaking whole, the breaking down of barriers between us, the swallowing up of separate provincial nationalities, is a consummation to which the natural course of things irresistibly tends ... the sooner the Welsh language disappears as an instrument of the practical social life of Wales, the better; the better for England, the better for Wales itself. Traders and tourists do excellent service by pushing the English wedge farther and farther into the heart of the principality; Ministers of Education, by hammering it harder and harder into the elementary schools.

Arnold went on to celebrate the particular contribution of 'Celtic' culture to the sense of unity of the British. Indeed he saw the fusion of Celtic, Saxon and Latin elements as resulting in the particular 'genius' of the British. Whilst Arnold elevated the study of Cornish, Irish and Welsh literature - in English translation of course - as having a unique contribution to make to the sense of
historical continuity of the British people, the actual Celtic languages themselves were destined for obsolescence. For, if every Englishman had within his cultural roots, a large dose of Celtic inheritance, then the actual 'superficial' differences of language could be removed. Arnold's advice to Welsh writers was:

> For all serious purposes in modern literature ... the language of a Welshman is and must be English ... For all modern purposes, I repeat, let us all as soon as possible be one people; let the Welshman speak English, and if he is an author, let him write English.

One of the 1847 Commissioners was able to report that, 'All are forbidden to speak Welsh in school, and are encouraged to speak English in play-hours, by which means it is making rapid progress in the town and the neighbourhood.' On the basis of statements such as these, and bolstered by government reports that enquired into the state of language and education in the Principality, a consensus emerged in 'official' circles that Welsh ought not to be encouraged in the school curriculum. With the introduction of the 1870 Education Act, this was to have serious implications for the future of the language. In the view of Williams and Roberts, any incursions by Welsh into the school curriculum since 1847 have taken the form of, 'concessions, rather than being viewed as a right'.

Whilst the views of the 1847 Commissioners, given a sophisticated rationalisation by Arnold and others, were accepted quite uncritically by English administrators and educationalists, in Wales there was an outcry. Coupland's verdict is that the affair of the Blue Books 'stung Welsh nationalism alive...All Wales... was up in arms'. The publication of the Commission's findings had the quite unintended consequence of crystallizing a sense of opposition to 'English rule' and the sense of distinctiveness of sections of the
Welsh intelligensia became dependent, as they saw it, on the twin factors of religion and language. The astonishing success of nonconformism in Wales had effectively separated the vast bulk of the population from their Anglican and anglicised masters. Mention has already been made of the efforts of sects like the Baptists and the Independents to educate their humble congregations. Consequently, the struggle over the role of language in education was not only about the supremacy of English. Several of the Nonconformist groups opposed state intervention in education *tout court*. Their view was that religion and education were matters for community control, and their efforts to disestablish the Anglican Church in Wales went hand in hand with opposition to compulsory state education following the 1870 Act.

**Language and social stratification**

Contemporary studies of Welsh communities, particularly rural villages, have focussed on the distinctions between Welsh and English speakers, and noted the marked tendency for the language division to follow class boundaries. The historical legacy of religious affiliation, language, loyalty and class identity was noted by, among others, Frankenberg.

The industrial and agricultural experience of the past confronted Welsh speaking, Nonconformist, Liberal wage earners and tenant farmers with Anglicized, Tory landlords and employers, as were Welsh workers elsewhere in Wales. English and Welsh were almost synonymous with landlord and tenant or capital and labour. As has often been pointed out, Disraeli's description of employers and employed as two *nations* applied literally to Wales.

The growth of Nonconformity among the rural tenantry and the urban working class was in sharp contradistinction to the Anglican loyalties of the gentry and their land stewards. The growth of a numerous
middle class of shopkeepers, tradesmen and professionals, made possible by the Industrial Revolution, swelled the ranks of nonconformist chapels. To the difference of language was added the difference of religion and class position.

The works themselves contain no middle class. There are the proprietors and their agents of administration on the one hand, the mass of operatives on the other. The elimination of a middle class is rendered still more complete, when to the economical causes tending to produce it, is superadded the separation of language.

In the words of David Williams, 'the cleavage between the landowning class and the rest of the nation was widened'. 67 This view probably exaggerates the extent to which the 'intermediary' sections of the middle class polarised along ethnic lines. Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation had created not just clergy, teachers and managers, but the commercialisation of agriculture had diversified the rural class structures. The peripheral elites became drawn to the metropolitan centres, resulting in what Hechter describes as the 'progressive estrangement of the gentry from their customary tenants in each of the Celtic lands'. 68

Inevitably, the close bonds of interdependence that had existed in the countryside became replaced by relations that are less 'intimate'; the tenant farmers become 'mere rent payers'. [He] intended to exact as much as he could from them, either by law or customary right.

This process of anglicization did not necessarily involve actual physical removal from Wales, but it did involve a certain effort at mental separation of landlord and tenant. The conscious rationale behind anglicization among the peripheral elite was to dissociate themselves as much as possible from the mass of their countrymen, who were so strongly deprecated by the English culture. Thus, they eagerly learned to speak English in the home, to emulate
English manners and attitudes, to style their very lives on the English model. In effect, this was a voluntary renunciation of their national origins.

At the higher levels of commerce and finance, the English language predominated, especially as many of the entrepreneurs who had exploited the coal and iron of the South Wales valleys were themselves English in origin. In fact, most of the industrialisation of Wales was accomplished with English capital and managerial expertise. The migrant workforce from England were, to some extent, privileged on account of their origins;

In the industrial areas the iron-masters, many of whom had their origins in English middle class dissent, became allied through marriage and association, with the gentry and adopted their anglicanism. Seldom did Welsh workmen attain to high administrative posts. 'In the works' says a government investigator, in 1847, 'the Welsh workman never finds his way into the office. He never becomes either clerk or agent. He may become an overseer or contractor, but this does not take him out of the labouring and into the administering class'. The English speaking landowner and the iron-master were anglicans the Welsh-speaking tenant and industrial worker became increasingly noconformist.

This tentative evidence of a cultural division of labour is developed by Hechter in his formulation of the 'internal colonialism' thesis. Briefly, Hechter suggests that the spatial diffusion of industrialisation in the United Kingdom, demonstrates the impact of 'core' areas in colonising the periphery. Historical evidence showing rates of economic growth and the concentration of commercial interests in the hands of English owners, is utilised by Hechter to show that even in the most developed societies differential patterns of growth have tended to persist. He argues that,

Despite centuries of inter-regional economic transactions, a recent compilation of regional statistics of the United Kingdom ranks Wales and Scotland
generally lowest among the British regions (Northern Ireland is excepted from the data) on a host of indicators of economic and social development, relating to employment, housing, education, health, environment, and personal income.

An unstated assumption that underpins such an hypothesis is the ideologically questionable notion of 'balanced' economic development. However, an adequate consideration of the thesis of 'internal colonialism' would require a detailed economic analysis which is beyond the scope of this thesis. In the 1847 Royal Commission the relationship between language and stratification is referred to thus:

My district exhibits the phenomenon of a peculiar language isolating the mass from the upper portion of society ... Whether in the country, or among the furnaces the Welsh element is never found at the top of the social scale, nor in its own body does it exhibit much variety of gradation. In the country, the farmers are very small holders, in intelligence and capital nowise distinguished from labourers. In the works, the Welsh workman never finds his way into the office. He never becomes either clerk or agent. He may become an overseer or sub-contractor, but this does not take him into the administering class. Equally in his new, as in his old, home, his language keeps him under the hatches, being one in which he can neither acquire nor communicate the necessary information. It is a language of old fashioned agriculture, of theology, and of simple rustic life, while all the world about him is English.

He jealously shrinks from holding any communion with classes either superior to, or different from, himself. His superiors are content, for the most part, simply to ignore his existence in all its moral relations. He is left to live in an under-world of his own, and the march of society goes so completely over his head, that he is never heard of, excepting when the strange and abnormal features of a Revival or a Rebecca or Chartist outbreak call attention to a phase of society which could produce anything so contrary to all that we elsewhere experience.
To sum up, the changing nature of agricultural productive relations in the nineteenth century, and the commercialization of rural enterprise, imposed new patterns of domination on the Welsh peasantry. Landlords were thoroughly anglicised in language, religion and sentiment and they imposed via their stewards, a more ruthless regime. According to one commentator, the English land stewards, often took great delight in more effectively attuning an easy-going peasantry to the requirements of a commercial market. Such was the Welsh peasant's introduction of the Englishman at close quarters that the stewards as a class were despised and a widespread anti-English feeling in the rural areas arose.

Similarly in the urban areas, it has been suggested that there was sectarian strife between English and Welsh labourers that tended to be exacerbated by the fact that the foremen and overseers were, on the whole, English, and they tended to discriminate against Welsh Nonconformists when men had to be laid off. 75

In the years after 1870 and the introduction of compulsory schooling in English only, the fate of the language was in the hands of the schoolmasters. Whilst it was comparatively easy to exclude the Welsh language from formal instruction, actually outlawing its use in school playgrounds and in other informal settings was more of a challenge. The answer was the infamous 'Welsh Not', a wooden block and chain used in schools throughout Wales from 1870 until the early years of the twentieth century. This device was hung around the neck of the first child that the school teacher overheard speaking Welsh. The child wearing it at the end of the school day was beaten, consequently there was an onus on the child to catch his school mates speaking the forbidden language to avoid the punishment. The method was also used with successful results in Brittany in an attempt to undermine use of the Breton language.
Although present-day nationalist writers concentrate on the systematic suppression of the Welsh language, there is certainly evidence that, as English became identified with upward mobility and educational achievement, sections of Welsh speakers began to turn their backs on their native tongue. Gradually, English became the language of ambition and mobility. One of the members of the 1969 Royal Commission on the Constitution, charged with investigating the devolution issue, commented in one of the sessions that took verbal evidence:

I was brought up in the Rhondda Valley, and my neighbours as a sign of their respectability chose not to use the Welsh language. Nobody forced them, but it was a status symbol that they spoke English with one another and brought up their children in English.

Later, in the same session, another witness told the Commission;

Why was it that we grew up not knowing Welsh? It was largely a question of status; a consciousness—never expressed but clearly there—that Welsh was the language of the peasant past, that language of the very small holdings my grandfather came from in Carmarthenshire. English represented the language of achievement and success, the language of progressive employment. This was linked with the intangible features—lack of self-confidence ... because of its association with past generations of Welsh people.

Another Welshman wrote:

All the Welsh boys I knew spoke English to each other after they began to go to school. We spoke Welsh before school days. Their social habits, but for the difference of the chapel, were those of their English neighbours. They knew Welsh enough to be able to talk it during holidays in Wales, indeed a little bad Welsh would add to their prestige as little gentlemen who after all did not disdain Welsh, and whose little slips bespoke familiarity with highly placed English.
Once the English language came to be seen as the language of mobility, 'progress' and advancement, it was a short step to regard Welsh as symbolising all the characteristics of 'backwardness' that the 1847 Commissioners had laid at its feet. Even in 1847 there was some acknowledgement that the attachment to Welsh might be broken if English was viewed uncompromisingly as the language of mobility and the future,

On the manifold evils inseparable from an ignorance of English I found but one opinion expressed on all hands. They are too palpable, and too universally admitted, to need particularizing. Yet, if interest pleads for English, affection pleads for Welsh ... Probably you could not find in the most purely Welsh parts a single parent, in whatever class, who would not have his child taught English in school; yet every characteristic development of the social life into which that same child is born - preaching - prayer meetings - Sunday Schools - club biddings - funerals - the denominational magazine, all those exhibit themselves to him in Welsh as their natural exponent, partly, it may be, from necessity, but in some degree also, from choice.

In four or five decades, the expansion of compulsory state education and the monopolisation of 'managerial' positions in the industrial and rural class structure, transformed the position of Welsh into a minority language with little social standing and no 'market supremacy'. With no official status and few socio-economic props, it was almost inevitable that the language would decline. 'To the average Welshman ... Welsh is associated with grandparents, kinfolk, village Wales'. As long as linguistic groups systematically devalue their own language, then this is, perhaps, a case of them gradually internalising a negative self-image.
Language and Political Conflict

Since the founding of Plaid Cymru in 1926, the party has elevated the Welsh language into a central place in their crusade, and its survival and restoration has been a core value of party activists. Saunders Lewis, the poet, novelist and playwright who played a leading part in establishing Plaid Cymru, believed that the crisis facing the Welsh language was the only political task worthy of a nationalist party. What motivated him, and the handful of intellectuals who joined with him in founding Plaid Cymru, was the need to rescue the language from further decline. An impression of the centrality of language to the identity of Welsh nationalists is provided by a recent writer;

For centuries the Welsh identity has not been political or institutional but linguistic and literary and in the last two centuries, religious. 'May the old language continue' says our national anthem. What else could it ask us to preserve?

Allied to the notion of the language as the defining characteristic of Welsh ethnicity, was the belief that the decline of the language presaged a disastrous collapse of 'traditional' culture and its associated values. For the founding fathers of twentieth century Welsh nationalism, the 'degenerated' state of the cultural life of the people was linked with the diffusion of urban and industrial ways of life. Their task, as they saw it, was to bring about the rebirth of a distinctive Welsh culture that had, supposedly, flourished in the distant past. This had been undermined, and eventually corrupted by the imposition and penetration of the English language and its culture. The only solution lay in a political goal that placed the language in a position of pre-eminence.

Welsh education must be made Welsh in spirit and in language. Priority must be given in the school's syllabus to Welsh literature and Welsh should be made the
sole medium of education from the elementary school to the university. Thus, every child in Wales, whatever his mother-tongue, will inherit Welsh culture and the language which is the only key to that culture. That language must be Wales' only official language, the language of the Government in Wales, the language of every county, town and district Council, of the council workers themselves and of the law courts. Every public medium that broadcasts information, that teaches or entertains the country, such as the wireless, must also be in Welsh, and used to strengthen and elevate the Welsh concept. In a word, the whole of Welsh social life and every instrument of social life must be constantly and unswervingly adapted towards one aim: a Welsh civilization for Wales. Only thus will the chain of history and culture and civilized life be kept unbroken in this part of the world, linking us with the past, and giving us nobility, tradition, stability and beneficial development.

In Chapter 4 I have tried to demonstrate the moral nature of Lewis's objection to English Imperialism and, the romantic longings, apparent in their propaganda, for a return to some lost arcadian existence. Whilst the Welsh language embodies the cultural history of the people, and is ennobled by the accumulation of literary work undertaken by Welsh poets, writers and playwrights, the English language, in contrast, is held to be morally inferior. In a Leavisite fashion, Lewis condemns the artefacts of mass culture which, he claims, flourish wherever the English language predominates. For these 'early' nationalists, and for large sections of the party today, language is the essential bulwark of an existence which is, in every sense, more desirable, but perceived to be under threat from pernicious anglicising influences. In a fairly typical passage, Lewis reveals the connection he sees between language, culture and identity;

Where Welsh is alive and vigorous, there you will find flourishing local eisteddfodau, literary meetings, reading classes, singing schools and an admirable interest in literature and music. And
whenever Welsh declines, and the English way of life and language replace it, there these things degenerate, and one finds football matches, races, billiards clubs and the cinema, and if there is any class at all held under the aegis of the colleges, it will be more than likely be a class in economics...What were once the pathways of song, are now the haunts of the owl.

The romantic celebration of a mythical Welsh Gemeinschaft is a critical theme in nationalist material, and is subjected to a more detailed sociological analysis in Chapter 4. What is clear is that they believed that the fortunes of the language are bound up with all that makes the Welsh different from the English, and every other nationality. It is the main standard bearer of ethnicity and the mark of differentiation between the majority and minority culture. Consequently, erosion of the language has profound implications for the maintenance of identity.

language is the fruit of society, is essential, and is the treasury of all the experiences and memories of a nation. It keeps the visions and desires and dreams of the national and treasures them in literature. It holds the memory of the nation, its knowledge of its beginnings, of its youth, it suffers, its problems, and its victories - all that constitutes the history of a nation.

The idea that 'Welshness' could survive without the language would strike such language loyalists as absurd. Ned Thomas, a lecturer at the University of Wales and a prominent defender of the language, expresses this sense of historical obligation that nationalists often refer to.

Languages are very delicate networks of historically accumulated associations, and a thought in Welsh has innumerable and untraceable connections with the thought of past centuries, with the environment, with the scenery even, with one's own mother and father, with their mothers and fathers, with the moral and emotional terms in which the community has discussed its differences.
The rallying call of Plaid Cymru, when it was formed, was the need to raise the consciousness of the people about the dire consequences of further language decline. Language became, for them, the single most significant issue and the restoration of Welsh, the main plank of the party programme. A contemporary sociolinguist has drawn attention to the possibility, indeed the likelihood of language playing this role:

Anything can become symbolic of ethnicity... but since language is the prime symbol system to begin with and since it is commonly relied upon so heavily... to enact, celebrate and call forth all ethnic activity, the likelihood that it will be recognised and singled out as symbolic of ethnicity is great indeed. 87

In order to restore the Welsh people to a proper awareness of their distinctive heritage, and then to support a social and political movement that aims at full nation status, the linguistic nationalists must convince others that the anglicised Welshmen and women are "victims" who have "lost" or had "stolen" a cultural tradition. Only a revitalised national movement, with linguistic revival as its raison d'etre, can hope to restore national pride. In a perceptive comment, Frankenberg suggested that, 'One of the most persistent and fateful themes in the Welsh consciousness of nationality is that of the Dominion of Britain. It is an amalgam of historical fact, legendary imagination and eschatological hope'. 88

The sense of urgency that permeates most discussions on the condition of the language is conditioned by the belief that, unless drastic measures are taken, Welsh will disappear as a 'living' language within two or three generations. In a 1962 radio broadcast entitled 'The Fate of the Language', Saunders Lewis himself predicted that, 'Welsh will end as a living language should the present trends continue, about the beginning of the twenty first century'. 88 Lewis's
successor as Plaid Cymru leader, Gwynfor Evans, was more optimistic in his evidence to the Royal Commission on the Constitution.

Language is a great national tradition. It belongs to the nation, and you have to give the people of that nation some great objective to strive for - you have to put something before them to aim at, to struggle for and to sacrifice for. It is in the process of working for these things that the spirit is effective. I believe that today the national spirit is rising, and we can see the possibility of once again being a bilingual nation.

The key to language restoration is seen as a combination of positive action by central and local government, particularly with regard to education, and the 're-awakening' of patriotism and a pride in national history, that only a nationalist party can bring about. Those nationalists most concerned with the revival of the language frequently mention the potential role of the school as an agency of linguistic regeneration. In the thirty six detailed interviews I carried out with Plaid Cymru activists, eighteen respondents claimed fluency in Welsh, and all of them placed efforts to arrest the decline in the language as one of their motives for joining the party. Among this group of eighteen Welsh speakers, who ranged in age from a twenty year old student to a retired diplomat, no fewer than eight had learnt the language as adults. Their parents spoke no Welsh, and they had all made, for similar reasons, conscious efforts to become fluent.

A recurring theme in the interviews with this group was the key importance they attached to educational reform and the role that schools could perform in fostering national awareness. They were united in believing that schools had the power to initiate greater awareness of the significance of language and nationality. A typical remark made by a 45 year old junior school teacher was, 'If only the schools and the teachers realised their responsibility to the present generation. If they do not change and adopt a more vigorously
supportive stance on the language then there will be no future for it'. A student teacher claimed that schools were crucial because,

More than anything else they can introduce our children to our history and our cultural heritage, which language is such a central part of. The schools I went to preached the virtues of England and her Empire, the English royalty and so on... with very little mention of the history of Wales. I've since had to search for that myself. I want the Welsh schools of tomorrow to ensure that all children speak its language and understand our wonderful history.

When asked about those things that helped to foster bonds of nationality, the Welsh speakers were more likely to stress language, even while acknowledging that the majority of Welsh are English speaking only.

The English-speaking activists also mentioned language preservation as an important and laudable goal, but they mentioned other policies that ranked more highly in their scale of priorities. One interviewee failed to show any interest in the language, and, after prompting, said, 'I'm not hostile to Welsh, of course not, but its not why I'm in this movement. In fact I'm sure those language campaigners do us more harm than good, especially where I come from...it can be an electoral albatross'. (40 years old male electrician) In the interviews, I tried to encourage respondents to distinguish between Plaid Cymru policies they supported enthusiastically, and those they felt ambivalent about. The English speaking activists were more likely to acknowledge the fact that the official policy of bilingualism, with its implications for employment in public service, were not likely to be popular in highly anglicised areas of the country. Nine of the twelve English speakers lived in constituencies that are densely populated, and with very low levels of Welsh influence (Gwent and Glamorgan). It is in these areas that the
original commitment of Plaid Cymru to restore the language is greeted with some scepticism, even among some of the Party faithful. The interviews with the activists demonstrated that divisions on the question of language, and its future status in an 'independent' Wales, tended to reflect both the ability of the activists to speak Welsh themselves, and their geographical distribution. At one extreme a middle aged housewife said,

If this party is incapable of restoring fully the Welsh language to its proper place in the life of the country then it is not worthy of support. The language is the link that binds us together as a nation...It may be a difficult task but it cannot be shirked. Our policies on economic matters, industry, transport and so on are important...but they are a means to an end...(we want) a complete rejuvenation of our national confidence. We have hung our head in shame for too long with sporting victories as the only occasional outlet for our patriotism.
(12.3.1978)

As far as this respondent was concerned, political expediency was no reason for the party to compromise on its commitment to the language. She aligns herself with one of the party's founders, Saunders Lewis, when he claimed that the language 'is the only political question deserving of a Welshman's attention at the present time'. In his 1962 radio broadcast, Lewis claimed that the language was,

more important than self-government...if we were to have any sort of self-government for Wales before the Welsh language is recognised and used as an official language in all the administration of State and local authority in the Welsh areas of our country. It would never attain official status, and the doom of the language would come more quickly than it will come under English government.

This original determination to have Welsh as the sole language of the country has been undermined by changes in the composition, social background and ideology of more recent recruits to Plaid Cymru. By
1968 the party had officially renounced this as a plank in their programme and, somewhat reluctantly, adopted a policy of bilingualism. The Lewis radio talk prompted the formation of the Welsh Language Society, specifically concentrating on public campaigns to alter the 'official' standing of the language. The founding members were all young professionals or students of the University of Wales, and, almost all were stalwarts of Plaid Cymru. As the WLS engaged in highly publicised campaigns of civil disobedience throughout the sixties and early nineteen seventies, the tensions within Plaid Cymru on the language question came to the fore. At the same time as sections of Plaid Cymru were attempting to 'modernise' the party image and develop a range of policy research groups to provide the party with a more thoroughly worked out programme on the economy, industrial growth and employment, the activists of the Language Society were attempting to place the death of the language at the forefront of the political agenda in Wales.

Because the vast majority of the four thousand or so members of the WLS were also members of Plaid Cymru, there was inevitable conflict over party policy. Indeed,

this dual membership was to have embarrassing consequences for the electoral performance of Plaid Cymru in subsequent years, precipitating major internal schisms at branch level over the question of Party support for the tactics adopted by the Welsh Language Society.

These tactics, which included disruption of government administration, attacks on broadcasting equipment, blocking of roads, and the destruction of English-only road signs, were urged on patriotic Welshmen by Lewis in the famous radio broadcast.

The political tradition of the centuries; all the economic tendencies of our own day, are set against the survival of the Welsh language. Nothing can change this, save resolution, determination, struggle sacrifice, effort...let us go to it in
earnest without vacillation to render it impossible to carry on the business of local or of the central government without the Welsh language...perhaps you will say that this could never be; that you would never get sufficient Welsh speakers to agree about it and to organise it into a weighty and forceful campaign. You may well be right. All that I maintain is that this is the only political issue with which it is worthwhile for a Welshman today to concern himself. I am aware of the difficulties. There would be storms from every direction.

Storms there certainly were, especially when language campaigners, mostly young students, began to appear in courtrooms in England and Wales on charges ranging from trespass to criminal damage and conspiracy. These young 'martyrs' for the cause of the language did receive notable support from older and established members of the Welsh community. Clergymen, teachers and magistrates in the Welsh heartland publicly declared their support. Inevitably, the price that Plaid Cymru paid, was an identification in the mind of the overwhelmingly English speaking electorate with the 'fanatics' of the Welsh Language Society. Whilst the majority of Welsh people seem to view the decline of the language with a mixture of indifference, it arouses fierce passions among this group of nationalists. A Plaid Cymru leader expressed his views thus;

Our problem in my submission is this; we must not merely preserve the Welsh language; we must restore it. Not so that it may supplant the English language but so that both may enjoy equality of status in the true sense, side by side. There can be no maintenance of the status quo. The alternatives are complete restoration, or complete extinction. It is as simple as that.

As long ago as 1833, an editorial in the Welsh journal Y Cymro declared

if once we lose the Welsh language that will be the end of us as a nation. The sun of the Welsh people will set, never
to rise again; and they will not be heard of any more as a nation but merely as a piece of driftwood that has survived from a wreck that disappeared in the great ocean of oblivion.

Contemporary nationalists may not express their views in quite such an apocalyptic manner, yet, for many, the survival of the language is paramount. In every interview carried out with Welsh speaking nationalists, a sense of crisis and desperation permeates their thinking. The idea that it was possible to support Plaid Cymru and not support the language struck them as almost absurd. There was even some suspicion in their ranks that the Scottish National Party was failing to be sufficiently concerned about the fate of the Gaelic language. Even though Scots Gaelic is spoken by only 1% of the Scottish population, in Welsh nationalist circles there is a definite feeling that the SNP should take the question of the language more seriously than it does nowadays. In an article in Welsh Nation, entitled 'Scots Ignore Gaelic', a nationalist questioned whether 'true' independence for Scotland could ensure the survival of a distinctive Scottish identity, unless steps are taken to restore the Gaelic language. Setting aside the fact that Gaelic has, for many centuries, been spoken only in 'peripheral' areas of Scotland, this writer criticises the SNP for reneging on earlier commitments to the language.

Gaelic and its restoration was a core issue in nationalist circles until the 1930's. The policy came to be regarded as a handicap however, and the SNP have always concentrated on 'practical politics' rather than becoming embroiled in the language issue. But can political independence alone ensure the survival of the Scots as a recognisable national identity? Can any nation which neglects its own language hope to survive? Sooner or later, if the Scottish identity is to survive the Scots will have to come to terms with the Scottish language.
This distinction between 'practical' politics on the one hand, and a romantic commitment to an idealised state of affairs on the other, is not, of course, unique to Plaid Cymru. Nationalist parties, and many other social movements, confront this transition from early idealism to a position where routine demands and the pressures of organisational change modify the original goals. The language enthusiasts, who viewed the switch in policy to bilingualism in 1968 as a 'watering down' of a crucial commitment, are vigilant on this question. The tensions within Plaid Cymru were exemplified by two contrasting views expressed in interviews with activists.

If some of the branches in the south had their way they would drop the language demands just because they find them an embarrassment. Some of them, only a few, have made a half-hearted attempt to learn Welsh, but it's a bit of a side issue as far as they are concerned. I argue with them sometimes that all they want out of the new Wales is jobs, houses and better wages. These things are all very well and I'm sure an independent Wales could do a better job of providing them...but that's not what a nationalist movement is all about. We have to inspire people... give them a new confidence and a new faith. Promises of a new steel works doesn't do that. (37 year old Engineer 20.6.78)

Another of my respondents, a 54 year old Minister of Religion, allied himself firmly with those who wanted no shirking from a commitment to Welsh. He claimed that, 'We have an ancient civilisation and an ancient language. If the party can build on that and give us back our pride, it is worth all the pay rises and all the foreign holidays'. (24.8.78) Such reasoning is not characteristic of ten of the twelve monoglot English activists that were interviewed. Their motivations for joining Plaid Cymru had nothing to do with 'sentimental dreams' about the past, and resurrecting the language in urban areas, where it died out almost a century ago. As one of them
We have to demonstrate that Welsh self-government will bring tangible rewards for the people. It's no use offering them a great revival of eisteddfodau (cultural festivals) when they want better road and rail links, more efficient use of our resources and more say in affairs. This is what I believe self-government could provide, but I'm never going to convince the voters in my area that Plaid Cymru can achieve this if we are tarred with the brush of language fanatics and made fun of as starry-eyed dreamers. (11.9.78)

Another one of my English-speaking respondents said,

Of course as a Welshman I have every sympathy with the language and it is a tragedy that the people in my area have lost it...Nevertheless if we are to make any headway in convincing the electorate that we are a modern party with solutions to real problems, then we cannot afford to be too obsessed with language. (20.6.78)

Undoubtedly, there are significant sections of the Welsh population who view the disappearance of the language with a mixture of relief and pleasure, especially if they have come to view Welsh as an unnecessary symbol of parochialism and 'backwardness'.

To sum up, the longstanding commitment of Plaid Cymru to language restoration, has been, and still is, a source of conflict within the party. And as far as the electorate are concerned, 'the emphasis given to the language issue by the nationalists is a political handicap to Plaid Cymru in the English-speaking areas.'

This conflict inside the party is manifested in occasional public utterances by party leaders and in differences that arise in the course of election campaigns. In its early years, the party was virtually nothing more than a campaign to save the language. As it has developed a range of policies, and attempted to widen its appeal, the original 'torch' of language restoration has been taken up by
Cymdeithas Yr iaith Cymraeg (Welsh Language Society) members. The fact that the activities of the Society have, 'alienated increasing numbers of the population', and created, 'hostility to the Welsh language', according to one Plaid Cymru leader, shows the extent to which the party has shifted its ideological position and recruited into its leadership men and women of different social origins. The fate of the language, and of Welsh nationalism also, to some extent, is bound up with public attitudes to the Welsh language, and it is to a consideration of this question that we now turn.

Attitudes to Language and Prospects for the Future

The relative success of the Welsh language movement in altering the official status of the language was symbolised, in 1967, by the passing of the Welsh Language Act. This gave improved rights for individuals to use the language in Courts, and it established the principle of equal validity, and is applicable, in theory, to all government departments. In the past two decades there has been a marked shift in official and public attitudes to the language, exemplified by the increased provision of Welsh-medium instruction, and the popularity of the bilingual schools that have opened recently. After considerable public protest, and a threat from Gwynfor Evans, the Plaid Cymru President, that he would starve himself to death unless the government kept its election manifesto commitment to create a Welsh-only television channel, Channel 4 was opened in Wales with a mainly Welsh programme content.

The success of Welsh-medium schools, the persistent efforts of Welsh language campaigners, and the increased opportunities for educated Welsh speakers to find favourable employment opportunities in broadcasting, local government and public services, have served to raise the prestige of the language. Indeed, it has been suggested
that English-speaking middle class parents are choosing Welsh-medium schools for their children, partly because the language now has a social cachet, and partly because the schools are smaller, more selective, and probably reproduce aspects of the grammar school. Nevertheless,

The demand for and provision of Welsh-medium education has increased prolifically since 1947. In the nine years from 1970-79 alone, the number of children receiving their education at Welsh-medium primary schools and secondary schools has more than doubled from 8,270 to 17,326. In addition, many secondary schools in naturally Welsh speaking areas now offer instruction through the medium of Welsh in anything up to ten subjects.

Williams and Roberts go on to claim that the battles over bilingualism in Welsh schools are a manifestation of a class division. The activities of Welsh language pressure groups have led to the formation of 'Parents for Optional Welsh', a group who oppose the extension of language teaching in the schools.

While those campaigning for the extension of Welsh are drawn from the Welsh-speaking bourgeoisie, groups such as POW draw their support from English migrant careerists who see no value accruing to their children from learning Welsh since they will anyway follow careers in England.

Nevertheless, it seems clear that the former embarrassment about speaking Welsh, has given way to a new-found confidence, so much so that it is no longer the case that 'The road to the promised land was paved with English grammar'.

Whilst the demographic evidence continues to show a decline, the most pertinent data concern the proportions of children under 16 speaking, and understanding, Welsh. A survey conducted for the Royal Commission estimated that 13% of that age range were fluent, but a more recent survey suggested that only 10.6% of the primary school
population in Wales spoke and understood Welsh. Given such data, it is understandable that emphasis is placed on the school as an agency of linguistic regeneration. In the interviews with activists, seventeen of the twenty four respondents placed particular emphasis on the schooling system as an agency of linguistic revival. A fairly typical comment, from a 40 year old schoolteacher, was,

If only the schools realised their responsibility to the present generation. If they do not change and adopt a more vigorously supportive stance on the language, then we might as well give up hope. It can't all be done by pressure groups and voluntary action. (8.4.77)

The belief that the educational system, and concerted government action in other areas, can mobilise national consciousness and rejuvenate an apparently dying language, recurs throughout the interviews. Several respondents specifically mentioned the success of the Israeli state in restoring Hebrew as the official language of the new state. Through the Ulpan movement, Hebrew was taught to all newcomers, and a modified system of teaching based on the Ulpan method is used in Wales. The Welsh term Ulpan is borrowed from Israeli Hebrew Ulpan, which is derived from Aleph, the first letter of the alphabet, i.e. literally an 'Ulpan' is an "alphabetization" of newcomers to the language. In Wales the Welsh National Language Unit has developed a modified Ulpan - adapted from Israeli schemes - for the teaching of Welsh to adults.

While Welsh language campaigners point to the revival of Hebrew as a positive omen for the Welsh language, and draw pointed conclusions about the role of the state, sociologically there are significant differences between the two cases. A.N. Poliak pointed out in the nineteen forties that the success of Hebrew was assured by the fact that no one group of immigrants to Israel formed a sufficiently large majority to impose its language on other
The fact that the two and a half million population of Israel, almost exactly the same as Wales, are prepared to become bilingual and participate in Hebrew teaching programmes, is seen by many nationalists as an example of what could be done in Wales. It is seen as proof that sufficient enthusiasm, energy and commitment could be expended on the Welsh language if Wales had its own government. As one of my respondents said;

"Look what has been done in Israel. We must never accept that the language is dying as long as there is an example like Hebrew. The schools do their job properly and the children become like apostles of Hebrew in the family...this is what we could do here." (23.8.78)

Other respondents mentioned the effort of post-colonial African states to bolster an awareness of nationality where none had existed before. Some of these African states modelled their educational systems consciously, as part of an attempt to promote national loyalty, patriotism and a respectful awareness of the symbolic manifestations of independence. Frequently, it was the schools that were to play their part as agencies of reform, and help to create new values appropriate to the new society.

Such examples were interpreted by my respondents as indicative of the role of self-government in positively encouraging a dormant language, and the key place of the school in regenerating a minority language. C.H. Williams has examined the correlates of language change in contemporary Wales and he concluded that, Welsh was highly likely to continue to decline, but he stressed the importance of, "education through Welsh as a means of complementing the effect of a moderately Welsh home background on future generations of children". It is in this context that the linguistic nationalists in Wales focus their hopes on school reform, allied with a vigorous programme of adult learning, as in Israel, as the key to arresting
further decline.

What is overlooked when such comparisons are drawn are the structural preconditions that make language maintenance or regeneration possible. In Rabin's account of the role of Hebrew in 'forging a nation', he places great emphasis on the role of language as an independent variable in the creation of national solidarity. Yet, in his own account, he mentions that a powerful agent for spreading Hebrew amongst the younger immigrants was the army, which maintains an extensive and, because of national conscription, an all-pervasive educational programme. Along with the rigorous enforcement of language requirements for jobs in government service, teaching and the civil service, the military provides a major institutional prop for the language. Without such a commitment from the Israeli government, the particular origins of the immigrants to Israel, and the significance of the army as a major institution in the country, it is unlikely that the Ulpan movement could have been so successful. The continuing military threat from some Arab states has also contributed to a strong sense of solidarity that can only have assisted the rebirth of Hebrew. 109

As well as questioning the validity of these comparisons between Welsh and Hebrew, there seems to be some doubt that the educational sector could ever, on its own, play the role that linguistic nationalists desire. Commenting on bilingual education programmes in the United States, Fishman claims that, 'the likelihood that the school could be the primary force in language maintenance is negligible. There is sufficient evidence now to indicate that schooling as the primary support for language maintenance is a very iffy business'. He went on to argue that,

Language to live must exist in the area of some protected natural function: home, church or the economic organisation of life. If school is to become an
influence in the preservation of a language, it has to have the language strongly and certainly there, with parental and other types of monitoring consciousness, so that the school has but to re-inforce rather than be the pillar itself.

Edwards raises a more serious point about language restoration, which has implications for the efforts of Welsh-language campaigners. One of the unintended consequences of focussing on language for positive action by governments and other institutions, with all the attendant pressures of a language policy, is to make a particular language seem less than 'natural'. Language provides an almost unconscious medium to interact and communicate information, ideas, etc.

Thus any attempt to focus upon language itself is in some sense an artificial or self-conscious process...in actively supporting and preserving Welsh or Scottish speaking areas, for example, one actually decreases their degree of naturalness.

Welsh language activists have set their sights firmly on arresting further linguistic decline. Sociologically, such movements may be seen as reactive in their refusal to accept the dynamic processes that lead languages to alter, absorb new influences, converge and decline. The United Nations has acknowledged the concept of 'language death'.

History has witnessed the extinction of many languages...Conquest, submission and genocide have caused linguistic minorities to disappear or to lose their identity. Many must have withered away for economic reasons. More often than not 'the survival of the fittest' is an accurate description of linguistic history.

From this perspective, the language revivalists, who form such an important section of nationalist opinion in Wales, have a static, hence unrealistic ambition, because, the 'history of language is a
Even so, the United Nations has questioned whether the death of a language should be accepted fatalistically, and suggests that languages might be the objects of conservation as legitimately as animals, plants or ancient buildings, for, 'No part of human behaviour more deeply reflects cultural roots and values'.

The commitment of the nationalists to the language, can, under certain circumstances, become a serious obstacle to the efforts of Plaid Cymru to build support in English speaking areas of Wales. Surveys carried out for the Royal Commission on the Constitution, showed that only a third of Welsh people supported the view that the language should be a compulsory subject in all schools in the Principality. There was even a fairly large minority who felt that all Welsh teaching should be abolished.

Table 3 Attitudes to Welsh Teaching

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<tr>
<th>Secondary Schools</th>
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<tr>
<td>Welsh teaching compulsory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Learn if they want to</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not taught at all, but should be preserved</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allowed to die out</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Junior Schools</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teaching in all junior schools in Welsh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Welsh in some junior schools</td>
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<tr>
<td>Welsh teaching abolished in junior schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

When questioned about official documents, signs and public notices, whilst the majority (74%) were quite content with bilingualism and equality for Welsh in official business, nearly a quarter (24%) wanted English only. A research study carried out by the Schools Council in Wales, came to the conclusion that, as pupils get older, their attitudes to Welsh become less favourable, while their attitudes to English become more favourable. The report went on to claim that, 'a defensive attitude vis a vis Welsh may result in an unfavourable attitude towards English'.

Pessimistic predictions about the disappearance of the Welsh language have come from Lockwood, who has concluded, with regret, that 'the outlook must be bleak'. What cannot be overlooked is the intensity of feeling aroused in nationalist circles by this prognosis. The consequences for Welsh identity, if Plaid Cymru is correct in associating the language so firmly with ethnic distinctiveness, must surely be the disappearance of, not only of the language, but the 'final' assimilation of the Welsh into 'west Britain'. Both these assumptions are questionable. Firstly, we have questioned whether language is as crucial for distinctiveness as some nationalists claim. Secondly, the powerful forces now operating in Wales to prevent further decline have succeeded in influencing and changing official policy in a number of crucial areas such as education, broadcasting and public services. The Welsh Language Society, and its many allies in education circles in Wales, want the language to survive as a matter of faith. No rational argument about the inevitability of decline will sway them. The reports, interviews and nationalist material reviewed in this chapter have confirmed the view that the language has a value to them,
and this value can be transformed into a commitment to social
and political action. The manifesto of the Welsh Language
Society provides a good example of such sentiments,

the value of a literary and colloquial
tradition is not a matter for objective
analysis after weighing and measuring
evidence....To the astonishing question,
'Why do you want to keep up the Welsh
language?' the true Welshman need only
answer, 'That our fathers be not
ashamed.'

For sections of the nationalist movement, this commitment to the
language transcends all other political considerations. In the
context of other ethnic movements, Fishman has pointed out that,
'language is crucial for relaying the good word, the message, the
call, and, as such... it easily becomes more than a means of
communication, even more than symbolic of the ethnic message: indeed
it becomes a prime ethnic value in and of itself'. It would also
be sociologically misleading to attribute too much significance to the
surveys that have been reviewed because, as Goudsblom has argued;

This practice (random sampling for survey
research) is based on the assumption that
society is only an aggregate of disparate
individuals. Polling a random
cross-section of individuals within this
aggregate should therefore give a
representative picture of the
distribution of opinions in the society
as a whole. Now this assumption is in
line with the democratic ideal that the
opinions of each individual are of equal
social significance; but it is, none the
less, unrealistic. What it fails to take
into account is the fact that societies
are structured, and that the opinions of
people who are located in strategically
important positions are far more
consequential than those of the majority
of the population. Survey research, in
short, is insufficiently attuned to the
social structure of opinion formation.

Bearing in mind this crucial point, the future of the Welsh language
will depend on the ability of defenders of the language to tilt the
power balances in their direction. In analysing the changing fortunes of the language, and its salience to nationalists and others, it has been necessary to base the argument on an historical discussion of the changing power relations between England and Wales. In discussing language use and patterns of use, the sociologist should concentrate on issues of power and control, on how language may be used to articulate the perceived interests of one group vis-a-vis another. Much of the work in the sociological and psychological area of language has, unfortunately, a missing dimension. It tends to ignore or play down power relations. Ethnic relations hot up or cool down, ethnic groups re-awaken or become dormant and their languages come and go. Such analyses tend towards voluntarism because they fail to locate changes in language loyalty to long term shifts in the balance of power between elite and subordinate groups, and in so doing, isolate the social sources of strength and power which make such shifts possible. For a minority group to change its language loyalties, there must be a shift in the power relationships of that group with another, and it cannot be understood by studying the group in isolation. Minority groups are not somehow autonomous units but linked at many different levels in relationships of interdependence with other groups. This analysis of the changing fortunes of the Welsh language, and its significance for many Welsh speakers, has attempted to chart language shifts by drawing out the implications of power relations for an adequate understanding of the phenomenon. The next Chapter examines in some detail how concern for the Welsh language influenced the ideology of the Welsh nationalist party in its formative years.
REFERENCES AND NOTES

2. Examples of linguistic oppression that have led to political conflict include Belgium when Walloons objected to official attempts to limit the use of the language in the school system. A related issue arose in South Africa in 1978 when serious disturbances broke out in Soweto and other black African townships when students objected to the imposition of the Afrikaans language into the school system. For other examples see Giles (1977).
5. In translation it reads 'heb cenedl heb iaith calon'.
11. Ibid p 45.

Although the Irish language is now in decline, and no longer a salient feature of Irish nationalist thought, this was not always the case. Early twentieth century Irish patriots felt much as Pearse did when he wrote the following:

Hence the language which is the main repository of the Irish life, the folklore, the literature, the music, the art, the social customs must be conserved...The language which grows up with a people is confirmed to their organs, descriptive of their climate, constitution, and manners, mingled inseparably with their history and their soil, fitted beyond any other language to express their prevalent thoughts in the most natural and efficient way. To impose another language on such a people is to send their history adrift among the accidents of translation 'tis to tear their identity from all places - 'tis to substitute arbitrary, signs for picturesque and suggestive names - 'tis to cut off the entail of feelings, and separate the people from their forefathers by a deep gulf - 'tis to corrupt their very organs, and abridge their power of expression....The language of a nation's youth is the only easy and full speech for its manhood and for its age. And when the language of its cradle goes, itself craves a tomb...A people without a language of its own is only
half a nation. A nation should guard its language more than its territories – tis a surer barrier, and more important frontier, than fortress or river”.


17. Oscar Falnes (1933).
18. For a more detailed discussion of SNP policy with respect to Scots Gaelic see H.J. Hanham (1969).
31. Law of Wales 1535-6 (27 Hen 8 c 26) Section 17.
32. Ibid. Section 17.
35. Cited in Gwynedd County Council (1985) p 27.
36. Ibid. p 7.
40. G. Williams (1979) p 135.
42. G. Williams (1979) p 136.
44. Ibid. p 3.
46. Ibid p 3.
47. Ibid p 3.
50. G. Williams (1979) p 140-1. There is, as yet, very little material available on the history of Welsh speaking communities in English cities such as London, Liverpool or Bristol. There is a chapter on the Welsh schools, chapels and communities of Liverpool in J. Glyn Davies Nationalism as a Social Phenomenon. There still exists a fee paying Welsh school in London that attracts 'exiled' Welsh, although the numbers now attending are so small that closure is likely. (The Guardian 19.4.83)
51. Cited in The Place of Welsh and English in the Schools of Wales London HMSO 1953 p 7. See also The Times July 25 1844.
52. This movement of mainly small farmers received relatively sympathetic coverage from The Times see The Times August
55. See for example the treatment of 'outsider' and 'insider' relations in N. Elias and J. Scotson (1965). This study of an urban community analyses the dynamics of 'in' and 'out' group relations and uses the notions of group charisma and group disgrace. In the case of English-Welsh relations, the existence of pejorative terms for the 'outsider' group can be traced back to the sixteenth century. The Oxford New English Dictionary has a number of entries under 'Welsh' 'Welsher' etc. Examples include 'To Welsh' - to swindle somebody, 'Welsh cricket' meaning 'a louse' 'Welsh Ambassador' meaning a cuckoo and 'Thats Welsh' meaning 'I don't understand you' (1648 usage). The way in which such epithets, along with more tangible elements of an oppressed status, contribute to the self-image of 'outsider' groups is an important question. Ernest Jones, Freud's early biographer, and himself a Welshman, felt that Freudian psychology could begin to provide an answer to the thorny problem of 'national' psychologies. Referring to the overwhelming importance of nonconformity in Welsh life, Jones suggested that; "Misfortune and suffering often have the effect of invoking a sense of inferiority, but not in the simple way one might imagine. It is not that the defeated man feels inferior if he thinks that the defeat has been his fault...It follows that religiously minded persons are more prone to suffer in this way than others, for they interpret misfortune in moral terms...As one would expect, therefore, a religiously minded people with history of defeat and suffering will be more prone than others to develop a national sense of inferiority, however much they may try to conceal this beneath trumped-up boastings of their good qualities. There are few nations to whom these remarks apply more strikingly than the Welsh and the Jews. Two peoples who have a great deal in common in their psychology...It would be tempting to investigate the past history of the Welsh from this point of view". 'Inferiority Complex of the Welsh' in E. Jones (1951) Vol I p 128. For further comment on the question of 'national character' see N. Elias (1982) pp 309-10.
59. Ibid. p 253.
60. M. Arnold (1891) p 10-11.
61. Ibid. p 11.
64. Coupland (1954) p 194.
69. Ibid. p 117.
70. Ibid p 117.
A.H. Dodd (1933) p 399.
Ibid. p 81.
Saunders Lewis (1975) p 15.
Ibid. p 13.
Saunders Lewis Y Faner 6 Sept 1923.
J. Fishman and H. Giles (eds) (198 ).
Saunders Lewis The Fate of the Language Planet.
Saunders Lewis Planet p 100.
Saunders Lewis Planetm p.100.
The influential Welsh language journal BARN (Comment) published letters in support of Welsh language activists from clergymen, academics and schoolteachers. At the time of the Swansea conspiracy trial in 1972, several leading Welsh figures gave evidence in favour of young defendants and stood bail. Publicity was also given to some magistrates who claimed that they were unable to try 'patriotic' Welsh men and women. One in particular, became embroiled in lengthy correspondence with the Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham. Her support for the language campaigners led, eventually, to her resignation as a magistrate. For details of the 'Barn' campaign see A.B. Philip (1975).
For a general discussion of social movements and the dynamics of organisational and ideological change see Barry McLaughlin (ed) (1969) and J.A. Banks (1973).
At the 1975 Plaid Cymru conference, resolutions on education policy that advocated Bilingual schools were amended to replace bilingual with the word 'Welsh'.
Birch (1977) p 120.
A respondent told me when field work was under way of an incident in south east Wales in which a predominantly English speaking branch of Plaid Cymru had fought a local authority by-election using English-only publicity materials and election addresses. This was in opposition to official party policy which makes it clear that all Plaid Cymru propaganda and election material must be produced in both languages. The candidate and his election agent were both reprimanded by the National Executive, although they were, by all accounts, quite unrepentant.
Dr. Phil Williams quoted in A.B. Philips (1975) p 186.
Ibid. p 162. For a further discussion of the conflict between parents in Wales about bilingual education in
107. Peter Worsley (1973) see Chapter 2 for a discussion of nationalism in post colonial states.

109. The question of whether Israeli conditions could ever be replicated in an independent Wales would depend on the existence of structural equivalents of the Israeli army. This is unlikely because the lengthy struggle against the British and the Arabs to establish the Israeli state, and the continuation of conflict since its establishment, has placed the military in a position of central importance, and provided a powerful motivational stimulus for Hebrew. Comparisons between the historical experience of the Welsh and the Jews are sometimes made (see footnote 55) and nationalists are wont to refer to the forced and voluntary emigration of Welsh men and women in the nineteen thirties as 'the diaspora'. Even so, the Jewish experience of the holocaust must have played a major part in galvanizing the determination to revive Hebrew.

110. Fishman in Lyons (1970) p 7. The reference in this quotation to 'home, church or economic organisation' as the three key areas is significant given the already mentioned importance of the Chapels and Nonconformity as vital areas in which the Welsh language flourished. Although rates of religious participation in Wales are, on the whole, slightly higher than is the average for Britain, Welsh society has been subject to the same process of secularisation that affects other industrial societies. A recent discussion about the decline of Chapel attendance concluded 'The Process of secularisation is removing from Welsh society ... one of its central supports, and the only solution is immediate action'. D. Ben Rees (1976) p 17. Thirty years ago a sociological survey of south Wales drew attention to similar processes, see Brennan, Cooney, Pollins (1954).

Jeremy Seabrook quotes a young Welsh teacher in the south saying "Because the expression of Welsh Nonconformity was Welsh, it has been doubly impoverished. It has been attacked by the furthest effects of secularism as well as by the lack of knowledge of Welsh. I have sympathy with the moral code, the view of life, the language, the religious and spiritual tradition; but that is alien to my contemporaries"....

"If the young have, for the most part, been released from the joyless disciplines of chapel and pit, they have also been disinherited from the other side of that life: a sense of secure identity anchored in a tradition of music and singing, of mutual improvement societies, penny readings, drama and oratorios; a world in which it was possible to be an intellectual and a working man. 'They were like lawyers, some of the men who worked in the pits then. In the Miners Institute Library you would find

111. Edwards (1968) p 100.

112. 'Development Forum' quoted in *The Times* 22nd September 1983. The Times also points out that three quarters of the world's population speak a mere 25 languages; 100 languages account for 95% of human speech. The remaining 5% is responsible for the global total of up to 8,000 tongues - so many and some so obscure that many have yet to be discovered, let alone recorded.


CHAPTER FOUR

WELSH NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY 1925-1945

This chapter sets out to describe and analyse the main characteristics of Welsh nationalist ideology in the twenty years after the establishment of Plaid Cymru (National Party of Wales). The small group of individuals who were instrumental in founding the Welsh nationalist party had several key things in common. They included, Saunders Lewis, Ambrose Bebb, D.J. Davies, J.A. Price and Lewis Valentine. All were committed to the preservation of those features of Welsh culture that they perceived to be under threat, in particular, the Welsh language; (see Chapter 3) and all were, or were to become, noted writers, poets and propagandists, and all were devout and active Christians, who saw their political task in this light. Meeting at a temperance hotel in Pwllheli in 1926, these men set about developing and articulating a distinctive set of beliefs and ideas about the contemporary condition of Welsh society and culture, and their proposed solutions to the social problems they felt needed attention.

Nationalistic sentiments were not new in Wales. In the late nineteenth century there was a marked upturn in the production and dissemination of Welsh language publications, which flourished under the auspices of Welsh Nonconformity. Although most of these were, understandably, religious in character, Glanmor Williams has claimed that

there was also a great mass of books of more secular interest, histories of Wales, biographies and poetry being particularly popular ... Even more impressive and more widely ranging in its influence was the growth of the Welsh language periodical and newspaper press.\(^1\)

By 1870 there were around thirty different publications in Welsh, and
although little is known about their readership, it seems reasonable to assume that there was a developing section of Welsh society who were well-informed, and socially and politically conscious of religious and secular matters. The mid-nineteenth century revival of European nationalisms, and the spread of popular nationalist sentiment, brought the writings of men like Mazzini and Fichte to the attention of sections of the Welsh middle class. The establishment of the University of Wales, a National Library, and the romantic 'rediscovery' of Celtic culture, all helped to foster a growing sense of national distinctiveness on the part of certain groups. The question of Irish Home Rule, and the efforts of the 'Young Ireland' movement, found their echo in Wales with the establishment of 'Cymru Fydd' (Wales to Be) and the election to Parliament of several Welsh radicals committed to Home Rule. Cymru Fydd was little more than a pressure group, most of whose members were also involved in the Liberal Party, yet they succeeded in placing issues of specific concern to them on the agenda of the Liberal Party. Nationalistic attitudes, which embraced concerns such as disestablishment of the Anglican Church, temperance and Sunday Observance, had traditionally been expressed through the vehicle of the Liberal Party. The election of Lloyd George as leader, and the Liberal commitment to Home Rule, ensured that the link between Welsh radicalism, nationalism and nonconformity, would continue to be expressed within the confines of the Liberal Party.

By the second decade of the twentieth century this was no longer the case. The Liberal Party was in decline, successive Liberal Governments had shelved Home Rule proposals, and Britain was entering a decade or more of economic stagnation and depression. Amongst committed nationalists there was bitter and open hostility to the Liberal Party, and a profound sense of betrayal by the Lloyd George
government. They claimed that the patriotic Welsh man or woman could no longer rely on the Liberal Party to champion their cause. The Labour Party, too, was formally committed to Home Rule for Wales, but it was more concerned to develop cohesion and loyalties based on class interest that cut across 'national' boundaries.

It was in this context that Plaid Cymru was formed in 1926, and set about articulating the grievances felt by a section of the Welsh intelligentsia with the existing state of affairs. Although the popular appeal of Plaid Cymru, measured in electoral terms, (see Appendix I) has fluctuated over the years since the Party fought its first election campaign, the Party has attracted, and continues to attract, groups whose main impulse to political activity was, and is, a concern for the cultural life of Wales, as they define it. Foremost among these was the language, as we have tried to show in Chapter 3, but concern for literature, art and culture in the widest sense motivated many of the early activists. Their objection was not just to the political integration of Wales with England, but to the ideas and values that, they felt, were associated with the dominant power. They were drawn to Plaid Cymru in order to combat the erosion of the distinctive values, beliefs and ideals of 'traditional' Welsh society. Contemporary changes were undermining a social order that was, in their view, every way superior to that which seemed about to replace it. In these early stages, the political philosophers of Plaid Cymru sought to delineate the main features that separated the social and cultural life of industrial England, from the alternative vision they had of an independent Welsh society. The new political party was to be the embodiment of a determination to renew or restore Welsh society to that state it enjoyed before the intrusion of anglicising influences.

Central to their conception of nationalism, was a belief in the
centrality of literature, language and national culture. Defence of Welsh literary and poetic traditions became the springboard from which to launch a more widespread critique of the social order, and Saunders Lewis, one of the small group who founded the party, was explicit in linking concern for the literary culture of Wales with its political future. This concern led, inevitably as far as Lewis was concerned, to a demand for self government. He argued:

If a nation that has lost its political machinery becomes content to express its nationality henceforth only in the sphere of literature and the arts, then that literature and those arts will very quickly become provincial and unimportant, mere echoes of the ideas and artistic movements of the neighbouring and dominant nation. If they (the Welsh people) decide that the literary revival shall not broaden out into political and economic life, then inevitably Welsh literature will cease to be living and valuable.

Smith has drawn attention to the 'strong correlation between literary renascences ... and the rise of some nationalist movements', and this is particularly appropriate when the 'revival' helps to shape national ideals, and weld disparate groups into activity. Nineteenth century nationalist movements in Scandinavia, Germany, and wherever the heady appeal of romantic thought held sway, were consumed with a feverish desire to promote philological research, and obsessed with the discovery or 'restoration' of ancient poetic forms, and the popularising of literature which glorified the people and its past. Hanham has claimed that European nationalism has always been backward looking and that 'It is national historians, and those who write and sing about the past who have created nations, and for this reason literary men and poets often rank as national heroes alongside statesmen and warriors.' The infant Welsh nationalist party conforms very much to this stereotype, particularly in its admiration for, and
eulogising of, the peasant traditions of the nation. It is the peasant who embodies the long oppressed history of the nation and, because they may not be conscious of their historical role as saviours of these traditions, it is the task of the writer or poet to give form and expression to these dormant aspirations.

The task confronting the nationalist movement was to 're-awaken' a sense of patriotism and restore a sense of national pride in 'traditional' ways of life. They saw themselves as the embodiment of a national spirit that stretches back into the mists of time, as, 'the bearer of a torch handed down by 40 generations of Welshmen that refuses to be quenched'.\(^5\) In the early years of Plaid Cymru, the influence of teachers, ministers and writers was apparent in much of the propaganda produced by the party. They shared many of the preoccupations and predilections of romantics in other nationalist movements; the discovery and promotion of ancient poetry, a passion for the nation's literature, and an unbounded admiration for the common peasant, his folk life and ways. Overlaid with such beliefs was a profound sense of a need to erect bulwarks against undesirable secularising influences. The 'new' Wales was to be reconstructed on the firm foundations of Christian belief. Writing in 1933, a prominent member of the Party made clear this commitment:

The new nationalism of Wales certainly aspires to be definitely Christian in so far as it turns its back upon the Imperialistic nationalism of the past, and cherishes universal freedom and peace among its ideals ... at the back of its social and political aspiration there exists a potent religious and ethical passion and an irreversible belief that Religion must be permitted to pervade and inform all life.

In order to embrace the Nonconformity of Lewis Valentine, D.J. Davies and others, and the Roman Catholicism of Saunders Lewis, they were quick to claim that there was neither need nor desire to identify this
commitment to Christianity, 'with any single type or form of ecclesiastical authority'.

Indeed, Lewis linked the demand for self government to his Christian beliefs in an explicit way. Support for the aims of the nationalist movement was not only consistent with Christian teaching, but it was practically a question of Christian duty. In an early editorial in the Party's monthly paper Welsh Nation, he claimed that self-government was itself almost a religious demand.

Let us never lose our clear and severe apprehension of the main point: that it is our absolute duty to ourselves as adult men and women to demand and to insist upon the responsibilities of self-government. This great thing is not a luxury. It is not a caprice. To refuse it is to betray the Christian conception of Society. It is to repudiate the whole development of European history.

The composition of the party at this time, and the strong appeal its message had for ministers of religion, meant that the conflation of Christian duty and national obligation was a persistent theme in these early writings. The apocalyptic vision of the collapse of religious morality and 'traditional' Welsh values, inspired statements such as the following from the Reverend D. Owen;

Welsh society is fast being shattered, remembering that it is a Christian society. The new order which is being thrust upon us and slavishly accepted by our local authorities, is a Godless civilisation. Do our Churches realise that when Welsh civilisation disappears, they too will disappear.

As far as Saunders Lewis was concerned, it was the duty of Welsh Christians to object to the political unification of England and Wales for, "under the Tudors and from then on the civilisation of Wales wasted away and declined. Today that civilisation is in moral peril". The Acts of Union of the sixteenth century were to be
deplored because they were an attack on Christian Wales. Speaking in 1926 at the Party's first Annual Summer School, Lewis said of the Union:

Every difference between Wales and England was obliterated. In the two countries there was one government, one language, one state law, one culture, one system of education, one religion, that is, government religion, government language, government education, government culture. Sixteenth century nationalism was nothing but the triumph of materialism over spirituality, of paganism over Christianity. And it was this materialism and pagan triumph that destroyed our Wales.

The growth in influence of socialist, syndicalist and communist opinion in the industrial areas of south and east Wales did not go unnoticed by the nationalists. Although there were examples of sympathy with the plight of the unemployed, the overriding concern was with the need to combat the spread among the Welsh of secular, foreign ideologies, especially communism. Lewis, writing in 1932, said,

Five years ago I prophesied that what the political future held for Wales was a choice between Communism and Christian nationalism. Today I see no reason to withdraw that prophecy. On the contrary, the day when these two forces must come to grips with each other in Wales seems to me definitely nearer and I do not think it will be long delayed. I admit frankly and with sorrow that at present, it is Communism that is growing fastest.

The rhetoric and imagery of the chapel pulpit was now finding a new platform, and the 'gospel' of nationalism took on aspects of a crusade against a series of interrelated processes. Secularisation, anglicisation and industrialisation were inevitably linked, in the eyes of the nationalist, and all were to be deplored. Inspiration for the reconstruction of Welsh civilisation could never come from England, or even from other European nationalisms. Only the conscious
study of the past of the Welsh people and its cultural traditions could provide practical guidance in the modern world. A typical example of such reasoning is provided by D.J. Daniel.

It is in the poetry of Taliesin and Dafydd Nanmor, in the ruling conceptions of the ancient laws of Wales, far more than in the Special Areas Acts or Five Year programmes that the salvation of Wales is to be found.

Closely linked with this enthusiasm for a specifically religious view of the world, was a conception of the nation as having a 'spirit', embodied in the 'soul' of the people. Ancient literature provides the key to understanding the historical destiny of the people, and an understanding of this heritage provides, not only a clue to the 'collective sentiment', but helps alleviate problems of a more prosaic nature. Lewis, for example, claimed that, 'the fact of nationhood is a spiritual force which, properly channelled, can help men overcome their material difficulties.' Another influential nationalist writer explained that,

Our main task is a spiritual one. It is to restore a sense of Welsh nationhood, a feeling of pride in our own people, a pride in the greatness of our heritage, a pride in the qualities of our people, and a sorrow for their afflictions that sting as does a wryst to the members of one's own family.

The social composition of the party at this time is reflected in the ideology, the rhetoric and the programme of Plaid Cymru. Although there are occasional references to the need for the party to broaden its base, and recruit in the English-speaking, urban areas, throughout the period under discussion, the party was dominated by lecturers, teachers, ministers and writers. Plaid Cymru was attacked by its political opponents for its elitist composition, and its 'unrealistic' and other worldly propaganda. In 1934, an editorial in its monthly paper acknowledged such criticisms and declared;
It was largely on sentimental grounds that the Nationalist Party came into being, and we frankly admit the charge that our ranks were largely composed of students, sentimentalists, "intelligentsia", teachers, ministers and literary men. But perhaps they are not bad qualifications after all. The sound heart is often a truer guide than the nerve racked head. The qualification for literary men is that they can see life largely and as a whole, and they have been in the forefront of every rebellion. And teachers and ministers of religion should bear the highest mark of training that the country can give for scientific judgement and abstract thinking. Few business men have a really scientific training. But we could not hope to succeed until we had drawn in the Working Man.

The significance of the poet and writer in Plaid Cymru is to provide the link with an idealised past, and popularise the heroes of the nation. At a time of national disaster, it is the writers who, it is claimed, can bring confidence, pride and a determination to protect the national heritage and promote the interests of the nation, for, it is they, and they alone, who are in touch with the very soul of the people. In all national movements the position of the writer is vital because, 'it is to him that the nation looks to give it all the trappings which the Romantic Movement taught Europe to expect of a nation, a glorious past, a distinctive culture and a national language'. This determined minority rejected the "Godless creed of Communism", spurned the socialistic notions of the 'brotherhood of man', which attracted so many zealous converts in Wales in the thirties. Their task was nothing less than reviving a people's sense of history, and through that a pride in their nationality. The slogans and battle cries of the majority of political activists in Wales seemed to them irrelevant. Survival of the language, literature and culture of Wales was the only noble cause worth fighting for.
Nationalism and Romanticism

In reaction against the secular, reasoning, rational philosophy of the eighteenth century there emerged a movement in social and historical philosophy known as Romanticism. The basic premise of Romantic thought was the belief in the gradual and unconscious nature of cultural evolution. It stressed the unique and organic unity and distinctiveness of national culture, and there was a definite strand of mysticism which runs through this type of social thought. Whilst great emphasis was laid on tradition and the past all men and nations were impelled to action by the great forces which constituted 'the spirit of the age'. The Romantic movement was the impulse behind much of the interest in purely national history. 'Further, for each nation the period of particular fertility for historical research was held to be the Middle Ages. This tendency was due in part to the strange misconception that this was the period of the fixing of the several national cultures ... Language was believed to be the vital mark of nationality.' In an intriguing pamphlet setting out the principles of Nationalism, Lewis made direct allusions to the condition of mediaeval Wales.

Our nationalism must be different. We must appeal not to material rights but to spiritual principles. We must approach the English government with a moral argument, and believe the day will come when once again the value of the principles of morality will be recognized ... What then is our nationalism? This: a return to the medieval principle; a denial of the benefits of political uniformity, and a demonstration of its ill effects; thereby arguing in favour of the principle of unity and variety. Not a fight for Wales' independence but for Wales' civilization ... First of all, let us not ask for independence for Wales. Not because it is impractical, but because it is not worth having. I have already shown that it is materialistic and cruel ... Europe will return to its place when the countries recognize that they are all subjects and
dependent ... Let us recall what it was like between the thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries. Today we too can build a Welsh civilisation without independence."

Throughout Lewis' writings there is an undisguised admiration for Catholic medieval Europe, in which diversity of language and culture coexisted under the influence of Rome. In describing elements of Plaid Cymru ideology as romantic in inspiration, it is this concentration on the emotional and traditional aspects of the Welsh 'spirit' that we have in mind. The cult of the medieval, an historical interest in the origins of the people, and a predilection for interpreting individual and social phenomena as the product of sequences of events which unfold according to the laws of growth of those phenomena; all these characteristics are discernible in the early writings of Plaid Cymru leaders. This romantic influence co-exists comfortably with a particular image of traditional community.

Closely linked with a concern for the role of language and literature is the recurrence in Welsh nationalist material of a concern with the decline of 'community'. Because the theme of community decline is so persistent, and a concern with the imposition of institutions and associated norms that undercut "gemeinschaftliche" values is so prevalent in the writings of these early nationalists, it is necessary to consider in some detail the meaning of the term and its specific utilisation by these social groups.

The significance of community

The term 'community' has been described by Nisbet as one of the unit ideas of classical sociology and, as such, can be traced back to the eighteenth century. The philosophical roots of the term are associated with a series of ideas which emphasise rootedness, cohesion
and belonging, as opposed to the undesired evils of 'alienation; estrangement; anomie; rootlessness; loss of attachment' which, supposedly, characterise mass society. In this sense the term is profoundly ideological and has been subjected to sociological criticism by, among others, Elias, Newby and Bell and Raymond Plant. Nisbet fixes the rise of the idea of community as an important aspect of social and political theory in the late eighteenth century, and it involved some notion of the 'whole man', "Community is founded upon man conceived in his wholeness rather than in one or another of the roles taken separately that he may hold in the social order'. Implicit in such formulations is the notion that, in communities, all interactions take place within an all encompassing network of inclusive ties. It is this aspect of social bonding that has been destroyed by the development of the division of labour, by increasing bureaucratisation and by mass society itself. As Plant puts it, 'In modern society man was now a narrow enervated being and the nature of his social controls had become more and more fragmented'.

It was, of course, Ferdinand Tonnies who first systematically elaborated the typology of 'gemeinschaft' and 'gesellschaft'. For Tonnies, life in communities was contrasted with the growth of impersonal, fragmented and incomplete existence in more differentiated societies. The important contribution of Tonnies was to make explicit the relationship between social organisation and the types of social bonding that characterise different types of societies. In this way he indicates how 'individual' personality is shaped by, and is part of, 'social structure'. Tonnies argues that society and social relations are the products of natural will and rational will; the former he terms community, the latter produces association. He repeatedly emphasised that 'community' values and structures are not necessarily of higher ethical value than 'gesellschaftliche' values,
yet his insistence that the former type of social organisation is more homogeneous than the latter, led almost inevitably to a value judgement becoming attached to them.

Norbert Elias has criticised Tonnies' work on two main grounds. Firstly, because of the ideological influences that permeate his discussion of 'community', and, secondly, for developing static typologies that help to 'nostalgically preserve a use of the term community which helped launch it on its career, but which has long been overtaken by the advance in the field of community studies'. The sentimental overtones of the concept are examined critically by Elias in his attempt to reformulate and refine a theory of communities. Tonnies is taken to task for portraying life in 'communities' as solidaristic and harmonious where unity of purpose and co-operation are the supposed features of this pre-industrial idyll. Discussing the success of Tonnies' book, Elias writes:

What one can regard as fairly certain is the fact that the sentiment which helped the community concept on its way was symptomatic of a rising trend both of feeling and of thinking in society at large which gathered strength from the later part of the nineteenth century on. Up to that time the belief that advances in industry, science and technology were harbingers of progress and a better life had been fairly widespread and dominant among the literati and the reading public of European societies. As industrialisation and urbanization advanced the tide began to turn. The feeling that industry, science and urban life were a kind of Pandora's box, a source of evils, gained the ascendancy over the belief in progress.

This revulsion and disapproval of industrial society and its associated features is apparent in the ideology of Welsh nationalist writers at the time of the formation of the party. A powerful theme in the documents and pamphlets produced by them throughout the nineteen thirties is one of revulsion at the consequences of
urbanisation. English-inspired industrialisation was responsible for eroding the 'traditional' way of life of rural communities, and everywhere, industry was a debilitating influence on the 'natural' relationships that obtained between Welshmen.

Newby and Bell have drawn attention to the malleability of the community concept, so much so that ideologues of the political left and right have relatively little difficulty in incorporating the idea to sharpen their critique, either of industrial capitalism or of industrialism. They argue:

The reason why community could unite aspects of virtually the whole political and philosophical spectrum was that it was itself so amorphous and so malleable. Community simply stood for what an endless group of thinkers ... believed to be what society should consist of. It was, in other words, the Good Life, and, even though different individuals' conceptions of the Good Life varied very considerably indeed, the fact that they could all be included under the label "community" meant that they could all unite in praise of it. The emotive overtones contained in the use of community continue to this day. Everyone it seems, wishes to live in a community.

Whilst Newby and Bell feel that it is possible to strip the term from any extraneous ideological associations or meanings, and formulate some scientific, non-contested definition of community, it might be that the whole history of the term and its associated meanings shapes our understanding of it to such an extent that a non-contested version is almost impossible. It is certainly the case that the concept has been utilised as a tool of social criticism by diverse groups, for different motives, but the main reason why so many of the ways in which it is employed in political debate and/or sociological analysis is suspect, is because it posits some notion, usually implicit, of a priori human needs. Particular 'communities' are judged according to
certain criteria which are not susceptible to sociological interpretation. A common characteristic is the tendency to attribute to 'communities' certain qualities. As Plant says, "Communities are often taken in a metaphysical sense and are credited with a life, history, spirit and ethos all of their own".28

The concern with the condition of human 'community', and the whole evolution of the concept, is bound up with the development of romantic social thought. As such it had an influence on a wide range of different social critics from William Morris to F.R. Leavis. This appeal is explained by Elias;

The latter (association) referred to a kind of social life which is cold, impersonal and fragmented ... lacking cohesion; human beings are relatively isolated; friction and strife occur frequently. Life in communities by contrast is warmer, more homely and affectionate. Solidarity and harmony, unity of purpose and co-operation, ensured by a firm tradition are greater. The community-association polarity, like the folk-urban polarity has romantic undertones. It reflects, at least in its initial version the discontent and suffering connected with increasing urbanisation and industrialisation: it betrays a certain longing for a reversal of the trend, for a return to an earlier stage in the development of societies where life was simpler and appeared to possess all those desirable qualities that are missed in the present.

What alarmed the Welsh nationalists was the fear that the corroding influences of 'English' civilization were overwhelming their nation's ancient heritage, the tangible manifestation of which was the language and culture. It seemed to them a real danger that the tide of 'progress' might entirely efface the characteristics of nationality, unless the average Welshman could be imbued with a respect for 'traditional' ways of life. In this, Plaid Cymru was much more than a political party attempting to turn passive support into votes,
membership and organisation. As a movement it had elements of a campaign that would re-awaken the people to join their 'crusade against the twentieth century'. Permeating the literature of Plaid Cymru in these early years is an infatuation with the simple country life. In Rousseauian fashion the simple peasant is imbued with all the qualities of honesty and 'wholeness' that are destroyed by industrial progress.

This elevation of rural life, and consequent condemnation of life in towns, can be understood, partly, if one appreciates the revulsion felt by many at the condition of the urban areas of Wales in the nineteen twenties and thirties. Rates of unemployment were consistently higher than the average for the United Kingdom as a whole, and many towns endured lengthy periods of depression, with as many as half of the workforce unemployed. The concentration of heavy industry in south east Wales, and the relatively 'undiversified' local economies in the rest of the country meant a concern with the 'balance' of the economy. In 1936, J.F. Rees, writing in the journal of the Welsh National Development Council, drew attention to the nature of industrialisation in Wales.

Reviewing the economic history of South Wales, one is tempted to suggest that the quality which has resulted in the present position ... has been inherent in the situation from the outset. There has always been a lack of industrial balance and consequently a danger that some change of circumstances would plunge the community into depression. Instability may be the mark of industrialisation everywhere, but in South Wales it is more obvious because the industries are few and they have been highly developed. They have been few because it has been more profitable to concentrate capital and labour upon them rather than to spread the available resources over a wide range of enterprises.

The nationalists seized on this 'dislocation' or 'imbalance' in Welsh
industrial development and contrasted it with the agricultural stability that, supposedly, existed before the industrial revolution. According to nationalist accounts, it was a time when all men had work and were secure and happy in their rural idyll. A vision is conjured of rural society in which interdependence existed in some 'balanced', almost 'perfect' form of 'organic' solidarity.

Rural industries flourished, Welsh goods were in demand. The woollen industry was important and each locality had its wool spun, woven, fulled and tailored locally. The boots they wore were made by local cobblers of leather tanned in the local tannery. The carpenter was skilled enough to make not merely farm implements but also to design and build and furnish houses with well-made furniture; smiths provided ploughs, gates and farm implements. Corn was grown for flour and animal food and the produce was ground in the local mill.

It was industrialisation per se which was singled out for blame by these early propagandists, and the solution lay in a determination to roll back the tide of industry that had engulfed south east Wales in the nineteenth century. While there were voices in the party that realised the virtual impossibility of rejecting industrialism, and returning to a society based on agricultural production, the tone of much of the writing was distinctly arcadian. As well as demanding that, 'the Welsh state must build a healthy and prosperous peasantry'. They looked back to that period when 90% of the people gained their livelihood on the land or from industries dependent on the land. The country was almost self-supporting and there was a fair balance between agriculture and industry.' D.J. Davies acknowledged the role played by economic factors in human history, but claimed that it was the changes wrought by such forces that had brought about the spiritual decline of Welsh civilization. Davies, too, looked to the Middle Ages for inspiration. The notion of the 'just price', the
beneficial consequences of guild regulation of business enterprise, and the primacy of agricultural production, were all examples, he claimed, of human control of the economic order in the interest of what were conceived as spiritual ends. He asserted that, 'men could do the same today if they were not hypnotised by materialism and the machine'. Self sufficiency for the national economy could only be achieved if rural industry was championed and the 'foreign' exploitation of coalfield and iron ore ended.

In an important article, written in 1932, D.J. Davies argued that concern with 'cultural nationalism' alone was limiting, and was unable to comprehend the intimate relationship between economics, politics and the survival of the culture. One nationalist acknowledged this:

During the first few years of its existence the Welsh Nationalist Party was continually charged with stressing too much the cultural side of nationalism and ignoring economic facts. There was a great deal of truth in this charge. The men who came together to form our party were men who had the future of Wales at heart and saw the Welsh language dying out. They were interested in seeing the language revived and our cultural life enriched. But let it also be admitted that the pioneers were willing to learn from experience. They soon found out that culture embraced everything that enriched the nation's life. The craftsman at his work in field, mine or workshop was contributing to the nation's culture equally with the writer or artist. Further it was found out that Wales was suffering materially as well as spiritually from being tied to English government and it was felt that by applying Nationalist principles to industry, the country would be enriched both morally and spiritually ... The gradual grinding down of men until they were mere machines had made them naturally deaf to all appeals to higher things.

Sole responsibility for the 'degraded' state of Welsh men and women is
laid at the feet of English Imperialism.

It is possible to discern a progression of concerns in the nationalist literature. Beginning with language and literature the link is made between the decline of the language and rural depopulation, which, in turn is attributed to the decline of agricultural employment. The high levels of urban unemployment and the 'crisis' facing the towns, with high levels of migration to England, compelled some sections of Plaid Cymru to take seriously the need to elaborate an economic policy. It was to D.J. Davies that this task fell. Others felt that detailed consideration of economic policy could be left safely until after the golden day when independence dawned. Davies argued that the credibility of the Party depended on its ability to formulate and project an economic policy that met the needs of the situation and was specifically geared to the particular needs of Wales. As Nairn has commented, 'Nationalism has always been a struggle to connect romantically conceived tradition and culture with the need for modern social and economic development.' The inspiration for Welsh social and economic development was to come from a nineteenth century Welshman, Robert Owen.

In industry no less than in agriculture, the ideal form of ownership and management is no doubt the co-operative one, since this is the form which permits the fullest development of the worker and encourages individual initiative together with the sense of responsibility and solidarity: and this is the ideal at which a Welsh National Government should aim.

We have already drawn attention to the connection that was made between rural decline and the vanishing 'spirit' of Welshness, for, as far as this group of nationalists were concerned, the only 'true' Welsh men and women lived on the land. The nationalist press at this time printed letters and articles that mourned the decay of rural life
and the decline of values that it, supposedly, embodied. In 1933 the problem of derelict land brought this comment in The Welsh Nationalist:

An appalling picture emerges ... I can give three examples ... 48 farms 40 years ago with families and servants in each ... today only 27 and several of these are farmed jointly by one farmer. In another district 100 fewer farms than 100 years ago and in ... Caernarfonshire 33 farms in 1903 16 today ... it must be remembered that the children and grandchildren of many of the people that lived happily on these farms are today tramping the streets of Merthyr, Liverpool and the Rhondda Valley, forlorn and kicking their heels in restlessness and hopelessness.

The Owenite conception of social co-operation, allied with a religious respect for the Chapel and the family, gave the movement a distinctive set of views. Factory work was not only exploitative and 'alien', but it undermined religiosity, sobriety, family life and the Welsh language. As far as Lewis was concerned, 'Agriculture should be the chief industry of Wales and the basis of her civilization. To ensure the moral health of Wales and bodily health of her people, South Wales must be de-industrialised'. In the context of the 1930's, against an economic background of depression and sharpening political debate, there are examples of the ritual attacks on industrialism taking on a slightly different thrust. Attacks on the capitalist system began to be couched in moral, even Marxist terms:

We assert as Nationalists the right of man to work. It follows from our conception of the sovereign dignity of the human being. The work of man is not like the work of animals, a servitude imposed on him. On the contrary, it should be the expression of his spiritual or rational nature. That is why the capitalist expropriation of the means of production is so terrible a crime against humanity.

By the mid nineteen thirties, articles in The Welsh Nationalist begin
to concern themselves more keenly with the economic problems of industrial Wales. The longing for the restoration of an essentially rural existence remains, but it is supplemented with a more strident anti-capitalism. It is, though, English capitalism that is objected to, and the implicit message is that Welsh variants would be altogether more beneficial for the people. D.J. Davies tries to contrast the state of affairs existing in the coal industry and the problem of absentee ownership;

Anthracite mining in West Wales was formerly under local ownership and management until the amalgamation of many small firms in 'Amalgamated Anthracite' between 1926 and 1928 in a number of financial manoeuvres by Sir Alfred Mond. Up to as late as the post-war period, industry had Welsh owners who shared a common tradition and history with their men, who recognised a body of custom of ancient standing. London control of 'Amalgamated Anthracite' led to more sectional stoppages which can't be explained with reference to national stoppages and wage negotiations but were localised and particular.42

In the same article, Davies quotes approvingly from a book by J.L. and B. Hammond entitled The Rise of Modern Industry. 'In South Wales ... the conditions were more like those of a newly discovered gold-field or a plantation in tropical Africa. The restraints of a tradition, of a common history, of experience in government were all wanting'.43 It is not my intention to assess the accuracy of these claims, nor to challenge Davies' point about the frequency of strikes and stoppages in the Welsh coalfield when control moved to London. What is more significant is the attempt to contrast the rural past with the imposed condition of foreign capitalism. It is specifically English capitalism that is objected to, and the implicit message is that the Welsh variant, with men sharing a similar cultural tradition and constrained by a 'common history', would be more humane, less
exploitative and altogether more beneficial for the people.

By 1935, the monthly paper has a headline which reads, 'Collapse of Capitalism Opens Door for Nationalism'. Part of it said;

It is acknowledged on all sides that the capitalist system is tumbling down, and only the few who gained immoral profits from it are sorry. It was a system built not for the creation of real wealth and for the service of humanity, but a profit making system ... Capitalism has brought poverty and degradation on an unparalleled scale to the many, and riches and luxury for the few. A system which causes food to be destroyed and men forced to stop work whilst millions are in dire need condemns itself. In the face of this collapse of the Capitalist system, men have turned in despair to either the Fascist state or the Marxian state. But both ... are slave States. They deny the inviolable principle of every individual to Liberty ... A man cannot have Liberty in the Fascist or Communist state. To become free, a man must own his own means of livelihood - he must have Property ... We stand for the prevention of the accumulation of riches in few hands; for the break-up of the monopoly of trusts and combines. We stand for making men the owners of the land and industry up to the limit which they can work themselves without making other men their wage slaves.44

Although there was a tendency for some nationalist propaganda at this time to elaborate plans for an alternative economic organisation of Welsh society, the main thrust of the Party's programme remained a vague desire to re-establish the primacy of agriculture. The vision of the reconstructed Welsh society was one in which, 'every person who desires land will be able to obtain it and no foreign baron or landowner will be allowed to stand in our way'.45 Only a return to the soil could bring about the desired changes in belief, and help halt the process of secularisation, and the appeal of anti-Christian ideologies. In 1933, a correspondent in The Welsh Nationalist made his opposition to Communism explicit. 'The new Nationalism of Wales
must embody a definite social and economic as well as political creed. If this is to be one of peasant proprietorship and small ownership, then Welsh Nationalism is essentially Christian and the foe of Communism. The feeling that the internal migration from the countryside to the industrial valleys had been an historical disaster permeates the nationalist press. The 'Pandora's Box' of industrial expansion had drawn men and women from the land and left them 'rootless', poverty-stricken and stripped of their language and culture in the sprawling towns of the south. On the land,

All over Wales in every large or little valley, stand the ruins of farmhouses and cottages; and the old people can tell you who lived there when they were young, how they were drawn away to the mines. They went and the land suffered. Ditches fell in, and meadows grew boggy, banks and hedges were broken ... Now these lands are hurrying back to the wilderness, and the farmer of today cannot call back from the deserted works and mines those workless grandchildren of farmers who stew there, for they are, themselves, too poor to employ them.

The legacy of the industrialisation of Wales was the deplorable state of the countryside, and the spiritually and physically unhealthy towns. Furthermore, the inhabitants of the urban areas were being reduced to mere 'economic beings' with no history, culture or tradition. Even the family was being undermined as part of this process, particularly as religious belief was no longer in the position to buttress family obligations. The family and the nation were under attack, so the task of the nationalist was to assert that, 'a sound Welsh economy will defend the people of Wales against external, and the families of Wales against internal exploitation'.

On the role of the family there was a clear message;

The ultimate unit of the nation are its families, and it is for, as well as in its families that the nation exists. Hence the whole economic system is designed to safeguard as far as possible
the equality and certainly the independence and security of the family. Its two great enemies are capitalism and centralisation for both systems set up other ends than the well-being and independence of the family ... Hence the emphasis on agriculture, on the small industry and the uncompromising opposition to urbanisation and its inevitable polarisation, to chain stores and multiple shops; hence too, the interposition of so many societies between the family and the State, each with its own function and assured status, and all so interwoven in the social structure that the State becomes in the main, merely the defender and guarantor of the system. Co-operative nationalism is at the opposite pole from the state idolatry both of Fascism and Socialism.

The interlocking themes of family, community, language and nationality make for a distinctive ideology. Although it is common for nationalist parties to adopt similar ideas about the 'uniqueness' of the people, and the eulogising of the nation's heroes, the particular mixture of nonconformist radicalism, anti-capitalism, Owenite-socialism and a strong sense of cultural superiority, make the early ideology of Plaid Cymru a distinctive amalgam of influences. The desire to re-establish agricultural communities with an egalitarian distribution of land, had an appeal for very limited groups. This kind of message made no headway in the urban and industrial areas of Wales and the infant party remained the preserve of relatively small groups of disenchanted intellectuals. Referring to the movement for nationalism in Scotland in this period, Hanham points out the mixture of influences at work, ranging from Christian Socialism, political radicalism, Social Credit and cultural chauvinism, 'everything except a frank acceptance of the modern state and commercial empires'. In Scotland there had been, throughout the thirties, a group who believed that economic and social policies were a diversion from the main aim of self-government. After 1934 there
were more systematic attempts within the Scottish National Party to develop policy on a wide range of issues for use after independence. The substance of these policies included the development of light industries, rural recolonisation, emphasis on fishing, afforestation and urban and rural rehousing programmes. The distaste for industrial and urban life parallels that in Plaid Cymru.

The influence of Marxist ideas, that spread throughout the labour movement in Wales in the nineteen thirties, forms a backcloth to many of the discussions on 'the state of the nation' in the Plaid Cymru press. The majority of the membership were involved with Plaid Cymru because they believed there was a vast unbridgeable gulf between the societies of England and Wales. This gap was spiritual, and a continuation of political union between such different societies would, it was argued, threaten the minority culture and, eventually the 'spirit' of the Welsh nation would be lost or forgotten. Smith has pointed out that one of the core features of nationalist ideology is the conviction that the world is naturally divided into nationalities, and that each of these has a unique set of characteristics. Only the triumph of self determination for all nationalities can lead to the full flowering of human civilisation as each people is free to nurture its own distinctive features. The early ideologists of the Welsh nationalist party echoed this theme;

... social life in Wales throughout the ages created a way of thinking, of experiencing life and of expressing the human spirit, which is especially peculiar to us; and it is true that the precious things in Welsh history and Welsh life today are the things that are consistent with this Welsh tradition.  

(My emphasis) 

The material deprivation of sections of Welsh society was a manifestation of a spiritual poverty that could be overcome via patriotism. A leading article in The Welsh Nationalist in 1933 said:
Over and over again in the history of the world such a condition of disaster has called out the best in the spirit of the nation, and we read of great-hearted men rising in the hour of darkness and turning that darkness into dawn ... After all nations can survive poverty, distress and famine: nations can survive even the loss of national culture: but no nation can survive loss of its own identity. The dreadful fact today is that the fundamental characteristics of the Welshman are vanishing from the face of the earth ... this twentieth century of ours is fast taking away his self-reliance, his independence of thought and his courage.

The preferred antidote to economic depression was a renewed commitment to the national struggle. If only the nationalist could inspire the people, especially the youth, with an understanding of the collective past and their noble ancestors, then the privations and hardship of mass unemployment could be alleviated. Amelioration of the conditions in the towns hit by depression and the slump, took the form of morale boosting. Lewis, in a typical piece, said;

There is nothing like the sense of belonging to a noble country for inspiring youth to heroism. Nationalism is above all a fountain head of heroism and brave resolve. It gives a beaten people hope. It gives them resourcefulness and drives away apathy and cynicism and selfishness. It rouses them to co-operation and it kills obstruction and the spirit that says 'No'. In the present economic and social distress of Wales this inspiration is just what we lack.

Nationalistic sentiment could even bolster those whose main concern was stability and social control.

For instability and lack of tradition in any country is a danger to the peace of every other country. Leaving Wales as it is today, full of disorder and uncertainty and without a firm tradition, would very soon be likely to cause rebellion and turn throughout the whole of Britain. I do not know whether the English government understood during the coal strike how indebted it was to Welsh
culture and the National Eisteddfod for the calm and order there was in South Wales during all the weeks of the dispute. If Welsh culture is capable of this today, at a time when it is weak, what would it not do when it is installed and fittingly crowned? That is, what the aim of self government will be.

As the economic depression worsened, and conditions in the south Wales valley towns deteriorated, some of the Nationalist agitation took on a superficial similarity with the anti-Imperialist, anti-capitalist rhetoric of Marxism. Referring to rates of unemployment, some of the analyses advanced by the Nationalists had a distinctly socialistic ring to them;

There must surely lie a heavy load of responsibility on the system that wrought this havoc. What that system was admits of no doubt. It was the system whereby, in its frenetic worship of Mammon and its lunatic lust for gain, English industrialism in the nineteenth century ruthlessly destroyed everything that stood in the way ... with every means within their power Welsh workers struggle to repudiate the sub human status that the international financiers of London seek to thrust upon them.

Later, in a discussion of the economy, the same writer goes on to add, 'No Welsh Nationalist supposes that English capitalism was deliberately aiming at such a result ... it is unnecessary to suppose that it had any other aim than dividends.' Yet the predominance of nationalist ideology finally re-asserts the unity of all classes in the nation. In order to condemn the capitalist order with such moral force, these writers were compelled to equate capitalism with all things English.

For the majority of nationalists, judged by an analysis of the written material between 1925 and 1945, the goal is not so much the creation of an emancipated proletariat, but nothing less than the re-birth of the Welsh peasantry. The scenario they envisaged for the
solution of the ills of society, as they perceived them, could not have been more different from those of the Marxists, especially if one bears in mind Marx's frequent dismissal of the peasantry as a 'progressive' social force and his strictures about the 'idiocy of rural life'. If the nationalist party was to gain new recruits and make a lasting impact on the political scene, it had to try to win support from the ranks of organised labour. Some of the early propagandists realised this, and they aimed their arguments specifically at the Welsh working class. In 1936, a banner headline in *The Welsh Nationalist* proclaimed, 'We Are The Workers' Party';

> The proletariat owns no property. If a man owns property, however small, he is to that extent free, for he cannot have every condition of existence dictated to him then as the wage-slave has ... Socialism and Communism, focusing their notice on the unfair administration of property by the Capitalists, preached against the ownership of private property. Both doctrines (which are fundamentally one) forgot (1) that it was the abuse of private property and not the holding of it that made Capitalism; (2) that it was the propertyless condition of the workers which made them defenceless ... Communism said to the workers, "Capitalism stole your goods; men cannot administer their own property, therefore let the State do it". Welsh Nationalism says to the workers, "English Capitalism stole your goods; Welsh workers must get their goods back." The Welsh Nationalist Party intends that the 40% unemployed workers of Wales shall know that their only hope of prosperous peasantry in Wales lies in the redistribution of property amongst them, and not in handing property to another body of men called the State.

Ultimately, the nationalist must attempt to absolve particular sections of the population from responsibility for their actions, for, the new political order being constructed must, 'reflect the pangs and hopes of every class in the nation'.

From this relatively loose network of writers and intellectuals,
concerned to promote and protect the indigenous culture, there emerged a political party committed to self-government. A few individuals engaged in historical research or 'national' literary endeavours may deepen awareness of nationality among fairly restricted circles, but this does not constitute a nationalist movement. As Smith states, 'It is only when a political demand for the reorganisation of the political set-up is formulated by a group which includes 'nationals' of the existent or projected nation that we can begin to talk of a nationalist movement'. The small coterie of intellectuals who founded the Party, and articulated many of the themes that recur in the movement today, were heavily influenced by a particular perspective on the relationship between mass culture and spiritual 'health'. The influence of poets and playwrights has already been mentioned. These men and women claimed that they had entered the political arena somewhat reluctantly. Only the dire state of national culture had drawn them away from their literary work.

In England at this time, writers and social critics were influenced by the work of F.R. Leavis on the relationship between art and literature and mass culture. Leavis and his followers believed that the industrial revolution in England had destroyed the particular communal experience of rural society, and he claimed that Britain was witnessing, 'a breach of continuity and the uprooting of life, of immemorial ways of life rooted in the soil'. Whereas Leavis felt that this communal past could never be recreated, and the bond between the intellectual and the 'common people' re-established, a central tenet of the Welsh nationalist movement was that the people could be mobilized to support a political party that had the aim of nurturing 'traditional' communities. The opposition to urban and industrial life and values, which permeates Welsh nationalist thought, becomes critical for the rebuilding of an 'organic' relationship between the
artist and the masses. All around, the sensitive Welsh intellectual saw the debasement of the language and the culture and the gradual penetration of a mass culture that spiritually weakened the people. In the nationalist press, between 1930 and 1940, there appear routine condemnations of English and American cinema, radio and popular literature. As far as they were concerned, the early twentieth century was witnessing the desecration of the language, the lowering of cultural standards, together with a profound neglect by young people, especially urban youth, of the literary traditions of the nation. A typical comment was:

> It is true to say that their standard of culture is based on the films and the popular twopenny fiction papers ... Through the influence of films, their outlook on life is such that they venerate "the smart set" and the buffoons of the screen: they copy their mannerisms and their accent. Most distressing of all is their disregard for their own tongue. How can their superficiality be changed to a love of profound things and true culture?

In a similar vein, another correspondent attributed great native genius to the Welsh. He claimed that,

> The Welshman, in common with most European and Asiatic stocks has a priceless heritage of native intelligence ... the Anglo-Saxon race is not so gifted ... A nation naturally vulgar cannot but produce vulgar periodicals ... muck drives out decency and lies drive out the truth.

Another writer accuses the English of making, 'a bestiality where there was once a decent and civilised life.' Saunders Lewis wrote a play for the BBC in 1936 which had the following lines. 'My country of Wales is a vineyard, given into my keeping, to be handed down to my children and my children's children, as an inheritance for all time. And look, the pigs are rushing in to despoil it.'

Nationalist thought tended to dichotomise Welsh/English along
the same axis as 'cultured/uncivilised', in that way trying to reverse
the value polarisation which had arisen in the 19th century. As far
as they were concerned the Welsh way of life was being dealt mortal
blows, and the people uprooted from the anchors of family, land and
chapel by the crude secular values of English materialism. In an
extreme variant of this ideology, it was argued that the true culture
of Wales was rural and the towns themselves were an alien intrusion.

A prominent Welsh academic and nationalist has argued that;

Wales has no civic heritage. The
essentially rural culture of Wales, like
that of the Balkans, had crystallised
before the introduction of towns by
aliens, and after the conquest the
distinction between country and town
became largely a distinction between
English and Welsh.

Once this type of argument was allowed to develop, it was a short step
towards condemning the inhabitants of the urban areas as 'uncultured',
and lacking some essential quality of Welshness. Saunders Lewis was
explicit in his belief that,

Whatever culture there has been in the
mining valleys of South Wales has been
the remnant of the social life of the
countryside, and has been Welsh in
speech. The extension of English has
everwhere accompanied the decay of that
culture, the loss of social traditions
... It has produced no richness of
idioms.

The belief in the superiority of Welsh literature, language and
traditions is, occasionally, explained with reference to biological
principles. When, for example, D.J. Daniel calls for the restoration
of the 'national will', it is, 'a restoration of a national past
stressing common struggle, common ancestry, traditions and biology',

Whilst a Welshman living among "the aliens" wrote, 'I live among
Englishmen and the differences between us are not merely personal, but
racial. The experience of other foreigners confirms, and daily
contacts, emphasise this.\textsuperscript{69}

The connection between a Leavisite concern with the deleterious consequences of mass culture, the decline of the language and the gradual 'anglicisation' of Welsh social life, combined to propel Welsh writers into the movement for Welsh statehood. Because the Party was very small in these early years, such men and women carried a great deal of weight in the determination of policy. Also, according to Glyn Jones, the influence of writers was significant because;

\begin{quote}
The tradition exists very powerfully in Wales that the poet is not a man apart, a freak, but rather an accepted part of the social fabric with an important function to perform. The type of writer who turns his back on society and abjures all responsibility towards it in a rootless Bohemianism is almost unknown in Wales. At the present time when the language is ruthlessly menaced, the idea of being involved in the nation's affairs, in her problems and her dilemmas, has fresh force for the Welsh language writer ... he sees himself as one of the guardians of an endangered heritage.\textsuperscript{70}
\end{quote}

This tradition, it is claimed, pre-dates the formation of Plaid Cymru, but it helps explain the over-representation of writers in the ranks of the Party, and goes some way towards explaining how Plaid Cymru's beliefs and values were shaped. In the early years of the SNP in Scotland, there was a similar involvement by the Kailyard school of writers. They, too, 'looked back to a Scotland which, it was believed, had existed - a rural Gemeinschaft where there was security ... where people knew their place and, on the whole, were nice to each other.'\textsuperscript{71}

For a brief period in 1936, the struggle of the Welsh Nationalist Party came to the attention of a much wider audience. Turning their backs on the established political parties, Plaid Cymru activists pioneered new, and sometimes 'unconstitutional' forms of struggle. In the Spring of 1936, the RAF announced plans to turn an
area of the Lleyn peninsula in North Wales into a bombing range. There were protests from many quarters, partly because the area was noted for its unspoilt natural beauty, partly because the plans involved disruption of long-established Welsh-speaking communities. When the protests were overruled and plans went ahead to transform the area, three leading Nationalists, D.J. Williams, the Reverend Lewis Valentine and Saunders Lewis, led an attack on the bombing range and, at dead of night, burnt down some buildings. In the morning they gave themselves up to the police and, eventually, stood trial for arson. A campaign in Wales involving hundreds of Churches and other institutions had failed to stop the plans for the range. The ensuing trial became something of a cause celebre, attracted widespread publicity for Plaid Cymru and was a subject of intense political controversy. At the first trial, held in Caernarfon, the jury failed to agree on a verdict and the trial was moved, amid much protest, to the Old Bailey in London. In 1936 a newspaper described scenes at the trial.

The Old Bailey has had many queues outside its entrances for famous trials but never one of the type that waited for hours today. They spoke Welsh and comprised of bankers, stockbrokers, shopkeepers, ministers and schoolmasters. Many of them were accompanied by their wives... they were the advanced guard of about seven hundred Welsh men and women coming to London ... it was only after much persuasion that any of the Welsh people consented to speak English to a Press Association reporter ... Among those left outside were many prominent public men in Wales, religious leaders and Bards.72

Inside the courtroom the defendants insisted on speaking Welsh. They refused to call witnesses in their defence, refused legal counsel and declined to give evidence. A newspaper account of the trial continued

Addressing the accused, Mr. Justice Charles said: 'John Saunders Lewis, do you wish to ask the witness any question
because if you do you will ask it in English or not at all?'
Lewis made no reply. Mr. Justice Charles then put the same question to Valentine who replied to him in Welsh, and his Lordship said, 'I have said if you want to ask a question, you must do so in English or not at all'. Valentine replied again in Welsh and was told to sit down.

Throughout the London retrial the defendants insisted on their right to be tried in Wales by a jury of their fellow countrymen. Addressing the jury in Welsh D.J. Williams declared, "I am not going to plead my case. I consider, with every respect to the jurors, that no one can do just cause except jurors from our own nation." This refusal to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court was, of course, consistent with nationalist demands for self government. It was also an indication of the depth of feeling on this issue. Lewis' speech in his own defence at the first trial in Caernarvon drew attention to two other proposed bombing schools in England, which the Air Ministry had not built after highly publicised protests.

Will you try to understand our feelings when we saw the foremost scholars and literary men of England talking of the 'sacredness' of the ducks and swans and succeeding on that argument in compelling the Air Ministry to withdraw the bombing range, while here in Wales at the very same time, we were organising a nation-wide protest on behalf of the truly sacred things in creation - a Nation, its language, its literature, its separate traditions and immemorial ways of Christian life - and we could not get the government even to receive a deputation to discuss the matter with us? The irony of the contrast is the irony of blasphemy.

They were convicted and served a year in prison. Lewis was dismissed from his post as lecturer at the University of Wales, and, when the men were released, they were hailed as national martyrs. Not all of Wales was impressed, however for, according to one local newspaper,
'Despite the frantic vapouring of hysterical professors ... the bulk of the Welsh nation are unimpressed by the skilfully engineered campaign of hysteria.'

By the end of the decade, with the United Kingdom embroiled in World War, Plaid Cymru had moved closer to pacifism. In September, 1939, every branch was circularised with an anti-war declaration, the branches were encouraged to continue meeting and organise anti-war opinion in their areas. In June 1940, J.E. Daniel issued a statement of Plaid Cymru's stance on the war. It re-iterated the main point that, without a government of its own, England had no right to involve the Welsh people in a 'senseless clash of rival imperialisms'. Until England recognised Wales' right to nationhood, then no government had any right to involve Wales in war and to conscript her manhood. A Plaid Cymru conference held in October 1939 passed unanimously two resolutions on their attitude to the war.

(1) That this conference of the Welsh Nationalist Party, firmly believing that nothing but evil can come to Wales through this war, requests the Government to call an armistice and a peace conference without delay.

(2) That we ask the Government, in so far as it professes to be fighting for the freedom and rights of small nations and national minorities, to regard and respect Wales as a nation, and acknowledge that fact in three ways: (a) By granting the National Petition for granting official status to the Welsh language in the courts of law. (b) By establishing a Consultative Committee for Wales, to safeguard Welsh interests during the war and to represent the Welsh nation before the government. (c) By accepting Welsh nationality as sufficient grounds for conscientious objection to military service.

The newly elected Party President, Professor J.E. Daniel concluded that,

We have officially adopted the pacifist standpoint in our annual conferences. It is a policy of non-cooperation and means
the refusal to England of our body and soul in its war game. Any efforts we make must be for the preservation of life, the relieving of pain, and the production of food within the political boundary of Wales. I hope that no member of the Party, appearing before the Tribunal for conscientious objectors would fear to put forward his Welsh national objection to war.

The Western Mail responded with disdain. In a leader on August 1st 1940, it said of Plaid Cymru, that, 'they were writing and uttering the most pestilential trash on the subject ... it was England's war, a capitalist war, an Imperialist war and therefore no concern of Wales ... we have heard this stuff ad nauseam.' Public opinion moved against the Party, and, by October 1940 their paper became increasingly bitter in its condemnation of the English. Under regulations rationing paper, The Welsh Nationalist was cut in size. Its opposition to the war, and Plaid Cymru's refusal to make any statement about the merits of the belligerents, made it inevitable that the taunt of fascist would be thrown in their direction. Within Wales, Plaid Cymru began to voice some of the resentment over the presence of evacuees;

North and Mid-Wales and indeed every part of Wales which is reasonably safe are rapidly being occupied by wealthy and leisurely English folk and Jews who are buying and renting every imaginable kind of dwelling at high rents ... (as far as Wales is concerned) the only role for her to play is that of unwilling host to England's cowardly rich.

The voice of Welsh nationalism remained muted and, for the next twenty five years, the party attracted little popular support.
Conclusion

The establishment of Plaid Cymru marked a recognition that all attempts to persuade the established parties to acknowledge Welsh nationhood, and make constitutional concessions on this basis, were ended. Nationalist ideology was legitimised, partly because the Nonconformist Chapels provided many of the early activists, and the rhetoric of the Party reflected the spiritual concerns of these men and women. Their task, as they saw it, was to foster a sense of communality based on a common language, history and territory, and the ideology of Plaid Cymru evolved into a unique configuration, involving influences drawn from Christian Socialism, Nonconformism, pacifism and the celebration of a romantic and mythical Welsh gemeinschaft.

Modernising urban and secular forces were singled out as the root cause of all that was amiss with Welsh life, and the involvement of writers and poets gave the party a 'cultural' orientation. Rural life is more susceptible to nostalgic yearnings, and Welsh nationalist material abounds with allusions to a 'Golden Age' when Welsh society was, supposedly, more integrated, less exploitative and predominantly rural. In this respect, Plaid Cymru activists are heirs to a tradition of elevating rural life that is a characteristic feature of social movements and schools of thought that embrace a wide range of political ideologies. The core of this tradition, according to Newby, can be stated quite simply. Life in the countryside is viewed as one of harmony and virtue. The town is disorganized; the countryside is settled. The town is bad; the countryside is good. Social relationships in the town are superficial and alienating; relationships in the countryside are deep and fulfilling. The images combine when the countryside is regarded as 'natural' the town as 'unnatural'.

As well as opposing imperialism and centralisation, the small group who developed and articulated twentieth century Welsh nationalism had
a particular contempt for the socially mobile deracine intellectual. Insofar as they developed a notion of human psychology, this emphasised the need for stability, 'roots' and a sense of 'connectedness' with the collective past. A central assumption is that all men crave, at some deep psychological level, fellowship and membership of a more intimate community, one that transcends the family unit. The scale and remoteness of organisation created by the centralising state is antithetical to specifically Welsh interests and to the need for identification, security and a sense of meaning. Hence the programme of Plaid Cymru was, and still is, heavily influenced by decentralist arguments and tends to favour 'community' solutions to social, economic and political questions. Only with a proper awareness of the collective past will the spirit and the values of the collectivity be renewed. A leading nationalist claimed that:

The importance of the "social heritage" and the sentiment of nationality is corroborated by modern psychology with its emphasis on the function of "sentiments" in the unifying and moralising of personality, and by sociologists ... who call attention to the phenomenon of the denationalised "uprooted man" as one of the most dangerous portents of modern times.

Implicit in such arguments is the assumption that the 'uprooted man' will, invariably, be urban man. An idealised and faintly mystical vision of Welsh rural life is not the prerogative of nationalists only. Ruth Glass has shown how pervasive is the tendency to equate anything rural with more satisfying social relationships. The ubiquity of this perspective has led to, 'a lengthy course of indoctrination to which all of us, everywhere, have at some time or other been subjected ... and to many of us the adjective 'rural' has pleasant, re-assuring connotations—beauty, order, simplicity rest, grass-roots, democracy, peacefulness, Gemeinschaft.' If
sociologists have been persistently seduced by such images, and thereby guilty of ideological short-sightedness, it seems relatively unsurprising that the new Welsh nationalist party, given its composition and appeal, was capable of celebrating the rural past in such a romantic and unrealistic fashion.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

7. Ibid. p7.
11. Ibid. p9.
22. R. Nisbet (1967) p47.
25. N. Elias px in Newby and Bell.
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27. Ibid. pxiii.
34. Ibid. p2.
42. D.J. Davies (19 ) p21.
43. Ibid. p21 my emphasis.
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51. See Brand (1975).
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64. The Welsh Nationalist May 1932 p2.
70. Glyn Jones (1968) p135.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Cited in the Observer 8 August 1954.
77. The Welsh Nationalist May 1940 p1.
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79. Caernarvon and Denbigh Herald op.cit.
80. Western Mail 1.8.1940.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE CONDITIONS AND VICISSITUDES OF ORGANISED WELSH NATIONALISM

Social and Economic Changes

This chapter aims to analyse the main features of the social structure of Wales, insofar as they are relevant for an understanding of the rise and decline of contemporary nationalism. It will attempt to connect the analysis of shifts in the programme and ideology of Plaid Cymru, to the changing social and economic structure of Wales. Only an analysis of such changing conditions will enable us to grasp more adequately the nature of the movement for self-government or devolution. An analysis of the changing social structure of Wales is relevant to the thesis because many of the demands made by nationalist political activists revolve around an assertion of profound differences between the two nations. These differences, it is argued, can only be fully acknowledged and adequate policies developed, if Wales gains a separate legislative body and a degree of autonomy in decision making.

Although Wales has been part of the United Kingdom for over four hundred years, there is clear evidence that the differential impact of industrialisation, and the associated demographic changes, are significant in explaining the differences between Wales and the rest of the United Kingdom. The claim is frequently made by nationalists that Welsh society is 'impoverished' by the link with England, that the political unification of England and Wales is detrimental to Wales, and that 'independence' would lead to major improvements in the material conditions of Welsh people. It is not the intention to assess the validity of these claims. This chapter will try to show how the belief in these claims forms the core of Plaid Cymru's propaganda, and the electoral successes enjoyed by the party in the
late sixties and seventies were, partly, an outcome of what were perceived as the deleterious consequences of social and economic changes.

The 1981 Census revealed that the population of Wales was some 2.8 million, distributed between the eight counties in the following way.

Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clwyd</td>
<td>391,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyfed</td>
<td>330,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwent</td>
<td>439,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwynedd</td>
<td>230,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powys</td>
<td>110,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Glamorgan</td>
<td>538,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Glamorgan</td>
<td>384,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Glamorgan</td>
<td>367,598</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of Population Censuses and Surveys.

Fifty years ago the population stood at 2.6 million. As Rees has argued, the location and movement, occupational and class structure of any population, together with its standard of living and, in extreme cases, its fertility and mortality rates, will depend upon its recent economic development ... (and) the age and sex composition of a population, together with its rate of increase, are important determinants of an economy's potential for economic development.

In Wales, the rapid development of coal, tinplate, slate quarrying and iron and steel industries in the nineteenth century led to rapid population growth, with the south eastern corner of Wales acting as a magnet, drawing in men and women from rural Wales, as well as from England and Ireland. In the years after the First World War all these
industries suffered a prolonged recession. An economy based on agriculture, mining and other traditional heavy industries was in a vulnerable position. The concentration of heavy industries in one area of the country and the relative lack of diversification into new manufacturing processes led to a long period of economic decline. In the nineteen thirties, such was the scale of the recession in these traditional heavy industries that unemployment was consistently higher than the British average. Throughout the thirties the average rate of unemployment in Wales was five times that of the average for Britain as a whole, though, of course, this varied both between areas and over time. Whereas the average rate of unemployment in England rarely went above 20% of the working population in the period between 1930 and 1937, the figure for Wales was over 30%, and certain blackspots such as Merthyr Tydfil (61.9%), Pontypridd (53.2%) and Abertillery (49.6%), 'made the figures for St. Albans, (3.9%), Coventry (5.1%) and Birmingham (6.4%) look as if they referred to a different age and economic system'.

The most spectacular manifestation of the decline of employment in the traditional industries was the out-migration of people. The total population of Wales has varied little over the past fifty years, but migration out of the country has cancelled out any natural increase in the population; 'Thus between 1921 and 1931 just over a quarter of a million people left Wales, the vast majority from the south Wales coalfield and by the end of the 1930's the total outflow was close to 430,000. It was estimated that more than half these were young people forced to search for work in the Midlands or the Home Counties. The overreliance on coal, steel and iron, led to a prolonged period of decline of the Welsh economy, and this is reflected in demographic patterns. Rees concluded that Wales has a falling share of the total UK population and that this was a
consequence of its relatively lower rate of economic growth.

Reviewing the average annual increase in population of the United Kingdom since 1931 he concluded that, 'In all periods the Welsh percentage was less than that of the United Kingdom'. Writing in 1975, one commentator claimed that, 'many parts of Wales have yet to make up in numbers for the depletion of their population arising from the depression in the inter-war years'. The exodus from Wales in this period was encouraged by Government measures.

There was a ... planned migration too, orchestrated by Neville Chamberlain after 1931 and assisted by the Ministry of Labour, in the transfer of tens of thousands of Welsh working people to the London suburbs of Hounslow or Dagenham, to the engineering works of Coventry, the light industries of Watford and Slough, and the Morris motor-car works at Cowley, Oxford ... there was a vast displacement of people from the valleys. The population of the Rhondda fell 13% in the twenties ... In all its population declined from 162,000 to 111,000 in 1951, with a disproportionately high ratio of elderly men and women left behind.

Between 1921 and the outbreak of war the population of Wales fell 7%. This historical legacy was to influence the demographic structure of Wales for several generations, for, as Morgan has claimed, 'Probably no other part of Europe showed such an extraordinary loss of population over this period'. As a result Wales has, on average, an 'older' population with greater proportions of both sexes over forty, and throughout the century an increasing female to male ratio. The advent of war in 1939 gave the Welsh economy something of a boost. Some of the companies that moved into Wales during the war did stay on and there were signs that the base of the economy was broadening. Nevertheless, two characteristics of the Welsh economy are particularly noteworthy. Relative to the rest of the United Kingdom, Wales has a lower rate of economic activity and consistently higher
rates of unemployment.

Table 2: Economic Activity Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Welsh Economic Trends HMSO.

What has been witnessed in the post-war period, is the steady but dramatic decline in the three pillars of the Welsh economy; agriculture, iron and steel and coal mining. Alternative employment in manufacturing, service industries and local and national government, has offset some of these job losses. Female activity rates have been rising rapidly as employment opportunities for women in these sectors increase. Although rates of unemployment in Wales in the fifties and sixties never reached the levels of the thirties, they were still relatively higher than those for England.

Table 3: Unemployment in Great Britain Scotland and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WALES</th>
<th>SCOTLAND</th>
<th>GREAT BRITAIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table shows that, even though unemployment was sometimes as low as one or two per cent, at no time is the average figure for Wales below that for Britain as a whole. It should also be borne in mind that migration out of Wales helped to keep levels of unemployment in Wales down.

Between 1964 and 1970, the years that witnessed the first significant electoral successes of Plaid Cymru, employment in agriculture was halved, down to less than fourteen thousand employees. Throughout the fifties and sixties deliberate government encouragement led to increasing efficiency and profitability on Welsh farms. The number of very small farms, under twenty acres, declined, and the traditionally impoverished farmers of the hilly and less fertile midlands, found new affluence and confidence resulting from increased production, steadier price levels and expanding markets ... on the other hand increased mechanization meant inevitably a further decline in the demand for agricultural labour and this added to the flow of the population from rural areas.

Farms in Wales tended to be less prosperous than those in England and Scotland, and much smaller in scale. In rural areas, the problem of declining employment opportunities was compounded by the decline in those few industries located in the rural areas. By the end of the nineteen sixties, the once-flourishing slate quarrying industry in Gwynedd was no longer economically viable. Between 1969 and 1972, all the major quarries closed down except one.

In the south, the decline of the coal industry had even greater consequences in terms of jobs. The number of mines producing coal in Wales fell from 171 in 1950 to 44 in 1979, and between 1965 and 1975, 50,000 jobs were lost from the coal industry alone. It is likely that this decline will continue as the Government and the National Coal
Board plan closures of more of the country's smaller, exhausted or 'uneconomic' pits. Wilding has estimated that in the period between 1964 and 1970, a coal mine was closed in Wales every seven weeks. It was the rundown of coal mining that changed most dramatically the economic and social life of parts of South Wales. As Morgan has commented, 'No sector of the British mining industry underwent a more remarkable contraction after 1945'. At the start of nationalisation in 1948, the newly-formed National Coal Board began to close dozens of the smaller pits, and numbers in employment fell from 200,000 in 1950, to 106,000 in 1960, down to 60,000 in 1970. By 1985, the South Wales coalfield employed fewer than 20,000 men. The following table summarises the main trends in employment in Wales in the twenty years after 1951.

Table 4: Changes in employment in Wales 1951-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment sector</th>
<th>1951-61</th>
<th></th>
<th>1961-71</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>-604</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+260</td>
<td>+20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>-18,227</td>
<td>-3,797</td>
<td>-16,100</td>
<td>+1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal manufacture and engineering</td>
<td>+29,940</td>
<td>+6,565</td>
<td>+17,750</td>
<td>+5,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Quarrying</td>
<td>-30,530</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-42,970</td>
<td>+40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical and artistic</td>
<td>+19,394</td>
<td>+9,196</td>
<td>+9,420</td>
<td>+9,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services, sport and recreation</td>
<td>+2,720</td>
<td>+531</td>
<td>+4,830</td>
<td>+27,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>+8,605</td>
<td>+18,207</td>
<td>-4,020</td>
<td>+21,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-4,483</td>
<td>+36,189</td>
<td>-48,650</td>
<td>+91,680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the pits closed, the industrial centres around which community life revolved, underwent a transformation. Former miners had to travel down the valleys to the coastal strip between Cardiff and Swansea, where newer industries were being established in an attempt to provide alternative employment. These industries also
tended to attract women workers, with direct consequences for patterns of domestic life. The social impact of such changes in employment in South Wales are currently under investigation. But it is clear that the social consequences of the decline of an industry that is male-dominated, that creates homogeneous communities and has its own particular pattern of status derived from working relationships will be profound. One study of the social impact of colliery closures has attempted to make explicit the connection between the economic and social dimensions of such a process.

Decline in coal mining has consequences beyond the purely economic as the social characteristics of the villages are liable to change. A policy of economic development and diversification may result in the population stabilising, but the villages will be socially very different from those that were created by coal mining. The largely homogeneous class nature of the villages will be diluted; no longer will the overwhelming proportion of the population be employed in a single and particularly dangerous industry. Within the working class, the proportion of skilled manual workers may increase with each generation of school leavers as apprenticeships become available in different industries. Great differences in economic interests may emerge and replace the solidarity that comes from all working in one industry. In some localities a new breed of middle class commuters may move into what were previously mining villages. While most local residents share the same occupational background a man's standing in the village is closely linked to the status he is given by his workmates. This cannot be maintained when men work in a number of different types of factory dispersed over a wider geographical area. Local leaders have traditionally been drawn from the N.U.M. lodges and as long as coal dominated they could legitimately claim to represent the local interest. As the collieries close the N.U.M. leaders may attempt to extend the base of their authority but with increasing industrial and social diversification, different and conflicting interests may emerge.
The industrial and economic changes brought about by the restructuring of the economy were experienced as an assault on traditional ways of life, and long-established patterns of authority and political legitimacy. Consequently, this was one of the key areas in which the Welsh nationalist party was able to capitalise on a sense of despair and confusion about the pace of social change. Because the Labour Party enjoyed a position of political dominance in local government in South Wales, and Parliamentary majorities for Labour Members were usually impregnable, it was the Labour Party that was forced onto the defensive.

The Labour Governments of 1964 to 1970 presided over this decline in coal production, and the population shifts that went hand in hand with lower levels of agricultural employment. A population drift away from the rural midlands and the iron and coal valleys, to the south east plain continued in the years between 1961 and 1971. This depopulation of the countryside and the former industrial valleys was seized upon by Plaid Cymru and utilised by them as an example of central government indifference to the social changes affecting Welsh people. Plaid Cymru were particularly concerned about rural depopulation, because these areas tended to be more Welsh speaking. Hence the connection between material, or 'structural' changes, and cultural change gave Plaid Cymru the opportunity to link their traditional concern about a diluted nationality, exemplified by a declining proportion of Welsh speakers, to the economic problems caused by job losses.

Income levels and activity rates in Wales are below the average for the United Kingdom, and emigration continued to cancel out natural population growth. It is the lower level of economic activity which underlies the lower per capita gross domestic product in Wales. Wilding estimated that gross domestic product for Wales was 5% below
the average for the 'assisted regions' in the U.K. He commented, 'The problem is not that Welsh industry is unproductive. It is simply that there is not enough of it.' The response of central government to the structural transformation of the Welsh economy was an attempt to provide alternative employment by deliberately encouraging the development of a more diversified industrial base.

Alan Butt Philip argues that the Second World War was crucial for the economic restructuring of Wales. The war stimulated decentralisation of industry which drew substantial manufacturing employment to Wales. Since then, various governments have offered direct subsidies, tax incentives and regional premiums, as well as help with the construction of advanced factory sites, in order to attract new light industries to 'depressed' regions of Britain. Since such schemes were introduced, with the exception of narrow bands in the south east and north east corners, all of Wales has been designated as a 'development' area. To supplement this attempt to lure employers to the regions, some central government functions were devolved to Wales. A combination of designated new towns, at Cwmbran, Newtown etc. the relocation of central government bureaucracies in Wales, and the building of new industrial estates with tax and rates incentives, was the 'official' response. Cardiff became the home of the Companies Registration Department and an investment grants office as well as the Welsh Office. Newport became a centre for passport issue, Swansea the new headquarters of the Department of Transport Driver and Vehicle Licensing Centre, and the Royal Mint was transferred to Llantrisant, a new town at the foot of the old industrial valleys.

Referring to this gradual change in the occupational structure, Day has pointed out that government action has included, nationalization, subsidization, and directive planning, and in Wales such
policy has had at least a limited success; manufacturing employment has been greatly increased ... the basic industries of coal, steel and farming are no longer quite so central.\textsuperscript{17}

In this respect, the occupational structure of Wales came to resemble that of England, that is, with a declining proportion engaged in primary and extractive industries, and a gradual shift from manufacturing, to the service sector. From the end of the War to 1968 the numbers employed in service occupations virtually doubled and stood at 345,000 in 1980. Gradually, the industrial character of the country bore less resemblance to Wales of the inter-war period. The growth of the 'service class', analysed by Goldthorpe and his collaborators in the Oxford Mobility Survey,\textsuperscript{18} applies more generally to Wales.

In 1967 the Government produced an economic plan for Wales, which was to be the basis for government action. The document, Wales the Way Ahead,\textsuperscript{19} was attacked because it failed to outline priorities for economic development, or any timetable for action. Its appearance spurred Plaid Cymru into producing its own economic plan for Wales, which, they claimed, drew on the expertise of academics and businessmen. For the first time since its foundation, the Welsh nationalist party attempted to appeal to the predominantly English speaking populations of the industrialised areas of the country, in particular the valleys of Glamorgan and Monmouth. Plaid Cymru activists in these areas, encouraged by the emergence of a new cadre of full time officials, began to exploit the 'failures' of a Labour Government to tackle the problems brought about by pit, rail and factory closures.

Between 1965 and 1970, unemployment rates in Wales began to rise significantly. In these years they were running at nearly 80% above the average for Great Britain as a whole. By 1971, the employment
forecasts in *Wales the Way Ahead* had been discredited, and many of its ill-thought out and imprecise aims had been abandoned. The decline of coal, rail and steel employment continued, and there were only two identifiable areas of growth. Employment in service industries rose by 71,000 between 1974 and 1984 and now constitutes over 60% of all employment, and the number of self-employed went up by 20% between 1974 and 1984. Employment in the public sector also shows a significant difference. In Britain as a whole the percentage is around 30% of the working population, in Wales it is around 40%. The explanation for this higher figure lies in the activities of central government. Because Wales, along with other regions of the United Kingdom, came to be seen as a 'problem' area in the nineteen sixties, it was granted special status under various regional development plans. According to the General Secretary of Plaid Cymru, the economic structure of Wales still bears the mark of the country's legacy as a supplier of basic products, and a recipient of economic investment with its origins outside the country.

At present Wales is over dependent on the massive public sector industries, coal and steel - vulnerable to political decisions in London and Brussels - and also on large scale companies owned and controlled from outside - one Welsh Council estimate was that some 70% per cent of firms employing over 100 people have their headquarters outside Wales.

All the evidence points to the fact that a stable economy cannot be built on enterprises which lack solid roots in the local community.

The expansion of manufacturing employment, brought about as a result of positive government discrimination, was limited by the fact that many of the employers took advantage of the regional employment premiums and other incentives, but, 'in common with the other underdeveloped areas, Wales faces the prospect of
dominance by "branch establishments". With both ownership and overall control of manufacturing concerns located in England, the 'head-office' often chooses to close down peripheral operations. According to Butt-Philip this leads to more severe recessions in Wales than in the rest of Britain.

Most of the short term recessions in the post war period occurred in the textile, clothing and electrical goods industries which, as durable goods industries, have been prominent amongst those farmed out to the 'developing areas'. While recessions in these industries in the Midlands and the south-east of England simply took the heat out of the economy and clipped excess demand, in Wales these recessions bore the marks of a trade cycle.

The relatively higher levels of unemployment, and lower average income in Wales, compared with the average for the United Kingdom, help to explain those observable differences in prosperity. There are numerous indicators to show the relative prosperity of one region of the United Kingdom compared to another. Wilding's review of official data on health, housing, education, unemployment levels and average income, revealed that on most indicators, the people of Wales were less prosperous than those in England, taken as a whole. This does not mean that Wales comes bottom of every league table, for, some regions of England, such as the North East, and Northern Ireland, frequently suffer greater relative deprivation. According to the Welsh economist, E.T. Nevin, the explanation for the differences between Wales and the rest of the United Kingdom, is the fact that Wales is relatively starved of the most progressive types of industry. A significant section of Plaid Cymru came to concur with this view in the nineteen sixties, and, it was in this period that the party made its sharpest
break with the anti-industrial, arcadian and romantic ideology of an earlier period. (See Chapter 4.) For the nationalist party began to claim that 'economic exploitation' by England was at the root of Wales's comparatively poor performance. Consequently, key figures in the party leadership began to elaborate an alternative economic plan, in order to demonstrate not just the viability of an 'independent' Wales, but the fact that self-government would provide greater opportunities for industrial investment, modernisation, employment and prosperity.\(^{22}\)

**Political Developments**

The 1966 Labour Government, having gained thirty of the thirty six parliamentary seats in Wales, and with several prominent Welsh MP's in the Wilson Cabinet, made more resolute moves to plan and co-ordinate policies on tourism, rural development and the creation of industrial employment. In addition to creating a new Cabinet post, a Secretary of State for Wales, with a devolved Welsh Office in Cardiff, the Government established an Economic Council for Wales and a Welsh Economic Planning Board. Later, during the 1974-79 period, the Labour Government founded the Development Council for Mid Wales, and a relatively powerful new body, with a large budget of £100 million, the Welsh Development Agency. By the late seventies virtually the whole of Wales was designated, for various purposes, as a development area with a range of incentives to try and draw industrialists to the regions. This had come to be seen as the core of the problem of the Welsh economy. In the 1967 official document, *Wales: The Way Ahead*, the government stated in a clear manner how the problem was perceived by official planners; 'It is the inadequate number of employment
opportunities which accounts for the comparatively low level of per capita income and the relatively high dependence of the Welsh economy on assistance from the Exchequer and on the import of capital.  

Despite increasing government expenditure on regional aid as a means of redressing some of the more persistent inequalities, an assessment of its effects is not easy. The Secretary of State for Wales in 1967 made clear the government commitment thus; 'The government are determined that as the economy of the nation gathers strength, a due share of its swelling resources will be devoted to the needs of Wales and of other less developed parts of the United Kingdom'.

It appears, with hindsight, that an assumption of 'swelling resources', was politically naive or, at least, very optimistic. In posing the question about the success of the plethora of official responses to the 'regional' question several points must be borne in mind. It is extremely difficult to assess what exactly 'success' or 'failure' would be in this context. The assumption that government action could solve problems of inequality that have their roots in decades of economic history, may well be regarded as unrealistic. If, on the other hand, we try to discover the extent to which regional policy eased the problem of unemployment in Wales then some assessment is possible. Given that it is almost impossible to disentangle the effects of regional policy from the general movement of economic swings and slumps, Wilding concluded that 'it looks as though Wales has probably had a fair share of the regional cake'.

Others have claimed that the achievements of regional policy with regard to Wales have been 'concrete and substantial, indeed encouragingly large'. Moore and Rhodes estimate that between
1960 and 1972 regional policies helped to create up to 80,000 jobs, and, in relation to the size of the working population, Wales had done remarkably well with regard to the range of measures that various governments introduced in the sixties and seventies. They add a note of caution, suggesting that a full solution to the problem of unemployment in Wales would have required the creation of anything between 200,000 and 250,000 new jobs.

The political dimensions of this issue were acute because, when the Welsh Office produced its own predictions of a shortfall in job opportunities, Plaid Cymru joined the fray. The government document forecast a shortfall of 15,000 jobs in Wales by the mid seventies. Plaid Cymru's Economic Plan for Wales, published to counter what were seen as optimistic government projections, forecast a shortfall of 177,500 jobs by 1976. By 1973 the survey of the Welsh economy produced for the Royal Commission on the Constitution revised earlier official estimates. The authors of this survey calculated that, by 1976, there would be a shortfall of 49,000 jobs. They went on to say, 'A significant increase in the demand for male labour ... appears to be urgently required ... otherwise we will doubtless witness an appreciable rise in the numbers of job-seeking males who have decided to emigrate'.

The issues of job losses, and the consequent prosperity of the Welsh people, came to be one of the central issues in political life after 1968. It was in this period that the programme, policies and ideology of Plaid Cymru underwent substantial modification. Groups that had once dominated the party, with their origins in predominantly rural areas, were challenged by new recruits from the industrial valleys of south Wales. As the composition of the party changed
so too did its ideology. It is this aspect that we turn to later in this chapter.

Wartime Britain witnessed an expansion in the size and scale of central and local government functions. The exigencies of wartime mobilisation and organisation gave rise to new institutions, and strengthened the range of activities of others. This led to a political acceptance of levels of state activity that would, formerly, have been unthinkable. The post war Labour Government gave no explicit recognition of a Welsh dimension to economic reorganisation. The experience of mass unemployment in the inter-war years confirmed them in their view that only central government initiatives, with the state assuming powerful new means of controlling the economy, could ensure post war prosperity and a degree of social justice. Although earlier, Labour manifesto's had promised a measure of 'Home Rule' for Wales, socialists were, in this period, far more concerned with the construction of the welfare state, with uniform standards of service established throughout the country. The prevailing ideology emphasised centralised solutions to problems of planning and economic management. To acknowledge a regional dimension to policy planning raised the possibility of different standards of health care, social welfare or employment in different parts of Britain. The demand was for greater central control and management of economic and social policies, not the devolution of these powers to Wales, Scotland and the regions, and Welsh and Scottish socialists 'demanded not more autonomy but a government which took more notice of their grievances'.

A partial recognition of the special status of Wales was evidenced by the gradual proliferation of Welsh based
institutions. Some of these were voluntary associations, but the most significant were a number of 'regional' branches of the state bureaucracy. The rationale for the growth of Welsh-based institutions included a claim that Wales had a distinctive historical identity that ought to be given some formal recognition for planning purposes. Also, the existence of a separate language was now seen to necessitate some administrative recognition, particularly in the area of education. By the late nineteen forties, for administrative purposes, Wales was recognised by the Treasury as one of the 'standard regions' of the United Kingdom. Also, the fifteen heads of government departments in Wales met regularly and produced an annual report on economic policy in the Principality. By 1948, the spate of nationalisations of basic industries, and the setting up of the National Health Service, resulted in the establishment of a Welsh Regional Hospital Board (1946), a Wales Gas Board (1948) and, amid some controversy, two regional electricity boards that linked South Wales to the Bristol area and North Wales to the Liverpool area. The establishment of a Council for Wales in 1948 and a Minister for Welsh Affairs in 1951, were not the result of nationalist pressure or agitation, but born out of a belief in Whitehall that such bodies could bring more coherence to the administration of Wales. That is, these concessions to some 'Welsh dimensions' in planning and administration were certainly not a result of any political challenge from Plaid Cymru, for, according to one writer, in 1945 and for several years afterwards, 'Welsh nationalism seemed to be as dead as the druids. Self-government in any form aroused little more than derision among most of the public ... at no level in Welsh life
did Plaid Cymru seem to make much impact'.

In the 1945 General Election, Plaid Cymru fielded eight candidates, 'mainly academics or intellectuals who enjoyed a somewhat ethereal relationship to the hard realities of party politics'. Seven of the eight candidates recorded humiliating results and, significantly, only in the University of Wales constituency did the Plaid candidate retain his deposit. For the Welsh nationalist, a distinctive political and cultural identity was taken for granted. In the absence of full blown self government, a subsidiary demand was for this separate identity to be given proper recognition by the state, through the creation of institutions that were Welsh in scope and character. From the perspective of London, of course, any concession to this view was seen as a consequence of administrative expediency only.

There are several likely explanations for the apparent lack of interest in Wales in the idea of independence, self government or even devolution at this time. It has been noted at the end of Chapter 3 that Plaid Cymru adopted a hostile stance to the War effort. Leading Party figures espoused pacifism and some, like Gwynfor Evans, were conscientious objectors to the military struggle. Others refused to fight in a War which Welsh people had not sanctioned, and the party newspaper, Welsh Nation, gave space to bitter attacks on the policy of evacuating urban families to be billeted on Welsh people. The paper was eventually forced out of publication, but the Plaid position on the War effort undoubtedly ran counter to the feelings of the vast majority of people in Wales. By 1945, the very success of the war effort seemed to have brought the constituent nations of the United Kingdom, and those of the
Empire, even closer together, and the sense of patriotism engendered by flag, monarch and Parliament swept away all but the most stubborn feelings of loyalty to a separate Welsh identity.

In 1945, Welsh voters had, in common with a majority of voters in the rest of the United Kingdom, elected Labour Members of Parliament. Over three quarters of the Parliamentary constituencies had been won by Labour, finally ending decades of Liberal pre-eminence. The Attlee administration came to power having made specific pledges to the Welsh electorate. The most important of these included the promise to establish a Secretary of State for Wales with Cabinet status, a separate Welsh Broadcasting Corporation and a new central body to plan the Welsh economy. Within a year of the election all of them had been abandoned. Although there were prominent voices in the Labour Party in Wales who were committed to greater devolution, and even a Parliament for Wales, for the time being, their influence was negligible. The trend was indubitably towards greater national planning, at the UK level, and the panacea for regional 'underdevelopment' was seen as closer integration between the different regions and nations of the British Isles. The pre-eminence of the Labour and Trade Union movement in Wales, and to a lesser extent in Britain, militated against appeals to 'sectional' interests. It was felt that workers solidarity would only be harmed if linguistic or national boundaries within Britain were given any credence. Although we must be cautious about attributing too much influence to any one individual, it is likely that Aneurin Bevan helped shape the attitudes of many Welsh socialists. Bevan enjoyed enormous popular prestige in Wales, particularly in his role as the
Minister of Health who presided over the start of the National Health Service. Bevan was convinced that any concession to sectional interests would hinder the consolidation of class consciousness on a British scale. He was also highly suspicious of a Welsh speaking middle class elite, and he was aware of the fact that he represented a constituency in which the vast majority of voters were English speaking manual workers. Bevan was 'passionate in his hostility to any form of devolution that might look like a surrender to nationalism'.

As a consequence, the post war Labour Government swept aside any commitment to devolutionary measures, with Attlee declaring that a Welsh Office would lead to an unnecessary duplication of administration, and Herbert Morrison arguing that the administration of Wales would deteriorate if a Welsh Office were created because, 'Wales could not carry a cadre of officials of the highest calibre', and he went on to state flatly, 'The proper remedy for Wales, as for Scotland, is to ensure that they both form part of a single economic plan for the whole country and are not thrown back on their sectional sources'. Other demands, for an Advisory Council for Wales and Monmouthshire, met with a similar response. Referring to the Council, Morrison is quoted in Cabinet Papers as saying, 'it is difficult to devise a plan by which such a Council would not become either a dead letter or a dilatory nuisance'.

Despite this hostility from prominent members of the Government, the gradual proliferation of Welsh-based institutions continued. In 1948 a Welsh Joint Education Committee was formed, followed by a Welsh Tourist Board, a Welsh Council in 1968 and in 1973, a Welsh T.U.C. The Welsh Council, a nominated body, embraced in a somewhat corporatist manner,
embraced both the Welsh TUC and the Welsh CBI, in an effort to co-operate in the operation of regional planning machinery. The 1970's saw the further growth of 'regional' institutions, some of which have no real equivalent in the regions of England, for example; the Board for the Development of Rural Wales, the Land Authority for Wales and the Welsh Development Agency. By 1984, the Land Authority had generated £240 millions of private investment, and the WDA had invested £220 millions of public money into supporting new employment creating ventures. The Labour Government of 1964-1970 was much more sympathetic to the 'special' claims of Wales than earlier administrations, and, in 1967, the Welsh Language Act gave the language equal status in all official business and in the law courts.

It is possible, then, to chart the growth of political and bureaucratic concessions to the idea of a separate administrative entity. The existence of specific legislation and organisations, by their very nature, testifies to an acknowledgment that Wales was more than just another 'region' of the United Kingdom. In 1964 the Wilson Government established the Cabinet post of Secretary of State for Wales, with a Cardiff based civil service. This brought Wales into line with Scotland with regard to administration, and it was a belated recognition of a distinctive identity which demanded special recognition. The first holder of this post, Jim Griffiths, MP for Llanelli, a long-standing devolutionist in the Welsh Labour Party, declared that the post had been created largely because of a new 'recognition of our nationhood' which would lead to a 'new status for Wales within the Constitution of the United Kingdom'. Whilst Plaid Cymru welcomed the creation of a Welsh Office in Cardiff as a timid step in the right direction, they
were clearly dissatisfied with the dependence on Whitehall that limited its activities. One of my respondents claimed;

The main features or characteristics of our nationhood are eroded by the continued decline in the language. What has the Welsh Office done about that? They have also failed to bring about an adequate economic integration of the country. And why should this be? ... because we lack what is vital for any nation, a central body, a parliament, to act on behalf of the nation. A Whitehall offshoot in Cardiff can never be enough.' (Field Notes 12.3.1978)

The theme of economic integration, along with territorial stability, a distinctive culture, group loyalty and equal membership rights, are cited by A.D. Smith as central characteristics of a nation. 36 It is clear that Welsh nationalists could claim to possess a distinctive culture, and a sense of group loyalty. For disparate reasons there emerged a consensus that government economic planning ought to take into account a Welsh 'national' dimension. From this point on, it was a relatively small step for the nationalist party to demand some further institutions that might bring this proliferation of statutory and voluntary bodies under some kind of umbrella. By the early seventies, many different areas of Welsh life were governed by nominated bodies. The cry of 'democratic accountability' of bodies such as the Welsh Hospital Boards, the Development Agency, and so on, had the effect of broadening the appeal of some kind of elected assembly for Wales.

As the Labour Government of 1966-1970 conceded 'special' status for Wales, and appeared more and more to recognise a crucial distinction between Wales and the rest of the United Kingdom, the nationalists, far from being assuaged by such concessions, claimed that the very logic of these decentralising
trends dictated the eventual goal of self government. As one of my respondents, himself a Cardiff civil servant said;

At what point are we supposed to be satisfied with the devolution of central government functions to Wales? In Whitehall they think that this will satisfy us. Far from it ... the more organisations, departments and official bodies they devolve, not forgetting all the QUANGO's, the stronger the argument for a parliament is. Only if there is some form of accountability of all these agencies to an elected Welsh Parliament can we be satisfied that the government of Wales is democratically run. (18.4.1978)

For the nationalist activists, the devolutionary trend in the seventies would lead inexorably to self-government, independence and equal status for Wales in the community of nations. Possessed of a language, albeit spoken only by a minority, with a capital city, a civil service*, an anthem, a flag, and a plethora of national institutions as at no other time in its history. For the first time there seemed to emerge some objective basis for national solidarity. Karl Deutsch has stressed the importance of a common attachment to symbols which serves to express and focus the nation's solidarity. This, he claims, develops out of 'intricately woven interlacements between different forms of activities, institutions and societies'. In Wales, along with official bodies, there were now a range of religious, cultural and sporting organisations that exhibited a Welsh 'national' dimension. A Welsh National

* In 1964 there were 225 civil servants in the Welsh Office in Cardiff. By 1984 this figure stood at 2,206 and it controlled a budget of £2,585 million.
Theatre, and a Welsh National Opera were complemented by national teams in rugby, soccer and other sports. According to a leading Welsh nationalist,

The emotion engendered by Wales in their red jerseys is worth consideration. Despite the decline of the Welsh language and of choral singing over much of Wales, the collective temper is as overwhelmingly Welsh at a Rugby international at Cardiff Arms Park as at the chairing of a poet at the National Eisteddfod ... In sport, even in the few games for which she cannot raise a team of the required standard, Wales is a conscious nation with her own institutions and myths and character. How long can this last without a revival of Welsh feeling generally?

Along with organisations of labour such as the Welsh TUC, more and more trades unions reorganised their regional boundaries to form a Wales 'region', and some began to hold Welsh conferences that were given media coverage. All these developments served, in a crucial way, to establish and reinforce a sense of distinctiveness, a consciousness of identity and place which was more than mere regional identification. By the end of the nineteen seventies there had developed in Wales a wide ranging network of institutions that all, in their different ways, gave some public expression to Welsh nationality. British membership of the European Economic Community, although it was opposed by Plaid Cymru, also led to some acknowledgment from Brussels of a separate Welsh identity. In 1976, the EEC opened an office in Cardiff, the first to be opened outside the capital city of a member state. This has led to the consolidation of what has been labelled a coherent and self-conscious 'territorial lobby' that embraces organised labour and capital. When, in 1982, for example, the Wales TUC presented a case to the EEC Social Affairs and Employment Committee for greater support for the
'deindustrialised' valleys of South Wales, they invited the Wales CBI to attend as observers. Borough Councillors and officials from Torfaen have visited Brussels to plan a job subsidy scheme in their area, and Plaid Cymru have completely changed their position on the E.E.C. Having originally been opposed to membership, the party realised that Welsh farming interests were immediate beneficiaries of the Common Agricultural Policy. In order to consolidate their support in rural areas, which had strongly supported British membership in the 1975 referendum, Plaid Cymru decided instead to accept membership but to campaign for a stronger voice for Welsh interests. This growing array of institutions, and their formal and informal interaction, has been highly significant in placing Wales on the agenda of decision making bodies in Britain and in Europe.

Even though Welsh nationalism was quite dormant during the fifties and early sixties, there were several notable events which demonstrate that a sense of Welsh political identity went beyond the relatively narrow confines of Plaid Cymru. In 1950 there was an all-party Parliament-for-Wales campaign which succeeded in collecting 250,000 signatures for presentation to Parliament in 1956. This represented fourteen percent of the Welsh electorate, but there was little support at Westminster, and only six of Wales's thirty six MP's supported the campaign. In 1967, a Government of Wales Bill was introduced in the House of Lords, but it failed to get a second reading. Despite the vicissitudes of Plaid Cymru's electoral fortunes in the post War period, the decentralising trends have been significant, both in giving Welsh affairs an audience beyond the confines of Wales, and in creating a loose network of Welsh-oriented leaders and decision makers. The evolution of
such an elite of Welsh administrators, spokesmen and bureaucrats seems to give a degree of legitimacy to the very idea of Welsh 'interests', that are distinct from those in the rest of the United Kingdom. Part of the rationale for an elected Assembly in Wales came from those who identified the emergence of this growing group who were, on the whole, unaccountable. One study of Welsh political institutions in the late seventies, expressed it this way.

The network of consultative government in Wales ought now to be seen and understood as an important institution in the government of Wales. It may be regarded as an effective supplement to the formal institutions, though essentially informal, flexible and largely private, and to some extent 'depoliticized', that is, removed from the arena of political conflict.

Arguably the value of the network lies in just these qualities (but) ... there is scope for a more expansive view of consultation, and a case for developing the network into a more open and inclusive institution of intergovernmental relations. The logic of the working of the system points to the value of an all-Wales elected body.

The particular merits or demerits of this argument need not concern us here. Two points are worthy of note and further investigation. Very little is known about this unofficial 'network', its composition, its overlapping membership and its degree of homogeneity. Secondly, the spread of Welsh institutions reinforces our sociological point about unintended consequences. It was never the intention of politicians, civil servants, journalists, and others, to fuel nationalistic sentiments. Yet the very act of devolving the functions of public and private concerns, had the effect of promoting an awareness of nationality which was to find political expression
in the late sixties and early seventies, and favoured the rapid
growth of the political party with self government and eventual
separation as its goal.

The Growth of Plaid Cymru in the sixties

In 1965, the fortunes of Plaid Cymru were at a low ebb.
Tension within the party over the language question had
contributed to a sense of despair. The 1961 Census had
revealed a further fall in the percentage of the population
claiming to speak the Welsh language (see Chapter 3).
Furthermore, the creation of a Welsh Office, headed by veteran
Welsh-speaking MP Jim Griffiths, seemed to steal some of their
thunder. Although membership figures for this period are
unreliable, one long-standing party member estimated that there
were fewer than twenty fully functioning branches, and less than
four thousand paid up members. The results of local and
national elections were so disappointing that, in 1965, leading
figures in Plaid Cymru were questioning seriously the value of
fighting elections. All such doubts vanished after the
unexpected by-election triumph of Gwynfor Evans, the Party
President, at Carmarthen in 1966. In parts of Wales, Plaid
Cymru was known as 'plaid bach' (the little party), acknowledged
as a group of sincere and well-meaning men and women,
enthusiasts with a commitment to the traditional language and
culture of Wales. The prospect of Plaid Cymru actually winning
a Parliamentary election seemed extremely remote. In the nine
constituencies which the party fought at the four General
Elections between 1955 and 1966 their average percentage of the
poll was 11.3%. In the Carmarthen seat, held for the Labour
Party by Lloyd George's daughter, Megan, Gwynfor Evans, by far
and away their most well-known figure, recorded the best result for the Party at the 1966 General Election with 16.1% of the poll. Just three months after the General Election, the death of Lady Megan Lloyd George led to the by-election which saw the surprise defeat of the Labour candidate, and the election of Gwynfor Evans with 39.1% of the vote and a majority of 2,436. The election of this first ever Plaid Cymru MP, transformed the Party's fortunes, and the result was welcomed by the Western Mail, the most widely read newspaper in Wales. Although this Cardiff based paper had always opposed nationalism, its editorial in July 1966 read;

For 21 years as President of Plaid Cymru, Gwynfor Evans has toiled unceasingly in what appeared, in election after disappointing election, to be a hopeless cause. Now at last his sincerity and dedication have been rewarded. In sending him to Parliament as their elected representative the voters of Carmarthenshire have performed a generous heart warming act. Gwynfor Evans's triumph is no greater than his personal deserts. But there is more to the Carmarthenshire result than the personal achievement of one man. Plaid Cymru's victory in what was apparently a safe Labour seat must rank as a major event in the political history of Wales. There has never before been a Welsh Nationalist Member of Parliament. The fact that there is one today must make not only the Government but also the Conservative and Liberal Parties think long and deep about their attitudes towards Wales and their policies for its future development ... The message is simple enough. The people of Carmarthen may or may not want Wales to be represented in the United Nations but they certainly believe that their county, and no doubt the rest of Wales, has received short shrift from successive Governments at Westminster. With the unemployment rate for Wales standing at double that of Britain as a whole, who is to say that they are wrong in this belief?

The Western Mail has consistently argued that the creed of nationalism is backward
looking and founded on a misconception as to the nature and function of the modern state. This criticism remains valid. But if Gwynfor Evans's victory in Carmarthen can awaken Westminster to the basic needs of Wales, the Principality will have cause for gratitude.

There were, of course, other reactions to the election result. The Labour Party dismissed it as a typical by-election protest vote, and a symptom of the difficulties experienced in parts of Wales as a result of the long-term decline in both agricultural and coal mining employment. Less than a year later, in a by-election at Caerphilly, another safe Labour seat, the Plaid Cymru candidate came within eighteen hundred votes of victory.

**Table 5:**

**Election results in the Caerphilly constituency 1964, 1966, 1968**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Plaid Cymru</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3,956 (11.0%)</td>
<td>26,011 (72.1%)</td>
<td>6,086 (16.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3,949 (11.1%)</td>
<td>26,330 (74.2%)</td>
<td>5,182 (14.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 (BY)</td>
<td>14,274 (40.4%)</td>
<td>16,148 (45.7%)</td>
<td>3,687 (10.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Times Election Yearbook* and *Western Mail*

With similar startling election results in Scotland for the Scottish National Party, in particular the victory of the SNP candidate, Winifred Ewing, at Motherwell in 1967, both nationalist parties gained membership rapidly. For the first time for more than fifty years, it seemed as if the successes of Plaid Cymru and the SNP raised again the question of the constitutional relationship between England and these two
constituent nations of the United Kingdom. Opinion polls recorded support for the two nationalist parties at anything between twenty five and forty per cent, although throughout this period it is important to note that the Scottish electorate were consistently more enthusiastic about the SNP than the Welsh electorate were about Plaid Cymru. Nevertheless, Plaid Cymru made the most of the publicity surrounding the election of their first MP. By 1969, party membership had risen to 40,000 and branches were started up in towns and villages all over Wales. In Scotland, SNP membership went up from 2,000 in 1962 to a claimed 100,000 in April 1968.43 In the case of Plaid Cymru, the rapid recruitment after 1966, and the new interest of the media in their activities, posed several problems of an organisational and a political nature. Party headquarters in Cardiff was inundated with requests for information about the Party's policies and information about membership. The Plaid Cymru Annual Report of 1966 records the fact that there were problems facing them on how best to take advantage of their newly found political prominence.

For most of the twentieth century, political loyalties, for a majority of voters in Britain, have tended to crystallise around class identification. As was argued in Chapter 1, there is no strong tradition on mainland Britain of political organisation along religious, or urban/rural lines, and territorial loyalties have been relatively insignificant in the development of the major political parties. By the late sixties, the resurgence in support for nationalist parties in Wales and Scotland, placed in doubt the unitary nature of the British state, and, it appeared to challenge long-held assumptions about the cultural homogeneity of the United
According to Smith, nationalist movements exhibit three basic themes in their propaganda: the ideal of collective autonomy, the uniqueness of the nation and its people; and the conviction that the special characteristics of the national group qualify them to make a unique contribution to the world community. The theme of collective autonomy stresses the primary objection to 'external' influence in the moulding of the nation's life. As such, it can be distinguished from movements and individuals whose patriotism does not involve a commitment to the struggle for national independence. It has been argued, in Chapter 2, that the particular form of Welsh nationalism that was prominent in the late nineteenth century did not partake of this character. A Welsh patriotism could coexist alongside a commitment to the British Empire, and a belief that the proper place of Wales was within the United Kingdom. For many of the 'Liberal Nationalists' of the 1880's, all that was desired was some recognition of the particular religious, cultural and linguistic differences that existed between England and Wales. These nationalists were satisfied as long as legislation was enacted which took into account such differences. Using Smith's criteria, the 'nationalism' of Cymru Fydd could not be nationalism proper. The programme of Plaid Cymru in recent years allows no such ambiguity.

In the case of Plaid Cymru, a persistent theme that runs through party propaganda is the idea of 'renewal', 'revival' or 'resurgence' of national pride. This is, it is claimed, a necessary forerunner of a full-blown commitment to the pursuit of political independence. The task of the 'believer' is to awaken a dormant sense of national pride in others and give it a
political direction. An example from the writings of Gwynfor Evans in 1973 will illustrate the point.

Plaid Cymru, which has been gathering together the creative energies of the Welsh nation, is thus more than a political party. It is a national movement and a moral crusade which has given much of its time to educate people in nationhood, awakening them to a sense of loyalty to their community and cultivating the incipient will to live a national life. Faced with anglicisation it is a resistance movement, confronted by English Government a freedom movement. It has been sustained by the knowledge that our ancestors faced odds as great as we do today and won through.44

More than twenty years earlier Evans wrote,

We have followed it (Wales) in its greatness and its weakness through the crisis of the centuries, which have seen the disappearance and oblivion of nations and languages, races and empires, and we ask ourselves now is there any reason for the astonishing persistence of this small community of ours? Can there be a purpose inspiring its tenacious will to live? And as Christian nationalists we can say that we believe that there is a value and a purpose in the life of Wales which is not to be lost, and that in fulfilling it, not only the life of her own people, but the life of the greater society will be enriched.

According to the nationalists' account of the past, the subject nation has been under foreign domination, yet, despite all the conscious and unconscious actions of the ruling power, a national 'spirit' or 'will' refuses to be crushed. Even when the young Welsh nationalist party preached its gospel of national duty and responsibility to deaf ears, the struggle to reawaken a lost pride was never abandoned. The political programme of legislative assemblies, tariff agreements and new constitutions are subordinate to a pseudo-mystical appeal to the national spirit that, despite adversity, refuses to be
vanquished. The Welsh nationalists, in their accounts of the history of the nation and its people, are forced to confront the unpleasant fact that the majority of Welsh people do not seem to share their concerns, and, furthermore seem relatively unmoved by the prospect of linguistic, cultural and political assimilation. A response often favoured by other movements for social and political change is then made use of. Because the 'people' are sacred and imbued with a 'natural' love of their homeland, the blame must be laid at the feet of their leaders.

It is the ordinary people of Wales who have been through the last four centuries the custodians of the Welsh tradition. It was not the people of Wales that failed, but their leaders. Had they leaders worthy of them, with strength enough to resist the fleshpots of the English parties, they would by now have been led to national freedom.

The fire of Welsh nationalism sometimes burns bright and strong, at other times its flame flickers weakly. Without the constant attention of nationalists throughout history, whether it be through poetry, religious activity or political education, the unique characteristics of the nation would be eroded. According to these accounts of Welsh history, the Welsh people have been seduced, cajoled or even bribed, into a belief that Wales is a rightful part of the United Kingdom. The religious imagery of rebirth and reawakening is invoked to show how all the misconceptions of the past can be set aside; 'Nationalists view it as a prolongation of their "mission" to secure for their group its rightful independence'.

A fairly typical example of such thinking is provided by Waldo Williams, a leading nationalist poet. For him, Plaid Cymru is much more than a political party;

It is the embodiment of our reviving national consciousness. It has its roots
in the democratic and egalitarian tradition of our country, and drawing sustenance from this, it will make a new class consonant with the modern world. This is our mission. It is we who are the radical party in this election. We want to see a Welsh state but it is essential to keep this instrument in its place. Its powers must be decentralised and responsibility must be distributed widely. The power of local authorities can be increased and the workers given a vote in the control of their industries. Wales is at an advantage here in being a small nation without the temptation of power politics and the vast expense they involve.

This idea that Plaid Cymru is not just a political organisation, but has more of the characteristics of a crusade intent on resurrecting the people's sense of national pride, recurs in the writings of the most prominent figures. Gwynfor Evans, again, expressed it in this way:

It is important to realise that Plaid Cymru has been more than a party and more than a movement ... This homogeneity, this deep unity in the party comes from a sense of sharing the pattern of values that we have inherited from the long past. However disheartening the response to our work may in the past have been, this gives us strength and hope; and happiness ... the weakness of Welsh political leadership this century reflects the Welsh situation. Plaid Cymru's fundamental task has been to educate the Welsh people in nationhood.

True to his word, many of Evans's speeches and popular political tracts are heavily loaded with references to the nation's history, its subjugation by the English and the need to 're-educate' the people in their political history. It came as no surprise to observers of the party that Gwynfor Evans should choose to close an eve of poll meeting at Caerphilly in 1969 with a lengthy speech about the activities of Llywellyn Bren in the twelfth century. One of the reasons why people fail to
support the nationalist cause, he believes, is that they have been stripped of their inheritance and are ignorant of the glories of the national past. Hence one of the tasks facing Welsh nationalists is to prepare the people for their historical destiny. 'Wales is not ready for full national status yet ... hard struggle is necessary to purify and unite the national community, so that when freedom is fully achieved the best possible use is made of it in a nation reconciled with her past'. 50 This concern with the historical roots of the nation and its people was again exemplified by the Plaid Cymru President in his address to the 1977 Annual Conference;

In recent generations the morale of the Welsh people has been low and weak ... this weakness and servility in our people, and their almost total lack of acknowledge of our history, of the acts perpetrated against us by generations that are long past is deplorable. Not only do our schools teach more English than Welsh history but what little Welsh history they teach is seen through English eyes ... They have been teaching our children throughout the years that we are members of a defeated nation, a nation that was driven by the English into the mountains of the west. The Welsh resisted them, as they resisted afterwards Vikings and the Danes and then for two centuries the French ... and it is probably true to say that we are the only nation which was a part of the western Roman Empire which succeeded in retaining its territory intact and retaining its traditions and its culture. All the rest were overrun, but not Wales and the Welsh, who resisted assimilation with such success in the past ... and we're not going to yield now. On the contrary, our generation is the one which will reject the contemptible situation, incorporated in England as we are, without a particle of national freedom. Therefore we are for full national status, and for winning it by hard and taxing but peaceful struggle ... we'll do it by organising the patriots of our land, organising them in a dedicated political party which will gather together within it all the forces making
A second strand in Smith's analysis of nationalist ideology is the idea of 'individuality'. The nationalist sees in the nation certain valuable characteristics or features that must be defended or protected against erosion or assimilation. In the case of Wales, if one were to single out one issue whose salience overshadows that of all the others in the armoury of Welsh nationalism, it would, as has been demonstrated in this thesis, be that of language. In addition to the commitment to the language, nationalists lay claim to be the inheritors of a radical and decentralist tradition in Welsh history. The ideological configuration of nonconformism, political radicalism and a deep attachment to the spiritual values of the small community, resulted in a century-long opposition to Conservative Unionism. The erosion of the 'unique individuality' of the Welsh people, leads only to the vulgarisation of the national culture. The encroachment of 'English' habits, customs and beliefs is deplored as leading only to spiritual and cultural impoverishment.

In the urban areas the people become easy prey for the trivial culture of the admass. The great libraries of the miner's institutes make way for more plush club bars; chapels are given over to bingo, horoscopes replace good literature; shoddy films supplant the eisteddfod: not the poet but the punter becomes the community's archetype. When the great bulwark of the language is breached and swept away it is not Shakespeare which comes in with the flood but the illustrated comics.

Closely linked with this alien onslaught of undesirable influences, is the decline of religious belief. So bound up with religious imagery is much of this type of argument, that the notion of secular Welshness is almost a contradiction in
terms to some nationalists. For this group, the loss of language is bound up with religious decline and the imposition of English cultural norms. In the study by Madgwick of the politics of rural Cardiganshire, there is ample evidence of a strong link between nonconformism and a dislike and mistrust of the English. Ministers and teachers who were committed supporters of Plaid Cymru expressed a strong dislike of the English. According to these respondents, the English are characterised as being obsessed with an arrogant concern for social status, whereas the Welsh, because of tradition and 'instinct', are untainted by such concerns. Instead, the Welsh are supposedly 'egalitarian', less arrogant and imbued with a deep-rooted love of social justice. One minister is cited as saying, 'The imperialist philosophy is deep in the makeup of an Englishman'.

Those manifestations of mass culture that undermine traditional ways of life are singled out for particular approbation; 'Already the bingo hall and the betting shop are becoming more a way of life than a form of relaxation'.

In the Cardiganshire study cited above, several nationalist ministers of religion condemned the wayward behaviour of contemporary youth and all of them attributed it to the corrosive influence of English 'materialist' pop-culture. One minister said, 'Twenty five years ago the country people wouldn't think of going to dances whereas now they go every weekend'. Another complained of the secular nature of many of the activities of young people. 'The pop group sing about chapel and Church and the language but they stay in the hotel on a Saturday night and don't bother to go to Church or Chapel on Sunday morning'. Permissiveness, 'rootlessness', and the loss
of a sense of 'belonging' are the direct consequences of the fact that Wales is politically united with England. Break that constitutional connection and, some nationalists believe, the influence of England will be weakened, and a Welsh state could nurture and promote a way of life that dispels 'anomie'. The critique of political unification goes, in other words, much wider than a debate about the economic viability of an independent Wales. What is at stake is the moral and spiritual well-being of the people, for, 'As the corporate State gathers pace there is a parallel decline in the moral outlook of the population'. Furthermore, the vitality of the typically Welsh way of life, setting aside the inconsistencies of what is precisely meant by such a term, is a safeguard against the loss of religious belief, national pride and a sense of 'belonging'.

We believe that the immense value of the Welsh tradition lies here. It is a Christian tradition and an intellectual tradition. I think myself that where this tradition is strongest people tend to be more alive, both intellectually and spiritually. I think that the decay of this tradition impoverishes the life and diminishes the vitality of those who are born into it. The Welsh nation has no more important function than to transmit its national tradition - which is essentially a pattern of values - to the coming generation.  

What A. D. Smith refers to as 'pluralism' in the context of nationalist ideology, is the idea that there is a close connection between the individuality or uniqueness of each particular national group, and the conviction that every nation has something special to contribute to the world community. Only the fullest awareness of, and celebration of, one's uniqueness as a people can lead to the 'pluralism' in which the world is enriched by each group's distinctive contribution to
culture and history. According to this strand in nationalist thinking, the 'family of nations' will be enriched if all subject peoples are free to play their rightful role in world affairs. In his 1966 election address to the voters at Carmarthen, Gwynfor Evans touched on this theme.

We have no right to preach to the world without first making Wales a country that commands admiration and respect. There is a great reservoir of untapped ability and idealism in the people of Wales, a pride which could not only transform Wales herself but make her one of the best citizens of the world community as well. Will you help us to make every Welshman prouder, more responsible and truer to himself by voting for a cause this time?

One of the most powerful images deployed by Plaid Cymru in their revival after 1966 was of the British state as overcentralised, remote and unresponsive to the needs of minorities and small communities. Leading nationalists absorbed the work of Kohr and Schumacher and applied their critique of large scale organisations to the British state. Kohr's work advances cultural, economic, administrative and philosophical arguments in favour of small nations. He gives examples of successful and unsuccessful federations of nations, and locates the source of all types of social pathology to the problem of 'bigness'. Here was a new social theory and political philosophy which legitimised Welsh nationalist aspirations and gave them an explanation for many of the social ills that they identified.

One of the themes in the early ideology of Plaid Cymru, as has been shown, was an abhorrence of large-scale industry and a celebration of small-scale rural communities. This aversion to urbanism, cosmopolitanism and industry, was to re-emerge in the sixties in a revamped form. Gone, though, was the idealisation
of the rural way of life. In its place was an elevation of any small scale organisation as inherently more efficient and desirable than centralised authority.

If people are to be given power and responsibility in industry and in their professions, such as hospitals, or in local or national government, the size of the entity must be considered as the most critical factor. Centralisation, whether capitalist or socialist, is the enemy of power for the people. Both capitalism and socialism have favoured bigness and therefore bureaucracy. The road to liberation lies through decentralisation.

According to Kohr, social, economic and technological changes have occurred because of the increasing pressure of population growth. Changes in the size of populations is the fundamental cause of historic change. He believes that there is a limit beyond which the manageable becomes unmanageable, and further growth in the size and scale of human organisations leads, not to 'progress' but to collapse. His insistence that there exists some critical size beyond which nations, communities, political units, or any organisation ought not to grow, found a receptive audience amongst Welsh nationalists. Here, it seemed, was an explanation for many of the social ills of our time which legitimised their demands for the creation of an autonomous small state. Again it was Gwynfor Evans who was in the vanguard of nationalist propagandists spreading this message.

Decades ago a railway journey was enlivened for me by comparisons made by an N.C.B. (National Coal Board) statistician, between pits in the matter of labour troubles. He showed how uncannily these troubles increased in arithmetic proportions to the size of the labour force. Comprehensive schools whose pupils and staff numbers have exceeded the 'critical size' are in constant trouble with discipline. Over-big industries, unions, hospitals even, have to decentralise their
A nationalist party faces the task of uniting all members of the community under the banner of the national struggle. Class allegiances, that might potentially divide fellow compatriots, must be played down. Welsh nationalism in this period attempted to appeal to all sections of the population, and the ideologues of the movement attempted to minimise class differences within Wales. The limited historical evidence about the anglicisation of the gentry, and the nature and type of industrialisation, contributed, they claimed, to the creation of a relatively classless society. The concept of the 'gwerin', a Welsh word for common people, was used by nationalists to suggest that the vast majority of Welsh people shared a similar class background. If the source of economic discontent could be located in the size and scale of organisations, rather than the nature of their ownership, control or the type of policies they pursued, then the potentially divisive appearance of class politics could be avoided. One of my respondents said in answer to a question about the political orientation of Plaid Cymru:

A party like ours does not recognise the petty differences between income and occupation that so obsess the English. Not only are we less snobbish than the English but we are more interested in people's commitment to their country. I think it's understandable that Plaid Cymru does make plans for the economy and so on ... but we must avoid the danger of putting off people who support the left or the right ... besides, these terms themselves will be meaningless in an independent Wales (teacher 46 years 18.5.78).

The theme of the deleterious consequences of 'bigness' was also used to argue against those who challenged the viability of Welsh independence. The relatively small size of the country
was turned into a positive asset, and other small nations were pointed to as an inspiration. A Plaid Cymru pamphlet claimed;

In general small nations have the greatest economic success. In Europe the four countries with far-and-away the highest standard of living are small. They are Sweden (population 7.8 million) Switzerland (6.0 million) Denmark (4.8 million) and Norway (3.7 million). Indeed of the ten most prosperous countries in Europe, seven have populations less than 10 million while two of them Luxemburg and Iceland - are smaller than Monmouthshire ... poor Britain has dropped out of the top ten altogether - but what else could we expect in a state so large, where so much power is centralised in one Parliament ... Wales is an ideal size for efficient government. Britain is far too large.

If the party leadership could focus attention on the question of size and scale, there was a possibility that arguments between 'left' and 'right' could be overcome, and this would add to the appeal of the party in some quarters. The feeling that dominant institutions in society were 'out of touch' with ordinary people was widely held in the late sixties. Protest movements around the world were at odds with existing political structures, and there was a widespread feeling that the sheer size and scale of organisations militated against more satisfying human relationships. Such a political philosophy was capable of transcending the traditional concerns of 'left' and 'right' and attracting into political activity groups that were disenchanted with the 'old' parties.

One doubts if the terms left and right, already open to so much misunderstanding, are going to have any meaning at all very soon. The debate between private enterprise and socialism is stale indeed to the rising generation. The important battle for them is that between the mammoth organization, whether it be private or whether it be public.
One of my respondents, an undergraduate at the University of Wales said:

Our task as Welsh nationalists is to restore not just a pride in our identity as Welsh men and women ... we have to give people a sense of belonging ... a sense of being fully part of the community. This is only possible if our policies put maximum emphasis on decentralisation. Schools, businesses, government must all be reduced in size so that everybody can feel a sense of responsibility and identity. This is so important ... we believe it is the solution to so many of the problems of the industrialised world. (10.3.78)

Arguments of this sort dovetailed with a generalised disenchantment with centralisation. They echoed the cries for participation that characterised youthful protest in many parts of the world. The Royal Commission on the Constitution, to be discussed in the next chapter, also made mention of such feelings of dissatisfaction with centralising trends.

The great advances in technology and large increases in the scale and complexity of government since the Second World War, coming at a time when Britain's status in the world has been on the decline, have tended to confuse ordinary people and to produce in them a vague feeling of dissatisfaction and insecurity.

With the Royal Commission giving some official credence to aspirations of this sort, it was relatively easy for Plaid Cymru to appear as the political party that was most in touch with popular movements and feelings. John Osmond, a journalist sympathetic to devolution and Welsh nationalist aspirations, wrote in his book *The Centralist Enemy*,

mammoth sized government, although mainly the product of a desire to give the people what they appear to expect, has brought with it as yet unsolved problems arising from the enhancement of centralised power, the rise of the expert at the expense of the democratic
representative and a gigantic proliferation of decisions which are so complicated and technical that the public is not qualified to judge whether what is being done in their name is right or not. Government seems to have been taken away from the people by its own sheer size and complexity, leaving them with an uneasy impression that their feelings as individuals are no longer properly taken into account.

This generalised feeling that political structures were inadequate at several levels, served to galvanize support for Plaid Cymru from groups that previously showed little interest in the romantic longings of a 'fringe' movement. The feeling that Britain was becoming 'ungovernable', that too much power was concentrated in London, and that democracy was becoming a meaningless slogan in such a highly centralised state, all combined to make some form of devolution more attractive. This may well stop short of the complete self government that Plaid Cymru demanded. Nevertheless, the party was able to make significant inroads into areas and groups that were previously deaf to their appeals on behalf of the language and the culture. The period between the Carmarthen by-election in 1966, and the establishment of the Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1969, witnessed a transformation in Plaid Cymru. Reference has already been made to the changes in the number of branches and the size of the membership. This brought into the party recruits who differed from the established membership. The party claimed that the Carmarthen by-election brought over a thousand new members and many of these were from the anglicised and industrialised areas of South Wales. Such new recruits could not be expected to share all the concerns of the party faithful, particularly as these tended to see the language as the pivotal issue around which all others revolved. The
pressures to elaborate more detailed policies on social and economic matters resulted in the formation of a Research Group, in 1967, and a determination among new recruits to give the Party a new image, stripped of its romantic nostalgia for a predominantly rural past. One of my respondents, a forty four year old technician who joined Plaid Cymru in 1967, said:

The branch in my town grew from nothing...several former Labour activists joined us and we felt very enthusiastic about our prospects. When I first went to a National Conference I met a completely different type of person. They were certainly patriots as I feel I am, but they were bookish, very religious and all seemed very well educated...and, of course there was the language difference. Although they were polite, it was clear that many of the 'old guard' regarded us as suspect because we couldn't speak Welsh. After all, our main interest was in social and economic progress. It seemed as if the Labour Party had failed us, despite years of our support of them, and as far as we were concerned it was up to Plaid Cymru to plan a more prosperous future for those areas where the majority of Welsh people live, in the industrial south east. (18.4.1978)

Such 'new blood' led to a higher level of internal conflict in the Party, as attempts were made redefine some of its official aims. The arguments about the deleterious consequences of the centralisation of economic and political power united all sections of the party. It resonated with other widely-held feelings about the effects of centralisation, and the presumed negative features of large scale organisations. If 'big government' was regarded as deplorable, what united all sections of the party was a conviction that political decentralisation was, not only morally justifiable on the grounds of Welsh nationality, but would also lead to greater efficiency. Gradually the emphasis in Plaid Cymru propaganda shifted. From
a concern with the principle of self-government, there emerged a new theme in the party literature. The principle of self-government or independence was now bolstered by a conviction that Welsh independence would lead to higher levels of economic efficiency, planning and prosperity. A critic of this shift in emphasis, an elderly minister, said

The trouble about the rapid expansion of the membership after 1966 was that everyone wanted rapid results. We long standing members knew that it was an uphill struggle ... for us it was a matter of conviction that Wales must be free. If this meant that we would be poorer as a result then this must be faced up to. My nationalism was a matter of pride. I would rather be free and eat bread than in chains and be fed cakes ... Plaid tried to convince everyone that self government would solve everything ... more industry, more jobs, more money ... we became as materialist as the rest of them. (12.10.1976)

We have already pointed to the persistent strand of anti-industrialism in the Welsh nationalist movement. (See Chapter 4). By 1967 a new theme emerges, in which the lack of industrial investment became identified as the cause of high levels of unemployment and generally lower living standards. Plaid Cymru emerged now as the standard bearer of industrial modernisation. In answer to the question 'What has Wales to offer industry?' a party pamphlet stated:

Wales can provide all the basic materials needed by modern manufacturing industries ... Coal, oil products, plastics and other petrochemicals; iron, steel and tin plate, a wide range of non-ferrous metals, including fabricated aluminium, zinc and nickel; quarried minerals; forestry products; synthetic fibres such as rayon and nylon ... the list is a long one...

An industrialist in Wales can usually find his raw materials close at hand. Wales can guarantee abundant water supplies. More and more industries require large quantities of water and
depend on areas where water is cheap and plentiful. Wales is an ideal centre for such industries. In almost every category of raw materials, Wales produces more per head than the rest of Britain. What is true today has been true for over a century: few nations have been so well endowed with material resources. We would expect such a nation to be among the most prosperous.

As Philip has commented, 'the party's economic policy had remained virtually unchanged for a quarter of a century ... gradually Plaid spokesmen altered their tone'. The main reason for the formation of the Research Group was to provide the party with policies that could convince the electorate that self-government for Wales was economically viable. Gwynfor Evans claimed in a pamphlet published in 1960 that Wales could form a common Market between the member nations of the United Kingdom. In this document he acknowledged the close economic links between the nations of Britain, and a tariff-free zone was advocated as the best means of achieving economic co-ordination. In order to exploit the economic grievances that had surfaced in the Welsh industrial areas, and the sense of disappointment with the activities and achievements of the Labour Government, Plaid Cymru began to project itself as the party of modernisation, economic planning and greater prosperity. One election pamphlet appealed for votes with the slogan 'Wales is being robbed' - the main claim being that the Welsh economy was, potentially, extremely robust and capable of expansion and more profitable exploitation. Only the political bond with England prevented adequate planning and vigorous exploitation of Wales's natural resources.

A corollary of these claims was the argument that Welsh self-government would see an end to political alienation and the
mistrust of political structures and institutions. Regardless of differences about economic policy, the goal of self government was capable, it was claimed, of uniting all members of the national community, young and old, 'left' and 'right'. Differences in occupation, income, or political ideology, could be set aside, because nationalists could unite the whole people under the banner of national 'freedom'. The tension between those who couched their arguments in terms of economic prosperity, and those for whom self-government was a matter of principle, was touched upon in the deliberations of the Royal Commission. In the sessions gathering verbal evidence, one of the Commissioners, Douglas Houghton questioned Gwynfor Evans

D.H. Is your demand for independence conditioned by being able to satisfy yourselves and other people that economic advantage will flow from it, or at least that there will be no significant economic disadvantage?

G.E. Our case is fundamentally a moral case. We are a nation, and we say that whatever the economic consequences would be we have to work within an economic context and work responsibly ... I am old enough myself to remember what happened in the years of the depression, and one cannot go to the people and expect them merely to accept your moral arguments. I know of no country in the world where the purely moral issue has been sufficient, but everywhere it has to be allied with the economic case as well.

The challenge facing the party leadership in this changing situation was to link cultural decline, the traditional concern of the party, particularly in rural areas, with the concerns about economic 'peripheralism'. Both cultural and economic neglect had to be seen as two sides of the same coin, and the 'expressive' nationalism of the party's long standing members had to be reconciled with the more instrumental motives of newer
recruits. Rawkins interviewed ninety five activists in Plaid Cymru during the early seventies in an attempt to differentiate between nationalists in terms of their origins, their commitment and motivations, and their ideological differences. He distinguished between four types of Welsh nationalists in terms of their range of concerns and their orientation to the future; party loyalists, cultural militants, fortress nationalists and modernists. The group he described as 'party loyalists', who comprised 36% of his sample, tended to be relatively 'open' with regard to recruitment and they rejected an exclusive approach to party ideology. Their class origins were diverse, although the majority were middle class, seventy four per cent of the sample having been to university. Rawkins summarises their views thus; 'The Party Loyalist is a pragmatist and a gradualist, with a distaste for class politics associated with the Labour Party. His basic orientation is to a broad-based, status group politics'.

This type of member exhibited little interest in policy-making or innovative and imaginative thinking as to how the party might extend its support in Wales.

What Rawkins termed 'Fortress Nationalists' appear to be the heirs to the values and beliefs of the majority of the Party's founders. In Chapter 4, I analysed the ideological origins of Plaid Cymru, and concluded that these can be seen as an amalgam of romantic and arcadian views about the rural past and a hostile view of urban and industrial society. A significant minority of current Plaid Cymru members see their political commitment to Welsh nationalism in the same light. For these men and women, loyalty to Wales must involve a rejection, not just of 'English' beliefs and values, but also a continuing hostility to all manifestations of an 'alien'
culture. As such, 'it represents a variant of the liberal tradition ... individualism, pacifism, a strong religious orientation and resentment at the incursions of the state, and of the forces of modernity and 'mid-Atlantic' popular culture'.

In terms of occupational background and educational experience, the 'Fortress Nationalists' are overwhelmingly middle class with eight per cent of them holding degrees from the University of Wales. They tended to be, on average, older than other party members, and among their ranks there was a very high proportion of teachers, lecturers, writers and ministers of religion, all with their roots firmly in the Welsh rural middle class. Their major concern was the decline of the Welsh language, which they saw as the prime marker of Welsh identity, under threat from a majority language which carried with it a cluster of values wholly at odds with 'traditional' Welsh values. This group of activists saw their commitment in terms of a moral choice between Christian values, supposedly characteristic of rural Wales, and the values of 'English materialism', which rewards the 'atomistic, self-seeking individual'. For them, Plaid Cymru was much more than a political party. It is a movement that draws its inspiration from the overriding need to protect the beleagured language and all the values they associate with it. As such, these nationalists tended to be involved in a range of religious and cultural organisations and activities that promoted the Welsh language;

For a nationalist of this type, political work is only one of a number of expressions of his nationalism. It must be fitted in with a general lifestyle taking its place alongside religious life, career, writing and teaching, family responsibilities, work with Welsh language youth and children's groups, women's organisations, and other social and cultural activities.
Among my respondents, there was evidence of this approach to Welsh nationalism. The language was the most pressing reason for the existence of Plaid Cymru and any attempt to 'water down' the Party's commitment to the establishment of Welsh as the dominant language in Wales was viewed as a compromise which, ultimately, would undermine the justification for a nationalist party at all. One of my respondents, a fifty eight year old teacher said,

Our language is a vital part of our sense of history, our values and our future. All over the world minorities are being steamrolled into conformity. If we are determined, not only to hang on to our beautiful language, but also to rescue it and make it the majority language in Wales, we will have struck a blow for all minorities. (12.10.1978)

Another stated,

The only time I speak English is when I am forced to. It is, after all, a foreign tongue imposed on us cruelly by successive English rulers. I read the history of English attempts to wipe out my language and I burn with rage. If this party has any goal, it must be to re-assert a pride in our nationality. The only way we can do this is to have pride in the language and campaign vigorously for its daily use in all spheres. (13.10.1978)

My own interviews with thirty six nationalist activists, most of whom attended the Annual conferences of 1977 and 1978, tends to confirm the distinction that Rawkins makes between these types of nationalists. The notion that membership of Plaid Cymru has something of the features of a mission, rather than being simply a political cause, also emerges in the interviews with those younger members of the party who are enthusiastic members of the Welsh Language Society. Formed in 1962 after a radio broadcast by Saunders Lewis, the Society regarded the pursuit of equal
status for the language as paramount. One of my respondents, a twenty-three-year-old student at the University of Wales, who had served a six-month prison sentence for conspiracy to commit acts of criminal damage in connection with the Society's actions against the BBC in Wales, told me,

My main reason for joining Plaid Cymru was to try to save Wales and the language. Everything unique and admirable about our past is being eroded by the spread of uniform and standardized ways. Many of our young men and women are either ignorant of our language or ridicule it as old-fashioned. They are ignorant of the beauties of our mother tongue and unaware of the history of English oppression of our people.

(12.10.1978)

In response to a question as to how national consciousness may be fostered among young people in Wales, several of the younger 'cultural militants' claimed that the publicity generated by the 'direct-action' methods of the Welsh Language Society, were highly successful in drawing into activity hundreds of young Welsh men and women. The fact that some of the activities of the Welsh Language Society had adversely affected the electoral appeal of Plaid Cymru, did not alter the views of the language militants that the fate of the language was more important than the short-term popularity of Plaid Cymru. They saw the demonstrations, break-ins, hunger strikes and so on, as a dramatic way of demonstrating the extent of the crisis facing the Welsh language and the depth of their concern. Furthermore, two of my respondents argued that this type of activity was more likely to enthuse young people and draw them to the cause, regardless of adverse press comment. Along with 'direct action', the language militants expressed concern about the extent and type of teaching of Welsh language history and
culture in the schools of Wales. In common with all my respondents, they laid emphasis on the potential role of the school in regenerating the language. This could only happen, they claimed, if Welsh schools embarked on a programme of intensive language teaching, allied with a new approach to the teaching of Welsh history.

The schools of Wales are failing to teach the history of our own country. There isn't enough emphasis on the long and noble civilisation of Wales. The schools ignore our culture and our values while singing the praises of our conquerors. (8.6.1978)

What binds Welsh people together is our Celtic inheritance, our community spirit and our language. Yet we look in vain for these in the average school curriculum. Although there are a few exceptions in the excellent Welsh-medium schools that have opened in recent years, the majority of Welsh children are brought up to believe that they live in a quaint corner of Britain. There can never be a British nationalism. Britain is a state formed out of different nationalities. The English recognise that, but most Welsh people have this pathetic belief in 'Britain'. (9.9.1978)

In the thirty six interviews, no fewer than thirty people specifically mentioned the role of the school as an agency of cultural and linguistic regeneration. They saw it as a responsibility of the education system to raise the levels of awareness of Welsh nationality, and this could be achieved, they believed, through greater emphasis on teaching Welsh history.

Another of my respondents, a middle aged female teacher, said;

All over the world people learn about their country and its institutions either from parents or from teachers. The tragedy of Wales is that, for so many adults, the link with their past has been broken. This places a much greater responsibility on the schools to tell children who they are, what it means to be Welsh, how deep our roots go, and why they should cherish everything Welsh, and
that means, more than anything else, our threatened language. (6.9.1978)

The type of Welsh nationalist who elevates the language and culture to such a central place in their thinking, runs the risk of alienating the English-speaking activist, especially those from the anglicised south-east of the country. One of my respondents questioned whether an English-speaking Welshman could ever have the same level of commitment to the national struggle.

It is through language that most people identify the Welsh nation. I look at my fellow countrymen from south and east Wales, and, although they might be just as patriotic in their own way, they have lost a certain characteristic ... It doesn't mean that they are not Welsh, it does mean that they can't possibly have the same commitment to the struggle for national salvation. (7.7.1978)

(28 year old civil servant)

The idea that Plaid Cymru is more than just a political party is clear from many of these extracts. The references to a 'mission', 'salvation', to the need to 'regenerate' or 'revive' the fortunes of Welsh nationalism, are common. Others talk of regaining the 'rightful inheritance' of the people. Such rhetoric bears the mark of religious imagery, but it also reminds us that, for significant sections of the party, their political loyalties have many of the characteristics of a social movement. Consequently the demand for self-government is much more than a call for a restructuring of the machinery of political decision-making. Nothing less than the complete and comprehensive overturn of the values and priorities of society would suffice. It is not just a matter of breaking the political link with the United Kingdom, but a question of rejecting everything that went before. One of my respondents
The conclusion I have come to is that the future of Wales will be found outside the norms and assumptions of the British system. British society demands, and rewards, individuals who have no attachment to one place or to the people they come from. Because we want to emphasise the importance of our communities, our opponents try to brand us as sentimental, nostalgic or impractical. We reject these criticisms because we know that it is our party that stands for real human value. (3.3.1978) (23 year old student)

Alongside the 'cultural militants', the party loyalists and the 'Fortress Nationalists' are those who were attracted to Plaid Cymru because it seemed to offer solutions to problems of economic planning and the prospect of greater prosperity. Rawkins identified this group as the 'modernists'. My analysis of the official and fringe propaganda of the period between 1968 and 1979, and the interview data I collected, suggest that within the category labelled 'modernist', there are two distinct themes, one more explicitly socialist than the other. In 1967, a party document produced by the newly-formed research group, complained about the infrastructure of Wales, and promised that a self-governing Wales could improve communications in the interests of industrial expansion.

Our road and rail network is inadequate in many parts ... Our first step will be to improve the road system. Our next step will be to select a number of growth centres. At each of these we will develop an industrial park offering a complete range of services to new industries.

This new interest in the potential for economic expansion was also evident in the Scottish National Party at this time. In the case of Scotland, of course, the discovery of oil and gas deposits in the North Sea did a great deal to boost claims that
Scottish prosperity depended on self-government, and the S.N.P. were able to exploit resentment with 'foreign ownership'. Nationalists in Scotland and Wales set about trying to convince a sceptical electorate that self-government was a viable economic proposition, and that independence need not entail economic hardship. The assets of Wales were less tangible, but included coal and water supplies - a source of nationalist grievance since Birmingham and Liverpool both receive 'free' water supplies from Welsh reservoirs. Plaid Cymru's leadership were faced, in the early seventies, with the need to graft this new-found concern with industrial efficiency, onto the original ideology of the party. They had to incorporate much of the traditional mythology of the party and align this with a bureaucratic programme that emphasised the inherent efficiency of small-scale organisations. From the mid sixties onwards, when the nationalist parties began to win elections and receive much more attention, there was greater pressure on them to demonstrate how Wales and Scotland could be economically viable nation states. The charge was made frequently that self-government was impractical, for it would involve a dramatic decrease in living standards for the Welsh and the Scots. Critics claimed that, because the economies of Wales and Scotland were linked inextricably with that of England, self-government would lead to economic dislocation on such a scale that only hardship would result.

To answer such criticisms, Plaid Cymru produced material which, by selectively drawing on official statistics, purported to show the relative deprivation of Wales, and the fact that Wales did not benefit economically from the political link with England. Professor E.T. Nevin of the University of Wales,
attempted a more objective exercise. He tried to assess the extent to which the Welsh economy was dependent on the net inflow from the Exchequer. His conclusions did not appeal to Plaid Cymru, because he claimed that Wales was a net beneficiary, in terms of public expenditure, of the political link with the United Kingdom. In response to nationalist agitation, the Government released figures in September 1971 which gave credence to the view that Wales as a whole benefitted from its integration in the British economy.

There was a general picture of the Welsh budget in deficit, by anything between £114 million and £182 million, when capital accounts were added. This applied even in 1968-69 when the British national budget showed a large surplus of £223 millions.

In order to counter 'unionist' propaganda, which questioned the idea that, in an increasingly interdependent world, small nations could ever be economically 'independent', Welsh and Scottish nationalists began to search for models for the development of small economies. Scottish nationalists, in particular, were very thorough in their efforts to find examples of viable small states. The Scandinavian countries proved particularly popular, with both Ireland and Israel variously serving as models for an independent Scotland to emulate. Welsh nationalists pointed out that Wales, with a population of 2.8 millions, was larger than many nation states that enjoyed sovereign status and a place at the United Nations. They argued that size alone was no criterion for denying a nation self-government. As far back as 1944, Archie Lamont had used Finland and Sweden as examples for Scots Nationalists to emulate, and in the thirties, the Welsh nationalist D.J. Davies had claimed inspiration from the Danish experience of
self government, whilst others pointed to the Swiss federal system as a possible model.

The consequence of political success for the nationalists was the need to spell out in more detail, precisely how self-government could operate, without adversely affecting the economic well-being of the Scots and the Welsh. In both parties, there was much more emphasis after 1966 on economic matters. The Scottish nationalist poet, Hugh Macdairmaid, was quick to detect such a shift in S. N. P. policies. In 1968 he condemned one of the party leaders thus: 'I could never be bothered with MacCormick. He believed in practical politics and had no time for art or culture. Art and culture mean everything to Scotland.' When Macdairmaid was writing, the S. N. P. had already divested itself of the romantic, Celtic literary nationalism, and Scots Gaelic figured nowhere in their concerns.

In Plaid Cymru, this was not the case, and the 'modernisers' in the party found themselves sometimes in conflict with the backward-looking literary romantics.

The electoral successes between 1966 and 1976 led to the election of Plaid Cymru town and county councillors, as well as three Members of Parliament. In some places they formed the majority party and controlled local authority policies. In 1976, The Times reported the capture of local authority seats by Plaid Cymru. 'The local elections last week ended an era in Welsh politics. Throughout Wales Labour lost more than a third of its seats, lost control of 11 of the 19 authorities it had held. In Merthyr, Plaid Cymru took 21 seats and Labour was left with eight.' The newly elected Plaid Cymru leader of the council said 'We wont push Welsh down people's throats ... There will be more bilingual forms, and people who write in Welsh will
be replied to in Welsh. But the social and economic problems are by far the greatest priority.\textsuperscript{81} This led to a dilemma for some party activists. One said in an interview,

\begin{quote}
Our task is to oppose apathy. Therefore we have to be aware of the dangers of becoming identified with running the system, even if it is better run than before ... our greatest threat could be the grinding down of our best talent in administering a system we basically disagree with ... In doing this we could attract those who do not want to change society but want to wield the levers of power. This is exactly what happened to the Labour Party.\textsuperscript{82}
\end{quote}

Younger activists, sympathetic with the views of the councillor quoted above, were concerned to connect the traditional ideal of 'community', with a form of decentralised socialism. The radical wing of the party became more explicitly socialist, and a fringe publication, \textit{Y Saeth} (the Arrow), published in 1976, claimed that,

\begin{quote}
this radicalism, this sense of equality and fair play, of concern for people as individuals, this opposition to the claims of mere brute wealth and power, seems to be innate in the very fabric of our nation. It was certainly here before industrial development gave it such a powerful stimulus, and its earliest expression in modern times is to be found in the more attractive aspects of nonconformity, the great formative force whose potential reached out from its purely spiritual mission into every aspect of personal and social life, and rapidly developed definite political implications.\textsuperscript{83}
\end{quote}

Radicals within Plaid Cymru tried to link the nation's nonconformist past, its language and literature, to the contemporary socialist concern for economic prosperity and equality. Some voices protested that the party was petit bourgeois and should commit itself to a type of revolutionary socialism.
It is possible that much of the contents of this essay will be opposed by nationalists who hold that the struggle for survival ... is a 'spiritual' struggle, and that to put it in a 'materialistic' context ... is to taint it ... one must declare that it is a mistaken and dangerous argument ... Wales will not be saved by prayers and fasts alone ... The time has come for us to throw away our cosmic pretensions and recognise what we are in reality, namely an academic petit bourgeois; a privileged class materially and culturally ... Since the start, the Welsh nationalist movement has wavered between Left and Right and its own philosophy, and it is high time for us, the present sustainers of that movement to realise that its demise will come quickly and with it our patriotism, unless we identify ourselves entirely with the aspirations and aims of the working class, namely the only Welsh class which is strong enough to free the whole nation from the grip of Imperialism while freeing itself.

By the 1975 Annual Conference, the left wing of Plaid Cymru, convinced that electoral success would come if the party could attract votes from Labour, attempted to commit the party to a policy of workers' control. The conference voted 84 to 62 against a resolution from the Aberdare branch in Glamorgan, which called for an extension of social ownership, under the control of elected boards from among the workforce. The delegate moving the resolution claimed that the policy was a natural extension of the party's traditional approach to co-operation, co-ownership and profit-sharing in industry. The resolution spoke of a 'fundamental conflict of interests between working people and non-accountable private sources of investment capital'. Opponents of the resolution complained that it was ill-thought out, doctrinaire and bureaucratic. Dr. Dafydd Hughes, a Parliamentary candidate, opposing the motion said,

Like the rest of the party I want to see a more equal and fair distribution of
wealth. But this is a naive motion, full of silly Marxist cliches that you would expect to come from first year students at the London School of Economics ... Class is not the main problem in Wales ... Let us forget about these English connotations and concentrate on policies concerned with a greater spread of income and opportunity.

Leading figures in the party were reluctant to embrace a class-based ideology, and Gwynfor Evans, in particular, was opposed in the mid-seventies to moves to declare Plaid Cymru an avowedly socialist party. The forces that Welsh nationalism opposed were common to capitalist and socialist systems, and, as far as Evans was concerned, the solution lay in the recreation of a pattern of values consonant with small scale communities. The challenge to the nation-states of advanced capitalism came, he felt, from a generalised reaction against technology, large scale organisation and bureaucracy.

All over the world there is a change in attitudes. Sensitive people are rebelling against the pressures of a technological and mechanical society. They are against its impersonality and inhumanity. They feel that their humanity and dignity is being degraded ... People are being manipulated by the big forces in life and the world has grown more complex and terrifying. There is a vacuum because of the decay of religious life. People are not so sure now where they are in terms of time and eternity. They want security ... Most people have this need to belong. When they are uprooted and pushed around they become a proletariat. Our work is against the proletarianizing of our people. Increasingly people feel the need for what Wales has to give them, a pattern of values they can rely on, a recognition of an individual's worth.

Such a philosophy has much in common with the mainstream of British conservative thought, exemplified by Burke, Scott and Disraeli, in that it tries to resolve the relationship between
economic progress and communal identity.\textsuperscript{88} It is understandable, therefore, that the internal debates in the party became more acrimonious after the influx of large numbers of disillusioned Labour supporters, keen to transform Plaid Cymru into a spearhead for socialism and nationalism. The 'modernists' became more prominent as the seventies progressed, with the majority of the leading figures coming from this group. Of the two members of Parliament elected in 1983, both are modernists', in that their emphasis tends to be on social and economic matters, although there are significant differences between them. Dafydd Wigley, M.P. for Caernarvon, and a former manager with Hoover Ltd., is closely identified with the 'technocrats' of the party, whilst Dafydd Elis Thomas, M.P. for Merioneth, and a former literature lecturer, is regarded as a type of Marxist. Up to 1979, when the devolution issue overwhelmed all others, the debates in Plaid Cymru centred around its economic programme. Since the publication of an economic plan for Wales in the late sixties, through to the debates about the issue of public ownership and workers control in the late seventies, the party was trying to formulate economic and industrial policies that demanded a greater measure of social justice, whilst remaining distinct from what Plaid activists regarded as the 'centralist socialism' of the Labour Party. Rawkins believes that, even in the 1980's;

mainstream political thinking in the Welsh movement remains uncomfortable with the notion of state power. The concept of a Welsh state remains poorly developed despite the efforts of the left-wing of Plaid Cymru's leadership in recent years. Emphasis is given to notions of decentralisation, as well as worker and community control of local economic and social organisations and institutions. In this context, the central state is seen as significant chiefly for its
revenue-generating purposes, its role in economic planning of industrial location and resource development, and its place in the educational and cultural fields. From 1974 onwards, when the party succeeded in getting three candidates elected to Parliament in the October General Election, policy became a subject of much more intense debate. A plethora of official and fringe publications testifies to the diversity of views now embraced under the banner of nationalism. The sharpest conflict was evidenced between those 'loyalists', who felt that a nationalist movement ought not to promote any 'divisive' policies, and those who felt that the only future for Plaid Cymru lay in displacing the Labour Party as the socialist party of Wales. In 1979, after a disappointing performance in the General Election, with Gwynfor Evans losing his Carmarthen seat, the scene was set for a battle over policy at the Annual Conference. Sections of the left-wing warned that it might be necessary to set up an independent republican socialist party to rival Plaid Cymru, but, although some prominent individuals did leave, a split was avoided when the leadership set up an internal commission to review the party's performance in the General Election, and to prepare measures for a revival in its fortunes. Whilst the left claimed that support would rise only if the party swung uncompromisingly leftwards and embraced a socialist stance on political and social issues, the right-wing linked the future of Plaid Cymru very firmly to the notion of patriotism, the language and the traditional culture. The enemy in their scenario was not so much capitalism, but creeping anglicisation, and the solution, a return to the radical appeal of the party's founders.

The sudden crisis confronting Plaid Cymru, particularly
after the hopes raised among its supporters following its rapid growth between 1966 and 1976, was exemplified by a drop in its membership for the first time for ten years. Between 1977 and 1979, the party lost one quarter of its student membership and in the 1979 General Election it won only 8.1 percent of the poll, as opposed to 10.9 percent at the 1974 General Election. The Western Mail claimed in an editorial, 'the party is a spent force ... it reached its peak some years ago; and of course there is only one way to go from a peak'.

Evidence provided by Denis Balsom about the composition of Plaid Cymru's support confirmed that the party had failed to extend its popular base. He showed that language issues remained the only policy that unified its supporters, and that the class profile of Plaid supporters in the rural north-west was very similar to that of Conservative Party supporters; in the industrial south it corresponded with that of Labour Party supporters. Balsom's conclusion was that, unless Plaid Cymru undertook a major revision of its policies, its appeal to the electorate would remain at no more than a tenth of the popular vote. Despite a broadening of its support in the anglicised south east, and the relatively successful way in which the party had capitalised on the weakening of Labour Party support, Balsom concluded that it remained highly dependent on the support of Welsh-speakers. Writing in 1984, Rawkins concluded that, 'the motivational pattern of party activists is unchanged to a remarkable degree'.

Caught between the objectives of extending working class support in the south, while retaining its traditional support among Welsh speakers in the north, the party floundered, eventually failing to appease either section of the electorate.
Activists from the industrialised areas of Wales did succeed in welding some of their concerns on to those of the party's traditionalists. Writing in Welsh Nation in 1975, Roger Tanner described the 'radical' and 'socialist' wings of the party, and he tried to claim that 'These two sets of beliefs are not at all incompatible, and it is time they were drawn together into a comprehensive system of beliefs and principles which should form the basis of action for Plaid Cymru in ALL parts of Wales.'

At the Annual Conference that year a compromise resolution on economic and industrial policy was passed. The conference rejected both capitalist and state nationalised control of industry and, instead, called for 'a third way in industry based upon decentralisation and the co-operation of all stake-holders in an economic enterprise, including employees, the providers of capital, the trade unions, and the community within which a concern is rooted.'

The left-wing argued that such a course of action was unrealistic, 'reality was a straight choice between capitalism and a new socialist order'. The success of the compromise resolution at this conference stemmed further faction fighting, but, Plaid Cymru failed to confront its central dilemma. As long as Welsh nationalist ideology coalesced around the language question, the possibility of the party extending its support remained limited.

To sum up, this chapter has attempted to outline the most significant changes in the composition, organisation, ideology and electoral fortunes of Plaid Cymru in the period since 1966. Drawing on official and fringe publications, interviews with activists and a review of the relevant literature, I have attempted to show how the socio-economic changes of the sixties and seventies, in particular the steady decline in employment in
agriculture, coal mining and steel manufacture, contributed to a widespread sense of grievance, based on a belief that Wales suffered from neglect and relative deprivation. Plaid Cymru was able to a certain extent to capitalise on these grievances and nationalism provided new recruits with an instant explanation for all social ills. It is apparent that the nationalist party, while not ignoring the concerns of the traditional party faithful, attempted to broaden its appeal and develop a range of policies that would attract non-Welsh-speaking support. Their success in attracting support from wider social groups added a new dimension to the internal affairs of the party, namely, an unprecedented level of conflict over policy goals. In the period between 1966 and 1976, the party was successful in fusing groups with diverse motivations for activity. An alliance was formed between traditional conservatives, motivated primarily by a commitment to the language and culture, and younger 'cultural militants', concerned about the erosion of distinctive communities in what they saw as an increasingly homogenous world order. Alongside these were the party loyalists and two types of 'modernists'. Left-wingers, often disillusioned Labour Party members or supporters, determined to build an independent Welsh socialist state, and another group, interested, primarily, in applying technocratic and managerial principles to the creation of a nation state that would be part of an economic union with the rest of the United Kingdom.

In the mid-seventies, it appeared as if Plaid Cymru had succeeded in uniting these disparate strands of political thought. By the end of that decade, the possibility of Welsh self-government receded after the referendum defeat of the governments' devolution proposals, and the fortunes of the party
ebbed. Those nationalists who saw the future in terms of a revival of all that was desirable in traditional ways of life, confronted those who saw nationalism as a vehicle for modernisation, and for promoting radical, and in some cases, socialistic change. For the traditionalists, the movement should be essentially protective, with its main priority the nurturing of the language, for, this above all else, was the basis of Welsh nationality. For the modernisers, interested in innovation and change, the movement for a self-governing Wales was part of a wider revolt against what they regarded as reprehensible centralising trends in industrialised societies. They saw an independent Wales as an opportunity to experiment with ideas of decentralisation and community control of economic and social matters. Ultimately, the party was unable to reconcile these distinct groups, nor shake free of its association with the language, and, as the proportions speaking Welsh continued to decline, opportunities for expanding the basis of Plaid Cymru's support was limited. In the prolonged debate over the devolution plans, the limits on the appeal of Welsh nationalism became apparent, and it is an analysis of this debate over the Governments' legislative proposals on devolution, that forms the basis of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX

DEVOLUTION

The recommendations of the Royal Commission to establish elected assemblies in Edinburgh and Cardiff, came about despite considerable disagreement between Commission members about their terms of reference. They also disagreed about the extent to which devolution should be pursued, and the mechanisms that were most appropriate to achieve a measure of regional devolution. It is widely acknowledged that Royal Commissions are often established as a result of political expediency. A Government, confronted by competing groups, each with compelling arguments, can resort to the strategy of setting up a Royal Commission in order to delay decision making, whilst giving the appearance of being determined on action of some sort. In his review of the work of Royal Commissions, Bulmer has suggested that they are unlikely to produce recommendations of a coherent nature because of their composition. He writes,

Representative Commissions, where membership is intended to reflect the different interest groups involved, are almost by definition not open minded, since particular members have particular axes to grind.

They are often composed of men and women who are seen to represent diverse viewpoints and interests. As such they may be unsuitable bodies to deliberate on proposals for reform, because protagonists are more likely to defend their own positions or perceived interests. As a result, the recommendations of Royal Commissions are often ambiguous and vague. Final reports reveal inconsistent arguments and express conflicting views that result in a proliferation of minority reports or memoranda of dissent.

The report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution was no
exception in this regard. It took five years between the establishment of the Commission, and the appearance of its final report. In the judgement of one political scientist, 'during that time, governments could conveniently use the Commission's existence as an excuse for dismissing devolution from their minds.' The composition of the Commission led to a final report in which it is possible to discern three distinct strands.

The majority Report acknowledged the special position of Scotland and Wales as 'nationalities', and advocated legislative devolution on the grounds that such national distinctiveness ought to be recognised constitutionally. Separate historical traditions and institutions, particularly in the case of Scotland, were cited as key reasons behind the majority decision to recommend the creation of Welsh and Scottish legislative assemblies. The Commission acknowledged that the devolution of government functions to a more local level was brought to public attention by the activities of the nationalist parties in Wales and Scotland, but they argued that decentralisation was of more general concern in England too. There have long been complaints about the 'remoteness' of central government and what seemed to critics to be an 'overconcentration' of power, wealth and privilege in the south-east of England. The great increase in the scope and complexity of government business led to complaints about a lack of understanding of the problems of the regions, and a lack of opportunity of people in the regions to participate in decisions that affected their livelihood. So strong was this feeling in the late 1960's that opinion polls showed a groundswell of support for regional assemblies. In the case of Wales, a 1968 Opinion Research Centre poll recorded that sixty percent of the sample wanted a separate parliament for Wales, and seventy percent were in favour of greater devolution, although the same poll showed that a vast
majority, seventy three percent, completely rejected separation from the rest of the United Kingdom. Commenting on the poll, the Western Mail said, 'The results of the poll carry a clear message for the major political parties: the majority of the Welsh electorate want a bigger say in the running of their own affairs.' An editorial commenting on the result said:

There is indeed no evidence that the people of Wales wish to cease being British. Equally, it would be wrong to see the problem merely in terms of regionalism. The deep-seated desire to preserve the national existence of Wales can be seen in the demand for Welsh institutions which runs like a thread through the past 100 years. The demand for devolution now is consistent not only with this desire but with the new historical situation in which Britain finds itself, shorn of Empire but part of the modern world in which over centralisation is neither good management nor good democracy. The time has come for Wales to prepare itself for power, to heal its internal divisions and to realise that devolution will only be the beginning.

One of the aims of this chapter is provide some explanation as to why such plans came to nothing. In order to analyse the fate of the Royal Commission proposals, it is necessary to disentangle the contradictory positions it advanced, whilst also charting the actual campaigns that took place in Wales on the question. These culminated in a referendum on the Wales and Scotland Acts, held on March 1st 1979, and the overwhelming dismissal of legislation that grew out of the Report of the Royal Commission. First, it is necessary to place the proposals for regional devolution in Britain into their proper historical context.

There is nothing novel in proposals for the devolution of central government responsibilities to the regions of the United Kingdom. Setting aside the peculiar historical circumstances that led
to the establishment of a parliament governing the six counties of Ulster, other schemes affecting the United Kingdom can be traced back over several decades. A 'devolutionary trend' can take different forms; the decentralisation of administrative activity to outposts of central government; the concentration of local government into larger units; the creation of intermediate units between central and local government; or the reorganisation of both central and local government into a new system of political and administrative activity. The Royal Commission of 1969-1973 was not the first attempt to bring about constitutional reform that had the devolution of power as its main aim.

One of the earliest works on the subject was published by the Fabian Society in 1905. It advocated the creation of eight provinces of the united Kingdom, each governed by an ad hoc board to administer housing, transport and municipal electricity services. At this time the prevailing argument was that such services were administered by units that were too small to ensure efficiency. The Fabians argued that provincial government would enable public services to be planned more effectively, although there was little apparent concern with increased levels of popular participation, one of the main reasons advanced in favour of decentralisation in the seventies.

In 1919, a geographer, G. Fawcett, published The Provinces of England. He argued that central government was overloaded, and unable, therefore, to give adequate attention to the particular problems experienced by the regions. He advocated the wholesale reorganisation of local government into twelve provincial administrations, with additional powers devolved from Westminster. Under his scheme, twelve provincial governments would replace existing local authorities, and assume devolved powers. He attempted to establish a number of geographical principles for defining the areas
of the regions of the United Kingdom. He argued that a region has a
capital, which is a focus for economic and social activity, and the
area boundaries should reflect the flow of ordinary people in their
daily activities. Fawcett's schema was used for the official
designation of ten English regions, plus Scotland and Wales, as the
basis for government planning during the Second World War. Even
though the history of geographers' attempts to delineate the 'natural'
regions of England is marked by dissent, and the constant redrawing of
boundaries, all have acknowledged the existence of Scotland and Wales
as forming distinct regions. According to Peter Hall, geographers
have developed alternative kinds of region - homogeneous regions and
nodal regions:

Homogeneous regions depend on the idea
that people think of regions in terms of
traits. Thus the popular stereotype of
the north east is: older declining
industries, loss of people by migration,
low average incomes, higher than average
unemployment. If indices like these tend
to follow each other region by region,
then by a big exercise in number
crunching one can define a set of regions
that are internally as homogeneous as
possible and externally as different from
each other as could be. Nodal regions
are different: they are based on the
notion that people think of regions in
terms of their internal organisation and
in particular their movements of people
... Given these criteria, what kinds of
regions do geographers make? The trouble
is that they can produce almost
anything.

As a consequence, the 'regional' map of England has been redrawn from
time to time.

After the Second World War, the technical and financial defects
of the local government system were subjected to critical scrutiny by
G.D.H. Cole. Cole argued for a system of regional planning
authorities, which were to be funded by a regional taxation structure
to provide revenue. In Chapter Five it was pointed out that post-war
developments in government and administration, forced an acknowledgement of some need for regional planning. In the case of Wales, this led to the creation of separate committees, a Minister and, eventually, a devolved Welsh Office. The utility of regional structures was first realised in wartime with the establishment of the Regional Commissions for Civil Defence. This precedent was continued after the war for purposes of reconstruction. The Treasury drew up its nine standard regions for England, and one each for Scotland and Wales, in 1946, in order to facilitate restructuring of the economy. By the nineteen eighties, the Department of Health and Social Security, the Lord Chancellor's Department, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Department of Trade and Industry, and the Department of Employment all have regional structures, but the essential characteristic of such decentralisation is that there is no uniformity about the regions into which England has been divided, and there are even differences within regions. For example, the Department of the Environment has eleven different regional structures, while the Home Office has only four, and the prison service, the Department of Employment and the Ministry of Agriculture have seven regions each, but these are not all identical. The picture of administrative decentralisation in England shows a confusing hotchpotch of provision, with a jungle of boundaries, with no centres of decision making that might co-ordinate action in any of the regions. This contrasts with Scotland and Wales, where the accretion of administrative functions by the Offices of the Secretary of State, does allow a degree of overall planning of services.

In 1949 Peter Self took up the demand for greater accountability of the ad hoc bodies that were emerging as vehicles of post-war reconstruction. He too, advocated the reform of local government, and the democratisation of regional planning and administration. The
idea of the 'regional city' arose at this time. Its most forceful advocate was Derek Senior, who divided the country into thirty-six areas, each centred around a city of economic, social and cultural importance. Senior eventually became a member of the 1966–69 Redcliffe Maud Royal Commission into local government, and he wrote a Minority report advocating the construction of regional areas of government, centred around regional cities. Senior's proposals to base regional government around a city, were considered by Mackintosh in his study of the inadequacies of local government, and, what he regarded as the overcentralisation of central government. Mackintosh came down in favour of eleven regional councils, with an executive based on the Westminster model. His regions were to be Scotland and Wales, six of the existing economic planning regions, and three new regions for the whole of southern England. This brief summary of earlier attempts to outline a system of regional government, helps to put into perspective the deliberations of the Royal Commission.

The Kilbrandon report assumed that constitutional reform, of some kind, was necessary in order to meet the growing criticism that government in Britain was overcentralised. The Commissioners decided that there were three possible methods by which they might effect a shift in the balance of power between regional and national centres. The three choices were between separatism, federalism and devolution. Separatism would entail the creation of independent states in Scotland and Wales, and the giving up of all claims to sovereignty over these areas. Federalism would entail the retention by the United Kingdom government of defence, foreign policy and customs, with central government giving up all internal powers to control domestic matters. Separatism, of course, is normally only discussed with reference to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It would entail the creation of
self-governing states, with the same status as any other sovereign country in the world. The Royal Commission concluded that a recognition of a separate national identity did not, in itself, justify the separation of the nations of the United Kingdom. Also, attitude surveys conducted on behalf of the Commission discovered no great desire on the part of the people of Scotland and Wales for complete independence. In the case of Wales, with the exception of by-elections in the late nineteen sixties, electoral support for Plaid Cymru, has hovered at around ten to twelve percent. Only nationalist parties advocate this step and, the Commission concluded, political separation would still entail economic interdependence.

Federalism has, to a certain extent, been tried within the United Kingdom. The unique constitutional positions of the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands contain elements of a federal connection to the United Kingdom. Again, the Commission found no support for the idea of a federal Britain in England, and very little in Scotland and Wales. Such a system would involve a federal or central government having sovereignty over certain matters and regional, or provincial, governments over others, with a written constitution to define the rights and powers of each. The Commissioners rejected this proposal, as basically unsuited to the United Kingdom. They argued that federalism was best suited to those states that were in the process of consolidation. It was well suited to a situation in which sovereign units were moving together for the first time to form one unit of government. The Commission also argued that some federal systems, such as the USA and Canada, were manifesting signs of political strain in the course of the twentieth century, as disputes about the relative power of each legislature spilled into political conflict.

Devolution, of some sort, was the remaining prescription for reform. There were however, difficulties in deciding on any sort of
definition of the term. For some, 'devolution' meant the same as regionalism, while others referred to 'decentralisation' or 'deconcentration'. However, the usual meaning of devolution is some delegation of control from central government to regional bodies, while leaving overriding control in the hands of a central authority. There are two separate strands involved with the idea of devolution; one is a regionalising of what are at present central government functions; the other is a regionalising of present local government functions; or, as they have been described, 'an upward extension of local democracy', as against a 'downward extension of central bureaucracy'. Those who advocated devolution to Scotland and Wales, favoured a combination of the two.

The final Report of the Royal Commission presented a summary of possible forms of devolution, within the existing constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom. Legislative devolution would entail powers being transferred to a regional assembly which would be able to enact legislation on policy and create the machinery to carry it out. According to the Western Mail, 'Wales and Scotland must have their own directly elected assemblies. That is the unanimous view of the Kilbrandon Commission on the Constitution, though its 13 members are deeply divided on what those assemblies should do'.

Regionalism entered the political agenda in Britain before the 1964 General Election. While the Conservatives believed that planning and co-ordination on a regional level could be achieved by an extension of the existing activities of government departments, the Liberal Party called regularly for fully elected regional authorities. The 1964 Labour Government favoured a regional approach to national economic planning, and they established boards for this purpose. The Redcliffe-Maud Commission on Local Government, which reported in 1969, also recommended a system of provincial councils, eight in all, based
on economic planning regions. They would have had responsibilities in the field of strategic planning and the co-ordination, and forward planning, of local government services for the whole region. Redcliffe-Maud envisaged that these bodies would be directly elected through the new local authorities, with co-opted members from outside local government. The terms of reference of the Royal Commission on Local Government precluded any specific investigation of the devolution of central government functions, but the tenor of many of its proposals were 'regionalist'. By the time the Redcliffe-Maud report on Local Government was published, the Commission on the Constitution had begun its work, so, some of these proposals were set aside to await the findings of the Kilbrandon Commission.

The Kilbrandon Commission concluded that a system of devolved central government functions would strengthen democracy, reduce discontent, and counter centralising trends in decision-making. The problem was in deciding what form the proposals for change should take. Three main approaches to the problem can be discerned in the final recommendations of the Commission. The first, supported by all the members of the Commission from Scotland and Wales, including Lord Kilbrandon, accepted the historical distinctiveness of Scotland and Wales. This group favoured special treatment for Scotland and Wales on the grounds of nationality. These two nations were not merely regions of the United Kingdom, and, as such, they deserved legislative assemblies in Edinburgh and Cardiff, but there was little justification for regional devolution in England. Although the Commission members had rejected separatism, their proposal can be seen as substantiating some of the claims of Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party. For them, the fact of nationhood had to be acknowledged through the creation of separate legislative assemblies.

A second group of Commissioners felt that the causes of
dissatisfaction with centralised government were common to all parts of the United Kingdom. They were opposed to devolutionary concessions to some parts of the United Kingdom, and not others. As such, they recommended the establishment of regional assemblies, not just for Scotland and Wales, but for the regions of England as well. They argued that the fact of nationality did not give people of Scotland or Wales the right to be better governed than those in East Anglia or Yorkshire. Scotland and Wales were to get nothing which was denied to the regions of England, for this would have contravened a principle of equality of rights. One of the signatories of the Memorandum of Dissent wrote that the principle of equality of political representation was, 'not only an important matter of principle, but also a reasonable prediction of what would be politically acceptable in the long run', and, without a recognition of the principle of equality, 'there would no longer by any reality to the concept of the practical unity of the United Kingdom'.

A third group, were opposed to the creation of any legislative assemblies, although two of the four commissioners who were sceptical about the demand for devolution, did agree that there was a case for legislative devolution to Scotland. The Commission not only presented a majority report, and a memorandum of dissent, but some of the signatories of the majority recommendations to create Welsh and Scottish parliaments, also supported the creation of English regional assemblies. Faced with such dissent, the reaction at Westminster was to hope that the challenge from nationalist parties would recede, and the proposed constitutional reforms could then be shelved.

The General Election of 1974 gave a new lease of life to the debate about the constitutional positions of Wales and Scotland. Plaid Cymru had lost its only Parliamentary representative at the 1970 General Election. By the October 1974 General Election, Gwynfor Evans
had won back the Carmarthen constituency, and Plaid Cymru had captured two Labour held seats in the rural north west. In Scotland, the achievements of the SNP were even more startling, the nationalists winning 13 seats and 22 percent of the votes. In September 1974, during the minority Labour Government, the White Paper, Democracy and Devolution: Proposals for Scotland and Wales was published. This laid down the plans for directly elected assemblies for Scotland and Wales. One crucial distinction was that, whereas the Scottish assembly was envisaged as having legislative powers, the Welsh assembly would possess only executive powers. Each was to be funded by block grants from Whitehall; there was to be no change in the role of the Secretaries of State for Wales and Scotland, nor in the number of parliamentary representatives from Scotland and Wales at Westminster. Later, in November 1975, a further White Paper, made clear that there were to be powerful constraints on the powers of any future Scottish and Welsh Parliaments. Not only were the legislatures to be denied any power to raise revenues, they were also to be denied the right to take policy initiatives in the spheres of industrial and economic affairs, agriculture and energy.

Reactions to the Kilbrandon recommendations varied. The Labour party in Wales and Scotland were divided on the issue. A Parliamentary meeting of Welsh Labour M.P.'s, held in November 1973, revealed the divisions. The Western Mail commented, 'The situation could arise therefore of the Labour Party being torn between the internal differences of the Welsh and the Scots'. Leo Abse, Labour MP for Pontypool, declared that the whole business was a 'dead duck'. Meanwhile, one of the commissioners, Sir Ben Bowen Thomas, was quoted as saying,

The Conservatives in Wales did not want devolution so they have kept their initiatives in the debate pianissimo. The same thing is true, to a lesser
extent, of the Labour Party. Having fathered the whole business, however, they couldn't run away from the infant, though, from their point of view, it was a most unfortunate infant to have fathered. The Liberals were angelically pure because they had been talking about this sort of thing for generations though it is true they haven't done much about it. Plaid Cymru, of course, shouted the odds.

Over the next three years, the splits and divisions within the major political parties, were to lead to a lengthy parliamentary consideration of the proposed legislation, and a detailed committee review of the various options, ranging from a consultative council, to administrative devolution, legislative assemblies and executive devolution. Throughout 1974 and 1975, various institutions and groups in Wales debated the merits of the various proposals. As the likelihood of a Welsh parliament increased, groups as diverse as the South Wales Area of the National Union of Miners and the Anglican Church in Wales deliberated on the issue. The Archbishop of Wales spoke in favour of devolution, and he was quoted as saying that any future assembly would help solve the problem of, 'remoteness of all levels of government'. At the miners' conference, a delegate, speaking in favour of the successful resolution that supported the call for a Welsh legislative body with law-making powers, said, 'Security of jobs, homes, opportunities and transport are even more vital to our future than our language ... the exploitation of 200 years of industrial capitalism has left Wales lagging behind even average levels in Britain'. He made it clear that he was not demanding separation from Britain, 'On the contrary, it means strengthening the voice and the case for Wales in the redistribution of wealth and resources of Britain as a whole'.

The inaugural conference of the Wales TUC, held at Aberystwyth in April 1974, also welcomed proposals for a Cardiff parliament. The
resolution, passed by delegates, called for the setting up of an assembly with full powers to make laws on economic and industrial matters. One delegate said, 'We are disenchanted with our centralised bureaucracy which is remote from the people of Wales. We do not want complete separation from Britain, but we want a more direct say in our day-to-day affairs'. A delegate from NALGO, the local government officers union, sounded a note of caution. This presaged a more serious split in the trade union ranks that was to emerge in the campaign of 1978-79. This union was concerned that a Cardiff based assembly would weaken the position of, and remove responsibilities from, existing local authorities. Because of this, NALGO felt obliged to defend the powers of local authorities against any encroachment from a newly established body, in the interests of protecting existing jobs and job opportunities.

The progress of the Wales and Scotland Bills through the Houses of Commons was tortuous. The Conservative opposition spokesman claimed, in a parliamentary debate in 1975, that there was no demand in Wales for a directly elected legislature, 'The most it would be is just added confusion, expense and cumbersome bureaucracy'. The Conservative Party stance was that the measures would fail to stem the nationalist tide, indeed, once created, such bodies could become the launch pad for further demands for greater autonomy, leading, ultimately, to the break up of the United Kingdom.

To believe the setting up of an elected assembly in Wales with certain powers of delegated legislation, with certain executive functions, will have the effect of satisfying or even subduing nationalist demands is a delusion. It will be the biggest stimulus yet created to those whose ultimate goal is independence ... What it will provide is this - an emasculated Welsh Office and an emasculated Welsh Secretary too, and ultimately it will provide an elected body which will demonstrate increasing discontent with the limitations of its
powers and functions which will increasingly demand more, and be in conflict with central and local government.

At the same time as Conservative and Labour sceptics were arguing that the measures would play into the hands of the nationalists by providing them with an institution that would spawn further powers, others, particularly Plaid Cymru activists, felt that the proposals did not go far enough.

From experts in constitutional law there was a barrage of criticism that drew attention to the anomalies and ambiguities in the proposed legislation. Foremost among these criticisms was the fact that the relationship between Westminster and the devolved assemblies was unclear in the case of a disagreement between them, and the future role of the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Wales was still ambiguous. Conservatives, and others opposed to any measure of devolution, argued their case on grounds of political integration, economic integration, and the evidence of a declining interest in the language and culture of Wales. Politically, they pointed to the fact that Wales, unlike Scotland, had never possessed the trappings of a modern state, and economically, Wales is integrated with England in every respect. South Wales is tied economically to the Severn Estuary and Bristol, north Wales is linked to Merseyside, and mid-Wales is linked to the West Midlands. Furthermore, opponents of reform challenged the extent of Welsh aspirations for constitutional reform.

Ivor Gowan, Professor of Political Science at the University of Wales, and a constitutional adviser to the Conservative party, wrote,

The Government has found support for its policies on devolution in the 'official' views, and spokesmen of a plethora of political, local government, cultural and religious organisations. But it is now learning to its cost that these pressure groups do not faithfully represent the views of the rank and file members, any more than trade union leaders reflect the
views of ordinary workers on industrial questions.

It seems to me that the demand for a referendum on devolution will, in the end prove irresistible. On present trends it is not unlikely that the majority of the people in such a referendum will decisively reject all moves towards devolution, a Welsh parliament or self-government. Sooner or later Whitehall and Westminster must learn that nationalists and "quasi-nationalists" are a small minority in Wales. The majority looks outwards and wishes to preserve Wales as an integral part of the United Kingdom.

By 1977, so entrenched and well organised was the Parliamentary resistance to the Scotland and Wales Acts, that the Government were forced to concede an amendment which demanded a referendum. Opposition came, not only from the majority of Conservative M.P.'s, with notable exceptions amongst the leadership, but six south Wales Labour M.P.'s emerged as leading opponents within the governing party. Against a background of the Labour Government, reliant on a pact with the Liberals, the Scotland and Wales Bills ground laboriously through the committee stages, and the Government was compelled to accept this crucial amendment to the Scotland Bill. This was later extended to include the Wales Bill. Moved by George Cunningham, a Labour MP representing a London constituency, the clause insisted that, if less than forty percent of the electorate in Scotland and Wales voted in favour of the proposals in a referendum, an Order repealing the Scotland and Wales Acts, would be laid before Parliament. With this critical amendment passed, Labour anti-devolutionist MP's could support the Government, secure in the knowledge that they would be free to campaign outside the House, and that the ultimate decision was to be in the hands of the electorate. On May 9th 1978, the Welsh Bill passed its third reading by 292 votes to 264, and both the Scotland and Wales Bills received the Royal Assent on July 31st of that year.
The challenge laid down by Ivor Gowan in 1976 was now to become a reality. The long list of Welsh organisations and institutions that had discussed their stance on the question were now being challenged to demonstrate that they were, indeed, speaking on behalf of their members, whether these be members of Chapel congregations or miners' lodges.

The referendum campaign in Wales

Plaid Cymru was faced with a prolonged internal debate as to their stance on the referendum campaign. The National Council of Plaid Cymru twice issued clear directives to the membership that they were to utilise the debate on the Government proposals to mount a campaign for full self-government. This entailed pointing to the limitations imposed on any Welsh assembly by the continuing constitutional link with Westminster. This, they argued, would constrain the actions of the Assembly, as it would still be dependent on the block grant from Westminster. Sections of the party argued that the weaknesses of the legislation were potentially so serious that it would lead to conflict between an assembly, probably dominated by the Welsh Labour Party, and the London Government, particularly if it was a Conservative Government. One of my respondents, a thirty year old civil servant, spelt out the scenario that she envisaged:

Once the Assembly in Cardiff is a reality it will be dominated by socialists. In fact all parties contesting elections for the Assembly will want to be seen to be doing the best they can for Wales. There is bound to be a head-on collision between London and Cardiff. Under these circumstances more and more people will come to see that self-government is the only answer. The limits on what we could do would become apparent, and Welsh politicians in the Labour and Liberal Parties will find themselves driven closer to our position. Although we have no illusions about these proposals, they give us a wonderful opportunity to convince more people of the necessity for independence. (6.6.78)
Another Plaid Cymru activist said,

A Cardiff based legislative body provides the party with a launch pad for full self government. Once it is in existence there is no going back. Logic dictates that the politicians, civil servants and other will gradually accrue more and more power. When London governments try to stop this momentum the people of Wales will see clearly that the half way house can never satisfy our aspiration for economic progress and political freedom. (12.6.78)

Within Plaid Cymru, the reservations many felt about the legislation were masked by a strategic decision to campaign vigorously for a "Yes' vote, in alliance with other parties and groups. The official line of the Labour Party in Wales was to support the proposals of a Labour Government, yet, at grass roots level, many Labour activists were disinterested, and many actively opposed what they saw an an opportunistic concession to nationalism.

Ideological tensions within the Labour Party in Wales were brought to the forefront in the campaign on the referendum. A section of Welsh Labour MP's, led by Neil Kinnock, opposed the devolution plans on the grounds that the assembly would weaken the voice of the Welsh members at Westminster, and compromise the unity of the Labour movement. In the parliamentary debates, the 'gang of six', renegade members of Parliament for Welsh constituencies, drew attention to the deficiencies and inconsistencies in the Wales Bill, and they claimed that, despite the establishment of another layer of government, critical decisions would remain with Westminster. Kinnock, Abse, Hughes, and their supporters in the Welsh Labour Party were doctrinally committed to, what J. Barry Jones has called, the 'statist, centralist tradition' in the Labour Party.

The anti-statist tradition within the Labour Party which had made it receptive to the concept of home rule was one of the later casualties of the First World War. By the early 1920's the party...
gradually moved towards an acceptance of the paramountcy of economic issues and with it the need for central economic planning ... no longer could the party afford the luxury of competing doctrines of the state and the growing ascendancy of the Welsh ensured that the party's prevailing doctrine would be centralist in the cause of economic planning, social equity, efficiency and economy.

A prominent opponent of constitutional reform, Donald Anderson, Labour MP for Swansea East, described the whole campaign around the Wales Bill as the 'devolution distraction'.

It is a sad commentary on decision-making in the Labour Party that, through an incremental process of creeping commitment and concessions, we reached a position so out of touch not only with the Welsh public but with many party activists as well. There had always been a Home Rule element in the Labour Party in Wales, but until the middle 1960's it did not progress beyond platform rhetoric ... Zealots worked to ensure that Party and trade union conferences passed resolutions in favour of devolution and relied thereafter on traditional solidarity to prevent back-sliding.

Nevertheless, in its evidence to the Commission on the Constitution, the Welsh Labour Party advanced four separate arguments in favour of a devolved assembly, although in deference to centralist opinions, the evidence made clear that the position of the party's members of parliament must be taken into account. In its submission, the Labour Party claimed that the Welsh Assembly could

1) provide the democratic machinery to focus on Welsh problems
2) provide a structure of government that would allow greater decentralisation
3) allow greater democratic control of nominated committees and statutory boards operating in Wales
4) rationalise administration by providing a top tier of local government.

This policy was presented as an overhaul of the machinery of
The divisions within the Welsh Labour Party were to prove critical in the course of the referendum campaign, and the limited participation of many Constituency Labour Parties compelled Plaid Cymru activists to play a more prominent part in the 'Wales for the Assembly Campaign' than many had envisaged.

When the referendum campaign began, there emerged a coalition of two heterogeneous positions. The campaign in favour of a devolved assembly embraced the executive of the Welsh Labour Party, a majority of Welsh Labour MP's, the Welsh Liberal Party, the Wales TUC and Plaid Cymru. Allied against the devolution measures were the Conservative Party in Wales, the National Federation of the Self-employed, seven of the eight County Councils, the exception being Gwynedd in the north west, the County Landowners Association, and the minority of Welsh Labour MP's who rebelled against their party, the so-called 'gang of six' - Donald Anderson, Fred Evans, Ioan Evans, Ifor Davies, Leo Abse and Neil Kinnock.

The pro-Assembly Campaign sought to widen its appeal by involving prominent Welsh celebrities in the fields of sport and entertainment. These included Barry John, Gareth Edwards, Sir Geraint Evans, Harry Secombe and Max Boyce. The recruitment of Rugby stars was an astute ploy, for it allowed the 'Yes' campaign to link their cause with sporting loyalties. As the national Rugby team is one of the few institutions that unites many Welsh people, regardless of their linguistic or political loyalties, it was a strategy designed to mobilise support for the campaign by identifying support for the national team with a 'yes' vote. In February 1979, at the international rugby match between Wales and Ireland at Cardiff Arms Park, leaflets were handed out by the Yes campaigners which likened
the match with 'the other big match; Wales v the Rest'; due to take place on March 1st 1979, coincidentally, St. David's Day. This leaflet listed the celebrities who had declared their support for a referendum 'yes' vote, and gave prominence to the stars of the Rugby field.

When the Wales and Scotland Acts were being drafted, it was never envisaged that they would be the subject of a referendum. Plaid Cymru regarded the provisions of the Wales Act with considerable misgivings, but once it became a matter of a campaign and a referendum, the leadership decided that the party had no option but to support the Labour Government's legislation. Seven months before the referendum, the Plaid Cymru President, writing in the pages of Welsh Nation, argued that the measures gave Wales a voice, and a democratically elected assembly could, he argued, act as a focus for Welsh interests.

Plaid Cymru has always been prepared to accept, and even to campaign for, measures which would strengthen Welsh life. This is a most important question to ask of Labour's assembly policy. Will it strengthen Welsh? To this the honest answer must be Yes. For one thing, it is an obvious advance in Welsh democracy. It will be representative of the Welsh people. Such an institution has never before existed. Wales has never had an elected assembly. The fact that it is elected gives it considerable power, much more than a superficial view would suggest. It will have the right to speak for Wales, and it can do so on any subject it chooses. Its debates will not be confined to those matters over which it has executive power. There is nothing to prevent it preparing an economic development plan. True, it cannot implement the plan, but because it is representative of the nation of Wales any representation made to the London government is bound to carry weight.

This argument about the democratic nature of the proposals coincided with the stance taken by the Labour Party and the Trades Unions. It
centred around the claim that decentralisation was desirable, overdue and could unite otherwise disparate political forces. The 'Referendum Manifesto', produced by the coalition grouping, 'Wales for the Assembly' emphasised this non-party political appeal;

The campaign involves those who regard the issue of establishing a Welsh Assembly as of supreme importance which transcends the cynical conflicts and petty-bickering that disfigures much of the political scene ... Although there are numerous differences within our ranks as to the extent and pace of the policy of devolution, we are united in the recognition that the Wales Act represents an historic step in the process of democratic decentralisation.

A subsidiary claim of the 'Yes' campaign was that, having halted the 'flood tide of bureaucratic centralisation', tangible benefits would accrue to the people of Wales. A Welsh parliament would, it was claimed, expose waste and inefficiency, improve the quality of transport, health care, housing and educational provision. Yet these claims were subordinated to a general appeal to decentralist sympathies.

The opponents of the Wales Act, in particular the Conservatives, claimed that the legislation bore the seeds of constitutional conflict. The prospect of London and Cardiff legislatures, at odds over their respective powers, and a recognition of the emergent properties of devolutionary movements, convinced many that these concessions to nationalist sentiments, would lead down the 'slippery slope' towards full separation. The 'No' campaigners also claimed that the Welsh Assembly would try to usurp the powers of the tiers of local government, and this was the very antithesis of devolution. The manifesto of the 'No' campaign, claimed that this would take power away from communities;

It is highly likely that the Assembly would recommend the abolition of one tier or another of local government in Wales.
such would be its vested interest in attracting to itself some of the powers of local government. The result would be the very antithesis of devolution.

The anti-Assembly forces concentrated on the spectre of constitutional conflict, and the threat that this would pose to the integrity of the United Kingdom. Continually they stressed that the incorporation of Wales in the United Kingdom had brought definite material advantages, and that economic interdependence would be threatened by a degree of political separation.

Wales has profited out of a system of partnership with the rest of the U.K. in which problems are identified in a 'global' and objective, rather than sectional manner, and where resources can be directed in a cool-headed and effective way.

The main danger to the unity of the Kingdom arises from the conflict which the Assembly would be bound to create not only between the U.K. Government and the Assembly but also between the different regions of the U.K.

To add to the catalogue of disasters that the Welsh Assembly would, supposedly, bring in its train, the 'No' campaigners suggested that the Assembly would be another costly layer of bureaucracy, following on from the unpopular reorganisation of local government, and that it would be dominated by a Welsh speaking elite. In the Anglophone areas of Wales, the fear that the Assembly would be dominated by Welsh speakers was actively promoted by the 'No' campaigners. Leo Abse, Labour MP for Pontypool, and one of the most vehement critics of the Government's measures, fuelled the fear that the Assembly would be led by the minority Welsh speakers.

The English speaking majority would be condemned to be strangers in their own land. The Nationalists, by insisting on Welsh being spoken in the Assembly, will ensure the creation of a Welsh speaking bureaucratic elite who will attempt to impose a false homogeneity upon Wales. There is no magic superiority of one
Alpine the charge that the assembly would be costly, ineffective, and dominated by a Welsh speaking elite, the 'No' campaigners insisted that the Wales Bill was a measure motivated by expediency. They charged it with being a sop to the nationalists that, far from assuaging demands for separation from the UK, it would actually strengthen the forces of nationalism. According to one scenario, frequently alluded to by the anti-Assembly forces, the limited powers of the Assembly in areas of industrial and economic policy would be exploited by nationalists. Whatever problems were experienced after the Assembly had come into being, could be laid at the door of Westminster for not giving the Assembly sufficient powers to deal effectively with the social and economic problems of Wales. Far from stemming the nationalist tide, the limited measures might well have the unintended effect of promoting greater hostility to London government.

In answering these charges the 'Yes' campaign was in a complete trap. As has already been mentioned, some sections of Plaid Cymru joined the campaign precisely because the Assembly had been presented to them by their leaders as the 'first step' towards total separation. Plaid Cymru's allies in the campaign, the Labour Party, argued that the Wales Act would stem the demand for separation, and lead to higher levels of satisfaction with government and a more harmonious integration of the United Kingdom. The then Prime Minister, James Callaghan, chose this as one of his themes in the campaign.

The Assemblies will bring the government of Scotland and Wales closer to the people of those two countries, but will not weaken the overall unity of our islands.

It is clear that the real weakness of the 'yes' campaign was the
inconsistent position of the various parties on the question of the future of the Assembly. The vulnerability of those in favour of the Wales Bill was such that explicit reference to the legislation was kept to a minimum. Instead, according to Jones and Wilford, the emphasis was on vague assertions that the assembly would strengthen democracy.

The 'No' campaigners, on the other hand, brought a range of arguments to bear. They appealed to anti-socialists in Wales by arguing that any future Welsh Assembly would be dominated by the Labour Party. In the early and mid seventies, several south Wales local authorities in which the Labour Party had enjoyed decades of uninterrupted rule, were in the public eye because of allegations of corruption. Years of 'one-party' government in these authorities had done little to reassure sections of Welsh opinion that a Labour dominated Assembly would not take on many of the characteristics of Labour held local authorities. The Conservative MP for Conway, Wyn Roberts, was quoted in the Western Mail as saying, 'The Assembly would establish a more complex and cumbersome machinery of government ... tailor made for the Labour Party caucus in South Wales'.

Another theme of the campaign, that surfaced from time to time, was the suspicion that the Assembly would, not only be dominated by Labour politicians, but that these would be, in the main, representatives of the heavily populated industrial areas of the south east. It seems ironic that the Gwent and Glamorgan authorities, where this population were concentrated, and whose representatives would, presumably, have dominated the Assembly, were opposed to the Wales Bill. Nevertheless, the deep-rooted suspicion that many North and South Walians have for each other, did play a part in arousing suspicion about who would control the legislative assembly. This was most bluntly expressed by Mrs. Gwen Mostyn Lewis, Chairperson of the Clwyd 'No' Campaign:
People in South Wales are very charming, but as a crowd they are loud and coarse. We do not want to be governed by Cardiff. The Assembly will be permanently dominated by Labour. It will be a dictatorship.

Within Plaid Cymru, there was considerable unease about their participation in the 'Wales for an Assembly Campaign'. The price to be paid for participation in this umbrella organisation was that nationalists remained restricted to the arguments in favour of a Bill which they roundly condemned. Plaid activists were convinced that the Governments' devolution policy was a 'sham', and the lack of commitment to this policy by leading Welsh Labour figures added to their mistrust. In many areas the nationalists found themselves at the forefront of the campaign. They found themselves promoting a measure that many of them had strong reservations about, and they distributed the 'official' 'Yes' campaign literature in the place of Labour activists. Dr. Phil Williams, a leading figure in Plaid Cymru, was opposed to the way in which the nationalist party had become embroiled in a campaign for legislation which was being advanced for dubious reasons, and which, from his viewpoint, was totally inadequate. In May 1978 he denounced the Labour Government:

I myself have never believed, for one moment, that the Government had any firm intention to establish an assembly in Wales ... In proposing a Welsh Assembly, the Government deliberately made it as unattractive as possible. They denied it the powers to tackle the real problems of Wales like housing and unemployment. They made certain that it would have no real job to do, but then proposed a suspiciously large number of civil servants to do it. The Government themselves publicised the cost of the assembly to encourage the opposition. The so-called Labour 'rebels' were given free reign to attack the assembly on every occasion ... I am not suggesting that from the beginning the Labour Government were totally opposed to the idea of Welsh and Scottish assemblies. By spinning out the parliamentary
procedure the options were kept open and so by 1977 they could reassess the position. By today they have done this and now there is a second, very subtle aim in pursuing the Wales Bill: to try and stop Plaid Cymru's growth by confusing the electorate. If they can arrange for this shabby inadequate and unpopular Welsh assembly to be identified with Plaid Cymru, and if they can then arrange for this assembly to be decisively rejected, then by association Plaid Cymru will suffer.

Setting aside the claims of Dr. Williams, there is certainly an air of prophecy in his final remarks in the above extract!

Plaid Cymru were highly critical of the details of the Wales Bill because it lacked some of the legislative powers which had been granted to Scotland, and they were suspicious of the commitment of the Labour Party to the Bill. The spectacle of leading Welsh Labour MP's campaigning actively against the Bill, and Labour-led local authorities using ratepayers money to publicise their opposition to the creation of an assembly, added to the feeling within Plaid Cymru that their participation in an all-Party campaign would rebound against them. Williams claimed that Plaid Cymru must try to distance itself from the devolution legislation.

For Plaid Cymru there is only one way ahead. We must make sure that every voter in Wales realises that the assembly is Labour party policy: full self-government is Plaid Cymru's policy. We must oppose Labour's devolution policy and Labour's assembly as a total sham from beginning to end. Only self-government can give Wales the houses and the jobs and the self-respect that we need - and self-government is the only policy worthy of Plaid Cymru support.

This hostility to Plaid's participation in an all-party campaign was not shared by other leading figures in Plaid Cymru. Some were convinced that a Cardiff-based assembly was a step in the right direction, and the party could not afford to ignore an opportunity to
support the creation of a significant Welsh institution. The party
President, Gwynfor Evans, wrote in 1978,

To dismiss this Bill as worthless is I think a great mistake. It has the great
virtue of making the devolved administration - in the Welsh Office and
in nominated bodies - accountable to the Welsh people ... If the Wales Bill goes
through all its parliamentary processes and then comes successfully through the
referendum the most substantial step yet in our political history will have been
taken. A little of the power which emanates from the Welsh people will have
been returned to them. It will not be an easy year for the party, its self
discipline will be sternly tested. For the Wales Bill is not a nationalist
measure ... That is not to say that we will have no part to play. On the
contrary, we must pull out every stop if we reach the referendum stage ... the
referendum campaign can be used to educate the Welsh people in the duties of
nationhood and in the value of nationalism...

The Plaid Cymru Annual Conference of 1978 debated the extent to which the
party should work for a 'yes' vote in the referendum. Delegates
repeated the fear that Plaid Cymru would gain little from a close
association with measures that were designed to thwart nationalist
ambitions. A lively debate revealed the extent to which some
activists feared that Plaid Cymru would become identified in the mind
of the voting public as the party that favoured 'more bureaucracy'.
Opponents of the assembly had made some headway in the opinion polls,
and the argument that a Cardiff-based legislative body was another
expensive layer of government was proving effective. Emrys Roberts,
Plaid Cymru Vice President, acknowledged the dangers for the party,
but argued 'This is not a question of logical analysis. It is a
question of emotion and self-confidence in our ability to control our
own affairs.' Plaid Cymru found itself in a very difficult
situation. It was inconceivable that they could actually campaign
against the creation of a Welsh parliament, yet they were hostile to the Wales Bill for reasons that have been outlined. The Party president spelt out his views in his address to the 1978 conference at Swansea.

Although we are fully aware of the Assembly's limited nature, it would a grievous error to underestimate the value of this measure of democratic decentralisation. Its rejection would incalculably harm the morale of Wales and would encourage many to think that she can be swept under the mat without compunction, with all the social, economic and cultural injury that would involve. On the other hand new heart would be put in the Welsh people by its establishment, which would be a blow for democracy with European significance. A massive Yes vote would resound through a score of submerged nations and historic regions in Europe to the distress only of the bureaucrats and centralists.

As a party which is committed to improving the conditions of Welsh national life, Plaid Cymru must do its utmost to ensure that the Welsh Assembly is established. This will be one of the big campaigns in the new year which we face. We have never before had a comparable opportunity of furthering the cause of Wales as we have in 1979 ... Every effort that we make will contribute to awakening and strengthening Welsh life, and it will add to our own strength which is by now very substantial.

Despite some dissenting voices, Plaid Cymru committed itself to full support for the 'Yes' campaign in the referendum. The extract from the 1978 Conference speech above demonstrates that the party leadership had linked the standing and credibility of Plaid Cymru to the fate of the referendum campaign. Opinion polls throughout 1978 showed a gradual shift in favour of the Assembly. In the middle of that year, opinion polls conducted by BBC Wales revealed the following result
Table 1: Intended vote on Wales Bill

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Government preferred</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>DON'T KNOW</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status Quo</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak assembly</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law-making Assembly</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Complete freedom'</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BBC Wales Opinion Poll May 1978

Compared with surveys of attitudes on the devolution issue taken a year earlier, there were signs of a significant shift in favour of an assembly. The improving fortunes of the Labour party in Wales at this time may partly explain this shift. It appears also, that a larger proportion of the electorate identified the proposed reforms as the result of a Labour Government, and not as a Plaid Cymru inspired measure.

Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Poll March 1977</th>
<th>Poll March 1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Welsh Nation July

This apparent movement in public opinion was seized upon enthusiastically by Plaid Cymru activists. It strengthened their conviction that the referendum could be won and, furthermore, that the political stock of the nationalist party would benefit from their identification with the establishment of this new national
institution. Further analysis of opinion polls taken in 1977 and 1978 revealed that those in favour of some form of devolution were more determined to vote in the referendum. In May 1978, of the 67.3% of the sample who said they would definitely be voting in the referendum, the results showed that opinion was fairly evenly divided.

Table 3: Voting intentions on the Wales Bill Referendum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BBC Wales May 1978.

Because the forty per cent who said they would definitely vote 'yes', represented only twenty five per cent of the total registered electorate, the '40% clause' would effectively mean that the Bill would fail. Dafydd Wigley, Plaid Cymru M.P. for Caernarfon, condemned what nationalists felt was a device to make the likelihood of defeat greater. In effect, he claimed, those who failed to vote would be counted as opponents of the reforms.

In the middle of 1978, it seemed as if the coalition that favoured the creation of an assembly were making headway in terms of public support. A 'Wales for the Assembly' conference was held in June of that year, and it attracted widespread publicity. It brought together leading politicians from diverse backgrounds, and all the major speeches exhorted Welsh voters to vote 'yes' in the referendum, in order to extend democracy. But later that year, the WAC campaign seemed to lose some of its momentum. The delay in holding the referendum, and the uncertainty over the date of the general election, had the effect of opening up differences of emphasis within the coalition. Labour loyalists continually stressed that the assembly
would democratise Welsh consultative bodies, committees and various 'quangoes'. This was summed up in the Labour Party slogan, 'Vote Yes: For Democracy, For Wales, For Britain'. The official WAC campaign pamphlet spelled out this line of reasoning.

At present there are over 70 non-elected bodies in Wales taking decisions affecting all our lives. They include bodies such as the Welsh Water Authority, the Land Authority, Tourist Board and so on. Twenty seven of these bodies are (in theory) directly responsible to the Secretary of State for Wales, and in 1976-7 they spent £450 million of public money - none of it subject to adequate democratic scrutiny.

The present Secretary of State - who is solely responsible for appointing 488 people to these bodies - is the most determined advocate of this transfer to an elected assembly: 'I fail to understand how the democratisation of such nominated bodies and transfer of decisions on their future to the Assembly can be objected to - except by those to whom democratic control is repugnant.

Meanwhile, other factions in the all-party organisation preferred to emphasise patriotism, and a commitment to Welsh identity. They attempted to portray a 'Yes' vote as a matter of national pride, and the campaign propaganda, complete with daffodils and dragons, called on supporters to, 'Vote for Wales on March 1st'.

To counter the 'democratic' argument, the 'No to the Assembly Campaign' claimed that the proposals in the Wales Bill would actually weaken local government and undermine grass roots democracy. A serious blow to the 'Yes' campaign, came when prominent Labour local government leaders attacked the proposed assembly. The Labour leader of Mid-Glamorgan County council argued: 'the evidence to-date suggests that the Assembly will create administrative chaos ... in our view devolution should be about reducing interference by central government bureaucrats and strengthening government at a local
Commenting on this intervention by Councillor Philip Squire, Jones and Wilford wrote, 'Coming from the leader of the largest Labour controlled Welsh local authority in the later stages of the campaign, the statement carried considerable weight and dealt an effective body-blow to the pro-devolutionist cause'.

The 'No' campaign also predicted tension and dissent between Cardiff and London, if an Assembly were to be established, and they linked two of their most consistent anti-assembly arguments, the costs of devolution and the danger of separatism. They implied that resource allocation between England and Wales would become fraught with political dangers. Resentment about the size of the block grant would lead, the NAC argued, to the real danger of separatist tendencies becoming prominent.

The Conservatives, in particular, concentrated on this theme, and in the final week of the referendum campaign, Nicholas Edwards, Tory MP for Pembroke, made reference to this aspect of the 'No' argument.

How is the British Government going to control the economy of Britain in the future faced by a rebellious Assembly in Wales that challenges its efforts to act in the interest of the British people? It is appalling that on top of all the other problems that face the Government in managing the economy and controlling inflation, we are to see an Assembly claiming all the authority of nationhood, standing up and challenging its rights to do so.

In February 1979, just a week before the referendum poll, the Western Mail and HTV published an opinion poll which broke down the main motives for voting 'yes' or 'no'. It proved to be profoundly depressing for those in favour of the Assembly. It revealed that the three main arguments of the 'No' campaign, the cost of the proposals, the danger of separation from the UK, and the creation of another layer of bureaucracy, had made a strong impact on public opinion. From the beginning of February, to the 24th, support for a 'Yes' vote
had slipped in opinion polls from 33% to 22%.\textsuperscript{46} The breakdown of reasons for their vote are reproduced below.

**Table 4: Which of the following arguments have most convinced you?**

**Those voting 'Yes':**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Give people more say in decisions</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help protect jobs and improve living standards</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help protect Wales's language and culture</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represent a step towards greater independence</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce the work load at Westminster</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Those voting 'No':**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost too much</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create another level of bureaucracy</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be used by Nationalists to break-up the United Kingdom</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourage investment and damage the Welsh economy</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage the use of the Welsh language</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce Welsh influence at Westminster</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Western Mail/H.T.V. Poll February 24, 1979.\textsuperscript{47}

It is instructive to analyse the respective campaigns on this issue in terms drawn from the sociological study of social movements. The hostility and ambivalence felt towards the Wales Act by some pro-devolutionists, in particular the membership of Plaid Cymru, limited the extent to which NAC could become a united campaigning movement. Instead, 'the emergent Pro-Assembly issue coalition
contained merely the trappings, not the substance, of a social movement'. Jones and Wilford come to this conclusion because the campaign failed to demonstrate all the characteristics which sociologists have come to expect of such movements. According to Gusfield, a social movement possesses a clear and self-conscious set of objections to the existing state of things. Typically, social movements are mass movements possessed of a worked out and reasonably consistent set of ideas which legitimises the movements' goals. In some senses, the pro-devolution campaign does share some of these features, but, according to Jones and Wilford, the Government was wrong in assuming a mass groundswell of support for its measures in Wales. As a consequence, the proposals embodied in the Wales Act were imposed on the Welsh electorate. 'They did not emerge as a result of the articulated demands of a broadly-based, organised and directed social movement'. Although the aspiration of Plaid Cymru for the creation of a sovereign and independent state does, clearly, imply a co-ordinated and worked-out opposition to the status quo, their participation in the WAC coalition brought only difficulties. Within nationalist ranks, there was considerable unease about Plaid Cymru's position. A significant minority of Plaid Cymru members, including prominent figures in the leadership, were opposed to the Wales Bill, because of its limited powers. The majority, however, were able to justify their support for the Bill on the grounds that, 'at least it's a start'. Their expectation was that, a process of incremental drift, would lead to the gradual accretion of greater powers for the Assembly, and any future conflict between the London and Cardiff parliaments would lead to a rise in the level of public support for separation, and the eventual establishment, for the first time, of a Welsh nation-state. On the other hand, Plaid Cymru's major allies in the coalition argued that the consequences of the reform would be an
end to nationalist aspirations. The assembly, far from presaging a future split in the United Kingdom, would satisfy regional and national feelings, improve the quality of government, and thereby strengthen the unity of the U.K.

This fundamental distinction between two of the leading parties in the ranks of the 'Yes' coalition was a source of considerable weakness. Plaid Cymru members were constrained to follow the 'official' line, and, many felt compelled to subdue their feelings that the terms of the Act were unacceptable. Also, disputes within the ranks of the Labour Party, referred to earlier in this chapter, further weakened the 'Yes' campaign. Ambivalence about the terms of the proposed legislation contributed to the fact that, 'the issue-coalition which emerged on the pro-Assembly side was an organisation essentially characterised as ad hoc, expedient and somewhat tentative'. The very heterogeneity of the 'Yes' campaign, forced them to unite around one theme, namely, the claim that the devolution measures represented an extension of democracy. The rather abstract concept of democracy became the foundation upon which the Yes campaign was compelled to construct its case. This expressive appeal to the electorate represents the 'value-orientation' of the campaign.

Although Gusfield has offered a definition of social movements as shared demands for change in some aspect of the social order, this fails to differentiate between movements in terms of their appeal to a wider audience. The claim that the referendum campaign was about the extension of democracy can be understood as an example of an expressive appeal to the public. According to Smelser, there is an analytical distinction to be made between social movements in terms of the 'expressive', as opposed to 'instrumental' appeal of movements for change. Of course, such a distinction serves the purpose of clarifying ideologies for analytical purposes, but, in any particular
empirical case, it is more likely that actual social movements will include both 'expressive' and 'instrumental' appeals. In the case of the 'yes' coalition in the referendum campaign, there was a tension between those who saw the measures as ends in themselves, and those who saw them as the beginning of a process of more extensive social and political change. In other words, Plaid Cymru's desire for the Welsh Assembly to take advantage of political opportunities to push forward the movement for independence for Wales, was an example of a 'value orientation', for it involves a demand for sweeping changes in the norms that govern identity, political authority and the legitimacy of the United Kingdom state. The Labour Party in Wales, of course, was not part of the same challenge to the standing and authority of the London Government. They sought only to bring about more limited changes in the administration of Wales, partly as a consequence of the political challenge from nationalist politicians.

Within the same campaign, there co-existed groups who were both 'norm oriented' and 'value oriented'. This is not uncommon, for there are many examples of social movements that are characterised by a tension between 'expressive' and 'instrumental' strands. The judgement of Jones and Wilford was that this 'ad hoc coalition of interests and beliefs chose ... to couch its campaign in primarily value-oriented terms, viz. by identifying itself as expressing the aspiration towards achieving a political value, the extension of democracy in Wales'. Meanwhile, the heterogeneous group that campaigned against any change in the constitution, could concentrate on the deficiencies of the Wales Bill, as well as raising some very telling points about the possibility of future conflict between the two legislative bodies in Westminster and Cardiff. The 'No' campaigners were also free to concentrate on the likely costs of another layer of government following on so soon from the unpopular
reorganisation of local government boundaries, and they raised the fear of linguistic domination by a well-educated minority, who, they claimed, would introduce linguistic restrictions for appointments in the public sector as part of the movement to preserve and maintain the Welsh language.

Some 'Yes' campaign literature made a connection between improved government and a more efficient allocation of resources. A campaign leaflet contained the following,

The Assembly will help tackle unemployment Wales urgently needs more jobs - and the right kind of jobs where they are needed most ... with jobs so scarce we in Wales would be foolish not to seize the opportunity. Without our own Assembly to act as a powerful lobby, Wales would lose influence and jobs to their areas.

The 'Wales for the Assembly Campaign' also claimed that a Welsh Assembly, co-ordinating public services at an all-Wales level, would enforce a greater degree of accountability and, as a result, there would be improvements in education, health, transport and other services. Although the 'yes' campaigners did try to justify the creation of a Welsh assembly in terms of the material benefits that would also flow to Wales, this 'instrumental' part of their campaign was never to the fore.

Towards the end of the campaign, in February 1979, the 'yes' camp were besieged, as opinion polls revealed a steady erosion of support. The three arguments against the creation of a legislative assembly, namely, the extra public expenditure, the establishment of another layer of administration, and the threat of separatism seemed to have had most impact on public opinion. The authors of the most detailed study of the referendum campaign concluded:

The initiative had passed from the 'Yes' campaign at an early stage; the decision not to persevere with promoting the aspirational objectives of devolution but
to adopt a more pragmatic and normative approach had trivialised what should have been the resolution of a great constitutional issue and played into the hands of the Assembly's opponents whose Act centred tactic was directed towards exciting a conservative reaction, in effect an implicit endorsement of the status quo ... by and large the 'No' campaign had aimed their appeal at an instrumental level. Not only were they able to capture the centre ground of the debate by projecting the 'slippery slope' scenario, but they consistently forced their opponents onto the defensive about costs, bureaucratisation and centralisation of decision-making within Wales. Their normative critique of the legislative proposals seemed amply justified by the overwhelming 'No' vote recorded at the referendum on 1st March.

The results, declared in the afternoon of March 2nd, on a county basis, revealed the scale of the defeat for the proponents of devolution. The Wales Act was rejected convincingly. Not one of the eight counties registered a majority in favour of the proposals. The scale of the defeat can be judged by comparing the results below with the opinion poll figures recorded in the middle of 1978 (see page 281).

Table 5: Results of the Referendum on the Wales Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTIES</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>TURNOUT</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clwyd</td>
<td>31,384</td>
<td>114,119</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwynedd</td>
<td>37,363</td>
<td>71,157</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyfed</td>
<td>44,849</td>
<td>114,947</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powys</td>
<td>9,843</td>
<td>43,502</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Glamorgan</td>
<td>29,663</td>
<td>128,834</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid Glamorgan</td>
<td>46,747</td>
<td>184,196</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Glamorgan</td>
<td>21,830</td>
<td>144,186</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwent</td>
<td>21,309</td>
<td>155,389</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 243,048 956,330 58.3 11.8 46.5

Source: Western Mail 3.3 1979.
Consequences of the Referendum Result

The most immediate and dramatic effect of the defeat for the Wales Act and the Scotland Act, was the parliamentary moves against the minority Labour Government. Conservative and Scottish Nationalist M.P.'s moved a vote of no confidence in the Callaghan administration, which was carried by one vote. The downfall of the Government led directly to the General Election in May 1979, which saw the Conservatives returned to power under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher. Among significant sections of political opinion, the rejection of the Edinburgh and Cardiff assemblies spelt the end of nationalism as a threat to the 'stability' of the United Kingdom, and a diminution in the level of pressure for the devolution of government functions to the provinces. In the General Election in May 1979, the Conservatives gained 58% of the poll in Wales, as compared with 24% in October 1974, and eleven of the thirty six seats; 'Wales located itself firmly within the South of Britain. At a time of heavy swings to the Conservatives everywhere, the heaviest swing of all, outside London, was in Wales'. In one important sense the referendum result marked a most decisive defeat for the Labour Party, for, not only did the electorate reject a crucial measure proposed by a Labour Government, the defeat led directly to the fall of that Government. Of course there are many and varied reasons why individuals cast their votes in the way they do. It is undoubtedly the case that many voted against a Labour Government proposal because of dissatisfaction with some other aspect of the performance of the government. The so-called 'winter of discontent' of 1978/79, when agreements on pay guidelines for public sector employees broke down into industrial unrest, surely added to the sense of dissatisfaction with the government.

If the Labour Party regarded the result as a defeat, with the
exception of the prominent rebels in the party, for Plaid Cymru, the aftermath of the referendum led to considerable internal debate. It appeared as if everything that the party stood for had been rejected by the electorate. The majority of the electorate, even in the rural and most heavily Welsh-speaking counties, had spurned an institution that was a prerequisite for the establishment of an independent nation-state, the fulfilment of nationalist aspirations. The leadership of the party immediately tried to distance themselves from the result, by claiming that it was a defeat for the Government. Some expressed relief that they could now proselytize without being compelled to operate as part of a coalition. The conviction that the defeat of the Assembly proposals was not a defeat for Welsh nationalism, was most strongly expressed by the Plaid Cymru President.

The referendum result has to be seen as essentially a Government defeat not ours. It is the Government that failed to implement its own policies and the defeat shows that we cannot trust this Government to carry this sort of policy through. They gave way on everything, right down the line, just did not force the issue hard enough. It is their failure... some members of the Government merely neglected the issue; others were rather more deliberate about it, making a sham of saying that they were giving the people a chance to decide but doing nothing to present the case properly to the people and they were no doubt happy about the outcome.

Despite such protestations, there is little doubt that the referendum result weakened Welsh nationalism. In the 1979 General Election, the nationalist party failed to make any gains, and actually lost the Carmarthen seat held by the Plaid Cymru President, Gwynfor Evans. The result also revealed the extent to which support for Welsh nationalism was limited to rural and Welsh-speaking areas of the country. In the heavily populated industrial south east, where Plaid Cymru activists had placed much of their hope throughout the nineteen seventies,
support for the Assembly proposals stood at only seven or eight per cent. Overall, only twelve per cent of the electorate voted in favour of the Assembly, and this corresponds to the level of support recorded by Plaid Cymru in General Elections throughout the seventies.

The various interpretations of the results are, of course, coloured by the ideological predilections of the protagonists. Nevertheless, the judgement of an historian and two political scientists was that, taken together with the 1979 General Election results, the referendum result was a manifestation of profound changes in the political loyalties of Welsh voters. Jones and Wilford concluded that the result 'witnessed the emergence of a new Welsh political profile', whilst Gwyn Williams, Professor of History at the University of Wales, suggested that the results signalled the elimination of Welsh peculiarities ...

Prominent members of Plaid Cymru attributed the debacle to the hostility of most newspapers. According to Gwynfor Evans,

The mind of the mass is conditioned by the media. The centralised London media are the most powerful engines of manipulation available to any establishment... When the media and the uniquely powerful civil service are united in their determination to enfeeble and devitalise a cause their power is all but overwhelming. They are one in their antagonism to Welsh self-government.

The question of 'media bias' against the proposals for a devolved Assembly cannot be investigated here. Suffice to mention that Jones and Wilford do make reference to the fact that there is no national daily newspaper in Wales, and, although there are dailies based in South and North Wales, the market is dominated by London-based
newspapers. They claim this is significant because, 'they tend to act as vehicles for the diffusion of a metropolitan culture and help to reinforce a centrifugal perspective particularly with respect to political culture'. They go on to point out that London-based popular papers trivialised the issues, whilst the 'serious' papers were, with the exception of The Guardian (whose Welsh sales are negligible), hostile to devolution. Jones and Wilford attribute the defeat of the devolution measures to a number of features specific to the campaign, but they also refer to wider social changes that had the effect of undermining a commitment to a specifically Welsh outlook on political matters. Of course, active members of Plaid Cymru refused to accept that the electorate were rejecting the principle of national self determination. In an edition of Welsh Nation that appeared only a month after the referendum, a correspondent wrote,

> This particular Act is dead, but nevertheless, the Yes campaigners did shy away from defending the Act itself, and we now have a problem in convincing people that the rejection was more to do with these particular problems than anything to do with the principle of devolved power.

However understandable this response may be, it cannot be allowed to stand as an adequate sociological explanation for the defeat of the Wales Act. Changes in the occupational structure in Wales, in particular a greater reliance on public service employment, were bound to influence attitudes towards any move that could be construed as 'separatist'. Also, long term demographic changes, particularly in the western rural areas of Wales, brought many more inhabitants as 'settlers', either because of work or in search of places for retirement. The less easily observed process of acculturation was also significant;

> there has been a widespread diffusion of Anglo values, techniques and institutions in to Wales. Whilst such diffusion can
occasion culture conflict, we would suggest that the evidence of such conflict in the Welsh context, as manifested by the referendum and the General Election results, is merely vestigial, at least in the political sense. Whilst there is evidence of a narrowly construed specifically Welsh cultural resistance – perhaps given its most overt expression in such diverse forms as Rugby football and Eisteddfodau – the diffusion of wider English political values has permeated the political consciousness of the vast majority of the Welsh electorate. On this assumption the prospect for a general acceptance of even a token Welsh Assembly (as represented by the proposals of the Wales Act) was destined to fail.

To sum up, the Government resolved the problems associated with the passage of its devolution measures by accepting, in the committee stages, an amendment that subjected the legislation to a referendum in Wales and Scotland. In Wales, two heterogeneous coalitions, embracing political parties, local government and other institutions, emerged to fight the campaign. In the course of this campaign, the opponents of the Assembly were able to convince a majority of the electorate that one step taken along the devolutionary road would lead to the 'slippery slope', ending only in the complete separation of Wales from England and the 'breakup' of Britain. The tactics of the respective coalitions allowed the 'no' campaigners to deploy a range of instrumental objections to the proposals, and they were able to capitalise on the disaffection in Wales engendered by the wholesale reorganisation of local government. It is also highly likely that the stance taken by some voters was influenced by their attitude to the Government. The Callaghan Labour Government was coming to the end of its period in office, and this was accompanied by heightened levels of industrial conflict. Because the measures were closely identified with the Government in office, and vigorously opposed by the Conservatives, it is difficult to separate the specific rejection of
the terms of the Act from a more general hostility to the Labour Government.

Furthermore, opposition from within the Labour Party, with six prominent Welsh Labour M.P.'s campaigning enthusiastically against the proposals, surely weakened the case for devolution, particularly in the industrial areas represented by these members. A wider process of social, economic and demographic change, referred to as a process of 'acculturation' has served to weaken the commitment of many Welsh voters to any distinctive symbols or institutions that express this difference. Also, since the change in the leadership of the Conservative Party after 1975, there was an important shift in emphasis. Ideologically, the Conservative Party began to espouse a free market liberalism in its approach to economic affairs. Allied to this, was a more critical response to the activities of the state. The policies advocated centred around the need to 'roll back' the boundaries of state activity, rejuvenate private initiative, and reduce the size and scale of both local and national government. Some of these themes bear resemblance to those that fuelled the nationalist upsurge of the late sixties and early seventies. Plaid Cymru and the SNP were able to take advantage of a certain hostility to what was perceived as 'remote and insensitive central government'. It is a relatively short step from this position, to accepting the view that the state had become "too big". Such inferences are bound to be tentative, but certain anti-state themes resonate both in the nationalist appeal and in Conservative Party propaganda, particularly after 1975. This illustrates the point that movements with differing political ideologies may nevertheless evince similar reactions against centralising trends.
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3. Western Mail 25.9.1968.
4. ibid 25.9.1968.
5. Fabian Society (1905).
15. Western Mail 12.11.1973
17. Western Mail 8.4.1974.
18. Western Mail 2.5.1974.
19. Western Mail 2.5.1974.
21. Western Mail 5.2.1975.
22. Western Mail 5.2.1975.
29. Ibid.
35. Ibid. p.27.
36. Ibid. p.27.
38. Ibid. p.4.
43. South Wales Echo 23.2.1979.
44. B. Jones and R. A. Wilford (1979) p.32.
45. Western Mail 22.2.1979.
46. J.B. Jones and R.A. Wilford (1979) p.36.
47. Reproduced in Appendix A of Jones and Wilford (1979) p.63.
48. Ibid. p.9.
49. See Gusfield (1968).
51. Ibid., p.10.
52. Gusfield (1968).
54. See, for example J.A. Banks and Robert Mears (1984).
60. Jones and Wilford (1979) p. 42.
64. Welsh Nation April/May 1979.
65. Jones and Wilford (1979) p. 44.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

In the introduction to this study it was stated that in the late nineteen sixties, several long established western European nation-states were subject to strong political and ideological challenges from movements that questioned the legitimacy of the centralised state. They challenged existing political structures on the grounds that they failed to recognise sufficiently the political aspirations and the cultural distinctiveness of well-defined minority groups within their borders. Earlier processes of nation state formation and consolidation had incorporated disparate groups, with separate languages, cultures and traditions, under a centralised authority. Despite centuries of acculturation, in the case of the United Kingdom, a sense of distinctiveness survived in Scotland and Wales, such that nationalist movements could launch campaigns against the unitary state. They claimed to speak for, and on behalf of, subject peoples, denied the right to self-determination. For a period, the Welsh and Scots in the United Kingdom, the Corsicans and Bretons in France, and the Basques and Catalans in Spain, generated movements that demanded self government.

Political movements claiming to represent these regional interests developed a degree of self confidence in questioning existing political structures. They began to articulate a set of demands; these included calls for greater administrative devolution, more recognition of and support for minority languages and cultures, through to demands for outright independence and the establishment of new nation-states. Such political groupings attracted considerable interest, and some of them gained a degree of electoral support that they had never before enjoyed. In France and Spain, for example,
there were important concessions made to these nationalistic movements. In Catalonia and Corsica, regional parliaments were established as part of an official policy of decentralisation which, it was thought, might assuage regionalist sentiments.

In the United Kingdom, the Royal Commission on the Constitution was established in response to a perceived threat to the unity and stability of the United Kingdom, and, throughout most of the nineteen seventies, it looked likely that elected assemblies would be set up in Scotland and Wales. Despite this upsurge of popular and academic interest in the 'new' nationalisms of Europe, sociologists have shown relatively little interest in such movements. In the main, the study of nationalist movements has been the province of political scientists and historians.

Confirmation of the sociological neglect of nationalism, and of nationalist movements, is provided by Anthony Smith. He wrote, 'one can only be amazed at the comparative lack of sociological interest and research in this field...even today it has not become a major area of sociological interest' ¹. A review of the content of major sociology journals in Britain tends to reinforce Smith's point. Nationalism and nationalist movements are discussed very rarely, with the important exception of the sociology of development, where there has been an abiding interest in the problems of nation-state formation in post colonial societies.

In the period since the end of the Second World War, when sociologists have turned their attention to nationalism, it is usually with reference to the creation of the new nations of Africa and Asia, many formed out of an amalgam of disparate peoples, cultures, and languages. In such cases, national unification and the mobilisation of national sentiments, was seen as a prerequisite for stable political development, which itself was seen as a precondition for
'modernisation' and economic development.

A survey of the published deliberations of scholars attending the congresses of the International Sociological Association in the years between 1952 and 1978, also reveals that nationalism was rarely mentioned, and, when there was reference to 'nation' or 'nationalism,' it was always in the context of movements in the Third World. The assumption must have been that the 'advanced' nation states had completed their nation-building, that future efforts need concentrate only on the development of supra-national and international organisations. The idea that 'global' processes of centralisation might engender a reaction, and that minority nationalisms could become the vehicle for expressing opposition to such trends, at both the national and international level, is relatively unexplored. It is necessary to echo the complaints made by Norbert Elias at the 1970 World Congress of Sociology. He claimed that the influence of structural functionalism, and other 'schools' of sociology that ignored long-term processes, such as nation-state formation, both reflected and contributed to the reinforcement of a deep-rooted tendency towards static and ahistorical thinking. We might add that much of the Marxist analysis that flourished in the nineteen seventies did little to reorient scholars towards the study of centrifugal trends in societies.

Elias also complained about the tendency to construct dichotomous and static models, that purport to explain 'persistence' and 'change'. There tended to be an assumption that 'modernisation' proceeded in a unidirectional and 'progressive' manner. The ideological components of such conceptualisations have been discussed elsewhere. Elias suggests that it might be more accurate to think in terms of 'waves' of centralisation, that in turn, trigger off centrifugal forces, without assuming that one or the other is, in any
sense, bound to be the 'victor'. They reside within the same structure, and are, in every sense, interdependent. In order to avoid, what Elias has called 'process reduction', it is essential to think in terms of a dialectical interdependence between 'continuity' and 'change'. Goudsblom is aware, however, that even these terms compel us to think in terms of static dichotomies. Referring to the terms 'continuity' and 'change', he writes,

this pair of opposites has the disadvantage of suggesting a contrast of change versus non-change. Such a suggestion is misleading of course. What we actually observe in biological and social life are sequences of change in which we detect varying degrees of continuity and discontinuity.

Further confirmation that the field of nationalism is relatively unexplored by sociologists is provided by the collection of essays on the history of sociological thought, edited by Bottomore and Nisbet. In a wide-ranging review of developments in sociological thought, that runs to over seven hundred pages, there are no references to 'nation', or 'nation-building', and only one reference to 'nationalism', and this in connection with ethnic stratification. Discussions of nationality, and attempts at some unambiguous definition of the 'nation', often touched on questions of racial origin and racial type. However, Lockwood has claimed that the systematic study of race relations has, until recently, been 'relatively isolated from the mainstream of sociological analysis.' He attributes this neglect to the fact that 'no racial problem at all comparable to that of the present day presented itself in the historical situation in which the basic structure of sociological theory took shape.' This questionable suggestion certainly could not be applied to the problem of nationalism. The years during which the foundations of sociology were laid were also the years during which European nation states
consolidated their boundaries, built empires in the name of the nation, and 'nationalised' their populations through the extension of centralised military, financial and educational institutions.

Lockwood also claimed that 'the creators of modern social theory were committed from the start to a mode of analysis in which a concept such as race could be of only secondary importance.'\(^9\) It was a mode of analysis, Lockwood contended, that focussed on such 'basic' and 'universal' aspects of social systems as the division of labour and religion. Dunning has suggested that this speculative hypothesis may help to explain the relative lack of sociological interest in, amongst other things, war, sport, and other less 'rational' areas of human experience and activity. Dunning suggests that 'the emergence of what became the basic foci of concern in modern sociology has been a process less free from the influence of heteronomous evaluations than Lockwood's analysis implies.'\(^10\) To understand why there seems to have been such surprising gaps in sociological theory, we are compelled to look back to the theoretical legacy of nineteenth century social thought. In his most recent work, Giddens has made a similar point.

We live in a world dominated by the nation state form... Yet neither thinker (Durkheim and Marx) gave any detailed attention to the nation state as a generic phenomenon and neither, in a systematic way, connects the nature of the modern state either with control of the means of violence or with territoriality.

Dunning's judgement directs attention to the fact that the relegation of nationalism to relative insignificance in the fundamental corpus of sociological thinking, is due to the subtle yet pervasive influence of ideological forms of thought.

Kumar has suggested another possible reason for this relative lack of interest in nationalism.\(^12\) The classical sociological theorists of the nineteenth century were interested, primarily, in the
impact and course of industrialisation and the development of capitalism. As a consequence, they focussed on social changes that were common to all industrialising societies, namely, processes of structural differentiation, bureaucratisation, secularisation and class formation. Their interest in stratification, especially the changing foundations of economic power and social prestige, tended to direct attention away from the formation of national loyalties. There are some important exceptions to this general point. Max Weber, for example, did concern himself with issues of national culture and national values. It is also worth bearing in mind that there is sometimes a distinction between what 'classical' sociologists actually wrote and what present day sociologists believe they wrote.

Seton Watson has commented on the 'arbitrariness of the national ideal'. Sociologists are, supposedly, more aware than most people of the often dubious basis of biological or pseudo-biological arguments that underpin the idea of 'national solidarity'. Consequently, this ideological opposition to nationalism can lead to an underestimation of the compelling force of patriotism and national sentiment. Also, sociologists may find themselves engaged in intellectual and emotional battles with those who base their view of the world on the notion of a primordial bond that unites 'chosen' peoples. Karl Mannheim, writing soon after the end of the Second World War, saw one of the prime tasks confronting sociologists, as combating the pernicious doctrine of nationalism. As far as he was concerned, the intellectual challenge was, to condemn national chauvinism, reveal the fallacious nature of pseudo-scientific doctrines, and help to innoculate the masses against this dangerous creed. In nineteenth century Europe, it had been the intellectual strata of the bourgeoisie who had done so much to champion the cause of the nation, and to popularise and disseminate its language, symbols
and myths. As far as Mannheim was concerned, their twentieth century successors should combat the influence of nationalism in the post-war reconstruction of Europe. It is understandable that he should take such a view, so soon after the defeat of fascism. He pinned his hopes on the rational, unfettered intellectual, who, unencumbered by feelings of parochialism, could struggle against the emotional appeals to particularistic loyalties. He wrote:

The emancipated intellectuals are those who are capable of extricating themselves mentally from the pressures both of outlived folkways and of manipulative attacks of propagandists who try to impose on them doctrines and artificial ideologies of nationalism. The intelligentsia try to resist this ideological pressure even at the price of being called unreliable by aggressive nationalists.

The influential theorist, Eli Kedourie, was also antagonistic to nationalist ideas and movements. He regarded nationalism as an aberration produced by western intellectuals, and he attacked what he saw as the internal weaknesses of nationalist doctrines. He believed they were dangerous and outmoded. As far as he was concerned, nationalism fuelled aggression, and promoted warfare, terrorism and totalitarianism. From a sociological perspective, he simplifies and, therefore distorts, his analysis because of the intrusion of extraneous values. Kedourie plays down the fact that warfare and violence are features of dynastic states and tribal societies, and is not, therefore, caused merely by nationalism. He also ignores the role of nationalism in providing the legitimacy for newly-formed nation states, uniting an otherwise fissiparous population under one viable authority. Furthermore, the purpose of attacking nationalist ideologies in an attempt to reveal their fallacious nature, is uncertain, for, as Zubaida has claimed, 'The interest of nationalist doctrine for social or political science lies precisely in the way
they are 'ideologies' and are not histories or theoretical discourses'.

It may be relatively easy to dismiss nationalist ideologies as inconsistent, or to question the claims they make, based on dubious assertions about the nature of human bonding. Such debunking has been condemned by Seton-Watson:

There are perhaps some persons who have genuinely risen above national prejudices, and whose loyalty is given solely to the human race as a whole...Such people are scarce, and their capacity for leadership of real men and women is doubtful. If they refuse to look more closely at the nationalist passions and prejudices which animate so large a proportion of humanity...they cut themselves off from the real world.

In Chapter Three, I characterised the ideology of the Welsh nationalist party in the years after its formation as romantic and arcadian. Uncovering the logical flaws in their argument has a limited usefulness, for an expose of such ideas does not detract from the emotional appeal of the beliefs. Denying the appeal of nationalism can only detract from more adequate sociological understanding of the phenomenon. Philip has warned against the tendency to underestimate the strength of nationalist appeals.

Those who have tried to advance the integration of Western European countries since 1945, through supranational institutions such as the European Community and NATO, have too easily discounted the strength of national identities to which people tenaciously hold.

According to Seton Watson, 'Nationalist doctrines will no more stand up to critical analysis than any other ideologies, yet this has not prevented them from capturing men's minds'. In spite of the attacks on nationalism, it has shown remarkable resilience, and continually
appears in different guises, fascistic, liberal, modernising, socialistic and militaristic.

Nationalism has been one of the most persistent and ubiquitous doctrinal constellations that has vied for men's loyalties since the erosion of religion. Despite protean local variations, it has re-appeared as a constant consistent set of demands and beliefs with regard to political and social arrangements.

However diverse nationalist movements may be in terms of their historical location, ideology and organisation, they all share a common concern, namely, the proper definition of what constitutes the 'nation', and what are its 'natural' characteristics. This vexed question has absorbed nationalist ideologues, and those who have studied the phenomenon. Of course, the idea of nationalism has been utilised by many different groups all over the world, and in many different contexts in order to justify their claims for territorial security and political sovereignty. Historians have provided a range of case studies of the origin and composition of such movements, but there are problems of a conceptual nature with much of this work. There tends to be a preoccupation with problems of moral evaluation, reflected in the distinction Hayes makes between 'original' and 'derived' nationalisms, and Hobsbawm's use of the terms 'historic' and 'non-historic' nations. Following Marx and Engels, Hobsbawm designates some nations as belonging firmly and unambiguously to the category of 'historic' nations. These are destined to enjoy statehood and sovereignty, whereas others, like the Welsh, are doomed to become parts of larger, unified nation-states. Similarly, the distinction that Hayes makes between 'original' and 'derived' nationalisms involves an ideological choice as to which category any particular movement falls into. Those movements graced with the term 'original', are regarded as worthy of spawning legitimate nation-states. Those
movements that are 'derived', will never sustain a successful movement, and are also likely to decline with the consolidation of unified nation-states.

There is also a marked tendency to view nationalism as, primarily, a 'state of mind', or, alternatively, to view it as a psychological variable. Karl Deutsch has stressed the importance of communication in the development of nationalisms. He has analysed the vicissitudes of nationalism in some detail, and, he claims, in every case, it arises out of emotional needs of humans for a sense of security. Those with whom one shares familiar customs, values and habits of communication are more deeply trusted. It seems that this psychological dimension of national identity is returned to again and again. Hans Kohn asserts that 'first and foremost nationalism is a state of mind, an act of consciousness'.\(^{23}\) Kohn goes so far as to regard nationalism as a fundamental instinct. He argues that people have an ego consciousness and a collective consciousness, which, in particular situations will become attached to, what he regards as the ultimate object of loyalty, the nation state. Setting aside the somewhat dubious voluntaristic formulation of these ideas, and the highly suspect use of the term 'instinct', this emphasis on the psychological dimension of nationalism has been extremely influential.\(^{24}\)

Those accounts influenced by a psychological approach have tended to concentrate on the theme of identification. The attachment to nationalist beliefs provides, in the words of Minogue, 'an escape from triviality'.\(^{25}\) Meaning and purpose is provided through an attachment to the collectivity of fellow nationals. Some studies become more specifically sociological when they link these assumed 'individual needs', to wider social changes. Some writers have claimed that weakened attachments to kin, local community, and social
class precipitate a strengthening of identification with the 'national community'. A fairly typical example of such reasoning is provided by A.B. Philip:

the personal need individuals feel to belong to a national community, indeed the speed of economic and industrial changes, and the upset to individuals' relations with each other caused by the erosion of religious belief and the break up of close family ties, which are the hallmarks of modern society, provide an urgent need for some simple and ineradicable set of social relationships which the national community and national consciousness can supply.

The idea that nationalism provides some coherent set of beliefs that replaces attachments to family, community and religion is widely held. We must be cautious about accepting uncritically some of these accounts. We cannot deny the psychological appeal of nationalism, but from a sociological point of view, some of the assumptions about the strength of community identity in the past are suspect. In Chapter Four, I tried to show how the concept of 'community' was itself loaded with ideologically questionable assumptions. Arguments that rely on some straightforward assumption that 'family', 'community' and 'religion', are all in some terminal decline are sociologically naive. Nevertheless, it has been claimed that, as a result of secularising influences, nationalism has become an 'ersatz religion'.

With the spread of democratic politics, and the rise of citizenship, the nation state has become the main locus of political authority, and for many, a significant source of personal identity. Even those societies that underwent socialist revolutions, always themselves became nationalistic, despite the fact that part of the appeal of communism has been to principles of international solidarity. Established socialist states were quick to emulate those
in western Europe, and all of them developed institutions, ceremonials, symbols, flags and national anthems, to celebrate the nation, and inculcate patriotism.

The Welsh nationalist movement seeks to construct its case for self determination on the grounds of Welsh nationality. The fact that Wales is indubitably a nation, but one that does not yet enjoy the rights of a sovereign state, lies at the root of their objection to existing constitutional arrangements. Even though the views of Plaid Cymru activists, analysed in Chapters Two and Three, reflect no ambiguity on the question of what constitutes a nation, the definition of a nation is fraught with problems. European nationalists sought everywhere for some unchanging manifestation of the supposed 'natural' differences between peoples. According to Minogue, these might be ties of 'blood or agreement on values and customs. Anything...and the more...the better.' In its different manifestations, nationalisms have placed varying emphasis on these bonds, as well as adding elements drawn from a common history, actual or mythical. In Chapter Three, I tried to show that the Welsh nationalist movement spawned a variety of historical accounts of the nation and its tribulations through history. These attempted to demonstrate the continuous thread that, supposedly, united Welsh men and women in the contemporary world, with those who lived long ago. The creation and elaboration of national myths, often the results of efforts by poets, writers and popular historians, is a feature of nationalist movements worldwide, and, in this regard, the Welsh nationalist movement conforms to the stereotype.
Cultural traditions, linguistic divisions, religious loyalties, racial characteristics or territorial contiguity, are variously cited as the 'objective' features of a 'true' nation. In Chapter Three, I tried to show how, for Welsh nationalists, the linguistic criterion came to be the issue around which all others coalesced. Language played a crucial role in the development of a sense of shared identity, a consciousness of being a group with a common ancestry, which generates a sense of relatedness and common purpose. It was this view that impelled many early leaders of Plaid Cymru to pay a great deal of attention to the teaching and restoration of the national tongue. Weber was aware of the role that language could play in the consolidation of national feeling, yet he cautions against the idea that the linguistic criterion is indispensable.

Of those cultural elements that represent the most important positive basis for the formation of national sentiment everywhere, a common language takes first place. But even a common language is not entirely indispensable nor sufficient by itself. One may state that there was a specific Swiss national sentiment in spite of the lack of common language; and in spite of a common language, the Irish have no common national sentiment with the British.

As far as Weber was concerned, the distinction between the 'nation' and the 'state', revolved around the fact that the state claimed authority over its citizens and all who resided within its borders. Enjoying a monopoly of the legitimate right to use physical force and impose taxes, possessed of armed forces and a bureaucracy, a state is capable of imposing its authority, if necessary. The 'nation' is a much more nebulous concept, because it refers to some subjective element of belonging and identification. It is able to conjure up emotions, sentiments, and abstract notions of loyalty. As such, it belongs in the sphere of values, even so, 'the sentiment of ethnic
solidarity does not by itself make a 'nation'.\(^{31}\)

Processes of state-formation involve, among other things, the annexing and conquest of peoples, and the eradication of distinctive cultural traditions. These differences are abolished either consciously by state activity, or are eroded through processes of acculturation which render the state more homogeneous. As such, the state creates and destroys nationalities. Poggi reminds us that the consolidation of a unified legal system, and centralised fiscal system, 'allows alternative juridical traditions to maintain validity only in peripheral areas and for limited purposes.'\(^{32}\) In many cases, there emerges one national language which is often, 'superimposed on a variety of local languages and dialects, which sometimes are harshly suppressed but more often are slowly uprooted by an expanding public education employing the national language.'\(^{33}\)

I have tried to show how, in the case of Wales, the sixteenth century Acts of Union abolished all distinctive legal customs and outlawed the Welsh language in law and trade and administration. Linguistic differences were viewed as an obstacle to the development of an emerging, English national consciousness. The language and terminology of the sixteenth century Acts of Union leave one in little doubt about the self-confidence and assimilatory intentions of English ruling groups. By the nineteenth century, the official view, expressed vividly in the reports of the 1846 Commission on Education in Wales, was that the language could not be tolerated, insofar as it hampered the assimilation of the Welsh into the United Kingdom. The state could not afford to tolerate excessive regional eccentricity, so, any concessions to the minority language were seen as a potential threat to national unity.

In the sixteenth century, vernacular translations of the Bible appeared, and these became powerful vehicles for the popularisation
and refinement of national languages. The translations facilitated the codification and standardisation of different tongues, and it gave them a literary and popular legitimacy. Becker and Barnes draw attention to the significance of Biblical translations;

The vernacular literature not only gave literary expression to the growing differentiation of national cultures, but constituted a national possession of first rate importance which served as a patrician inspiration for years to come.  

This point is particularly apposite in the case of Wales. The sixteenth century translation of the Bible and Book of Common Prayer into Welsh, was a key factor in giving the otherwise beleaguered language a significant social function.

This stands as an example of the unintended consequences of intended action, for, one aim of Tudor policy was undermined, quite unintentionally, by the pursuit of other goals. One strand of Tudor policy was the pursuit of religious uniformity throughout England and Wales, with the aim of minimising any threat to the Tudor dynasty after the quasi religious break with Rome. In order to achieve this, the Bible was translated into Welsh in recognition of the dangers of ignoring the religious needs of the Welsh. This proved to have long term, unforeseen consequences, namely, it ensured the survival of a language that, according to the Acts of Union, was to be eradicated. Instead, as I tried to show in Chapters Two and Three, the maintenance of Welsh as the language of religion gave it a social function, a legitimacy, which ensured its survival into the twentieth century.

The question as to whether language can be seen as a 'determinant' of nationality was discussed earlier, but we can conclude that, although groups sharing a common language have often felt a strong sense of shared identity, and a common 'insider' status, there are problems in regarding language as the test of nationality.
Toynbee saw no such difficulties. He wrote, 'In Central and Eastern Europe, the growing consciousness of nationality had attached itself neither to traditional frontiers nor to new geographical associations, but almost exclusively to mother tongues.' Although there were cases where language could serve this function, the linguistic criterion is an unreliable test of nationality. As Cobban has claimed, 'the exceptions were extensive enough to rob the language criterion of much of its practical value...Each nation clung to the language test where it was favourable, and rejected it where it worked against the national interest.' Smith, too, believes that the place of language in the development of nationalist sentiments may well have been exaggerated. He writes, 'political and religious conflicts and problems are of greater importance in the rise of nationalism - particularly among the intelligentsia...than language and class conflict.' Yet, in the absence of concrete, distinctive institutions, a sense of Welsh national identity was constructed, largely, around the language. For nationalists, it became the single most important 'marker' of group identity, and it was this, more than anything else, that symbolised the differences between the Welsh and the English. In turn, this had consequences for the ability of the twentieth century Welsh nationalist movement to develop, and extend support for their aims among the majority of Anglophone Welshmen and women.

Eugen Weber demonstrates that, before 1870, large sections of the French rural population lived in virtual isolation from the national centre. It was only when the countryside was opened up by roads and railroads, and when school education, military service and elections became general, that, in a further spurt of the civilising
In the nineteenth century, all states pursued the goal of homogeneity, through the acculturation of minorities, quite self-consciously, and, as Bendix points out, battles over the control of education are illustrative of the significance attached to state schooling as an agency of nation-building. Bendix shows how, in France, for example, the state fought to wrest control of education from the hands of the Church. The 'national' culture was imparted to the masses in this way, hence, nationalists everywhere have demanded the establishment, and the extension, of state schools. In this respect, my respondents conform to this pattern, in the way that they referred to the need to inculcate a sense of patriotism through the teaching of Welsh language, culture and history in Welsh schools, in order to resist further anglicisation.

For Smith, the key to understanding nationalism is the 'scientific state'. According to him, the scientific state utilises the machinery of bureaucracy, wedded to the results of scientific research, to develop administrative procedures that incorporate the population under one central authority. This state is also 'interventionist' in the sense that it seeks, or claims to seek, to raise living standards, educate the people, provide them with a sense of pride, and administer public affairs according to rational and calculative criteria. Smith writes:

In every sector - war, administration, taxation, communications, trade, education, security, law and morals, even aesthetic taste and fashions, the scientific, homogenising state became the supreme regulative organ, the apex and co-ordinator of endeavours in hitherto unrelated fields. Gradually it provided the framework by which all activities could be compared and evaluated. The state...was now seen in an entirely new light...as a tool for creating uniformity, and for converting diverse social and cultural allegiances into a single political loyalty...The basis for the claim to authority by the 'scientific
state' was not simply superior force. Its claim lay in its possession of rational, effective knowledge; and further, in its ability and resources to use that knowledge for alleviating misery and injustice.

Between 1870 and the end of the First World War, state activities had drawn Wales into much closer links with the rest of the United Kingdom. Involvement in the war had also inspired a degree of British patriotic sentiment in Wales, and this served to consolidate further the idea that the Welsh nation was now an integral part of the United Kingdom, and could express its nationality in the context of the British state. In the periods immediately after both World Wars, separatist feelings were at a low ebb in Wales, and, as was noted in Chapter Two, the idea of an 'independent' Wales found little popular support. By the end of the second World War, leaders of the Labour Government, elected on a manifesto that offered significant concessions to a separate Welsh identity, in the form of new institutions, discovered that there was little support for such measures. I draw attention to this here, because it reinforces Smiths' general point about war as a homogenising factor. Warfare has tended to be associated with disintegration and national crisis, and this approach has ignored the integrative effects of warfare.

If agrarian mores tended to disperse and fragment any sense of ethnic community, war tended to crystallise and unify it. Indeed of all the factors that have gone into creating and sustaining ethnic identity, war has been one of the most potent and perhaps the most neglected.

In Western Europe, in nearly every case, the consolidation of the centralised state went hand in hand with the emergence of full blown nationalism. 'People who lived in states that became increasingly consolidated as political and economic entities became ever more conscious of their common situation, and developed a common
The term 'nationalisation of society', points to the close and enduring link between the developing nation state and industrialisation;

it also suggests the movement of centralization that was taking place in all European societies, breaking down the insulation between the different parts (regions and classes) of society, and tending to a levelling effect in which all individuals become uniformly subject to a centralized state.

This process, referred to by Elias as 'functional democratisation', occurs as the nation state becomes the basic unit of political life, and the arena in which class and other structurally generated antagonisms are fought out. The sheer novelty of this new unit of political organisation can be grasped when it is compared with medieval political organisation. Bendix shows how, in the medieval order, the King not only ruled over his lands as if they were his private domain, he also possessed the judicial and administrative apparatus of government. As a consequence, he could dispose of them as if they were pieces of property. The authority of government was as much linked to family as property. According to Bendix;

the decisive criterion of the Western nation state is the substantial separation between the social structure and the exercise of judicial and administrative functions. Major functions of government...have been removed from the political struggle in the sense that they cannot be appropriated on a hereditary basis by privileged estates and on this basis parcelled out among competing jurisdictions. Politics ceases to be a struggle over the distribution of sovereign powers whenever the orderly dominion over a territory and its inhabitants is conceived to be the function of one and the same community -the nation state. Instead politics becomes a struggle over the distribution of the national product and over the policies and administrative implementation which affect that distribution.
Bendix's thesis stresses the reciprocity of rights and obligations as the hallmark of a developing, national political community. In Europe, the rising power of the working class in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries expressed itself in demands for citizenship rights. The organisations of the working class demanded the right to participate in the political process on terms of equality. In this challenge to their 'outsider' status, the nation-state became the stage on which the battles were fought between competing social groups. Referring to these changes, Elias writes:

The legal extension of the franchise, often against strong resistance, was the manifest institutional consequence of the latent shift in the distribution of power towards broader strata. In the preceding centuries, access to the central monopoly power chances of the state and influence over appointments to government posts was usually confined to small, dynastic, aristocratic elites. However, the changes in the texture of human relationships which occurred in each of the more developed countries during the nineteenth century were such that no section of society remained simply a relatively passive object of domination by others. None of them remained entirely without institutional channels through which they could exercise pressure, directly or indirectly, upon governments, and in some cases they could influence appointments to government offices. The emergence of mass political party organizations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was simply a manifestation of this limited reduction of the power differentials between governments and governed.

In the case of the United Kingdom, state formation processes operated in such a way that, for the majority of the population of Wales, their national consciousness became bound up with the ideal, and reality of the United Kingdom. Manifestations of a Welsh national consciousness in the nineteenth century notwithstanding, political legitimacy was seen to emanate from the centralised institutions of a global Empire.
located in London. The idea of British nationalism was crucial in eliminating alternative sources of allegiance, for it turned the nation, 'from an historical fact into a political ideology, into the one exclusive principle of legitimation of the State.'

To sum up, attempts to define the nation state have tended to concentrate on, either a set of 'objective' factors, usually land, religion, language, or common culture, or, on the more subjective identification of peoples with the political unit. Indeed, among the writings of nationalists there is a recognition that one or more of these is needed to give their claims for national status a degree of plausibility. Of course, there are in existence nation states, and nationalist movements, where not all of these factors are present, but it is difficult to envisage any movement for nationhood thriving if none of them are present. According to Weber;

It is primarily the political community, no matter how artificially defined, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity. This belief tends to persist even after the disintegration of the political community, unless drastic differences in the customs, physical type, or, above all, language exist among its members.

Weber was in little doubt that the idea of a common purpose, and national solidarity, was galvanised by political action.

One of the explanations advanced for the upsurge in support for minority nationalisms in Western Europe, has focussed on the crisis of legitimacy of the centralised state. It is claimed that people cannot identify with class, as once they did, and the increased support for ethnically based movements and minority nationalisms is a manifestation of the inability of the modern nation state to provide a sense of identification. Great Britain no longer possesses the
resources, or the grandeur of an Imperial power. The gradual erosion of national confidence attendant on the relatively more serious impact of economic decline, means that minority nationalities, like the Welsh and the Scots, no longer feel the same sense of commitment to the United Kingdom. A Scottish historian expressed this viewpoint thus:

the factor which, a hundred years earlier, had done as much as anything to make the Union acceptable to Scotland was now absent. In the century and a half that had followed the Union, Great Britain had become the heart of a great and expanding Empire, an Empire to which its citizens, whatever their race, were proud to belong, an Empire that offered unlimited opportunities for men of parts, opportunities of which the Scots had taken their full share. Now this was no longer so. Britain had become a small country with big problems and a waning confidence in its own ability to solve them, ... some of them now took less pride than formerly in belonging to Great Britain, that the Union flag no longer had quite the same meaning for them as in the days when so many of them had willingly died for it.

It is difficult to come to any firm conclusions about the relationship between Imperial decline and the resurgence of minority nationalisms in the United Kingdom. Undoubtedly, some of the economic grievances experienced by Scottish and Welsh nationalists were exacerbated by the scale of Britain's economic decline in the sixties and seventies. In the nineteenth century, for example, Welsh nationalism aligned itself with British Imperialism. I tried to show in this study how Welsh nationalists of the last century, drew inspiration and pride from the fact that there was a specifically Celtic contribution to the Imperial endeavour. Twentieth century Welsh nationalists are much more likely to condemn the Imperialism of the British state, and identify Wales as an exploited colony of England.
An important distinction in any analysis of nationalist movements, and one that has been implicit throughout this study, is the distinction between movements that have achieved statehood, and those that live on as minorities within multi-national states. Minority nationalists aim to preserve all that is distinctive about the group. There may exist a sense of in-group solidarity without them enjoying any particular political rights. A nationalist movement in these circumstances must attempt to do two things. Firstly, it must try to 'awaken' in its own people a sense of grievance, so that, ultimately, they feel the lack of sovereignty and state institutions as an injustice. Secondly, they must attempt to persuade the people they claim to represent that some measure of devolution, or, at best, political independence, will guarantee the well-being of the group. Some ethnic minorities are so territorially scattered or so weak that they are doomed to remain stateless. Others, because of their organisation and their power resources may succeed in seceding from the existing state.

In the case of Wales, the likelihood of the movement for Welsh self-government succeeding, will depend, partly, on the persistence of structural differences between England and Wales. In Chapter Five, I outlined the impact of certain industrial changes. Two trends were singled out for particular attention. The first of these was the dramatic decline of male employment in traditional manufacturing industries. Replacement employment has come, largely, from public and private investment in the service sector. The growth of the service sector, in common with trends in England generally, has implications for political identification, and the results of elections in Wales, since 1966, (see Appendix) show a steady decline in the share of the vote going to the Labour Party. At the same time, the involvement of the state in stimulating private investment, and devolving
governmental functions, has been crucial in terms of the restructuring of employment. The failure of the limited plans for political devolution, analysed in Chapter Six, were a result, partly, of fears that employment prospects would worsen without the continuing political link with the United Kingdom.

In this study I showed how some of the appeal of Welsh nationalism lay in its articulation of opposition to centralising forces. This opposition to the growing size and scale of centralised institutions was a recurring theme of the Welsh and Scottish movements. A recent contributor to the analysis of the Welsh nationalist movement, has commented sympathetically on this revolt against 'bigness'. Unfortunately, Khliefs' analysis is marred by an overriding concern to explain Welsh-English relations in terms of \textit{gemeinschaft} and \textit{gesellschaft}. Indeed, this is the theoretical axis around which much of the writings of nationalists, and their sympathetic commentators revolve. Welsh language and culture become elevated and celebrated as a bastion of traditional community values, in the face of increasing urban and industrial homogeneity.

According to Khlief, Welsh nationalists are part of a current worldwide feeling against bigness and its corollaries of impersonal, elusive or tentacular administration; in short against the trivializing and dehumanising pressures of modern industrial society, the degradation and manipulation of people for commercial profit...as the Welsh slowly lose their land and language, they witness erosion of traditional social bonds, the kinship system, mutual aid, activities that bring them together, and friendship networks. For them, a sense of community is not a quest but something they have experienced.

Such statements betray the author's romantic use of the term 'community'. Such sweeping and dubious assertions about the nature of the movement for Welsh self-government must be challenged. This author
ignores an important strand in nationalist agitation, namely, demands for greater efficiency and industrial development. Significant sections of the Welsh and Scottish nationalist movements saw self-government as desirable, precisely because it would, in their view, stimulate the industrial and technological modernisation of the economies of Wales and Scotland.

Khlief insists that ethnicity can be regarded as a 'search for roots, for identity, for creation of gemeinschaft in the midst of gesellschaft, for coping with issues of alienation in mass society.\(^\text{52}\) He goes on to claim that, in an industrialised world of increasing uniformity, ethnic distinctiveness is mobilised to provide the missing element of 'belonging'. This is part of a protest against the 'homogeneity of modern life'. I regard such arguments as insufficiently purged of extraneous ideological elements, lacking in precision, short of supporting evidence and not without some internal inconsistencies.

I have tried to show the differences in the way that Welsh nationalism has manifested itself in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the last century, many of the 'Liberal Nationalists' desired only some recognition by the state of distinctive religious, cultural and linguistic traditions. There were few calls for outright 'independence', and there was little demand for a separate legislative body. One of the central strands in nationalist thought is the idea of collective autonomy, and the programme of Plaid Cymru in the twentieth century demonstrates this. Yet, using this criterion, the nationalism of Cymru Fydd in the last century could not be nationalism pure and simple. In other words, contrary to the ideology of the nationalists themselves, Welsh nationalism is, in important respects, a specifically modern phenomenon. It is unlikely that it will succeed in detaching Wales politically from the United Kingdom. Yet, the
likelihood remains that a residual sense of difference will persist. This could always, potentially, provide a springboard for future political conflict, although social and economic trends point in the direction of increasing structural similarity between Wales and England. To that extent, one must count the cause of Welsh nationalism—taken on its own terms—as a story which, to date, is one of unfulfilled aspirations.
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4. N. Elias (1978)
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8. ibid p57
9. ibid p57
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15. E. Kedourie (1966)
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37. A.D. Smith (1975) p230
38. E.Weber (1976)
39. R. Bendix (1964)
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42. Peter Worsley (1964) p70-1
43. K.Kumar (1978) p90
44. R. Bendix (1964) p105
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46. L. Snyder (1967) p37
48. see P. Mayo (1974)
50. B. Khrief (1980)
51. ibid p75
52. ibid p80
## APPENDIX

### Table 1: Plaid Cymru - Performance in Parliamentary Elections 1925-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Seat</th>
<th>Total Fought</th>
<th>% of electorate Voting for Plaid Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Caernarfonshire</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>1.1 Lib.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Caernarfonshire</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>2.2 Ind. Lib.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Univ. of Wales</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>17.9 Lib.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Caernarfonshire</td>
<td>2,534</td>
<td>5.7 Ind. Lib.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943(by)</td>
<td>Univ. of Wales</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>n.a. Lib.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945(by)</td>
<td>Caernarfon</td>
<td>6,844</td>
<td>n.a. Lib.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neath</td>
<td>6,290</td>
<td>n.a. Lab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Caernarfon</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>3.2 Con.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caernarfonshire</td>
<td>2,152</td>
<td>4.1 Lab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neath</td>
<td>3,659</td>
<td>5.3 Lab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Univ. of Wales</td>
<td>1,696</td>
<td>14.4 Lib.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from A.B. Philip (1975)

### Table 2: Plaid Cymru Membership 1925-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>2,500</td>
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</table>


### Table 3: New Recruits to Plaid Cymru 1962-1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>New members enrolled</th>
<th>Total claimed membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-3</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>2,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-4</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>2,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-5</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-6</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-7</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Annual Reports of Plaid Cymru
### Table 4: Wales General election Results 1945–1983 Constituencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>Plaid</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Times Election Yearbook

### Table 5: Votes cast at General Elections 1959–1983: Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Plaid Cymru</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>841,447</td>
<td>486,335</td>
<td>78,951</td>
<td>77,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>837,022</td>
<td>425,022</td>
<td>106,114</td>
<td>69,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>863,692</td>
<td>395,795</td>
<td>89,108</td>
<td>61,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>781,941</td>
<td>419,848</td>
<td>103,747</td>
<td>175,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>745,547</td>
<td>412,235</td>
<td>255,423</td>
<td>171,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>761,447</td>
<td>367,248</td>
<td>238,997</td>
<td>166,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>768,458</td>
<td>526,254</td>
<td>173,525</td>
<td>132,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>603,858</td>
<td>499,310</td>
<td>373,312</td>
<td>125,309</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Times Election Yearbook
Table 6: Details of Plaid Cymru members interviewed - 1977-8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Higher Education</th>
<th>Length of Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Shopowner</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Miner</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Steelworker</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Plumber</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tr>
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<td>59</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Solicitor</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Electrician</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Builder</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Solicitor</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Cleaner</td>
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<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Labourer</td>
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<td>Electrician</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Questionnaire to delegates at the 1978 Plaid Cymru Annual Conference (150 distributed, 15 returned).

Adran Cymdeithaseg

Holiadur i aelodau cynhadledd Plaid Cymru:
Anwyl Aelod,

yr wyf yn paratoi thesis ar genedlaetholdeb, a polisiau Plaid Cymru. Hoffwn gael gwybod beth yn syniadau aelodau Plaid Cymru. Wrth ateb y cwestiyniau hyn fe fyddwch yn fy helpu i gael darlun mwy eglur a chywir o Plaid Cymru. Fe fydd pob ateb yn falch os ychwanegwch unrhyw sylwadau eich hunan. Gellir dychwelyd yr holiaduron i mi yn y gynhadledd, neu i'r cyfeiriad uchod.

Diolch yn fawr am eich help,

yr eiddoch yn ffyddlon

Robert Mears

Dear member,

I am preparing a thesis on Welsh nationalism and the policies of Plaid Cymru. For this reason it is important that I have some idea of the views of Plaid Cymru members. By answering the questions below, you will help me to get a clearer, and more accurate picture of Plaid Cymru. All answers will be treated with confidence. Please feel free to add any comments of your own. Completed questionnaires can be returned to me at the Conference, or, sent to me at the address below. Thank you very much for your help.

Yours faithfully

Robert Mears


1. Oedran/Age
2. Rhyw/Sex
3. Gwaith/Occupation
4. Do you speak Welsh?/ Ydych yn siarad Cymraeg?
5. Do your parents speak Welsh?/ Ydi'ch rhieni yn siarad Cymraeg?
6. Am faint o amser i chi wedi bod yn aelod a Blaid Cymru? How long have you been a member of Plaid Cymru?
7. Ydych chi wedi bod yn aelod o unrhyw blaid arall? Have you been a member of any other political party?
8. Os ydych, pa un? / If so, which one?
9. A ydych yn aelod o unrhyw glwb, neu gymdeithas? (ee capeli, undebau llafur etc) Are you a member of any other clubs or societies? (eg churches or trades unions) Please list.
10. A ydych chi'n Gristion? / Are you a practising Christian?
11. Ym mha ffordd eich daliadau crefydd yn effeithio ar eich daliadau gwleidyddol? In what way do you religious views affect your political views?
12. Pa polisiau Plaid Cymru, yn eich barn chi, sy'n fwyaf pwysig? pa polisiau syn fwyaf tebygol o fod yn boblogaidd gyda'r etholwyr? Which Plaid policies are most important, in your opinion?
policies are most popular with the electors?

13 Pa bolisiau'r Blaid hoffech chi newid?
Which Plaid policies would you like to change?

14 Beth, yn eich barn chi, yw'r prif rhywstr i gymydd Plaid Cymru?
What, in your opinion, is the main reason for supporting Plaid Cymru?

15 Pa ddulliau fyddech chi'n fodlon i amddiffyn yn ychwaegol i ymladd etholiadau seneddol, i ennill cefnogaeth i genedlaetholdeb?
What methods would you advocate, in addition to fighting elections, that would win more support for nationalism?

16 Os caiff Cymru hunan-lywodraeth, pa o'r grwpiau canlynol fyddai mwyaf dylannodol?
In a self governing Wales, which groups do you think would wield most influence?

17 Pa rai o'r grwpiau hyn ddylau gael mwyaf o ddylanwad?
Which of these groups do you think should have most influence?

18 Beth, yn eich barn ci, yw'r prif rhywstr i gynnydd Plaid Cymru?
What, in your opinion, is the main reason for supporting Plaid Cymru?

19 Beth fydd y prif fanteision i Gymru mewn sefydlu Cynulliad?
What are the main benefits for Wales in the Devolution measures?

20 Beth fydd y prif fanteision i Blaid Cymru?
What are the main benefits for Plaid?

21 Ydi'r Cymry yn fwy ymwybodol o'u cenedlaetholdeb nag oeddyynt ddeng mlynedd yn ôl?
Do you think Welsh people are more aware of thier nationality than they were ten years ago? If so, why? / Os, paham?

22 Beth yw pwysigrwydd hunanaeth cenedlaetholdeb heddiw?
What importance do you attach to bonds of nationality today?

23 Beth, yn eich barn ci, sy'n clym'r Cymry gyda'u gilydd?
What, in your opinion, binds Welsh people together?
(What do they have in common?)

24 Beth all ysgolion wneud i feithrin ymwybyddiaeth cenedlaethol?
What can schools do to foster national awareness?

25 A ydynt yr ysgolion yn gwneud hyn nawr?
Are the schools doing this now?

26 Pa mor bwysig yw gywrbodaeth o hanes Cymru?
How important is a knowledge of Welsh history?

27 Beth ydi'r prif ddadleuon dros hunan-lywodraeth?
What are the main argumentss in favour of self government?

28 Sylwadau neu cwestiyniau
Comments or questions

Diolch yn fawr
Thank you

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