Modernity, Urban Space and Music Industries: Hip-Hop and Reproduction of Street Music in Paris and Tokyo

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Despite their importance, debates on the global culture industry and its effects on local cultures have often been framed by the dichotomy between global capitalist producers and local romantic consumers, which fails to locate dialogues between production and consumption, globalisation and localisation, at a specific historical and geographical crossroad. This thesis attempts to assess this crossroad, focusing on the construction of hip-hop scenes in Paris and Tokyo. It pursues two routes of inquiry.

Firstly, it tries to trace history and geography in the two cities of street music: the music labelled as 'delinquent' while disposed to accumulate specific capital. How has this 'street' been mediated by the globalising music industries? How has such global mediation been locally naturalised through oppositions between the 'commercial' and the 'authentic'? Secondly, through fieldwork, it seeks to detect a series of taxonomic conflicts among music industry personnel regarding hip-hop's local legitimacy. How are both the globally disseminated notion of black American 'street' as hip-hop's origin and the locally accessible history and geography of 'street' informing the hip hop scene in each of the two cities? How is hip-hop understood globally unifying and locally diversifying at once?

As the two routes intersect, it turns out that the local hip-hop scenes cannot be explained simply as a product of capitalist manipulation or romantic resistance. Hip-hop has transformed the music industries in the two cities, yet its resistance is also implicated in modern technologies and industries as it has instituted its own network of cultural intermediaries. Despite (and because of) its oppositional disposition, hip-hop contradictorily reproduces modern symbolic orders. This being the case, the role of the music and related media industries should urgently be re-conceptualised for a further understanding of contemporary media and popular culture. This study is a small contribution to this issue.
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INTRODUCTION

N'ayant pas grandi à New York, je faisais partie des légions de jeunes dont la toute première rencontre avec le rap fut un maxi rebondissant et plein d'entrain de Sugar Hill Gang, intitulé «Rapper's Delight» (Sugar Hill Records, 1979), un single qui annonçait les premiers pas d'une nouvelle forme d'art, à l'échelle mondiale.

Fernando Jr. 2000, 13 (trans. A. Réveillon and J.-P. Hanquel)

"Have you checked out Herbie Hancock's 'Rock It' video Saturday night?" said an American pop fanatic friend of mine in one Monday morning in the early 1980s in our secondary school in a suburban city of Tokyo. 'Rock It' (1983) was one of my first encounters with hip-hop, and I did not even imagine that the same video was diffused in different places on the planet simultaneously. I liked funky music without knowing it called so, but was never particularly black music oriented: not because of its blackness, but simply because of its absence. Yet, with hip-hop, black music began emerging to our universe. Even I, I vaguely remember, shamelessly breakdanced at some occasions - perhaps at the annual school sportsday. By the late 1980s, when I entered a university in Tokyo, there were already some Japanese rappers whose presence I came to know of through late-night television programmes. In the early 1990s, there was a second media wave of rap and dance, with Bobby Brown and MC Hammer. Late-night television became filled with dance music again. I began frequenting black music nightclubs. I was, like many music producers I encountered in Tokyo and Paris, of the generation for which there was no hip-hop in childhood and there was US rap before local rap.

The present thesis is based on a research conducted for about three years from 1996 to 1999, based on a chain of investigative interviews in and around the music industries¹ in Tokyo, Japan and Paris, France, regarding their local hip-hop scenes. It is inherently subjective: it is written at the crossroad of my own trajectory and that of a set of expressive practices globally known as hip-hop culture. Music has always been with me, but it was not until I started my study in the UK that I began questioning local music scenes, identities, differences and similarities, and hierarchy among them, in rapidly globalising cultural economy. My choice of the two non-anglophone fields, too, is subjective, for it is a strategy to break with, or at least highlight, both Anglo-centrism of existing research in this domain and cultural nationalism that a foreign student may often fall when writing about one's own

¹I use the term 'music industries' in the sense that these are a complex amalgam of various corporate and mercantile activities, not only the recording industry, but also the printing and broadcasting media industries,
country. My own experiences in Europe have been one that simultaneously encourages and discourages me to be Japanese. That is, in one way or another, people encourage and expect me to be Japanese; otherwise, I am "too Europeanised, Americanised or Westernised" and "not really Japanese". I feel dislocated. I do not want to deal with this Japaneseness, Frenchness or blackness in this thesis. All I want to tackle is the dislocatedness.

This thesis does not sound 'authentic', too, for it is not written by someone who is from a ghetto or who has been in hip-hop culture head-on from one's childhood as most of today's hip-hop fans are in the two countries. My choice of hip-hop is not derived from my own life in the street or anything. I only found hip-hop and rap perfectly suitable for an investigation into ways in which internationally dominant – Anglo-American – music interacts with and makes sense in various local social spaces and in which these processes structure the global popular music production. Yet, at the same time, it is not written by someone who is predisposed to denounce or celebrate hip-hop culture for the sake of it. Certainly, I am not always wholeheartedly accepted in the milieu: interviewees can be explicitly dubious about my interests – either as an academic, as an alien or as an Asian, or all of them – but the entire research is undertaken with the joy of dialogue with people, exploring the two cities, gathering materials and assembling them all in respecting their logic. I believe that this should not prevent this thesis from being critical, inspiring and informative.

This study provides neither an ethnographic account of urban sub-cultural audiences nor an endless dispute on who controls and takes advantage of capitalist industrial cultural production system. It starts, instead, from the point where these two arguments fuse. What I want to trace are places, topos, at which the audiences and the culture industries interact each other – at which identity, meaning and value are articulated, contested and transformed. I am not simply talking about geography. I am also talking about abstract ‘places’ disembedded by modern media technologies. Hip-hop often talks of its authenticity and legitimacy in spatial terms, in terms of its mythical origin – ‘street’, ‘underground’ or ‘core’ – in which communal pleasure bound to ‘now’ and ‘here’ is immediately and collectively shared. Yet, the emergence of the local hip-hop scenes in various cities around the world invites us to re-examine the taken-for-granted topology of its ‘street’. How at all are these hip-hop cultures at once ‘hip-hop’ globally, whereas each local scene claims its distinct local’ identity and legitimacy? I suspect that it is not beyond the mediatised space that its globalisation and localisation negotiate. That is, hip-hop’s ‘street’ immediacy is a product of its insertion to the globalising market of symbolic goods. What I want to discuss in this thesis is, therefore, how this ‘street’ is recognised and configured as an immediate and authentic collective experience despite its mediation.

The present thesis consists of three parts. Part I assesses some of the central concepts so as to facilitate the research and analysis that follow. In the first chapter, I explore the genesis of hip-hop culture critically in examining disembeddedness of ‘street’. In the second chapter, I review a rich body of literature on the relationship between globalisation and localisation. In my opinion, globalisation is clearly a consequence of modernity (Giddens, 1990), but to argue this, it is essential to understand that there is an intrinsic dialectic between globalisation and localisation. Local implementation of the retailing shop networks or clothing makers, and so on.
globalising music industries is an innate part of the modernisation process. In the final chapter, I outline the simultaneous relationship between production and consumption of symbolic goods in a specific social space. Drawing on Bourdieu's (1986, 1991, 1993) notion of the field of cultural production, I underline the importance of identifying co-existence of the 'authentic' and the 'sell-out' practices for a genre of art to institute its autonomous market.

Part II traces reembedding and socialisation of recording and other derivative media institutions in France and in Japan. My focus is on history and geography of popular music production and shifting topology and contents of 'street' music in Tokyo and in Paris. ‘Street’ culture, to be produced and consumed as such, inherently pursues distinction, in its own terms. I trace the way such an identity space is mediated by the music industries as much as the industries are transformed through the dialogue between the 'street' and the 'mainstream'. Implementation of technologies such as record pressing plants or broadcasting institutions; institutionalisation of legal frameworks such as international copyright/author's rights treaties; human migration such as post-colonial settlement or American occupation; topological and other transformation of urban space and entertainment facilities such as music-halls or nightclubs; various forms of cultural politics, such as dance venue licensing or media language quotas, among others, form, inform and transform the way people make sense of music(s) and world(s). I mainly reflect on the insertion and construction of black American music(s) in the two cities. Jazz, rock 'n' roll, soul, rock, funk and disco, with their blackness and Americanness, are menace to the legitimised canon of music and dance in both French and Japanese societies, but from quite different positions. Through the locally variable, yet globally synchronised, dichotomy of the 'street' and the 'mainstream', I try to identify some of the central drives behind local construction of the hip-hop scenes in France and in Japan. It is a necessary runway for our take-off to the field research.

Part III deals with the outcome of the field research that I conducted: firstly, of the Tokyoite hip-hop scene, and secondly, of the Parisian scene. The two countries share interesting similarities and differences concerning their phonograph market structures, in addition to their importance in hip-hop’s global record sales. Firstly, both France and Japan as phonograph markets have relatively large share of domestic repertoire sales, which leads to an assumption that distinction between US hip-hop and local hip-hops and between local mainstream popular music scenes and ‘street’ scenes are more easily observable. Secondly, the two markets are shaped through different histories and degrees of socialisation of music and media institutions. For example, there has been a considerable amount of African and Caribbean post-war immigration to France, whereas in Japan the practically only trace of black culture is through American service members. Paris still maintains its circumscribing wall-transformed-into-peripheral-motorway to distinguish its centre and its suburbs, whereas Tokyo slides and dislocates its centre ceaselessly. In France, the state actively intervenes in defining its contemporary national popular culture, whereas the Japanese government hardly does. In Paris, there are far more FM radio stations than in Tokyo, whereas Tokyo accommodates a mushrooming number of small record shops unlike Paris that a handful of megastore chains dominate.

The conclusion summarises and puts together all the discussions and findings from the research. It consists of two arguments: reflection on the reproductive structure of domination in the both global
and local fields of popular music production and on methodological limitation. While I tried to grasp as many aspects of structural, habitual and practical differences and similarities within and around the two local hip-hop scenes, it is hardly comprehensive. There is no ontological line that is drawn between and within musical cultures in practice, apart from one that is constructed analytically and ideologically in observer's mind. Yet again, my point is that globalisation is not simply about spatial expansion and imposition. It is inseparable from historical accumulation and negotiation in a particular locale, "the physical settings of social activity as situated geographically" (Giddens 1990, 18: see also Stokes 1994, 3-10). Some cultural critiques ontologically dispute the global, and the American, but they overlook the transnational and relative networking of many cultural configurations today.

Hip-hop culture is decidedly American. As most of my interviewees in this research admit, the United States and its black popular culture is an important source of their local hip-hop authenticity. Some even decide to migrate to New York or Los Angeles to establish their own business, to pursue their career or simply to feed back knowledge and technology to their own local scenes. At the very same time, others argue that hip-hop is all about their own local 'street', by themselves and in their own language. In practice, most members of the 'global hip-hop nation' alternate the two poles for their self-identification according to the situation, mediated by their position-taking in their social space. I conclude this introductory chapter by quoting Stuart Hall (1996b):

> Identities are never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions. They are subject to a radical historicization, and are constantly in the process of change and transformation. We need to situate the debates about identity within all those historically specific developments and practices which have disturbed the relatively 'settled' character of many populations and cultures, above all in relation to the processes of globalization, which I would argue are coterminous with modernity (Hall, 1996[a]) and the processes of forced and 'free' migration which have become a global phenomenon of the so-called 'post-colonial' world.

(4)

Perhaps, we have been talking too much about the direction of globalisation. The route of hip-hop's globalisation is also a locally historical and geographical accumulation of such processes.
If it is true that one form of universalism is no more than a nationalism which invokes the universal (human rights, etc.) in order to impose itself, then it becomes less easy to write off all fundamentalist reaction against it as reactionary.
Bourdieu 1998a, 19

Competition was at the heart of hip hop. Not only did it help displace violence and the refuge of destructive drugs like heroin, but it also fostered an attitude of creating from limited materials. Sneakers became high fashion; original music was created from turntables, a mixer and obscure (highly secret) records; entertainment was provided with the kind of showoff street rap that almost any kid was capable of turning on a rival.
Toop 1991, 15

Music gives us a way of being in the world, a way of making sense of it: musical response is, by its nature, a process of musical identification; aesthetic response is, by its nature, an ethical agreement. The critical issue, in other words, is not meaning and its interpretation - musical appreciation as a kind of decoding - but experience and collusion: the "aesthetic" describes a kind of self-consciousness, a coming together of the sensual, the emotional, and the social as performance. In short, music doesn’t represent values but lives them.
Frith 1996, 272
Hip-hop is often referred to as a *street* culture. Equally often, its genesis is associated with marginalised, Afro diasporic neighbourhoods of New York inner-city, notably the South Bronx, in the mid-1970s. David Toop (1991) calls it "a particularly New York phenomenon" (22). Tricia Rose (1994) argues that it was forged by "the tension between the cultural fractures produced by postindustrial oppression and the binding ties of black cultural expressivity" (21). She underlines:

Hip hop culture emerged as a source for youth of alternative identity formation and social status in a community whose older local support institutions had been all but demolished along with large sectors of its built environment. Alternative local identities were forged in fashions and language, street names, and most important, in establishing neighborhood crews and posses. [...] Identity in hip hop is deeply rooted in the specific, the local experience, and one's attachment to and status in a local group or alternative family. (34)

Hip-hop culture, then, is strongly tied to a particular place and time. Hip-hop, as it were, refuses to be disembodied as a mere set of signs and symbols — or, does it? How can this 'street' be recognised as an immediate and authentic collective experience in our hyper-mediated society?

Withstanding romanticism, I would argue that hip-hop has been dislocated since its outset. It has always been dislocated in its pursuit of a wider audience and stronger influence — a distinction, in short. I am certainly not disputing the presence of something in the South Bronx neighbourhood that was to be known as a political, cultural and marketing category of 'hip-hop' and 'rap'. Hip-hop might well be shaped by a specific material condition in the South Bronx and it surely, as Rose (1994) argues, "gives voice to the tensions and contradictions in the public urban landscape during a period of substantial transformation in New York" (22). Nonetheless it seems quite another thing for this 'voice' to be actually heard, for it to be "known and recognized, that is, socially instituted as works of art and received by spectators capable of knowing and recognizing them as such" (Bourdieu 1993, 37). For hip-hop to be understood as a coherent culture consisting of specific disciplines — graffiti, breakdancing, breakbeat DJing, rapping — with "defining aesthetic and stylistic characteristics" (Rose, 26) that tells the 'real' from the 'fake', it has to be inserted into a wider social space and to institute its own market, hence producing a meaningful difference. In this account, as soon as breakdancers showed themselves off in downtown New York, cassette tapes mixed by DJs passed on around and diffused with 'ghetto blasters (battery-driven cassette tape players)' or 'bombed (graffiti-ed)' subway cars travelled around New York City, hip-hop's dislocation and quest for its market started.

One may still argue that hip-hop's authenticity derives from its dextrous appropriation of the scarce resources available in the street. Undoubtedly, as Rose (1994) claims, "hip hop transforms stray technological parts intended for cultural and industrial trash heaps into source of pleasure" (22). Breakdancing therefore requires only a strip of cardboard. To tag or graffiti, a maker pen or cans of spray paint suffice. The middle-of-the-range Technics SL 1200 (Mk-2 was released in 1979) turntables were in a price slump in the late 1970s in the USA. Breakbeats are drawn from familial or neighbourhood record collections, hence inheriting (black) music continuity. To rap, one needs a
microphone, and not years of musical training. Yet, how much of these could be considered as “black cultural expressivity” (Rose, 21) or “a peculiarly New York phenomenon” (Toop 1991, 22)? Mural tagging might be upsetting the authorities in many other cities around the world almost all the time. House or block dance parties would equally be found elsewhere, and escalated dancing might always involve some kinds of acrobatic gestures. The use of multiple turntables to mix records dates back, for example, in Japan to the beginning of the twentieth century when a group of musicians and musicologists attempted, lacking musicians capable of deciphering, performing or orchestrating Western music ‘accurately’, to listen to an entire symphony recorded on a series of 78 rpm records. It should also be noted that, as Juan Flores (1994) remarks in arguing Puerto Rican contribution to hip-hop, “when it was still in the streets, rap was marked off not so much racially but in terms of class, geography, age and, though they tend to make little reference to it, of course gender” (92).

Hip-hop, before it was called so, had been a series of obscure practices. Its significance as an inner-city culture would only be generated through its insertion to wider New York City, through its invention of other: the mainstream culture. Toop (1991) elaborates:

White New Yorkers might never have to visit the black or Hispanic parts of town; in that sense graffiti was a visitation upon them. A relic from a past age of street-corner men and warrior gangs, graffiti had progressed from a scribbled tag (nickname) or club name on the wall to an elaborate art form emblazoned with Magic Marker and spray paint over every available surface of the subway trains and buildings. If the city refused to come to young blacks and Puerto Ricans, then they would go to the city. (14-5)

Then it comes as no surprise that graffiti had not developed its styles much until the mid-1970s, when the local authority hardened its anti-graffiti policy and began seeing it “as a central reason for the decline in quality of life in a fiscally fragile and rusting New York” (Rose 44). It is only then graffiti “began to develop elaborate individual styles, themes, formats, and techniques, most of which were designed to increase visibility, individual identity, and status” (42). It is not coincidental that, around the same period, graffiti attracted attention of some intellectuals (see Baudrillard 1976, 118-28) and became exposed in SoHo galleries as ‘works’ or ‘pieces’ of art with demonstration of breakdancing etc, giving birth to ‘artists’ such as Jean-Michel Basquiat or Keith Haring.

By 1980, a few rap records had been released, of which ‘Rapper’s Delight’ (1979) by the Sugarhill Gang was epochal regarding the outgrowth of hip-hop market and its mediatisation, in that it at once dislocated hip-hop nationwide via radio and record media, and located its origin in nowhere but New York. The song reportedly sold over two million copies, diffusing the words ‘rap’ and ‘hip-hop’ to a nationwide audience and beyond, but the reaction was not favourable in the inner-city. Unlike what was happening in the South Bronx which “was against the disco that was being played on the radio” (Africa Bambaataa: quoted in Toop 1991, 65), ‘Rapper’s Delight’ adopted a break from Chic’s massive disco hit ‘Good Times’ (1979) and entered the primetime radio. It was happening somewhere else – Sugar Hill Records, its label, was based in New Jersey, not New York; the song was only accidentally discovered; its lyrics plagiarised from a Bronx rapper known as Grandmaster Caz and rapped by a makeshift trio unknown to the street (Fernando Jr. 1994, 12-3). Many chronicles of hip-hop refer to this incident as a debut of mainstream commercialisation of an otherwise immaculate street culture.
However, what these accounts do not tell is that, by denigrating the commercialisation, they conjure up the impeccable ‘street’ and valorise that for which they speak. All at once, that is, it became valuable and meaningful to be just in the street.

Gradually, as commercial hip-hop market expanded farther, graffiti writers, breakdancers, DJs and rappers began shaping their network of cultural production and remuneration. It expanded from, for example, house and block parties to local discotheques, such as Club 371 and Harlem World in Harlem or Disco-Fever and T-Connection in the Bronx, to larger downtown venues, such as Ritz (ex-Studio 54), the Peppermint Lounge, Danceteria or the Roxy and to radio shows (small ones like WHBI to more influential ones like WBLR or Kiss-FM). It was followed by a release rush of rap records by DJs and rappers, such as Grandmaster Flash and Furious Five or Africa Bambaataa and Soul Sonic Force, who claimed their hip-hop legitimacy for being at its origin, in the ‘street’. ‘The Message’ (1982) by Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five, which initially received quite straightforward rejection from the street for being too political and undanceable (Samuels 1995, 244)), eventually became a street norm representing the devastating inner-city realities of post-industrialisation. In 1986, Run D.M.C released their international hit: ‘Walk This Way’. In the same year, with KRS-One’s ‘South Bronx’ and Marley Marl’s ‘(South Bronx) Kill That Noise’, hip-hop’s ‘street’ became more articulated entities: from a rather vague ‘inner-city’ to more geographically precise the Bronx and Queens. It is crucial here to understand that the more hip-hop became ‘hip-hop’ as a distinctive culture and art form, the more street became ‘street’, "either reluctantly or happily divorced from the everyday lifeworld" (Gilroy 1993, 73).

In the course of the 80s and the 90s, hip-hop’s ‘street’ ceased to be a ‘New York phenomenon’ and expanded decisively to the US and other prominent overseas markets. As Rose (1994) argues, rap’s acceptance by nationwide cable television networks, such as BET (Black Entertainment Television) and MTV (Music Television), in the course of 1980s, “had a significant effect on the music industry and on rap music” (8). When Yo! MTV raps programme started in 1989, “any black artists began to appear on MTV regularly” (8) and “MTV has discovered that black artists in several genres are marketable to white suburban teenagers” (8). The dislocation also racialised the ‘street’. Namely, in constructing suburban mass audiences, ‘white voyeurs’ or ‘middle-class white teenager’ as its opposite polar, hip-hop’s “class, geography, age and, [...] gender” (Flores 1994, 92) origin was transfigured as a heritage of ‘black American’ or ‘African American’ tradition. It is only then, as Chuck D of Public Enemy put it, rap became ‘black America’s TV station’. These processes, as Greg Dimitriadis (1996) points out:

> have separated hip hop’s vocal discourse (i.e., ‘rap’) from its early contexts of communal production, encouraging closed narrative forms over flexible word-play and promoting individualised listening over community dance. The shift towards in-studio production has affected the art in a number of crucial ways, most especially by redefining hip hop culture by and through the relatively more narrow and more easily appropriated idiom of ‘rap music’ (179)

Sophistication of hip-hop production in conjunction with new technologies, notably digital sampling, furthered the abstraction of its value and meaning from its basic function, communal dance, to a more
elaborate, coherent, disembedded one that can transgress time and space. I am not suggesting that the
music and media industries have diluted hip-hop culture into a mere simulacrum of black exotica, nor
that there has been no black or African American influence on hip-hop. I am simply arguing that hip-
hop dynamically maintains its authenticity through ceaseless writing and rewriting of its history,
through which it becomes at once impeccable and implacable and its authenticity becomes abstracted
into “an idiom which could create solidarities beyond the boundaries of face-to-face communication”
(Dimitriadis, 187).

Another thing most of the hip-hop chronicles understate is that hip-hop presupposes its
globalisation from its outset. Besides the relatively global success of ‘Rapper’s Delight’, hip-hop’s
earliest ‘enemy’, disco, was not simply an American phenomenon: it is what Malm and Wallis (1984)
call “the lowest common denominator for the largest possible market” (300) that permeated the globe
in the late 1970s. It was to introduce a new dance style to the disco-saturated French youth market
that a French mainstream radio station, Europe 1, financed the New York-based French Celluloid label
to release, with Fab 5 Freddy, the very first rap track in French language (with what is said to be a
Japanese refrain (or just a groan)), ‘Change de Beat (Change the Beat)’, in 1982. In November 1982, to
promote it and other four 12-inch releases, Africa Bambaataa, Grandmixer DST, Fab 5 Freddy, Futura
2000, Mr. Freeze, the Rock Steady Crew and others landed in Europe. Japan, too, has been
strategically inscribed in the US hip-hop culture since its early days, not least because Africa
Bambaataa and Soul Sonic Force knew how to count up to four in Japanese in their 1982 ‘Planet Rock’
or Kevie Kev suggestively declared his love of Tokyo in his ‘All Night Long (Waterbed)’ in 1983. In
October 1983, Africa Islam, Busy Bee, the Cold Crush Brothers, Double Trouble, Fab 5 Freddy, Futura
2000, Lady Pink, the Rock Steady Crew and others crashed at Pithecanthropus Electus, Tokyo’s
cutting-edge nightclub for promotion of the semi-documentary cult hip-hop film, Wild Style. Also
missing from the US inventory of hip-hop history is that the Yo! show was initially started on MTV
Europe, presented by the French Sophie Bramly, known as Afrika Loukoum, in 1987.

As Paul Gilroy (1993) argues in The Black Atlantic, black art forms are products of the very
transculturality and internationality of their formation and, in hip-hop, “aesthetic stress is laid upon
the sheer social and cultural distance which formerly separated the diverse elements now dislocated
into novel meanings by their provocative aural juxtaposition” (104). Yet, as he illustrates in taking
Quincy Jones’ 1989 album, Back on the Block, as an example, hip-hop reassembles the global “rather
into the receptacle provided to the interaction by the grand narrative of African American cultural
strength and durability” (108). It is in this sense that I want to explore throughout this thesis the
converse of David Toop’s (1991) claim that “no matter how far it penetrates into the twilight maze of
Japanese video games and cool European electronics, its roots are still the deepest in all contemporary
Afro-American music” (19). Instead, it is only when it ‘penetrates into the twilight maze of Japanese
video games and cool European electronics’ (and into many other parts of the planet) that:

Rap’s forebears stretch back through disco, street funk, radio DJs, Bo Diddley, the bebop
singers, Cab Calloway, Pigmeat Markham, the tap dancers and comics, The Last Poets, Gil
Scott-Heron, Muhammad Ali, acapella and doo-wop groups, ring games, skip-rope
Hip-hop presupposes globalisation before it becomes both 'black' and 'American', but little has so far been explored the double-bound system which at once makes hip-hop black American and gives rise to what Toop identifies as "the extraordinary subsequent influence of hip-hop all over the world – scratch mix seminars in Japan, rap radio in Holland, breakdance fever in Germany, smurf madness in France, rap clubs and crews in Britain" (100).

Certainly, I am aware that hip-hop's global trajectories are not confined in Gilroy's (1993) black Atlantic world. His formation of the black Atlantic world is configured not only in Afrodiasporic and Anglo-American or Anglophone sphere, but also in the 'multiculturalism' in this sphere. How can we, then, come to term with the predominantly cross-Mediterranean migration between France and the Maghreb, or the cross-Pacific world in Japan in which little voice is as yet gained by ethnic and/or cultural minorities, which in one way or another characterise the 'street' I am looking at? In underlining the Caribbean and Afro-American musical influences on some of the Anglo-Asian popular music groups such as Apache Indian and Bally Sagoo, Gilroy argues:

"Thus the role of external meanings [from racism] around blackness, drawn in particular from black America, became important in the elaboration of a connective culture which drew these different "national" groups together into a new pattern that was not ethnically marked in the way that their Caribbean cultural inheritances had been." (82)

Then the question is the ways in which 'blackness' and 'street-savvyness' are mediated to other particular locales.

The four central terms on which following chapters are centred are globalisation, localisation, production and consumption of popular music. Once we locate ourselves around the four terms, it becomes immediately clear that, for some decades, academic discourses on culture and society have drawn a clear line between those, on the one hand, who refer to modernity as a source of global cultural domination and 'mass' production, and others, on the other hand, who refer to post-modernity as a source of local cultural resistance and 'popular' consumption. Few seem to have transgressed the academic dichotomization that seems undermining our understanding of culture in the rapidly structuring political, economical and aesthetic world system. Dealing with rap as one of his examples, Peter Manuel (1995) points out an interesting coexistence of pre-modernity, modernity and post-modernity in the contemporary popular music. That is, while "many of the sampled riffs used in rap exhibit in one way or another their artificiality as media-derived, mechanically-reproduced simulacra" (232-3), rap still emphasises its very modernistic concerns with its lyrics affirming "a rage and machismo which at once protest and flaunt the existence of an evidently permanent underclass in modern society" and its videos referring to streets of New York ghettos, "with its abandoned buildings, garbage heaps and pervasive malevolence" (233). The relationship between the global dissemination of hip-hop and the local institution of its 'street' should not be understood as one between so-called 'modernity' and 'post-modernity', oppression and liberation, production and consumption, or global and local. It is in fact their co-existence and confrontation, which I would argue is in itself the product of a taxonomic system of modernity, that makes hip-hop what we think it is.
Globalisation and Localisation

Americanisation and Popular Music

Hip-hop may be taken as a quintessential American cultural commodity globally disseminated by the "U.S.-based cultural imperialism, in that rappers benefit from the disproportionate exposure of U.S. artists around the world facilitated by music industry marketing muscle" (Rose 1994, 19). Burnett (1996) suggests that "in the 1990s, American mass media products account for 75 per cent of broadcast and basic cable television revenues worldwide. Some 55 per cent of all film screening and 55 per percent of all home video rentals worldwide are American materials" (4). Concerning music, he estimates that "American phonograms accounts for over half of world recording revenues" (4). The debate of Americanisation, or "American cultural imperialism" (A. Mattelart et al. 1984, 15), is very much an offspring of an extensive discourse of media and cultural imperialism. In France, Americanisation translates, above all, as "the increasing commercialization of the cultural sector and the parallel development of the new technologies of communications" (27), which "is radically new" (27). In Japan, too, there has been a continued strand of anti-Americanism, of which Yoshimi (1997) quotes Saeki (1993) arguing that "America is the only country in the world that could propagate ideas of 'freedom' and 'equality' through commodities. In all cases, it displays consumer goods as if they were a culture, and goes so far as to make them symbolise their nation" (quoted in Yoshimi 1997, 159). "The inevitable reference to the North American threat has," proclaims Michele Mattelart (1988), "the advantage of giving one name to various issues at stake while evoking the weight of the several determinants (technical, financial, cultural) that affect communication policy" (429). But how much of these 'various issues' can be converged and attributed to the single monolithic appellation of 'the United States of America'? The term 'Americanisation' appears to oversimplify the complicated issues involved in cultural production on the globe.

Reebee Garofalo (1993) succinctly sums up cultural imperialism and Americanisation in popular music production as follows:

The transnational flow of music is often envisioned as a vertical flow from more powerful nations to less powerful ones, or as a center-periphery model with music moving from dominant cultures to marginal cultures, from developed countries - particularly the United States - to the rest of the world, with accompanying images of overpowering, displacing, and/or destroying local cultures. (17)

Not only recordings, but also materials, knowledge and human resources mobilised for popular music production are unequally distributed by the capitalist transnational music-related corporations. Ever since World War II, a handful of major transnational recording companies, mostly American and British in origin, have been controlling about 60 to 80% of the entire world phonograph market. When I started the research (in 1996), the global market was shared by the six transnational major corporations as follows: 17.0% by Polygram, 15.7% by Sony Music Entertainment, 14.5% by Warner Music Group, 14.0% by BMG, 11.2% by EMI Music, 6.0% by Universal Music International. Almost 80% of the global market is dominated by the six major companies (Lefeuvre 1998, 72: today, in 2001, the concentration furthers as Polygram merged to Universal to form the largest transnational
IFPI estimates that the world record sales value in 2000 amounted to 37.0 billion US$, which comprises 2.5 billion units of compact discs (CD), 800.9 million units of prerecorded cassette tapes, 380.1 million units of singles (7-inch and 12 inch single, CD single and cassette single formats) and 13.5 million units of analogue LP records. Figure 1 depicts development of the global phonograph market size and that of each record format from 1975. In the space of two decades, between 1975 and 1995, the global phonograph sales figures expanded more than five-fold.

Cultural imperialism deals not simply with economic domination of cultural production as above, but also with a broader inquiry that involves culture in and of the international media. A great number of researchers pay attention to the contents of information circulated through the unequal international media infrastructure. An American television soap opera, Dallas, somehow comes to symbolise the cultural impoverishment caused by Americanisation. M. Mattelart (1988) denounces:

"Whenever there is discussion of the future of culture, the shadow of "Dallas" is cast. "Dallas": a ready-made anathema. This is the poverty we want no part of. (A cultural poverty, obviously; in "Dallas" no one is broke!) And yet, while the Sorbonne was excommunicating "Dallas", contracts were being signed to renew programming in France (TF 1, one of the three French television channels, purchased twenty-three more episodes in 1983). While the American writer Susan Sontag [on Le Monde 15 Feb. 1983] was claiming that "American culture is not as important as people say it is," the great majority of televiwers the world over were preparing to enjoy that on Saturday, as usual, J.R.'s latest Machiavellian plots and Sue Ellen's new torments. (431)

The American capitalist ideology, it is said, "is seen as inhering in the images of dazzling skyscrapers, expensive clothes and automobiles, lavish settings, and the celebration in the narrative of power and wealth and so on. All this is seen to have an obvious ideological manipulative effect on the viewer" (Tomlinson 1991, 45-6).

Little analysis and research on cultural imperialism perspective is available in popular music studies. In fact, at least as far as the recording industry is concerned, it is quite slippery to identify in any substantial way what exactly is 'imperial' or 'American' in transnational popular music. Institutionally, through a series of acquisitions, mergers and conglomeration since the 1980s, ownership of the major transnational recording companies, amidst strong oligopoly, has clearly been
de-centralised to some non-Anglo-American capitals. In 1986, German BMG (Bertelsmann Music Group) purchased American RCA (Radio Corporation of America) records. In 1987, Japanese Sony acquired American CBS (Columbia Broadcasting Systems) records to form, in 1996, SME (Sony Music Entertainment). In 1990, Japanese Matsushita bought American MCA (Movie Corporation of America) Music Entertainment, which was resold to Canadian Seagram in 1994 to become Universal Music International in 1996. In 1996, British Thorn detached from EMI (Electrical and Mechanical Industries). In 1998, Polygram, a recording company of Dutch Phillips, was handed to Canadian Seagram's Universal Music International, a large part of which was then bought up by French Vivendi in 2000. Hence, only one transnational major company is owned by American capital today (in 2001).

Figure 2 shows the size of the six largest phonograph markets in the world from 1993. It reveals two things. Firstly, changes in ownership do not alter the rather stable order and size of the phonograph markets at least in any immediate and drastic manner. Secondly, the countries that 'own' the transnational majors – Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA – are the larger phonograph markets in the world. Given that they compete with each other to penetrate in the global market, to name America as the only dominant seems increasingly misleading in ownership terms.

Culturally, the United States of America and music it produces have never been comprised of a homogeneous, monolithic ‘America’. Keith Negus (1996) points out:

The sounds and images of US musical entertainment contain important contributions from numerous groups, such as the Eastern European Jewish influence on the formation and development of Hollywood, television comedy and Tin Pan Alley songwriting or the African-American and Latino influence on the development of jazz, blues, salsa, rap and hip hop styles. It is difficult and misleading, therefore, simply to view cultural forms emanating from the United States as a unified ‘dominant culture’. (173)

Arguably, hip-hop is ‘anti-capitalist’ and ‘anti-American’. Moreover, today, as the ownership of major transnational culture corporations diversifies, people not only talk about ‘Americanisation’ and ‘Westernisation’, but also ‘Japanisation’, ‘Brazilisation’, ‘Indianisation’, ‘Vietnamisation’ and so on (see Appadurai 1990; Featherstone and Lash 1995; M. Mattelart 1988; Reeves 1993). The assumed singular American domination seems to downplay many other forms of domination and imposition inside and outside the territory of the United States. Figure 3 depicts the transnational majors’ share in some local markets in 1996, and the proportion of phonograph sales attained by independent local labels to the total of the transnational majors’ sales (comprising 100%) in the same year. It clearly shows how differently each of the transnational major record companies operates and how differently
it comes to term with local music makers in various local markets.

Dave Laing (1986) argues that the transnational operationality of the recording industry may not be dealt with in the same way as other mass media industries. He points out that “unlike film or television, music is not innately a recorded or broadcast form” (332). That is, music making, whether singing, whistling or hand clapping, is an intrinsic part of daily life. Although such a simplistic assertion might invite misleading subjectivism, it nevertheless seems to hold that what makes the recording industry quite different from the film or the television industry is its relatively cheap production cost, and consequential investment in local musical production by the transnational corporations. Garofalo (1993) points out:

The exportation of international pop encourages the development of a whole production and distribution infrastructure within the host country. The employees of the subsidiaries of multinational recording companies, for example, are most likely to be residents of the host country. In order to make their facilities cost-effective, these multinational recording companies typically get involved in the production of local musics. (26)

Not only recording companies, but also record retailer chains or satellite music television services have today become not simply dealing with ‘international’ products, but also increasingly engaged in disseminating and promoting local products (some even have started exporting local acts recently, facilitating their global trade networks). Therefore, the local implementation of transnational music corporations, even if it can facilitate US hip-hop culture circulating globally, is not immediately responsible for the institution of its own market or that of local hip-hop scenes in France and in Japan.

**Post-modernity and Popular Music**

Reflecting the perceived decline of US cultural hegemony and the potential rise of local empowerment, towards the end of the 1980s, the focus of (American) cultural imperialism debates has shifted to the active interpretation of ‘imperial texts’ by their local audiences. Meanings of *Dallas*, ‘excommunicated’ by French intellectuals from the Sorbonne and failed to be popular in Japan, is let to alternative ‘watchings’ by various local audiences (see Ang 1985; Katz and Liebes 1990). Malm and Wallis (1984), while clearly alerted at the outset by “the threat of being flooded by a nationless transnational music culture” (xiv) to affect musics in small countries, acknowledge that local music cultures, if being under influence of industrialisation, somehow maintain their particularity despite ‘cultural imperialism’ or ‘Americanisation’. They identify a new pattern of global and local musical interaction, “transculturation” (297, 300-2), emerged around 1970s, in which several music cultures...
are synthetically integrated into a rootless and originless style, such as disco music. They argue, “through the transculturation process, music from the international music industries can interact with virtually all other music cultures and sub-cultures in the world, due to the worldwide penetration attained by mass media during the past decade” (301).

Once it is shown that small, minority, marginal cultures in the world are not simplistically homogenised by a dominant culture, cultural imperialism is quickly replaced by global pluralism, celebration of neo-liberal free economy and decline of nation-states. Inquiring into global hip-hop, George Lipsitz (1994) succinctly lays out:

The significance of these seemingly ephemeral works of popular culture [recordings by some non-American hip-hop artists] goes far beyond their role as commodities. The diasporic conversation within hip hop, Afro-beat, jazz and many other Black musical forms provides a powerful illustration of the potential for contemporary commercialized leisure to carry images, ideas, and icons of enormous political importance between cultures. Whatever role they serve in the profit-making calculations of the music industry, these expressions also serve as exemplars of post-colonial culture with direct relevance to the rise of new social movements emerging in response to the imperatives of global capital and its attendant austerity and oppression. (27)

I do not neglect some such potentials of global cultural commodities, yet the problem of the above account seems that it conflates transnational corporate activities with global oppressors, without due justification, and by the same token it identifies certain “slum dwellers from around the globe suffering from the effects of the international austerity economy imposed on urban areas by transnational corporations and their concentrated control over capital” (27). In so doing, Lipsitz somehow reduces the transnational music industries into simple “conduits” (4) through which music simply circulates globally. This claim is clearly insufficient to explain why at all these ‘slum dwellers’ have to resist the oppression with nothing but hip-hop, of which black America remains the originator, and why non-American hip-hop artists have few means to cross the national, linguistic or market boundaries without mediating through the United States of America.

While the insistence on a change in global power structure should be noted, in most of what Hall (1996b) would call “celebratory variants of post-modernism” (1) overlook the ways in which the transnational music industries operate in the shifting global structure. Cut ‘n’ mix, scratching and sampling, which are considered to be post-modern musical production and in whose terms hip-hop culture is often characterised, are given deceptively superficial treatment in this perspective, too. According to Iain Chambers (1990):

In what is increasingly turning into a global soundscape, different sounds and musical ideas are raided, lifted from the past, and existing styles and genres increasingly drawn in, contaminated, and cross-indexed. Whether it is break dancing in Paris or soul music in Glasgow, the production of Japanese techno-pop in Los Angeles or electric African music in New York, the metropolitan repertoire is literally “scratched” together in a continual mix. (309-10)

No DJ, to my knowledge, simply cuts and mixes everything from the global ‘conduits’, nor are
audiences willing to dance to any music unselectively. On the contrary, cutting and mixing co-opt and transform music's structure, texture, rhythm or lyrics to fix it at now and here, only through which DJs communicate with their dancing audiences. That the 'transcultural' music is 'break dancing in Paris or soul music in Glasgow, the production of Japanese techno-pop in Los Angeles or electric African music in New York' might indicate more diffused hegemony in global popular music production, but it could also be "new circuits of imperialism" (Sivanandan 1990, 169) in which "the factories themselves can now be broken down into smaller units and scattered all over the world – in global assembly lines" (171). The fact that the transnational culture corporations supersede the conventional state boundaries does not immediately mean that its control over culture is overwritten by transnationally invested cultural identities.

Appadurai (1990) is one of the first who come to term with a system of global cultural production, pointing out "certain fundamental disjunctures between economy, culture and politics" (296) in the new global reality. While questioning the validity of conventional conceptualisation of ownership and control to be attributed to the state-centric ideology, he nevertheless maintains that the structure of power and domination persists, albeit in more deterritorialised and fragmented forms. Namely, despite the increasingly non-Anglo-American ownership of the transnational major recording companies, Anglo-American popular music still circulates the globe more easily than others, which explains why Bertelsmann, Sony and Seagram bought up US labels (along with the catalogues and artists) rather than simply proposing more German, Japanese and Canadian artists and catalogues in the world, respectively. As Figure 4 indicates, 'international' – Anglo-American – repertoire sales dominate 'domestic' repertoire sales in most of the larger phonograph markets in the world even today. The new reality of global cultural economy, as it were, does not liquidate but reproduces and reinforces the relation between the dominant and the dominated in a disguised form. It is precisely because of that, as Jocelyne Guilbault (1993) rightly puts it, "the question of defining the local has become such a pressing issue in the 1990s, not only for small and industrially developing countries but also for traditionally dominant cultures" (33).

**Nation-State, Politics and Globalisation**

For Guilbault (1993), defining the local through music is not simply of cultural and political necessity, but intrinsically it "has sprung from an economic interest given the new opportunity to promote difference and to take advantage of the world market now more easily available" (34).
On the one hand, world music takes advantage of the skills and resources of the dominant traditions [...]. At the same time, however, world musics such as zouk, rai, and soukous juxtapose musical characteristics of a particular culture without any attempt to blend these elements with those of the dominant musical traditions — with the result that the output of the small locals is still clearly identifiable. The result of these strategies of composition [...] has meant greater access to the music market controlled by the dominant traditions, as most commentators have been quick to point out. (37)

This passage clearly shows that the shifting of hegemony in transnational music production and the widening of access to material resources do not lead to a cut 'n' mix bricolage, but to yet another power struggle and competition, with more supra- and sub-national political, economic and cultural classes stratified in the global field of cultural production. To an important extent, “global culture is now thought of as contested terrain where there are only locals engaged in a battle over transnational markets” (Guilbault 1993, 34).

In these conditions, as in Garofalo’s (1993) quote earlier, transgression by the transnational music industries of state boundaries disposes two contradicting possibilities. On the one hand, as we have seen, their local implementation may train, support and develop local musicians, producers, entrepreneurs and the like. In this sense, the transnational music industries do not necessarily oppress local cultures, nor do they impose a particular system of cultural value. At the very same time, it may also give rise to the craving produced by strategically downgrading locally available products (Sklair 1990, 41, 75-81). In this case, the implementation may be challenged in various terms. Because of the critical balance of positive and negative benefits the transnational practices may bring forth, the state or other cultural authorities have to play a totally new political and cultural role today. Appadurai (1990) insightfully illuminates the new ambivalence of nation-states as follows:

States find themselves pressed to stay 'open' by the [transnational] forces of media, technology, and travel which had fueled consumerism throughout the world and have increased the craving, even in the non-Western world, for new commodities and spectacles. On the other hand, these very cravings can become caught up in new ethnoscapes, mediascapes, and eventually, ideoscapes, such as 'democracy' in China, that the state cannot tolerate as threats to its own control over ideas of nationhood and 'people-hood'. (305)

If a dominant and long legitimised national culture is under considerable threat, the state exercises its power to protect the national culture, for instance, by imposing taxation or censorship policy at its frontier.

In this account, critics of Americanisation and cultural imperialism can be read as a form of nationalism in the face of transnational intrusion with which the state aims not only at maintaining coherence of its nation, history and space, but also at participating in the contested transnational markets. It would be worth remembering here that the politically invested denunciation of cultural imperialism and Americanisation has often been shaped within international, and not global, institutions such as the United Nations, especially UNESCO. Much of the denunciation is articulated by nation-states and their ruling class elite, defying brutal transnationalisation of corporate capitalism.
and unequal distribution of resources with which to confine their nations. The controversial speech given by the French Minister of Culture Jack Lang at UNESCO World Conference on Cultural Policies in Mexico in 1982 (Mondiacult '82) and the subsequent polemics it aroused in France reveal the instrumentality of cultural imperialism and anti-Americanism for defining, protecting and promoting its national culture. Lang's speech "decrying the U.S. monopoly of the means and distribution of cultural production and calling for the affirmation of identities and pluralities" (M. Mattelart 1988, 430), the French media "turned it into a battle of value and judgements and assumption" (A. Mattelart et al. 1984, 15). On the one hand, as A. Mattelart et al. remark, "Lang was accused of having launched 'a war of berets, bourrées, and Breton bagpipes' [Hennebelle 1982] against Dashiell Hammett, Chester Himes, William Irish, Orson Welles, Meredith Monk, Richard Foreman, Jackson Pollock, Andy Warhol, Merce Cunningham, etc" (15). Among anti-Americanists, on the other hand, this accusation appeared as "national masochism" (15) which, in their writing, was curiously reduced to "the French tradition of antagonism between the 'cultural' and the 'technical'" (15).

One question arises: who or what is this French? Only against "the United States, the first country to have written its history on celluloid, profiting from the combined effects of a liberal economy and the development of the media" (M. Mattelart 1988, 430), the dissociation between art and technology is invented as 'the French tradition' (forgotten here is the entire series of technologically invested art and spectacles, including the Eiffel Tower, in the belle-époque). Only against Dallas, that is, it is articulated that:

In France, the association of television with literature, theatre, and cinema has been a telling one, and the production of French cinema seems to have been more often inspired by the creative urge of an author than by the stimulus of commercial competitions. (M. Mattelart, 432)

The point is that such a remark, while pretending its position to be outside of the transnational market force, in fact recognises and participates in the market precisely by producing such a difference from a transnational product in the transnational arena, which is promptly followed by the French state's institutional endeavour for development and valorisation of French, and francophone, cultural commodities in France, in Europe and in the world from the late 1980s.

It is not, of course, simply a French or European phenomenon. We could easily identify a similar strategy of cultural invention in nihonjinron – the discourse on and of Japanese 'uniqueness' – which almost always defines Japan in reference to the Unites States, in overriding various intra-national differences including race, ethnicity, gender, generation and social class in Japan. As Mouer and Sugimoto (1995) point out, most of the nihonjinron best-sellers are written after the 1970s, when Japan began imposing itself internationally as an economic/electronic giant. According to their argument, "these nihonjinron have been repeating essentially the same claim on several aspects every now and then" (25). That is:

Firstly, in individual psychological terms, the Japanese form weak sense of ego. They do not establish independent self.
Secondly, in human relation terms, the Japanese are collectivist. 'Groupism' with which they devote themselves voluntarily to a group to which they belong characterises the way the Japanese relate each other.

Thirdly, on the holistic social level, principles of consensus, harmony, unity, etc. are penetrated throughout. Therefore, stability and solidarity in the society is extremely high.

(26)

They argue that *nihonjinron* has a set of ideological functions for the ethnocentric, elite, ruling class fragment in Japan. Firstly, by conjuring up the uniqueness of Japanese business customs, they can take advantage of negotiation with an overseas business partner who has but to respect and follow the differences and customs. Secondly, by emphasising the harmony and collectivism as the Japanese virtue, the management can evade its confrontation with the labour. Lastly, by imposing the unique Japanese tradition, it undermines women from social participation (138).

What about, concerning hip-hop, black nationalism and pan-Africanism, whose "voguish language of absolute cultural difference associated with the ontological essential standpoint provides an embarrassing link between the practice of blacks who comprehend racial politics through it and the activities of their forethrown opponents [...] who approach the complex dynamics of race, nationality, and ethnicity through a similar set of pseudo-precise, culturalist equations" (Gilroy 1993, 34)? Black American intellectual Bakari Kitwana (1994), denouncing cop-killing, misogynist gangsta rap and commercial exploitation of black violence stereotyping, argues:

Yet, in a capitalist economy, when corporate industry commercializes aspects of Black culture, most often, there is little concern for the art or culture. The ultimate objective is profit and because of this lack of sensitivity, that culture becomes distorted. Most certainly, Black folks' participation in commercial popular culture does not mean that these distorted images of Blacks and Black culture are accurate representations of Black culture simply because the transmitter is Black. Neither does the process of commercialization of aspects of Black culture by definition extract their Blackness. (13)

Then, what is Black culture?

What is it that gives rise to all these forms of nationalism or local essentialism, as if nothing would make sense in the world without them? Jonathan Friedman's (1995) concept of the global systems seems very useful to answer this question. The global systems are, as he argues, "a product of a definite set of dynamic properties, including the formation of centre/periphery structures, their expansion, contraction, fragmentation and re-establishment throughout cycles of shifting hegemony" (74). The formation of both global and local cultural identities, generation of both globalisation and localisation strategies, are hence preconditioned by a perceived structure of the system that, in its turn, is transformed by the very executions of these strategies. It is a dynamic process with which meaningful world is constructed and by which our conditions of existence is informed as well as limited. He argues:

The practice of identity is not a question of identity possessed by an individual or group, that is, as a label or title. Nor is it about identity defined by the psychologist, attributed to others, although the activity of the psychologist is very much part of what I am trying to
get here. The practice of identity is about the identification of an existential world, the attribution of meaning to the world, to objects, persons and relations. This practice identifies self as it identifies the world. (86)

In his argument, globalisation involves formations not only of cultural forms but also of global institutional structure, because strategic articulation of local cultural identities is a product of global expansion of the transnational practices, including the transnational corporations, and implementation and institutionalisation of their globalisation strategies. What I think is noteworthy here is that the transnational practices, including those of the music industries, are an intrinsic part of the way we understand ourselves, the way we are globalising as well as globalised.

Globalisation, thus, does not free us from modern systemicity — it is not post-modern, classless cut ‘n’ mix of local music cultures. Globalisation is a product of a newer configuration of global system that presupposes rather than undermines nation-states. As the reaction by a segment of French population against Lang’s UNESCO speech suggests, a national culture, legitimised, substantiated and policed by the state through its cultural and educational policies, can be challenged within state boundaries and such oppositions can be articulated to that against which the national culture is defined and legitimised. If France as defined by its republicanism and ‘civilisation’ does not seem advantageous to a class of its population, it may as well pursue other identification strategies. The same can be said of a class of the Japanese that suffers from the embellished national harmony and groupism. Black nationalism may not have its proper state, yet the gangsta rap enterprise emerged against more intellectual, conscious rap that “tried to steer youth in a more positive direction” (Ro 1996, 2) in the same black nation, for which most of the anti-gangsta, pro-black hip-hop journalism speaks. It leads from this that conflict between nation-states and transnational music corporations should not be understood as a static and metaphoric confrontation on the state (or any other cultural) boundaries, for it takes place within. Globalising of the music industries inherently involves localising of their activities and facilities through a series of negotiations between those who envisage losses and those who envisage gains out of implementation and operation of the transnational corporations in a local space. It is through such oppositions that (national) cultural boundaries are defined and redefined and transnational activities make sense. It happens within a specific locale, in a specific geometry and continuum of power and economy (and not in a mythical global public sphere or a metaphysical global ghetto). If globalisation inherently generates localisation and puts the nations and the states into struggle, nation-states play an important, if not decisive, role of classifying and indexing the influx of artefacts into “friends and enemies” (Bauman 1990, 143), “proper and improper, right and wrong, tasteful and unbecoming” (144), and eliminating the “ambivalence” (143). Then how do the modern music industries operate in practice in our present world?

**Music Industries as a Disembedding Mechanism**

Anthony Giddens (1990) argues that “modernity is inherently globalising” (177), and in such conditions, increasingly, power, trust and authenticity are legitimised in a “phantasmagoric” (19) manner by a set of social relations dislocated from a particular time and space. He argues that the development of modern social institutions intrinsically involves disembedding, or “the ‘lifting out’ of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of
time-space" (21), and reembedding, or "the reappropriation or recasting of disembedded social relations so as to pin them down (however partially or transitorily) to local conditions of time and place" (79-80). It is not my purpose here to deploy his institutional analysis of modernity further, yet two points seem relevant to the global-local systemicity of musical production that I am trying to grasp here. The first is his conclusive note:

The globalising tendencies of modernity are simultaneously extensional and intentional – they connect individuals to large scale systems as part of complex dialectics of change at both local and global poles. (177: my italics). Namely, the music industries as a set of modern institutions presuppose at once their globalisation, or geographic expansion of the territories in which they operate, and localisation, or socialisation in each territory in which they install their branch, factory and other facilities. The second point is the overall theses of his analysis:

All disembedding mechanisms interact with reembedded contexts of action, which may act either to support or to undermine them; and that faceless commitments are similarly linked in an ambiguous way with those demanding facework. (80: my italics)

That is, globalising of modernity is not an imposing, oppressive process that cultural imperialism or Americanisation perspective disputes it to be, for it presupposes oppositions, like the anti-imperialist or anti-Americanisation denunciations themselves. Nor is it a cut 'n' mix, border-mingling process that post-modern global culturalists celebrate it to be, for the local transformation of subjectivity is linked to that of global social organisation. In short, it is not a unilateral process. Rather, it embraces a set of ambiguous and dynamic processes which imply "dialectic features, provoking opposing characteristics" (19).

In Giddens' (1990) formation, disembedding presupposes "the creation of symbolic tokens" (22) and "the establishment of expert systems" (22). Symbolic tokens refer to "media of interchange which can be 'passed around' without regard to the specific characteristics of individuals or groups that handle them at any particular juncture" (22). Expert systems refer to establishment of "systems of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that organise large areas of the material and social environments in which we live today" (27). My argument here is that increasingly standardised record formats (i.e. vinyls, cassette tapes, CDs, etc.) in the modern world can be seen as symbolic tokens, produced with their authenticity – the meaning and value of their contents – guaranteed by expert systems of the music industries. Certainly, as Attali (1985) points out, circulation of music by means of its first commodity form, printed musical score, predates the phonograph technology. Yet, as Attali himself suggests, the disembedded nature of the phonograph technology is "powerful and original because, since it plugged into a stockpile playing on time and space, it seemed to be a tool for the generalization of representation, a symbol of the internationalization of social relations" (95). Records, more interchangeable than most of the nationally or regionally defined musicianship and musical notation systems, brought about an unprecedented transformation of social space in which music makes sense and through the process, records become abstracted from reproduction of live performance to performance per se. Sara Thornton (1995) argues:
As the composition of popular music increasingly took place in the studio rather than, say, off stage, records came to carry sounds and musics that neither originated in nor referred to actual performances. In the 60s, with the increased use of magnetic tape producers began to edit their wares into ‘records of ideal, not real, events’ (Frith 1987, 65). Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s, new instruments such as synthesizers and samplers meant that sounds were recorded from the start. Accordingly, the record shifted from being a secondary or derivative form to a primary, original one. (27)

Hip-hop culture itself, through scratch mixing or digital sampling, has been constructed upon such an abstraction or naturalisation of phantasmagoric authenticity on record.

How concretely then have these institutions been disembedded? The invention and commercialisation of phonograph by Thomas Edison in 1877 was quite a local event in itself. Moreover, it was almost meaningless: no one could envisage its usage. Edison did propose some potential usage, but he did not imagine, nor wanted, to have his invention used as cheap entertainment which would eventually become its main usage as it became both disembedded from the context of its invention and reembedded into other social spaces: Edison Phonograph Company, through its competition with Bell and Tainter's Columbia Graphophone Company, gradually admitted to musical exploitation of the invention; it surprised Japanese spectators that an invention by a Westerner spoke Japanese (Hosokawa n.d., 286); French academics believed that it was a ventriloquism and accused the machine for insulting the Académie (de Cande 1978, 271). In 1898, Berliner decisively adapted the technology to public and private entertainment usage, proposing more efficiently duplicable disc format. The permeation was rapid. The sole US sales increased from 3 million units in 1900 to 140 million in 1919 (Brooks 1977: quoted in Gronow 1983, 59). The French figure is estimated to have been between 10 and 20 million units in around 1929 (Gronow, 62) and some 14.4 million units were reportedly produced in Japan in 1930 (RIAJ). Global expansion of phonograph technology accelerated after World War II and integrated previously isolated territories. “Throughout the Seventies,” Malm and Wallis (1984) suggest, “music industry technology has found its way into every corner of the world” (xiv), thanks to cassette tapes that enabled recording with increasingly affordable equipment. Today, the recording industry constantly sells almost 40 billion US$ worth of sound recordings in the world annually (see Figure 1 (p. 12)) and IFPI counts 1,400 record producers and distributors in 76 countries as its members (this suggests that modernity is still globalising). Other music-related industries follow the same dynamics: music video channels and megastore record retailers or even nightclubs, such as the Ministry of Sound, and specialist record stores, such as Rough Trade, expand transnationally today.

What always accompanies the geographic expansion of phonograph is the institution of copyright/author's rights, a 'faceless' expert system par excellence. Like the phonograph technology, this institution emerged from specific local needs before it became aligned internationally. The first written copyright law was enacted in 1710 in England and appropriated by many European states and the United States shortly. Copyright, here, was “a tool of capitalism in its fight against feudalism” (Attali 1985, 52) and conceived as an alienable property, so that a publisher can purchase and own it from its author. France had initially adopted a similar system, but “such customs were demolished at
Once by the French Revolution and author's rights were codified in 1791, pushed by the tidal legislation of the principal belief of the Revolution: the natural law and Romanticism" (Masuda 1999, 60). In author's rights concept, an artwork is recognised as its author's expression and is morally and intellectually "perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible" (Lefeuvre 1998, 170) of its author. Facing predominantly Belgian pirate printers, French Romantics, notably Victor Hugo, initiated the establishment of the International Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (the Berne Convention) in 1886, ratified by ten mostly European states and their colonies in that same year. The United States did not adhere to the convention because of its incompatibility with the copyright law. Japan acceded to the convention in 1899 with its first CHOSAKU-KEN2 (meaning literally 'the right concerning written products') law, which was conceived not out of artists' need for protection, but because doing so was one of the conditions imposed by Western countries to abolish their unequal treaties (see Masuda 1999; Mitsui 1993). To reconcile the disparity between the European states and the United States, and to promote a wider awareness of copyright/author's rights in the world, the Geneva Convention, also known as the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC), was established in 1952. After a series of revisions and amendments, the Berne Convention today embraces over 140 party states and UCC, over 100 states.

Given the rapid transnational growth of the culture industries, the friction and contradiction between copyright system and author's rights system are rendered compatible globally today so much so that the two terms are used almost interchangeably. Yet, as they are disembodied into a transnationally applicable institution, they also become somehow entrapped in a cultural nationalism. Gilda Lefeuvre (1998) underlines the French republican and Romantic heritage in negatively referring to the capitalist 'Anglo-Saxon' copyright system:

The French right protects any author and their work, but the [Anglo-Saxon] copyright system is an economist and liberal right favouring the profitability of exploiting the work, in the same status as any other 'products' whatsoever. By its principle, the author finds oneself dispossessed of one's rights for the benefit of one's 'employer'. (190)

Despite that the music industries in Japan are heavily reliant on the institution today, its reembedding is often converged with a sense of (lost) nation, as in Mitsui's (1993) following argument:

Significantly, before Westernisation there didn't exist any concept in Japan that equated with 'right' or 'droit'. The word kenri or its abridgement, ken, as is used as a part of chosaku-ken [...] was coined as a term to translate 'right' into Japanese in the late nineteenth century (it was one of many Western words for which no fitting equivalents existed, such as 'society', 'individual', 'modern', and 'liberty' – such words as 'privacy' are used as loan words without being translated). (142)

The objectified opposition, ethnic (as in Franco-Latin and Anglo-Saxon) or regional (the West-individual-rational and the East-collective-inconceivable), is a product of the modern global system per se. These immaculate images borrowed from the French Romanticism or the Japanese collectivism are products of their institution in the transnational market.

Precisely because of the kind of nationalism and local essentialism, a transnational recording
company is obliged to take various forms and disposes a set of strategies in a given local space, while linked to its headquarters in, most notably, New York, Los Angeles and London, and susceptible to centralised surveillance (such as the continuous duty to submit project reports and sales performance reports). Paul Rutten (1991) schematically categorises local markets with three parameters of market size, international and local repertoire share and international importance of local repertoires (see Table 1: data from 1994 still validates his argument). Depending on classifications as such, a transnational major label ought to, if it were to pursue the maximum profit, produce ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ acts. Japan and France fall into the second category – their markets are relatively big and their domestic music share is high but is not as important internationally. Although a direct comparison between the two markets would generate other qualities that differentiate them as we will see in Part II and III, we can easily suppose that signing local acts and buying up or investing in local labels would be more important than blatantly imposing ‘international’ artists and music in the two markets.

Most international A&R personnel both in France and Japan confirm this practical principle when they say they consider their role as middle-people between ‘international’ artists and their local audiences. A Japanese ‘international’ A&R suggested, “the most important thing is not just to introduce an [international] artist to the market as being the coolest overseas act, but to assign local value to the artist’s image as much as possible and bind the artist to the market” (Miyai 1996). Here, ‘imperial’ or ‘American’ cultural value is, in fact, quite obsolete a concern. Bringing an American rapper down to hip nightclubs or specialist record shops in Japan is much more vital. He also explained that, increasingly, his role expands to mediate not only between ‘international’ artists and local audiences, but also between ‘international’ artists and ‘domestic’ artists. French ‘international’ A&Rs also indicated that, to dodge the francophone song quota on broadcasting media, it was essential to contract French rappers to co-act with American rappers. Here again, US hip-hop values are not

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3 Artists and Repertoires. Used as A&R personnel or A&R department. In Japan, a term ‘direkutah (director)’ is also used who belongs to seisaku bu (production department). In France, ‘directeur(ice) artistique (artistic director(ess))’ is often used and whose department is called département artistique (artistic department). In general, an A&R is in charge of all that concerns sound, from finding and signing of an artist to managing budget, personnel and schedule for recording, mixing, mastering, etc. For the sake of simplicity, I use the term A&R regardless of country in this thesis.
simplistically imposed. Instead, US rappers make sense in France through their association with the mostly immigrant marginal French youths whose hip-hop identity is constructed against the French government's conservative cultural politics. Transnational practices are, as Negus (1993) argues, "actively translated and transformed into and by the local" (310). We ought then to look at the way such a social space is constructed and the way the operationality of recording and music-related industries are understood within it. In the following chapter, I examine the way the role of industrial cultural production in a social space has been understood and theorised, for doing so will enable us to obtain an analytical tool to explore Paris and Tokyo, their 'streets' or their hip-hop scenes. I take Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin as a springboard for further discussions of social space and the music industries.
Production and Consumption

Culture Industry and Eternal Consumer

For Adorno and his colleague Horkheimer (1979), modern, technologically invested industrial cultural production is a transparent manifestation of capitalist exploitation, rationalisation and domination of the proletariat. Music thus produced, they argue, occupies "men's senses from the time they leave the factory in the evening to the time they clock in again the next morning with matter that bears the impress of the labour process they themselves have to sustain throughout the day" (131). Adorno, before anything, is one of the first scholars to rightly point out the importance of understanding cultural products in a social space, and it is undeniable that modernisation and urbanisation transform the lives of those who live inside it. He, with Horkheimer, acutely anticipates the relentlessly globalising, modernising and urbanising landscape of our days:

The huge gleaming towers that shoot up everywhere are outward signs of the ingenious planning of international concerns, toward which the unleashed entrepreneurial system (whose monuments are a mass of gloomy houses and business premises in grimy, spiritless cities) was already hastening. (120)

In the midst of such de-humanising development, the flood of all-identical, mass-produced commodities called 'culture' deprives art of its capacity to express critical, free and autonomous human potential. He justly identifies music in the street as a potential means of political subversion:

The power of the street ballad, the catchy tune and all the swarming forms of the banal has made itself felt since the beginning of the bourgeois era. Formerly, it attacked the cultural privilege of the ruling class. But today, when that power of the banal extends over the entire society, its function has changed. (Adorno 1991, 30)

Music is co-opted, tamed and disempowered by the capitalist imperative of culture corporations, which pursue nothing but maximisation of profit. The culture of the people, or the 'banal' above, is regulated, conditioned and undermined by the culture industry, and "the listener is converted, along his line of least resistance, into the acquiescent purchaser" (28-9).

The image of street culture as a locus of opposition is echoed in many of the current critiques of the music industries. Although from what appear to be from opposing views and positions, it is not difficult to detect that Adorno shares strikingly much with hip-hop's charge against commercialism:

The stereotyped appropriation of everything, even the inchoate, for the purposes of mechanical reproduction surpasses the rigor and general currency of any "real style," in the sense in which cultural cognoscenti celebrate the organic pre-capitalist past. No Palestrina could be more of a purist in eliminating every unprepared and unresolved discord than the jazz arranger in suppressing any development which does not conform to the jargon. (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979, 127)

The resemblance between Adorno's perspective and the forms of nationalism and local essentialism I highlighted in the previous chapters reveals that Adorno's denunciation of the culture industry in defence of pure, autonomous and uncompromised art is in fact another uninterested submission to the "market of symbolic goods" (Bourdieu 1993, 112) which is a product of modernity, of "the Industrial
Revolution and the Romantic Reaction” (113) in the latter half of nineteenth century. For Bourdieu (1986), Adorno’s critique is “a direct, naive analogy between the very form and uses of ‘popular’ music and the world of alienated labour” (386), whose credibility owes to “the fact that it enables the nostalgia and revulsion of an amateur to be expressed with populist impeccability” (386). Denigrating industrial mass art, Adorno valorises the art for which he speaks.

Adorno’s argument may be summarised schematically as Figure 5. Ultimately, he distinguishes autonomous and true society and music that he advocates, from compromised and false ones that he argues are products of the capitalist cultural industry. In so doing, he not only analytically and ideologically, but also temporally and spatially separates the capitalist producers and “the eternal consumer” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979, 142), living “in the false society” (141), who contents oneself with “pseudo-individuality” (154), and whose taste is “declined” (Adorno 1991, 26), “sado-masochistic” (35), “regressive” (40) and “childish” (41). For his intellectual sensibilities, “all mass culture is identical” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979, 121) and little, if any, is allowed for audiences to transgress the ‘eternal’ loop of consumption and to create. At the basis of such a unilateral perspective seems his overemphasis on “the predominance of the effect” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979, 125). Because consumers under the monopoly cannot but obey the effect, “the whole world,” they claim, “is made to pass through the filter of the culture industry” (126).

Certainly, the music industries intervene in and co-opt creative processes concerning their corporate imperatives such as saleability and marketability. However, his strong assumption on the ‘effect’ lacks sufficient insight of what people do with such commodities. Surely, often, “consumers appear as statistics on research organization charts, and are divided by income groups into red, green, and blue areas; the technique is that used for any type of propaganda” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979, 123). However, these classification and labelling schemes may not predetermine consumption so that “something is provided for all so that none may escape; the distinctions are emphasized and extended” (123). It is rather because of the invisibility and unpredictability of consumption that music producers seek to identify, interrogate and index their audiences, and such a process typically involves not only statistics in research organisation but also active participation in the very consumption by music producers, or employment of ‘consumers’ as ‘producers’. It is commonly known that more than 80% of the newly produced musical commodities fail to be profitable every year. The corporate imperatives do not always coincide with what Adorno calls capitalist ideology, and it is too harsh to conclude that all industrial cultural commodities are deprived of critical or oppositional potentials, as anti-capitalist, anti-white hardcore rap titles could be million sellers just as often.

Figure 5: Adorno’s Culture Industry

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Aura, Resistance and Subcultures

Walter Benjamin's (1973) argument draws a sharp contrast to Adorno's denunciation in that he sees in the advent of art reproduction technologies a crucial moment for liberating art from the established authority to the masses. Unlike Adorno who considers the autonomy of art from the compromised reality crucial for cultural and social criticism, Benjamin sees "a negative theology in the form of the idea of 'pure' art, which not only denied any social function of art but also any categorizing by subject matter" (226). For him, what is important is how the new reproduction technologies empower the masses to produce their own aesthetics and politics in the modernising and urbanising society. Where Adorno sees gleaming, oppressive skyscrapers Benjamin sees a blast:

Our taverns and our metropolitan streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our factories appeared to have us locked up hopelessly. Then came the film and burst this prison-world asunder by the dynamite of the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung ruins and debris, we calmly and adventurously go travelling. With close-up, space expands; with slow motion, movement is extended. The enlargement of a snapshot does not simply render more precise what in any case was visible, though unclear: it reveals entirely new structural formations of the subject. (238).

He regards mechanical reproduction as a means to revolutionise the daily reality of the masses and to enhance their political consciousness. The age of mechanical reproduction, he argues, is a phase of withering of "aura" (223) from a work of art, its detachment from the traditional aesthetic canons. Namely, the meaning and value of a work of art are released from their "parasitical dependence on ritual" (226) which he defines as "the location of its original use value" (226).

Benjamin (1973) also brings forward the notion of 'appropriation' of and 'participation' in a work of art by the masses. Namely, the meaning and value of a work of art are left for its consumers' appropriation and participation. Although not specifically dealing with music, Benjamin argues that a mechanically reproduced artwork "makes the cult value recede into the background not only by putting the public in the position of the critic, but also by the fact that at the movies this position requires no attention. The public is an examiner, but an absent-minded one" (242-3). He continues:

By making many reproductions it [a reproduced artwork] substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence. And in permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation, it reactivates the object reproduced. These two processes lead to a tremendous shattering of tradition which is the obverse of the contemporary crisis and renewal of mankind. Both processes are intimately connected with the contemporary mass movements. (223)

A perception of the masses, driven by "the desire [...] to bring things 'closer' spatially and humanly" (225) and "their bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its reproduction" (225), "extracts [sense of the universal equality of things] even from a unique object by means of reproduction" (225). He observes that, while a traditional and authoritarian aesthetcian "who concentrates before a work of art is absorbed by it" (241), "the distracted mass absorbs the work of art" (241).

Benjamin's perspective, too, is adapted by many cultural theorists today. As Simon Frith (1983)
points out, his theories are "rediscovered" (47) and "remade" (48) by a group of scholars following the counter-culture movement in the 1960s. The masses are transfigured as 'people'. Cultural ethnographers set out to investigate how industrially produced popular music can be 'productive' within a mass society and how consumers actively 'appropriate' mechanically reproduced cultural commodities and 'participate' in production of meanings different from those conceived by the (original) producers. Dick Hebdige (1979), drawing upon Barthesian socio-semiotics, argues that a subculture is a set of coherent codes that generates 'deviant' meanings and 'appropriated' uses against the 'natural' order legitimised by the authorities and "'given' for the whole society" (9). In his argument, "subcultures represent 'noise' (as oppose to sound): interference in the orderly sequence which leads from real events and phenomenon to their representation in the media" (90).

Figure 6 summarises Benjamin’s perspective, in which the modern capitalist culture industry is reduced to a mere supplier of mass-produced, identical cultural texts. The emergence of mechanically reproduced art certainly changes people's subjectivity and sensibility, yet this argument is also subject to at least two critical considerations. Firstly, it has not reconciled but furthered the dichotomy between production and consumption in confusing symbolic consumption, i.e. one makes sense, and economic consumption, i.e. one purchases, therefore overlooking the material and economic constraints of industrial music production which Adorno's perspective acutely denounces. While theorists like Stuart Hall (1980) and John Fiske (1989) rightfully conceptualise interaction between production and consumption and differentiated circuits of economies and symbols respectively, most of Benjamin's protagonists, often categorised under 'cultural studies' label, too often emphasise symbolic 'resistance' by the subordinated 'popular' audiences, and the role of the industry in cultural production is simply disregarded. A subculture may not be as homogeneous and autonomous as they argue it to be. It may not always be so semiologically coherent and politically invested as to subvert the authorities, and its emergence more often than not depends on both the internal and external geometry of economic relations often involving strategic participation of various entrepreneurs. Digital sampling bricolage in hip-hop might have been a challenge to the modern romantic concept of author, but it would be misleading not to acknowledge the fact that this specific technique of composition is quickly incorporated to the systematic exploitation of copyright/author's rights system through specialised companies.

Secondly, whereas it is right that, as I argued earlier, the cultural industry cannot entirely control the consumption and, often, consumers do produce innovative meanings alternatively from its conceived usage, these theories often privilege, romanticise and essentialise a particular fragment of society as the source of 'authenticity'. How, then, can one tell one fragment more authentic than others? Some researchers tend to assume a culture as an ontological given, which Bourdieu (1993) denounces as "treating distinct but objectively hierarchized cultures in a class society as if they were
the cultures of such perfectly independent social formations as the Eskimos and the Feugians" (129). This essentialist configuration inherently serves to exclude other fragments of a society from their scope and to overlook much more complicated issues of cultural, political and economic dynamics not only between the dominant culture and the subordinated subcultures, but more importantly between and within subcultures in a given social space that reflexively construct their authenticities and identities. Little has been argued, while seeking for possibilities and describing practices of subcultures to operate in a society as 'noise', that each subculture canonises its own system of symbolic and linguistic legitimacy. For a subculture to be coherent, it presupposes a form of authoritative power with its proper canonical dogma that distinguishes itself from the 'fake'.

**Social Space, Taxonomy and Field of Media Institutions**

What I want to explore in this research, then, is not the semiotic features of cultural texts. Culture has so long been understood in terms of text and context: Adorno maintains that the capitalist rationalisation of an artwork regresses and standardises the masses (see Figure 5 (p. 27)). Benjamin investigates ways in which a text is interpreted and appropriated alternatively by the masses (see Figure 6 (p. 29)). However, what is it that makes us discern a text as a text: that enables us to extract a text from its context? The line that divides a text from its context can be drawn infinitely according to the knowledge and disposition one embodies (for example, in a Tokyo hip-hop nightclub, women often dance with their predominantly female companies, whereas men individually lean against the DJ booth to steal DJ's technique, each of whom listening to very different 'text'). Moreover, cultural semiology, based on text and interpretation, fails to explain one of our commonest daily practices – judging music without listening to it. When a rock fan proclaims “rap sucks,” it is not after s/he has listened to everything classified under the generic category of rap. In the same way, as in Pierre Bourdieu's (1993) example, a “connoisseur can immediately discern, from such reference points as the work's genre, the radio station, the name of the theatre, gallery or director [and names of producers or labels, concerning popular music], the order of legitimacy and the appropriate posture to be adopted in each case” (129). In such occasions, it would be hard to identify a text as clearly separable from its context and to single out an exclusive site where its meaning is produced.

To explain the assertions by the rock fan or the connoisseur quoted above, we ought to grasp taxonomic principles that govern the hierarchic and dynamic relationship among classes of art with which we make sense of our lives (see Figure 7). My task then is not to define the meaning and value of hip-hop texts by myself, but to explore how producers, diffusers and audiences of hip-hop culture locate its authenticity against other cultures in a given social space and with which strategies they maintain and expand its territory. In brief, I take hip-hop as a position in a social space defined by ceaseless conflicts and dialogues with different cultural genres to institute its political, economic and cultural legitimacy. In this respect, this research draws on Bourdieu's (1993) following passage:

The boundary of the field is a stake of struggles, and the social scientist's task is not to draw a dividing line between the agents involved in it by imposing a so-called operational definition, which is most likely to be imposed on him by his own prejudices or presuppositions, but to describe a state (long-lasting or temporary) of these struggles and therefore of the frontier delimiting the territory held by the competing agents. (42-3)
Popular', 'street' or 'underground' culture is no more than such a position that seeks for its own distinction. It is positioned at the negative pole in the class, economic and power scales while refusing to submit to the legitimate political economy, which resembles what Bourdieu (1991) terms the "vulgarised distinction" (94), or "outcast's aristocracy" (96: see also Minamida (1998)). Subversive as it may be in the field, it is also, like Adorno's pure art, a product of its submission to "the market of symbolic goods" (Bourdieu 1993, 112) in which "symbolic goods are two-faced reality, a commodity and a symbolic object" (113). Here, instead of further speculating an 'operational definition' of hip-hop's logic of distinction, I would like to outline two important points in Bourdieu's theorisation of the field of cultural production: the opposition between the restricted production and the large-scale production, and the notion of artists and intermediaries.

In order for a genre and then an artwork to be autonomised, or objectively distinguished as an irreducible category, it contradictory presupposes "the opposition between the 'commercial' and the 'non-commercial'" (Bourdieu 1993, 82). Opposing and neglecting each other, they are inseparable as the one necessitates the other to define itself and to be intelligible as such. Namely, the opposition between the 'authentic' and the 'sell-out' generates a specific field of cultural production.

It is the generative principle of most of the judgements which, in the theatre, cinema, painting or literature, claim to establish the frontier between what is and what is not art, i.e. in practice, between 'bourgeois' art and 'intellectual' art, between 'traditional' and 'avant-garde' art, or, in Parisian terms, between the 'right bank' and the 'left bank'. While this opposition can change its substantive content and designate very different realities in different fields, it remains structurally invariant in different fields and in the same field at different moments. It is always an opposition between small-scale and large-scale ('commercial') production, [...]. The differences in the relationship to 'economic' considerations and to the audience coincide with the differences officially recognized and identified by the taxonomies prevailing in the field. (82)

It applies to hip-hop production, in terms of the 'authentic' and the 'sell-out', or, to remember
Kitwana's (1994) passage quoted earlier, the "Black" (13) and the "commercialized" (13). What is important is that the opposition is also deployed geographically in this quote, between the two banks of the Seine. In hip-hop terms, as we will see, Paris is divided not only between bourgeois right bank and intellectual left bank, but also, even more significantly, between Paris and the working-class banlieues (suburbs) – "the Parisian banlieue represents exactly the 'lieu du ban', the place where one is banned" (Marchand 1993, 101).

Bourdieu's theorisation of the field of cultural production also demands that works of art must neither be understood as a result of simplistic imposition of and deterministic manipulation by external structural forces (as in Adorno's perspective), nor as an internal expression and interpretation by a particular fragment of society (as in Benjamin's perspective): an artwork must be considered as "a manifestation of the field as a whole, in which all the powers of the field, and all the determinisms inherent in its structure and functioning, are concentrated" (Bourdieu 1993, 37). The sociology of art and literature, he argues, has to consider both "the direct producers of the work in its materiality" (37) and "the producers of the meaning and value of the work" (37). That is:

The 'subject' of the production of the art-work – of its value but also of its meaning – is not the producer who actually creates the object in its materiality, but rather the entire set of agents engaged in the field. Among these are the producers of works classified as artistic (great or minor, famous or unknown), collectors, middlemen, curators, etc., in short, all who have ties in art, who live for art and, to varying degrees, from it, and who confront each other in struggles where the imposition of not only a world view but also a vision of the artworld is at stake, and who, through these struggles, participate in the production of value of the artist and the art. (261)

The meaning of a work of art is shaped by its position and disposition in and with which it is produced, diffused and consumed. Meaning, certainly, is inscribed in musical texture, but it is not inscribed naturally as much as strategically. That is, a text and its meaning are generated at a certain strategic position and disposition in the field of power to systematically exclude, or incorporate, noise – its other – in which production and consumption have a complicit relationship.

Jacques Attali (1985), in his study of music in Europe, proposes the notion of 'the network of music', or the network of intermediaries who inscribes meanings and values to the music they mediate. In modern free markets where "music has become a commodity, a means of producing money" (37), the network of music is where music is composed, performed, recorded, pressed, packaged, distributed, sold, consumed, destroyed and worn out (37). Namely, a work of music "is an abstract form produced in several steps, which are structured differently depending on the network within which the work is inscribed" (37). Although his analytical scope pertains to a very long span of time – twenty-five centuries (!) – and founded on the Greek-Roman-European geo-historical narrative, I find it quite relevant to the current discussion in that the notion of expanding and contracting of networks in the field of musical genres enables us to understand conflicts among intermediary institutions as dynamic and relative processes.

A network can be destroyed by noises that attack and transform it, if the codes in place are unable to normalize and repress them. Although the new order is not contained in the
structure of the old, it is nonetheless not a product of chance. It is created by the substitution of new differences for the old differences. Noise is the source of these mutations in the structuring codes. For despite the death it contains, noise carries order within itself; it carries new information. [...] The absence of meaning is in this case the presence of all meanings, absolute ambiguity, a construction outside meaning. The presence of noise makes sense, makes meaning. It makes possible the creation of a new order on another level of organization, of a new code in another network. (33)

Each of musical cultures, genres or works – young or old, challenging or established, heresy or orthodox and noise or music – constitutes a particular network of intermediary agents and institutions connecting artists and audiences, and they are distributed in a contested social space, with various degree of power and influence at disposal.

Our argument so far may be schematised as Figure 8, which I hope would serve as an analytical framework for our further discussion. Reembedding of music, technologies that produce, diffuse and consume it and industries and institutions that exploit such technologies takes shape and makes sense only in a specific locale, through their dialogues with the existing structure of popular music production. Such a structure may be divided into the field of production, the field of consumption and, between them, the field of media institutions. Each field contains a generic relation as in Figure 7 (p. 31), which more or less corresponds to distribution of actors, agents and institutions in each field (such as artists and producers in the field of production; television, radio and written press in the field of media institutions; and classical aficionados, jazz enthusiasts, rock fans or hip-hop heads in the field of consumption). In order to avoid overemphasising hierarchic connotation among the fields, I align them horizontally, rather than vertically. Namely, hierarchy is more significant in the top-bottom and
left-right axes of each field. The antagonism between rock and hip-hop is understood not as that between producers and consumers, but as that between positions that established rock genre and establishing rap genre take in each field. In this sense, each field retains a simultaneous, symbiotic and homological relation with the others.

It should also be useful here to explain the field of media institutions that mediates between the production and consumption fields. With the advent of modern sound and media technologies such as printing, phonograph, film, radio, television, etc, social space increasingly transcend geography, interconnecting the global and the local and enabling music, such as hip-hop, to be meaningful in an otherwise geographically distant locale. At the same time, through a reembedding process, a set of institutions that manage and control the technologies – nation-states, book publishers, recording companies, film companies, radio stations, television stations, etc. – shape competitions for the credibility and authenticity of information they deliver, hence stratifying and hierarchising each other in a local space. The field of media institutions is produced of these competitions. It has always been contested between, for example, painting and photography, radio and phonograph, television and radio, 'serious' and 'tabloid' newspapers, 'public' and 'private' broadcasting, satellite television and terrestrial television, Compact Disc and vinyl and so on. What is important is that, through these competitions, which invite us to participate while transforming our subjectivity, geography is mediatised, as the field simultaneously naturalises the mediated-ness. Namely, through a process of reembedding, mediatised social space is abstracted as social space per se, just as it naturalises performance on a record as performance per se.

What this research tries to identify is the network of hip-hop agents – I shall call them street intermediaries – in such contested fields, through its dialogues with other genres and its denigration of the 'commercial', the 'sell-out' or the 'mainstream'. It traces and describes the complicit network that shapes hip-hop's authenticity and prescribes particular meanings and values in hip-hop as it constructs, maintains and expands the 'street' – its source – in which its audience is invited to participate. To this end, I conduct a series of investigative interviews with music industry personnel. I discuss its outcome in Part III (see Appendices for a detailed methodological note), but to do so necessitates an inquiry into the structuring of the field of media institutions in Paris and Tokyo both historically and geographically, for Parisian and Tokyoite hip-hop authenticity is implicated in the urbanisation and mediatisation of the two cities, more deeply than, or at least as deeply as, that of the South Bronx, NY. It also urges us to identify the topology of 'street', the position that contests the legitimate cultural production with its virile vulgarity, that has been constructed and reproduced in the two cities. Despite its claimed immediacy, as argued earlier, hip-hop's 'street' cannot be understood without taking into account the mediatisation of geography, for it is reembedded into the complex web of urban transport system and media institutions of a particular social space.

It is in this sense that I want to start Part II with Haussmann's modernisation project of Paris (1852-) and the Meiji government's Renga-gai (Brick Arcade) project of Tokyo (1872-), both of which aimed at mediatisation of the urban space, engraving their future and global consciousness through the hi-tech buildings, the wide streets, the gas lights, the railway or the tramway and other transport and media systems in the capitals. 'Street', already at that time, was integrated to the music publishing
industry, with the rise of populist movement, as a place from which and a medium through which popular songs were emerged and diffused. There were funfairs at the fringe of the two modernising capitals; there were musiciens ambulants (itinerant musicians) or enka-shis (broadside singers) both of whom organised syndicates for songbook diffusion in the two cities. I am not trying to associate hip-hop with these musics that have today been embellished as the popular music to represent the nation, i.e. CHANSON and ENKA. To the very contrary, the very consecration of these national genres generates a vacuum in the two cities, which would give rise to a more transnationally invested, more complicatedly mediatised network of street music production. Jazz or rock 'n' roll, for example, took a similar position in the two cities with their Americanness and blackness reembedded quite differently. It is in this reproductive social structure that both French and Japanese hip-hop can be understood at once as globally shared hip-hop culture and locally particular French or Japanese scenes.

Some principle indices may be due. My primary focus is on urban and suburban geography of the two cities – transformation of urbanisation and suburbanisation politics, spatial distribution of population, development of transport systems and institution of musical venues such as dance-halls, nightclubs and discotheques that more or less associate a particular genre of music to a particular part of the city. The second focus is on the way in which modern music and media technologies and institutions are socialised into such geography, and foreign music culture into local music culture. In the end, I examine the medium and position with which a 'street' music is associated: the trajectory its artists draw and, in such a process, how media institutions naturalise the mediated-ness of the street. I focus on four phases of the two local histories not so much to periodise them but to highlight different ways some of the most globally dominant popular music genres are desired, lived, understood and transformed. These are: the institution of popular music market and formation of the recording industry (pre-1920); the emergence of jazz market and radio broadcasting (1920s-30s); the reembedding of rock 'n' roll and television broadcasting (1950s-60s); and the rise of what can be called 'transnationalised local music', such as world music in Paris and techno pop in Tokyo, and the outbreak of digital audio-visual technology (1970s-80s) that leads to the institution of hip-hop market in the two cities.
Part II. TIME AND SPACE, OR HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY

Some consideration ought be given to mysterious factors at work in many cities which chase them to the west while condemning their eastern quarters to the misery or to the decadence.
Levi-Strauss 1984, 136

By definition, black popular culture is a contradictory space. It is a sight of strategic contestation. But it can never be simplified or explained in terms of the simple binary oppositions that are still habitually used to map it out: high and low; resistance versus incorporation; authentic versus inauthentic; experiential versus formal; opposition versus homogenization. There are always positions to be won in popular culture, but no struggle can capture popular culture itself for our side or theirs.
Hall 1992, 26-7

Africa Bambaataa likes mixing things up, too. He has been know to cut from salsa to Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony to Yellow Magic Orchestra to calypso through Kraftwerk via video game sound effects and the Munsters television series’ theme tune back to his base in James Brown.
Hebdige 1987, 144

The question - “What should be put in the Beaubourg [Pompidou Centre]?" - is therefore absurd. It cannot be answered because the topical distinction of the inside and the outside ought not to be posed. Here is our truth, a truth of Möbius - utopia no doubt unrealisable but to which Beaubourg gives a reason nonetheless, insofar as any of its contents is a counter-sense and ruined by the container in advance.
Baudrillard 1977, 20

The villain, Shredder, in Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, hidden away in the darkness of the sewer system, operates by the same ninja principles, to erode and undermine American civilization. What these popular cultural expressions reflect is an anxiety about the ‘stealth’ of Japanese corporations. The Japanese stealers-in are perceived as having a robot-like dedication to achieving world hegemony and to undermining the principles of Western modernity.
Morley and Robins 1995, 152-3
Giddens (1990) argues that modernity is not only “inherently globalising” (177), but also “inherently future-oriented” (177). In other words, modernisation is ceaselessly projected to the future to break with the past, while this projection towards the future is simultaneously oriented to geographic expansion. In modernity, thus, future and progress often coincide with the ‘discovery’ and ‘conquest’ of the planet. It seems crystallised in universal exhibitions, the first of which was held in London in 1851, displaying not only the latest scientific and technological progress but also the modern universe, consisting of nation-states and their colonies, spatially distributed in the often architecturally elaborated pavilions. France hosted a universal exhibition in 1855 and then every eleven years from 1867. Japan participated in one from 1873 in Vienna, although a self-nominated representative had actually participated in the 1867 Paris exhibition. It is not a mere coincident that one of the most decisive breaks with the traditional world was observed in France and in Japan at around this period, in the form of colonisation – *mission civilisatrice* – for the former and Westernisation – *okka seisaku* – for the latter. In both cases, clearly, the new global consciousness is projected to the future progress and prosperity of the two nations. Yoshimi (1987) is right in arguing that “universal exhibitions modernised the universe itself” (122).

The modernisation of the universe was also inscribed in urban space. Haussmann’s radical urbanisation of Paris from 1852 was, for example, conceived “to make [Paris] a technological and leisure metropolis to be displayed to the world at the *Exposition universelle* of 1867” (Millan et al. 1995, 15). Where Haussmann cared to reconstruct, concentrated in the western area where universal exhibitions were held (today’s 7th, 8th, 9th and 16th arrondissements), there would be modern housing with the latest comfort and facility and better access to railway stations and to public parks. Not as exhaustive as Haussmann’s project, a similar modern gaze was inscribed in Tokyo’s *Renga-gai* project. Upon the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the modern Meiji government immediately took over the Western concession in the Tsukiji area from the Tokugawa shogunate, and joined forces with Britain to construct, in 1873, the first railway between Yokohama international port and Shinbashi, adjacent to the concession. In 1875, two years before Tokyo’s population surpassed one million, *Renga-gai* was completed in Ginza, located conveniently between Tsukiji concession and Shinbashi station which were, as Yoshimi (1987) rightfully points out, “the window open to the ‘West’” that was transfigured as “the source of transcendent significance rather than the West itself” (168).

Another point equally common of modernisation of Paris and Tokyo was the implementation of political surveillance system by way of spatial segregation of different social classes, cultures and musics. In embellishing the central and western Paris and projecting wide avenues and boulevards connecting “principle points of the capital and military establishments destined to protect them” (Haussmann: quoted in Marchand 1993, 116: see also Berman 1983, 131-71), the city limit was expanded from the ancient *Mur des Fermiers-Généraux* (the custom barriers for the octroi (city toll)) to the new fortifications in 1860, annexing the nearest *banlieues* into the actual twenty *arrondissements* accommodating 1.6 million people (see Map 1). The urban proletariat was integrated to the city toll scheme while the new fortifications redrew the boundary between *intra-muros* (inside...
the wall) and *extra-muros* (outside the wall) Paris. The Opera was relocated half a kilometre westwards, at the expense of razing melodrama theatres and various forms of street entertainment on *le Boulevard*, stretching from the Place de la Madeleine to the Place de la Bastille and having attracted both the rich and the poor. The popular theatres and funfairs retreated to the peripheral quarters (such as Belleville and Ménilmontant) or, if one hesitated to pay the city toll, to *extra-muros*, to the obscurity of what was known as the *zone* (a band of land surrounding the new fortifications, reserved administratively for military purpose but constituting a slum and hotbed of urban crime). Even after a greater freedom of expression was granted in 1881 under the Third Republic (1870-1940), street musicians had to face heavy administrative regulations – not only censorship and licensing from the government but also permission from music publishers and bookshops (see Landron 1997, 75). The entire project completed the shift from vertical segregation (the poor lived upper floors and the rich lower ones) to horizontal one, and extended it to entire Paris, between the bourgeois west and the proletarian east

(Marchand 1993, 88: see Map 1).

The Meiji government, too, established its political, economic and cultural legitimacy through spatially segregating, policing and taxing vulgar street entertainment. In establishing the Ginza area as 'the window to the West', promoting Western music (the Rokumeikan imperial ballroom was inaugurated near Ginza in 1883) and consecrating some of the popular arts as 'national' arts (the Kabuki-za theatre was inaugurated in Ginza in 1889), the government flattened out the poor eastern riverside quarters. The district of Ueno was converted into a park in 1873. Its funfairs were, together

Map 1: Spatial Segregation in Haussmann’s Paris

Map 2: Spatial Segregation in Meiji Tokyo

Source: Le Hallé (1986), Marchand (1993)

Source: Across (ed. 1987)
with slums, razed, and instead the government constructed the Sogaku-do concert hall (in 1885), the Imperial Museum (in 1886), Tokyo College of Art and that of Music (in 1887, to be unified as Tokyo College of Arts), the Imperial Art Gallery (in 1888) and the Imperial Library (in 1906). The area around Asakusa had remained relatively untouched until 1882 when the government filled its surrounding marshes and renovated the area into another park. The park was divided into six blocks and most of the street entertainers were at once driven to the sixth block and came under governmental regulation and taxation. In this way, the western areas of the city called Yamanote, or hill side town (Hongo, Koishikawa, Ushigome, Azabu or Akasaka), gradually accommodated the white-collar population, whereas the prototypical proletarian population dissolved eastwards to constitute Shitamachi, or lower side town (Shimoya, Asakusa, Honjo or Fukagawa: see Map 2).

The neatly segregated and hierarchised political, economic and cultural classes, however, were gradually transformed into a perpetual bazaar of the electrified and exotic bodies and objects. Streetlights prolonged the nightly pleasure and became associated with prostitution. Exotic luxury was associated with hedonism and raw pleasure. Not surprisingly, places between the rich and the poor halves of the two cities became the mythical source of popular culture. Montmartre, which embraced most of the cabarets and café-concerts in Paris with which many popular songs of the Belle Epoque are associated, was one such topos. The attraction of Montmartre was not a cosy hang-out for the Parisian bourgeoisie unless submitting to its own rules – "the chanson was not emerged from a cultural place but rather from a blasted place and the bourgeoisie would, to hear it, imitate the crooks" (Calvet 1981, 69). Behind Montmartrois cabarets, café-concerts and music-halls was Paris' largest red-light district, frequented by prostitutes, pimps and gangsters, for whom these nosy snobs were soft touches. They, often referred to as the apache or the zonier (from the peripheral zone of the fortifications), were the source not only of Parisian fear but also fantasy of the banlieues with its heroic wildness and libertine love. According to Marchand (1993), the apache was "a new form of criminality" (211). "These sons of the poor," he continues, "not only sought to thieve, but also to be recognised. They attacked the bourgeoisie not to survive, like the miserable of the July monarchy, or to destroy it, like the anarchist, but to imitate it" (211). Towards the 1900s, an increasing number of café-concerts began adopting 'music-hall' style offering "a programme of sensational attractions from the four corners of the globe" (Pasqualini 1996, 8) with successful songs like Joyeux Nègres (Happy Negroes), Petite Tonkinoise (Little Tong King Girl), L'Amour au Chili (Chilean Love) and Valse Chaloupée (Swaying Waltz: one of the first to constitute the 'apache' genre).

As music-halls in Paris fused and confused progression and regression, an increasing number of popular theatres in the sixth black of Asakusa Park were transformed into cinema-theatres from around 1903, offering, in addition to films, a variety of shows, ranging from more feudal GIDAYU, NANIWA-BUSHI or KABUKI to more modern brass band, SHIN-GEKI or operetta. Asakusa attracted the young Yamanote bourgeoisie that sought for modern, progressive entertainment. Yet, as Montmartre, behind the over-Westernised, even kitsch, facades of cinema-theatres was Tokyo's largest red-light district, and Asakusa was often associated with moral regression, so much so that "most schools and families kept their children from going to Asakusa at the time" (Miyazawa 1990, 2). ASAKUSA OPERA, emerged in around 1915, seems a case in point. Descendent from the discontinued opera section of the
Imperial Theatre (constructed in Ginza in 1911), their operetta attracted young intellectual and bourgeoisie, while its affordable price and diluted Western ambience invited more vulgar Shitamachi youths known as peragolo, supposedly a compound word of 'opera' and 'gigolo' (Masui 1990, 35-8). Masui (1990) argues that an essential factor of the sudden success of Asakusa Opera lay in its eroticism, as "Japan, until then, had had very few occasions to watch feminine bodies on stage. [...] At Asakusa where beautiful actresses would dance imminently, it is rather natural that their intimate charm glued a young audience in the first place" (194-5). The 'West', access to which the Meiji government and its elite ruling class had monopolised, became transgressed, eroticised, commodified and consumed. The grafted Westernisation swiftly revealed its deficiency in Japan where even social dance, eagerly patronised by the Meiji government as a civilised means of socialisation, immediately scandalised the conservative because of its promotion of opposite sexes dancing as a pair in public (see Nagai 1991).

Phonograph technology found its way to the two cities around this period. Its first official demonstration in Japan and France was held, not surprisingly, in nationally important institutions. Edison's Phonograph was first presented in the Academie des Sciences in Paris in 1878, while the first phonograph fabricated by a British engineer after Edison's article in a scientific journal was shown at Tokyo Chamber of Commerce in 1879. His improved, electrified Phonograph was shown in Asakusa in 1887 and in Parisian universal exhibition in 1889, and did not take long before exploited by street entrepreneurs. In Japan, so-called chikuonki-ya (phonograph trolleys), offering extracts from popular plays and comic stories for a tip, filled the crowded streets of Asakusa Park and spread around the nation by the 1890s. In France, Charles Pathé "ran from one funfair to another" (Marty 1979, 85) in the Parisian banlieue, playing cylinders in public from the mid-1890s. He soon started supplying to cafés and, in 1896, with his brother Emile, succeeded in domestic production of a complete copy of Edison's Eagle model, renamed as Le Coq "to give a French touch" (87), with their phonograph salon and recording studio installed in prestigious rue de Richelieu, adjacent to the Opera, and a factory in a banlieue town of Chatou. Their business was thus hazardous, yet very successful — according to Lesueur (1999), "Pathé produced 45 million of cylinders only between 1900 and 1908" (8) for predominantly café, cabaret and other public use — so much so that it attracted SACEM's (Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique: Society of Musical Authors, Composers and Publishers) attention, which resulted in them paying amends of 500,000FF and giving rise to the application of the author's rights law on recorded music (reinforced in 1905).

Japan, on the contrary, suffered from the lack of technical expertise to mass-produce recordings. Most of the cylinder fabrication was based on handcraft manufacturing, and the shortcoming was furthered as the technology shifted from a relatively simple cylinder to Berliner's disc format that would necessitate an expensive recorder and a dedicated pressing plant. To realise a Japanese disc, Western recording engineers had to come to Japan, record the music, bring back the engraved master to press it and export the final products back to Japan. Fred Gaisberg of Gramophone visited Japan in February 1903 as a part of his two-year long recording trip to Asia (see Moore 1999, 103-16). The first domestic disc pressing factory was established in 1909 by Nichibei Chikuonki (Japan-American
Phonograph: future Nihon Columbia) launched by an American by the name of ZHorn?4. It had two contradictory consequences. Domestic pressing drastically reduced the record price (while imported Western titles remained unattainable) and accelerated its integration to popular music production. At the same time, it gave rise to an increasing number of pirate producers. In so-called Kumoemon scandal in 1914, a German impresario by the name of ZWardermann?, who recorded a NANIWA-BUSHI star, Kumoemon, under an exclusive contract, sued a company that pirated the recording, but lost the case because of the lack of juridical recognition of CHOSAKU-KEN on recorded popular music of improvised nature. CHOSAKU-KEN on recorded music was only legislated for in 1920.

Paris quickly established a star-system with its music publishers, recording companies, popular press, cabarets, music-halls and, above all, SACEM. With music-halls, to which "people came [...] for the spectacle and no longer to drink or to discuss" (Calvet 1981, 70), popular music became something of value in its own, and their variety of 'sensational attractions from the four corners of the globe" left a profound trace in the vocabulary: the variétés, generic and sometimes despised term under which people generally class chanson, designated a spectacle of music-hall originally" (70). Streets, too, became a 'market', invested in by music publishers as a strategic point for promoting their commodities. Street musicians and singers, on the other hand, established their own trade union called the Syndicat des Chanteurs et Musiciens Marchands de Chansons (Union of Commercial Singers and Musicians of Popular Songs) in 1906 to monopolise the distribution of so-called format rue (street format) songbooks, only available through street musicians, to drive out 'pirate' street musicians. It was a mutual process. Musicians were interested in the improvement of their social and professional status and stabilisation of revenues by the legitimisation of their activities. For publishers, as Daphy (1997) points out, "to make a success out of a song, it needs to be performed everywhere" (95).

The first national hit song in HAYARI-UTA genre in Japan is said to be 'Kachusha No Uta (Kachusha's Song)' by Sumako Matsui with its alleged record sales of 20,000 copies in 1914. It was an accompaniment song in a SHIN-GEKI interpretation of Tolstoy's Resurrection. Yet, as Osada (1978) points out, its success owed much to ENKA-SHIS, or broadside singers, who played the song in the street (14). Originated as a political instrument to spread the Jiyu Minken Undo (Movement for Civic Rights and Freedom), these street message singers gradually became organised in production, distribution and sale of songbooks and booklets around associations such as Seinen Kurabu (Youth Club). As music and song became central, ENKA-SHIS appropriated Western musical instruments, notably the fiddle. Although a part of their repertoire consisted of parodies and versions of existing melodies, their own compositions and songs accompanied (silent) films or popular plays, particularly those by SHIN-GEKI troupes, would increasingly be important. As in Paris, streets became increasingly an integral part of popular music production. In a crude sense of the term, successful music is not a particular type of music, but music diffused in a particular way - diffused through as many media as possible. Musicians were increasingly channelled to 'success', and the 'street' became a sort of a rehearsal studio or waiting room for stage or recording debut.

4 The inverted question marks designate words I come across in Japanese publications whose alphabetical spelling I could not trace.
Phonograph was socialised into the two cities as such. It was not yet altogether affordable to ordinary households, while its price dropped rapidly. The catalogues of leading companies at the time were clearly inclined to upper-middle-class taste – classical and legitimised folklore – while popular genres began to be released gradually. In all cases, recording was only secondary to live performance in artists’ careers in both markets until the 1920s when phonograph encountered its own audience as the audience produced an industry for its own music, whose inarticulate disposition we have already seen in transgressive Montmartre and Asakusa. The name given to this disposition is ‘jazz’, in which technological (and often American, automated and industrial) expertise of phonograph mingled with increasingly *eroticised* future and universal expansion – the West in Japan, and the Africa in France.
Jazz, the State, the Nation
Paris: Jazz, Africa and the Bourgeoisie

Jazz was brought to France by American troops of World War I – more than 2 million (of which 370,000 were black) in France by the end of 1918, (Tournès 1999, 13). The Harlem Hell Fighters, a black jazz orchestra for 369th infantry regiment of the United States, toured 25 cities in France in 1918. The new music attracted not only young artists, such as Jean Cocteau, Maurice Ravel or Igor Stravinsky, who saw a means to challenge European civilisation in Jazz, but also music-hall orchestras, such as Grégor et ses Grégoriens or Ray Ventura et ses Collégiens, who sought to present themselves "as the champion of jazz à la française and protest against invasion of foreign orchestras to the national scene" (Tournès 1999, 27-8). France of les Années-Folles, the wild inter-war years, was accompanied by the flood of American industrial products and the intensifying presence of strangers, tourists or immigrants, mostly European but also American, African, West Indian and Indo-Chinese (proportion of foreigners of the total French population increased from 2.96% in 1911 to 6.58% in 1931 (INSEE)). Reestablishment of national order was imperative, and the advent of new media technologies – radio and sound film – contributed to the diffusion and transfiguration of CHANSON as an expression of French people. The inescapable poverty and desperate crime of the peripheral quarters and the zone were to be embellished as the “future memories of the everlasting beauty of the suffering of the working class" (Rifkin 1991, 200) and repetition within “the coherence of a language of the popular” (201). Jazz was what CHANSON was not. On the one hand, jazz was an industrial and material mass culture derived from the USA. On the other, jazz was associated with Africa and blackness: “signifiers of the unknown, [...], and as such could be applied to any culture or race” such as “the native American `Indian’, “the Near East (orientalism), the Far East (japonisme) or the Pacific Islands (melanomania)” (Archer-Straw 2000, 14).

A significant turning point of jazz in France was marked by a Hispano-black American singer and dancer, Josephine Baker, whose La Revue Nègre (Negro Revue) in 1925 and Le Bal Nègre (Negro Ballroom) in 1927 at the théâtre des Champs-Élysées were instant successes. While more or less spontaneously conforming to the ethnocentric stereotypes produced by colonial literature (“`childish Negro', cheerful and naive” (Dewitte 1985, 45)), Baker's popularity, at the same time, “emerged as an essential marker pole of the distinction, among the music from America, between the black element, originator, and the white element, imitator” (Tournès 1999, 25-6). Her shows definitively confirmed the tacit suspicion among the French that jazz was black music, and this blackness divided the society. On the one hand, while undeniably influenced by it, CHANSON singers gradually detached from jazz, all the more so because their jazz was often considered inauthentic and non-danceable compared with that by Anglo-American musicians, black or not, which French musicians saw increasingly as menacing robbery of the ever-tightening job market (see Jackson 1999). On the other, with its craving for exotic other, Paris eagerly honoured blacks – for black Americans, brought to Europe as soldiers from the USA where they confronted racial segregation, France appeared to be a utopia with its ephemeral acceptance of and tolerance for coloured people. “All naturally,” as Dewitte (1985) argues, “the opinion leaders of the American 'negro renaissance' movement were to be voluntarily exiled to
France at the end of the 20s and their influence on West Indian intellectuals in the Latin Quarter could not be neglected" (10). While stigmatised by their detachment from colonial realities of Africa and clandestine African workers not visible from Paris, what Sartre (1967) would later call the “Greco-Latin Negroes” (7) gave rise to the first attempt in France to theorise their culture – the négritude movement.

Jazz was associated with a series of ruptures in Paris – between music and noise, white progressivism and black primitivism, European civilisation and American industrialism, music-halls and dancehalls, social dance parties and individualised surprise parties for which “one phonograph sufficed” (Joannis-Deberne 1999, 135). It is not coincidental that, as Attali (1985) notes, “the first significant campaign against noise in France took place in 1928” (123). The city of Paris underwent a drastic reorganisation of its spatial structure: the fortifications were demolished from 1919 whose sites, together with some 17 insalubrious blocks, including large parts of Belleville, Ménilmontant and Bastille, were replaced by a brick-coloured strip of high-rising Habitations à Bon Marché (HBMs: council housings). From the 1920s, the population of central Paris ceased to grow (2,906,472 in 1921 to 2,829,753 in 1936), while that of its nearest suburbs (la Petite Couronne (the Small Crown): today’s Haute-de-Seine, Seine-St-Denis and Val-de-Marne) began a considerable growth from 1,691,417 in 1921 to 2,481,300 in 1936 (INSEE: see Figure 9). With the noise of urban construction and jazz, the distinction superseded a simple difference of musical or cultural tastes: it also coincided with the topological slide of Parisian nightlife from the right bank to the left bank of the Seine, notably from Montmartre, which had become too ‘touristic’ and too expensive to live in, to Montparnasse, which had remained agricultural and cheap. In 1910, métro line 4 connected the two districts and, in 1911, the boulevard Raspail, one of the interrupted projects of Haussmann, was finally completed, facilitating development of the district. Once integrated to the urban network of Paris, Montparnasse, located between the aristocratic quarter of Saint-Germain-des-Prés and the demolishing zone, began offering, in the course of 1920s, a score of dancehalls and bars, such as le Bal Nègre de rue Blomet, le Bal de la Glacière, le Dôme, la Rotonde, le Jockey, le Sélect and la Coupole, where clients danced to jazz, and music inspired by or associated with it like MUSÉTE and BEGUINE.

CHANSON singers, instead, pursued their careers in emergent sound film and radio with which their songs were diffused to as large an audience as they had never imagined before. In 1929, the first French musical film, La Route est Belle (The Route is Beautiful), was released, followed by Sous les Toits de Paris (Under the Roofs of Paris) in 1930 and 14 Juillet (14th of July) in 1932 by René Clair. Ironically, the sound films have dislocated that of which they talk – Parisian street musicians and
popular quarters. Streets became too noisy with cars and ever-continuing urbanisation and, as a street
singer complained in 1935, “people don’t have any money anymore, nor much enthusiasm and almost
no time to waste: they are pressed to go back home where radio and phonograph warble out the
refrains of the day. Our business is over [...]” (in Lesueur 1999, 8). By 1935, most of the leading
cabarets, café-concerts and music-halls in Paris were closed down. Others, including le Moulin Rouge,
l’Olympia and Ba-Ta-Clan, were converted to cinemas (see Sallée and Cheveau 1985). CHANSON was
lifted out of the streets from which it claims it emerged, when it was transfigured as “the fantasy of its
own disappearance” (Rifkin 1991, 208) for a national, and international, audience. In 1934, cinema
attained 320 million francs of annual turnover in France, which augmented to 453 million in 1938
(INSEE 1951). According to the data compiled by CNC, 453 million people attended cinemas in 1938 –
an average French person went to cinema 10 to 11 times a year (see Figure 10). Popular successes were
no longer generated from live performance in the street, in cabarets or music-halls, but images of them,
multiplied and projected simultaneously in different places.

The dislocation of music-hall stars from stage performance and their differentiation from jazz
were further instituted by radio. The pre-history of French radio broadcasting is too complicated to
detail here. Suffice to note that, despite disposing a legal framework for wireless communication, the
state could not monopolise the airwave. In 1921, the first public radio station, future Radio Tour Eiffel,
started broadcasting. A Parisian private station, Radiola, started in 1922. In 1923, another public
station, Paris PTT, started transmission, and the state introduced band-length allocation and licensing
control on private stations. In January 1928, the state ordered existing private stations to cease
broadcasting. Out of them, 13 stations did not agree, only to be authorised ex post facto half a year
later. Four of the authorised 13 stations were Parisian – Radio-Paris (renamed from Radiola in 1924,
and to be nationalised in 1933), le Poste Parisien (sponsored by the newspaper, *le Petit Parisien*), Radio Vitus (to become le Poste de l’Ile-de-France in 1934) and Radio LL (to become Radio-Cité). The public stations developed their national network, which gradually overrode regional differences, and production and transmission were to be centralised in the capital towards the 1930s. It is difficult to obtain exact listener figures before the tightening of tax collection in 1933, but, following the estimation by Brochand (1994), the number of listeners reached one million before 1932, and developed steadily from 1,367,715 in 1933 to 5,219,661 in 1939 (see Figure 10).

Music was central to both public and private stations. A large part of music programme relied on an orchestra each station employed in the 1920s, while cheaper and handier records replaced the live music in the course of the 1930s. The musical preference of each station was not clear in the beginning, but each radio station, by its own strategies to promote audience fidelity, gradually articulated itself to cultural and musical tastes. The public stations were “particularly important within the domain of news [...] and within that of classical music,” whereas the private stations were “the origin of programmes gaining immense popular success [...] and established achievement of singers such as Charles Trenet or Edith Piaf” (Cazenave and Ulmann-Mauriat 1994, 104). As cinemas displaced music-halls, an increasing number of musical programmes carrying music-hall vocabularies were launched on the radio in the 1930s, such as *Le Micro de la Redoute* (*Microphone of the Banquet*), *Le Music-hall des Jeunes* (*Music-hall for Youths*), *Le Bar des Vedettes* (*Stars’ Bar*) or *La Revue des Succès* (*The Revue of Success*). Recording companies were alerted as the radio diffused their songs freely. *Le Poste Parisien*, according to Brochand (1994, 391), agreed with the recording industry in 1933 that it would not programme any new song for 15 days from its release; that it would not programme music more than 60 hours a month; and that it would not programme the same record more than once without its publisher's authorisation. Finally, SACEM intervened in the negotiation in 1937 so that the broadcasters had to pay for recorded music used. Once agreed, and the radio listenership increased rapidly, radio, like film, became an important means to promote records. Pasqualini (1996, 47) reports that some even paid to plug their records at the time.

In the midst of the rapid penetration of music-hall CHANSON into the film and radio industries and permeation of these media to daily life, jazz was rarely on the air. It certainly was, but if it was, then, as Jackson (1999) points out, French composers and musicians unions were strongly pressurising the government to dissuade Anglo-American music from being programmed on the air, or foreign musicians from performing, both in cultural terms – the French CHANSON tradition was in peril – and economic terms – rampant foreign performers and composers deprived French performers of job and French composers of author's rights revenues. Jacques Canetti (1986), then a programming director for *le Poste Parisian*, who realised live relay of Duke Ellington’s concert in Paris in 1933 and Louis Armstrong’s in 1934, recalls that his jazz programme was received with hostility:

I entered the studio timidly, I went out equally timidly, for I felt it well that the programme caused violent reactions from listeners. The 'hot' jazz was considered as music of the savage people and me, as their prophet. I was in a sort of ghetto. If I had played Jack Hylton or the likes, it would have been less negative, but there, these roars, as they called it, the screams.... (119-20)
In 1936, Canetti was appointed as the programming director for Radio Cité. Despite equally keen determination to promote jazz, “his programme, Le Music-hall des Jeunes, in which he let the listeners vote, gave him Agnès Capri as the first laurel.... The turning point was cleared: Canetti contributed to introduce Charles Trenet, Lussienne Delyle, Edith Piaf” (Brunschwig et al. 1997, 80).

The rejection instituted a market for 'hot' jazz – pure and immediate jazz as opposed to scholarly and lifeless 'straight' or fake jazz – and its diffusion was anchored much more importantly in the urban landscape of Paris, in its DANCINGs, bars, cafés or dancehalls. In 1932, the Hot Club of France (HCF) was inaugurated by a group of students in Paris, of which Hugues Panassié was the president. Their aim was to organise dispersed 'pure' enthusiasts and promote 'hot' jazz in France and in the world. The HCF organised a series of conferences and record concerts, in which Panassié, the son of a wealthy industrialist, would play his rare and expensive US jazz records. In 1933, it organised the first of its series of 'hot' jazz concerts in the basement of a specialist import record shop in Montparnasse and in 1935, it launched Jazz Hot, the first critical fanzine devoted to jazz. For the first time, musicianship was acquired not through reading of printed musical scores but through listening to music not available other than on records. Some French jazz musicians, earning their lives playing 'straight' music or, for better or worse, backing music-hall singers, gradually gathered together, and eventually became the prominent multi-racial French Jazz group, Quintet of the Hot Club de France, featuring an Italian descendant violinist, Stephane Grappelli, and a gypsy guitarist, Django Reinhardt, whose success more or less built not only the financial foundation for the Club, but also its authenticity. By 1937, it established its own record label, Swing, whose “discs will be the selections of the best artists and orchestras of jazz in the world” as its advertisement claimed (du Peuty and Ody 1997, 48).

Jazz in France was to see unexpected expansion even under the Nazis occupation. Jazz, at the same time, was the first music in France whose authenticity could not be fully handled by music publishers. Unlike in Japan where musicians capable of playing European musical instruments and reading its musical notation were scarce and 'authentic' Western music could only be appreciated through its recordings from an earlier stage of the socialisation of phonograph technology, stylistic changes in music occurred mostly within the capacity of its own musical resources before the arrival of jazz in France. The disembedded nature of 'hot' jazz accelerated the full-scale take-off of the record industry in France. If, in 1936, Tino Rossi’s ‘Marinella’ caused a sensation by selling 80,000 copies (Pasqualini 1996, 53), ‘Je Suis Swing (I Am Swing)’ of Johnny Hess, a precursor of 'jazzy' VARIÉTÉS, sold two million copies in 1939. In 1934, in the crude crisis of music-hall business, a new type of music-hall, A.B.C., was inaugurated in Paris, which would soon become “the music-hall of Paris” (Brunschwig et al. 1981, 9). It no longer offered a variety of spectacles, but concentrated on showcasing of artists whose songs were available in record shops. It is only then that the recording industry in France replaced the music-publishing industry as an important institution to produce success. The statistical figure of phonograph production in France during this period is hard to establish. All I have at my disposal is the neighbouring German ones from 1927 to 1938. Given that the market leader, Gramophone, had its European factory in Hanover, Germany, the French figures should be much smaller (Gronow (1983) estimates the French figure for 1929 to be between 1/3 and 2/3 of the German figures), yet the French market must have followed a similar curb in the
assumption that both the German and the French markets suffered from the Depression in around 1931 and recovered from around 1936 (see Figure 10).

**Tokyo: Jazz, the West and the Elite Class**

One of the first performances of jazz in Japan is said to be in a cinema-theatre in Asakusa in 1921 and the first records categorised under 'jazz' appeared in around 1925 (see Kurata 1992, 139-40). Jazz, however, as Kurata (1992) points out, signified "any popular titles from abroad. Moreover, even Japanese HAYARI-UTA accompanied by Western musical instruments was called jazz. The sonic difference was received as the bustle, and the term jazz was associated with that bustle" (140). The Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923 flattened and burned the Shitamachi area which contained many fragile wooden buildings, giving rise to migration of popular entertainers, impresarios and their audiences in Asakusa to the less damaged Ginza district (see Yoshimi 1987, 219-20). It also 'modernised' the entertainment: the number of traditional fairground stalls dropped from 20,137 (of which 230 permanent) in 1924 to 8,625 (102 permanent) in 1938, whereas cinemas increased from 45,909 (of which 891 permanent) in 1924 to 95,712 (1,847 permanent) in 1938, serving 420 million spectators nationwide (Nichigai Associates 1999). The swift eruption of popular entertainment to the place which had been constructed as 'the window to the West' transgressed the symbolic order, accompanied by the abrupt explosion of the market: the population in Japan increased from 55.9 million in 1920 to 71.9 million in 1940 (JSA), of which Tokyo city embraced the highest growth rate (198%) from 3.7 million in 1920 to 7.4 million in 1940 (JSA). Devastation cased by the Earthquake in turn facilitated the government completing the circular Yamanote railway line in 1925, followed by a number of private railway companies that connected suburban areas that they developed to the central Tokyo. In 1932, Tokyo's city limits were expanded to subsume 5 million people. Between 1920 and 1940, the population of the old central Tokyo remained almost stable from 2,402,591 people in 1920 to 2,821,555 in 1940, whereas the population of the newly annexed suburbs augmented rapidly from 953,595 in 1920 to 4,190,364 in 1940 (TMG: see Figure 11). In the midst of the influx of urban migration and the shrinking distance between Asakusa and Ginza, the elite class became urged to re-established their social distinction and inclined to nationalism, particularly in the form of anti-Americanism or anti-Westernisation. Jazz, a Western popular music, was clearly one of the most visible dividers of the musical space in Tokyo.

Apart from the obvious destruction of Tokyo, there were two less obvious consequences of the Great Kanto Earthquake concerning popular music production. The first of them was the introduction of electric recording technology and local pressing of overseas recordings. In order to scrape up budget for restoration of Tokyo and its economy gravely undermined by the earthquake, the government introduced, from 1924, 100% tariff on imported luxuries, including records. To get around it, some of the Japanese recording companies sought to import master discs from overseas labels to press them locally. With local pressing, they could not only evade the luxury import tax, but also produce overseas recordings at a price as low as domestic ones. In 1927, Nichibei Chikuonki transferred 80% of its capital to an American firm, Columbia Graphophone (Columbia Records from 1931), to establish Nihon Columbia. In the same year, the Japanese importer of Polydor established Nihon Polydor, and American Victor established its Japanese branch, Nihon Victor. The consequence
was crucial - "by pressing foreign records in Japan, the price dropped from 3, 5 or 7 yen to 1.5 yen a copy. 'Extraordinary bargain price' in its genuine sense" (Kurata 1992, 148). Locally pressed cheaper records of European and American music transformed the way the distance between the 'West' and Japan was felt, and furthered the transgression of the 'West' by the masses.

Another consequence of the Earthquake worth noting was the implementation of radio broadcasting, for the government took it of immediate importance to establish a nationwide electric communication network in case of a natural disaster like this (and artificial ones like social disorders and wars). Though initially instituted as private ventures, radio broadcasting came under total state monopoly in 1925. In 1926, the three nationalised stations in Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya were unified into one public service corporation, the Nihon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), based on listenership subscription. Together with the development of popular culture, the nation's political consciousness was at height, and the ruling class found radio as an effective means to "distract the nation from unconfined criticism against the government" (Hidaka 1991, 20).

The stations had to face strict pre-censorship by the authorities. To avoid politically sensitive contents, entertainment features were indispensable, yet they, too, were subject to rigorous regulation — the authorities banned "those dealing with 'love affair' and 'seductive terms'" (Hidaka, 20). Hayari-Uta, Asakusa Opera and jazz were three of the most despised genres. According to Osada (1978), most of the music on the air was "limited to Western classical music, minyo [ballad], zokkyoku [folksong] and jun hogaku [pure traditional music]. When it came to naniwa-bushi and kodan [storytelling], those that would serve to sustain loyalty, nationalism or feudalistic family values were prioritised" (34). The programming, thus, wavered between the stations that needed to reflect popular taste to increase more listenership and to stabilise management, and the authorities that needed to "erase contents 'leaning to radical political agitation', 'embracing extreme ideas' and 'alluding foul opinions'" (Hidaka 1991, 20).

The listenership took a full seven years to reach one million in 1932 (see Figure 12).

The emergence of radio broadcasting and its use of music gave rise to another dispute on the CHOSAKU-KEN law. The government, having reserved performing rights of foreign compositions to facilitate better diffusion of Western theatre and music since the Berne Convention, was pressured at the Roman conference in 1928 and acceded to performing rights, resulted in a revision of the law in

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**Figure 11: A Century of Japanese and Tokyoite Population**

Source: JSA, TMS

N. B. Because of the way the data are isolated, the old central Tokyo is estimated as a summation of today's Chiyoda, Chuo, Minato, Shinjuku, Bunkyo, Taito, Sumida and Koto wards, roughly corresponding the old city limits of Tokyo defined in 1888, whereas the newly annexed suburbs, the rest of the current 23 wards.
The government was unable to nominate an appropriate local institution to exact the fees, and Dr. Wilhelm Plage, a German expatriate, was commissioned as an agent in Japan in the same year. However, Dr. Plage, as is often alleged, not only charged a seemingly excessive amount of fees, but also assumed unreasonable authority on himself (he is reported to have undermined performances and presentations if necessary, causing seventy-two lawsuits in the one year of 1931, out of which six were civil and sixty-five criminal (see Omori 1986, 223: quoted in Mitsui 1993, 137) and Nihon Hoso Kyokai could not broadcast foreign music, live or recorded, for a year (Ando 1995, 18)). The government intervened in 1934, firstly by revising the CHOSAKU-KEN law once again so that use of commercial recordings on the radio is exempted from copyright collection and secondly by enacting a bill to disprove any CHOSAKU-KEN agent without the state’s consent. In 1939, the Japanese equivalent of SACEM – JASRAC (Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers) – was established. The society, as Mitusi (1993) argues, “was thus born out of governmental anxiety about foreign pressure,” rather than “to protect the copyrights of Japanese ‘Authors, Composers and Publishers’ themselves” (138). The harsh insertion of Japanese performers, writers, impresarios and broadcasters into the international arena of art business sharply put into question their position in it – is it, the polemic heated, impoverishment of pure Western art by the very West, or should Japanese artists be more conscious of CHOSAKU-KEN?

Despite the growing scepticism towards the ‘West’ and its ‘progress’ among some intellectuals and artists, jazz – the signifier of the bustle of all that is Western music – boomed. Jazz was rarely on the air, but radio did not threaten the record sales – unlike the slow growth of radio listenership, record sales increased almost three-fold from 10.5 million units in 1929 to 29.7 million units in 1936 (see Figure 12). In 1929, a song called ‘Tokyo Koshinkyoku (Tokyo March)’ became a national success. The song was, as its songwriter put it, “a jazzy satire of vacuous lives of the contemporary Tokyoite,
dancing boisterously beneath the absurd expansion of economic life" (Yomiuri Shimbun, 4 Aug. 1929: quoted in Kurata 1992, 161). Jazz scandalised the society not simply because of its incomprehensible instrumentation, but because of the dance that came along with it. Jazz was often associated with deviance, all the more so as its venues – cafés and dancehalls in and around Ginza – “definitely became one of the mass entertainment institutions and the waitresses’ sexual service became explicit” (Yoshimi 1987, 223) after the Earthquake. “Tokyo Koshinkyoku’, according to Nakamura (1991), was one of the first songs “completely planned and produced by its record company” (267), tied in with a film of the same title produced and distributed by Nikkatsu Film company. Its promotional strategy inscribed the song in the network of these ‘deviant’ topos in Tokyo. According to Osada (1978), “the recording company pressed special sample records containing a trailing narration of the film and the song for intermission in cinemas and gave them to the film company. The film company then distributed them to cinemas nationwide to play” (44). Yomiuri Shimbun reported that “promotional teams for Nikkatsu Film spread the records to cafés and bars, and made loud noises about the film” (30 Sep. 1929: quoted in Kurata 1992, 157). The refusal by the radio in turn mediated jazz to institute its own space – cinemas, cafés and dancehalls – with its one market – the young generation of outgoing suburbanisation, known as mo-bo, or modern boys, and mo-ga, or modern girls.

Jazz, if rarely considered as black music, was nevertheless closely associated with to the decadence of the West and, with pre-war Japanese jazz, the eroticised ‘West’ went beyond something to ‘watch’ – as in ASAKUSA OPERA – and became something to ‘touch’. By 1928, there were some 21 dancehalls in and around Tokyo and, not very surprisingly, some of them became implicated in sex industry. Also in 1928, police introduced licensing policy for dancehalls and imposed a set of very strict, detailed and concrete regulations on location, building structure, opening hours, employees’ criminal records, customers’ nature, etc. The dancehall was classified almost as a brothel and state’s intervention against jazz and dance got tighter and tighter during the 1930s. According to Nagai (1991), the regulation of 1928 defines that a successful dancehall “should be inside a fireproof building and be situated above the third floor; be equipped with dancers’ toilets and anterooms; provide a smoking corner exclusively for clients; have seats for clients differentiated from those for dancers” (85: my italics). Dancing bodies were concealed in an invisible space – ‘above the third floor’ – and marginalised from the mainstream. Dance culture in Japan, to borrow Nagai’s passage, “was cooped up in a cage called dancehall, and locked up with a key called law” (72). The number of dancehalls in Tokyo had been weeded out to some eight by the mid-’30s, of which three in the Ginza district. Jazz in Japan was, thus, a symbol of the deceptive ‘West’ – accentuated by the affairs of Dr. Plage – and materialist, industrial ‘mass’ culture – echoed by the anti-Americanism.

Jazz also had transformed the structure of the Japanese recording industry. ‘Tokyo Koshinkyoku’, and another popular hit, ‘Kimi Koishi (You, Sweetheart)’, are both reported to have sold 300,000 copies and 250,000 copies respectively. These figures might have been exaggerated, but the recording industry envisioned today’s operability in these decades, in actively producing popularity, rather than recording artists and songs that were already popular. In the course of the 1930s, Nihon Victor joined hands with Nikkatsu Film, and Nihon Columbia with Shochiku Film. The former also retained Shinpei Nakayama as its exclusively contracted composer, and the latter Masao Koga, which
institutionalised senzoku-sei, a star system centred on recording companies that employ composers and songwriters exclusively. Mediatisation of deviances, such as jazz, alcohol and dance, and their association with Ginza, rapidly and drastically abstracted the geographic tension between shitamachi and yamanote in these decades. As 'Ginza' became abstracted as a symbol by films, phonographs and the urban transport network, 'street', too, had to negotiate with modernisation, urbanisation and abstraction of Tokyo. Many argue that new media technologies eliminated enka-shis from the street, but that does not mean the disappearance of 'street' music production. Simply, a fiddle alone could no longer be effectively heard in the loud urban soundscape of Tokyo.

From the mid-1930s, under the totalitarian regime, the modern media of mass diffusion increasingly came under the strict regulation of the authorities. Film attendance increased from 198 million in 1930 to 420 million in 1938, whereas length of film cut by the censorship scheme diminished from 24,166 metres in 1930 to 14,100 metres in 1936 (Nichigai Associates 1999). The auto-censorship must have been the only way to maintain the business. Although the radio stations gradually programmed hayari-uta, with its own generic term, kayo-kyoku (literally 'song for singing'; so called as the radio station authority thought it inadequate to call a new song 'popular' when it was not yet popular (Osada 1978, 34-5)), it was soon replaced by militant and nationalistic propaganda songs, played daily on national radio. In 1934, the government suppressed regional programming to establish centralised broadcasting from Tokyo. The 2.26 military coup d'état took place in 1936. In the same year, cafés were refrained from playing phonograph after 22:00, and all the recordings became subject to pre-censorship by the authorities. In 1937, when Japan entered the Sino-Japanese war, nationwide dancehall oppression commenced and both Nihon Victor and Nihon Columbia were forced to withdraw from Japan, and ceded, first, to Nihon Sangyo and, later, to Tokyo Denki (today's Toshiba). It was then that the annual record production began dropping (see Figure 12). By 1941, there were 6,624,000 radio subscriptions, covered by 43 stations. The record industry would not be able to reach the level of 1935 until 1961. It was the radio that conveyed the news of Japan's defeat to the nation in 1945.
The cultural production in the immediate post-war era in Japan entailed an immense transformation of the pre-war cultural value and social orders. The occupation army's General Headquarters (GHQ) imposed strict censorship on cultural production as soon as it was founded in 1945. Under the supervision of its Civil Information and Education Section (CIIES) and Civil Censorship Department (CCD), the entertainment industries began their operation. The film industry was the quickest to recover its pre-war production level (the first post-war film, Soyokaze (Breeze), was produced in 1945 under the GHQ's supervision, which resulted in the first kiss scene ever in Japanese film history). Its theme song, 'Ringo no Uta (Apple Song)', sung by Michiko Namiki, was also the first post-war hit song which restored the tie-in operation between the film and the recording industries based on the SENZOKU-SEI system of KAYO-KYOKU, the term replaced HAYARI-UTA. The severely damaged recording industry and its press factories, if relatively slowly, also retrieved their operation and major recording companies, such as Nihon Victor and Nihon Columbia, restored both their trademarks and business operation. Radio, this time, was on their side, for KAYO-KYOKU and jazz were encouraged under the censorship scheme, while certain genres, such as KABUKI and NANIWA-BUSHI, were banned from radio for being too patriotic and feudalistic. The GHQ considered the Nihon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) as an adequate means to regulate the nation, despite that the government presumed a US-led occupation policy and prepared for privatisation of radio broadcasting.

The presence of about 400,000 mostly US servicemen impressed their music in Japan. From their base camps, their jeeps or their own radio network (the Armed Force Radio Service (AFRS), today's Far East Network (FEN)), American popular music was heard and recognised as 'jazz' in a lump again. In the same year, the government opened private clubs, dancehalls and cabarets exclusively for US servicemen around their camps and especially in the Ginza quarter where there were the headquarters. It was a covert and xenophobic measure of the Recreation and Amusement Association (RAA: a governmental committee) to "protect [Japanese] women from sexually hungry Occupation Army troops" (Nagai 1991, 165). The post-war Japanese jazz, outgrown from the pre-war weir of the SENZOKU-SEI system, began instituting an entirely different network and market from KAYO-KYOKU genre. Even if it was difficult to attract Japanese clients, its market was readily there as an entertainment for US servicemen. Musicians were considerably lacking, and not only those involved in the pre-war jazz scene, but also musicians from any other training background flocked in front of the camps and the dancehalls for high wages ("jazzmen earned what an average university graduate would earn in a month in a day" (Kurita 1995, 61)). And from there, jazz permeated Japanese audiences. By 1946, dancehalls not exclusively for GIs opened in the Ginza or the Shinjuku quarters, and more and more hit songs were made with jazz references, such as 'Ai no Swing (Swing of Love)' by Mariko Ike or 'Tokyo Boogie-woogie' by Sizuko Kasagi. Japan would soon welcome Gene Krupa's Trio in 1952 and Louis Armstrong in 1953, but the government remained 'dance-phobia'. The prefecture-based Entertainment and Amusement Trades Control Act (1948) was enforced and the rigorous sanction of dance and musical performances became restored. Dancehalls and live music venues, like
prostitution and gambling, came under legal control again.

Japan concluded the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 with the United States and most other Allied powers (except the Soviet Union, China, India and Burma). As the treaty became effective in 1952, the GHQ was dissolved. The Japanese recording industry rapidly embarked on the international business. Thanks to the economic growth and improved condition for foreign exchange, master disc importation from overseas labels restarted in 1951. By 1953, the production recovered the 1941 level. At the same time, privatisation of radio broadcasting was granted as a by-product of the anti-Communist policy of the United States which feared Soviet’s and China’s influence on Japan. In Tokyo, Radio Tokyo (today’s TBS) started broadcasting in 1951, followed by the Nihon Bunka Hoso Kyokai (today’s Bunka Hoso) in 1952 and Nippon Hoso in 1954. In 1953, the NHK started its television broadcasting. A private station, NTV, followed in the same year and set up 220 so-called *gaito terebi* (street-corner television sets) to popularise television. The government and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry actively supported permeation of television in the 1950s as a means to develop the electronics industry in Japan. By 1960, 34 NHK stations and 37 private television companies (246 stations) nationwide catered for 6,860,000 subscribers (as opposed to 11,802,000 radio subscribers, with 365 stations (of which 115 private stations and NHK’s two experimental FM stations (JSA 1988): see Figure 13).

As wages from the US army camps and the GI dancehalls were disproportionately high, and the recording industry suffered from lack of shellac and of economic stability, jazz musicians had often considered recording secondary in the 1940s, but as the Occupation Army withdrew, they (reportedly there were some 3,000 Jazz musicians in Tokyo by 1952 (see, for example, Osada 1979, 154)) gradually approached recording companies. Some secured places in the *senzoku-sei* system for *kayo-kyoku* as composers or accompanists, whereas others challenged *kayo-kyoku* genre by mobilising not only musical skills but also management and business know-how acquired in the army camp business, which would lead them to institute a network for *pops* genre: popular music from the United States, its
Japanese cover versions and Japanese music derived from it. Popular music from the United States considered almost indiscriminately as jazz, it went almost without confrontation that musicians and promoters from jazz background in the US army camp dealt with country & western, rockabilly or even Hawaiian music in the early 1960s.

Although POPS was mostly performed and promoted in a number of so-called jazz kisas (jazz coffee shops) prominent in the Ginza and the Shinjuku quarters, it was also favoured by the private radio stations that sought to differentiate themselves from public NHK and from each other. Bunka Hoso started an 'international' hit chart programme, Your Hit Parade, in 1955, and other stations followed the current. Following the jazz boom brought about by Gene Krupa and Louis Armstrong in 1953, Mambo saw a phenomenal popularity among the youths in 1955. Rockabilly was also one of the first POPS sub-genres promoted by ex-army-camp jazz promoters. It was a vague category – a genre of music promoted by jazz impresarios and performed by country and western musicians in jazz coffee shops and, again, Western-ness superseded blackness.

In Japan, among other things, because rockabilly was considered as 'a version of country and western with a fiddle or a harmonica replaced by a saxophone' and performed mainly by country and western singers and because songs by white artists [Elvis Presley, Jean Vincent, etc.] tended to be introduced, rock 'n' roll would be delivered very tardily, resulting in the appellation [rockabilly] more enduring than in its original birthplace. (Asahi Shimbun 1987, 146)

Be it as it may, it was the emergence of a veritable youth market that revolted the society. The first 'western' festivals at the Nihon Theatre in 1958 drew around 50,000 teenagers in a space of one week and some of the excited audience climbed up to the stage or pulled performers down from the stage. By the end of the 1950s, an increasing number of POPS acts became televised. It was also by this time that the broadcasting media and their entertainment features, particularly popular music, became criticised as degrading. In 1959, the government revised the broadcasting law to impose stricter ethic codes. In the same year, the Entertainment and Amusement Trades Control Act was revised to restrict late-night trade of the jazz coffee shops which "were problematic as a hotbed of juvenile delinquency" (National Police Agency 1994, 3). The act was revised once again in 1964 before the Tokyo Olympics and as a part of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government's 'clean up operation' for the Olympics, allegedly 200 teenagers hanging around in the Ginza quarter were taken into protective custody in one day of 19 September 1964.

Figure 13 reveals that record production failed to grow until 1960, whereas radio subscribers increased constantly from 1950 followed by television from 1955. The recording industry, monopolised by six companies (Nihon Victor, King Records, Teichiku Records, Taihei Records (became Nihon Mercury from 1953), Polydor (inactive from 1951, reactivated by Fuji Denki and Deutsche Gramophon) and Nihon Columbia), and heavily reliant on the SENZOKU-SEI system, could cope neither with the emergent youth market nor with the newly established broadcasting media institutions. Gradually, POPS artists and promoters established production companies and music publishers mediating among the youth market, the record companies and the radio or television stations. These companies started to manage artists and rights of their works independently from the

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recording companies: it was, after more than half a century of its implementation, the first spontaneous enterprise based on exploitation of CHOSAKU-KEN. The emergence of television broadcasting had a drastic effect on the film industry and, eventually, on KAYO-KYOKU network, for film had been a central means of its dissemination. Alerted, the film industry refused to supply films for television, which resulted in the flood of American films and serials on the television screen. Peaking in 1958, the annual film attendance declined from 1.10 billion in 1958 to 0.25 billion in 1970. The recording companies were worried about confrontation of the emergent POPS producers with the long held convention of SENZOKU-SEI system, and tended to release Japanese POPS acts under foreign labels with which they had distribution deals. The micro groove technology was introduced in 1951 and associated with the new taxonomy: Western classical music and traditional folk music recordings tended to be released on the LP format, costly but offering the best sound quality. POPS was associated with the new and handy EP (and later single) format and KAYO-KYOKU with the conventional 78 rpm SP format.

As the mass media grew and music publishing business turned out to be profitable, toward the beginning of 1960s, POPS production began to involve a complexly interwoven string of CHOSAKU-KEN shared among production companies, recording companies, music publishers, television stations, radio stations or even swimsuit manufacturers, and became established as a highly mediatised commercial venture. An article from the June 1961 issue of Music Life magazine (in Kurosawa 1995, 134) reveals that rockabilly stars were, apart from the regularised 'western' carnival at the Nihon Theatre, featured in a number of successful films, popular theatres and music programmes on television. New dance steps were eagerly promoted by the industries on almost yearly basis, ranging from the twist (1962), the bossa nova (1963), the surfin' (1964), the swim (1965) or the go-go (1966). From around 1962, some of the rockabilly bands adopted electric instrumental music, largely influenced by the Ventures, which led to so-called elekii (electric guitar) band boom. In 1964, the first single of the Beatles, 'I Wanna Hold Your Hand', was released in Japan, and some of the groups adopted GROUP SOUNDS style (Japanese equivalent of the Mersey beats), followed by COLLEGE FOLK (influenced by the Brothers Four, Peter, Paul and Mary and the like). All of them mobilised extensive media promotion campaigns from film to magazines, television appearance to concert tours. At least one of the independent music publishers and/or production companies was involved in each of these acts. POPS became the mainstream, and the question became whether or not it was authentic music for the youths.

As POPS became established as a new system of star production and irretrievably implicated into the mainstream business, it gave rise to an opposition within the youth market. Along with COLLEGE FOLK and GROUP SOUNDS artists, there emerged so-called UNDERGROUND FOLK and NEW ROCK movements in the late 60s, which turned their back to the 'ubiquitous and artificial' POPS. Unlike POPS which, after all, inherited the SENZOKU-SEI system in that composers and songwriters offer songs to singers and performers, even though they were now exclusively contracted by independent production companies, instead of recording companies, the authenticity of these 'underground' genres was granted, among other things, only to artists who play songs composed and written by themselves. UNDERGROUND FOLK music in Japan was emerged against the commercial and apolitical COLLEGE FOLK
singers. The first of a series of underground folk music festivals, Folk, Folk, Folk, was organised in 1966. In the same year, the Beatles performed in Tokyo, at the unlikely Budo-kan, National Arena of Martial Arts, scandalising the conservatives and the nationalists.

At the Budo-kan, all seats were removed from the ground floor to isolate the stage from the audiences. On the first floor, a solid iron fence was constructed. The bright lighting illuminated the arena throughout the performance where policemen were distributed. Paper streamers, placards and flags to cheer up each member of their favourite group were all taken away, and the audience was refrained from standing up. Teachers from concerned high schools lined up around the venue for 'educational guidance'. From the airport, the hotel to the venue, the fans were blocked by a thick wall of policemen, and taken pictures of by journalists. (Asahi Shimbun 1987, 246)

“There were,” the same article reveals, “the total of 8,370 policemen mobilised during their stay, and 6,520 teenagers were taken into custody” (246). Around this time NEW ROCK genre emerged against commercial GROUP SOUNDS fad.

NEW ROCK instituted its market through endless polemics over its rhythmic drive and linguistic barriers. Yuasa (1999) argues:

Whether a Japanese song rocks or not tended to be mixed up with the question of background, reference and identity of a song and an artist who played it. Who controlled the artist and the song? It was argued that rockabilly and group sounds could not (and must not) be called ‘rock’, for they were mass music produced under the control of the major production companies and ought to be categorised as kayo-kyoku. These were, in other words, music of the ‘Establishment’. (31)

Some, notably Yuya Uchida, stubbornly kept writing and singing rock songs in English, whereas others, such as Happy End, appropriated rock’s philosophy to Japanese daily life vocabulary. The advent of media technologies in the 1960s could not let the POPS production companies and music publishers to exclusively gatekeep information on the American and European popular music. The first television satellite relay between the United States and Japan was realised, reporting the assassination of US president J. F. Kennedy, in 1963 and the Tokyo Olympics was relayed to 104 broadcasting institutions in 70 nations (Hidaka 1991, 233). K. Sazanami (1998), president of Shinko Music and influential lyric translator for Japanese cover versions of American pops, recollects that he finally gave up translation after the Beatles, not simply because their Liverpool English was hard to decipher, but more decisively because listener’s attention was directed towards the ‘real’ Anglo-American rock tunes hidden behind the ‘artificial’ POPS made by the production companies, like his.

In Tokyo, musical production as such could no longer take place in Ginza. Since the raid of 1964, Ginza, particularly its outmoded cabarets and dancehalls, lost its centripetal force for popular music production. Further more, the displacement of Tokyo’s population reached to an unprecedented phase – the population of old Tokyo and its annexed central area ceased to grow and even started to decline in the 1970s and instead western periphery of Tokyo and greater suburbs of Chiba, Kanagawa and Saitama prefectures began accommodating rapidly growing population (see Map 3 and Figure 11 (p. 49)). As young households moved off central Tokyo, clubs and live venues moved to western Tokyo.
Pops artists shifted their hang-out to the Akasaka and the Roppongi quarters where there were headquarters and studios of television production, while rock and folk artists tended toward the Shinjuku quarter and its farther western suburban extension of Nakano, Koenji and Kichijoji. According to Yoshimi (1987), the Shinjuku quarter at the time consisted of:

Hootenannies hanging around Fugetsu-do coffee shop or so-called Green House at the east exit of the station; underground theatres and happenings based at venues such as the Sasori-za and the Pit Inn or in the precincts of Hanzono shrine and so on; student activists who organise demonstrations or campaigns for raising funds; folk guerrillas at the west exit of the station; young people simply strolling; and even prostitutes and vagabonds in and around the Sanko-cho area. (272-3)

On the street in such a way, and through performances at indoor venues called laibu hause (live houses) and many open-air and often free rock and folk festivals, UNDERGROUND FOLK and NEW ROCK expanded their realm and market from the end of the 1960s. ‘Street’ here differed significantly from that in the 1900s and 10s, derived from the Movement for Civic Rights and Freedom, and from that in the 1920s and 1930s, based on dancehalls and cafés gushed out of the vulgarisation and eroticisation of the ‘West’. ‘Street’ for UNDERGROUND FOLK and NEW ROCK was defined as opposed to the mass mediated commercial POPS/KAYO-KYOKU production system. It was ‘natural’ against ‘artificial media product’; ‘human handwork’ as opposed to ‘inhuman mass production of stars’; and ‘one’s spontaneous choice’ as opposed to ‘someone else’s manipulation’.

It should not be overlooked, however, that their distaste for the mass media was not entirely anti-media. Naturalised as ‘underground’, late-night radio shows served as an important means to mediate the ‘street’ authenticity to the increasingly dispersed audiences nationwide. One of the first hit songs to represent UNDERGROUND FOLK, ‘Kaettekita Yopparai (A Boozer Returned)’ by the Folk Crusaders (1968), was a popular choice in Kansai radio’s late-night show, Midnight Folk, in Osaka,
and then was taken up by Nihon Hoso's similar programme, *All Night Nippon*, in Tokyo, to become a national hit. Similarly, most of the leading folk and rock artists participated in private AM radio stations' late-night shows. There was a mutual interest between the artists, who sought for channels to communicate with appropriate audiences, and radio stations which needed to redefine themselves in the face of the rapid growth of television broadcasting, the introduction of colour television and FM radio stations. It must also be noted that the popularisation of transistor radio enabled the youths to listen to these late-night programmes without parental intervention. Audiences were most welcome to participate in these mid-night shows via phone-ins or request cards. Bunka Hoso's late-night programme, *Say! Young*, went so far as to sponsor *Shinjuku Playmap*, a give-away magazine widely read among UNDERGROUND FOLK and NEW ROCK fans.

The opposition between the 'street' music and the 'mainstream' music was also translated into the organisation within the recording industry. As the 'street' market extended nationwide, tension grew increasingly between, on the one hand, the major recording companies and POPS/KAYO-KYOKU production companies and, on the other, the 'street' network of UNDERGROUND FOLK and NEW ROCK production. Politically subversive messages and disturbing performances by some of the artists did not agree with the reinforced ethic codes of the major labels and mass media corporations. Some songs suffered from sales boycott and others from airplay restriction. In 1969, two of the first Japanese independent labels, URC (Underground Record Club) and Elec Records, were inaugurated. URC initially was a mail-order venture and its artists co-operated with local record shops and music instrument shops to organise their concerts and to sell their records. By the mid-70s, most of the major recording companies launched their own semi-independent folk and rock labels, including Express for Toshiba Records, Bellwood for King Records, Black Records for Teichiku Records, Mushroom for Columbia Records, Vertigo for Phonograph Records, etc. In these labels, a great deal of musical and aesthetic decision making control was assigned to artists themselves. Towards the late 1960s and into the 1970s, when the concept album principle (where an artist conceives an entire album as one's expression rather than a hit song on a 7-inch single) became conspicuous among Anglo-American rock production with the evolution of studio recording technologies, a new distinction arose within popular music: the LP format for 'authentic' folk and rock artists and the EP format for 'inauthentic' POPS/KAYO-KYOKU artists.

**Paris: Rock 'n' Roll, Yéyé and Pop**

The provisional Prime Minister of the Republic, Charles De Gaulle, knew, surely from his experience with the BBC during the war, the power of electric media. In 1945, the provisional government re-ordered all the existing radio and television (experiment had started since 1935) transmission facilities in the French territory under its monopoly. The state, in post-war France, explicitly considered radio and television broadcasting as one of the most indispensable instruments to reconstruct its destroyed nation and to channel its traumatised national identity. In eliminating regional services and private stations, *Radiodiffusion Française* (RDF, to become *Radiodiffusion Télévision Française* (RTF) in 1949) broadcast in two channels, cultural Programme National and entertainment Programme Parisien from 1945. In 1947, musically oriented Paris Inter was launched. However, the administration of radio and television broadcasting oscillated between a set of political
ideologies which, along with the changeable governments and the Ministers of Information during the decades, resulted in unstable management of programmes and audiences (according to Cazenave and Ulmann-Mauriat (1994, 137), there were, between 1945 and 1958, 16 legal projects concerning status and financing of broadcasting and 28 Ministers of Information). Both the Right and the Left expected broadcasting to disseminate French cultural and intellectual heritage for all its people and the government retained the right to forbid certain programmes from transmission — “control of programmes was from 1953 vested directly in the government Ministry of Information, which paid careful attention to the composition and presentation of news, and exercised the right to schedule official announcements” (Forbes et al. 1995, 146).

One exception to the monopoly was the American Force Network (AFN) station transmitted from Paris until the middle of 1946 (as it moved to Germany this year), which brought American 'hot' jazz on the air and was appreciated by French jazz fans. US servicemen, sometimes disappointing French jazz heads for their intolerance for or ignorance of 'their own' black music, brought with them abundant of new gadgets and new practices, from car to the jitterbug, enough to induce craving, especially among the young generation. America, in French imagination, “functioned as both dystopia and utopia” (Forbes et al. 1995, 142). It was, on the one hand, the name given to the fear that would menace and downgrade French tradition and cultural heritage that politicians considered as of urgent importance to reconstruct. On the other hand:

The fervour of anti-Americanism in some quarters was in direct proportion to the enthusiasm which all things American elicited in other quarters. Audiences flocked to watch *Gone with the Wind, Casablanca*, and many other Hollywood productions; children were entranced once again by Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck; and the intelligentsia became jazz buffs, quarrelling bitterly over the challenging bebop to traditional swing. The attraction was not only a glimpse of prosperity, it was also an image of freedom. (Forbes et al. 142)

France’s relationship with the United States would remain ambivalent throughout the post-war decades. It would give rise to a complicated set of both positive and negative manifestations, especially after the Marshall Plan, which facilitated the state-led modernisation in many corners of economic and social activities in France, including the drastic suburbanisation of the Parisian Region that we will observe later.

The other exception to the state monopoly of airwave was so-called the *postes périphériques* (peripheral radio stations), transmitting in French language for French audiences, but from out of the French boarder, for the state monopoly of radio transmitters and interdiction of commercial advertisement could not reach out of the French territory. Radio Luxembourg, launched in 1931 and seized by the Nazis during the war, was the first of the kind, and enjoyed the greatest audience in France until the mid-1950s. Both national and peripheral stations aimed at a similar market cluster, assuming familial use of the radio in households (whose 'perverted' programming of jazz the Hot Club of France accused and against which it even organised a series of campaigns (see Tournès 1999, 203-12)). It was only after the launch of Europe 1 in 1955, 35 % of whose capital was to be acquired by the SOFIRAD (an affiliate of the French government), that radio began catering for the emergent youth
market. In the same year, Europe 1 launched its dedicated regular jazz programme, *Pour Ceux Qui Aiment le Jazz (For Those Who Love Jazz)*. Europe 1's programming strategies, to borrow Cazenave and Ulmann-Mauriat's (1994) passage, "took exactly the opposite of what the other stations did" (139), introducing, here again, American DJ style.

The acceptance of jazz by the radio, which paralleled with the rigorous expansion of its market and popularity, furthered the autonomisation of 'authentic' jazz. Above all, the success of *Pour Ceux qui Aiment le Jazz* was quickly followed by other stations. An article in the Dec. 1949 issue of *Jazz Hot*, established as the most influential guardian of authentic jazz, read:

> As this good old review asks me to present you here, each month, news about the radio, I cannot begin this series but with a wish: may the peace be with us! May the long war of buttons (of radio) which, since the Liberation (oh, irony!), have divided the jazz defenders and people in the *Radiodiffusion Française*; [...] (Montassut 1949, 19)

Its Dec. 1960 issue, on the contrary, listed up, together with Voice of America (VOA) services, some 14 weekly jazz programmes on RTF, Radio Luxembourg and Europe 1 that could be tuned in from Paris. Music-halls, which saw a revival boom in the 1950s, integrated jazz much more eagerly than in the previous decades. According to Tournès (1999, 466), the proportion of music-hall spectacles with jazz attraction to the entire number of jazz performances in France augmented rapidly from 0% in 1946 to 73% in 1957, if declined equally rapidly to 25% in 1963. The opposition between the 'commercial' jazz and the 'authentic' jazz, then, paralleled the emergent opposition of popular songs, between the 'artistic' CHANSON RIVE-GAUCHE (the left bank chanson) and the 'commercial' VARIÉTÉS based on music-halls, mostly situated on the right bank. The district of Saint-Germain-des-Prés, with legendary caves and cabarets such as le Tabou and le Club Saint-Germain, became the central topos of 'authentic' jazz and intellectual CHANSON. Film makers, too, collaborated eagerly with jazz in the late 1950s, i.e. in the nouvelle vague era, in their struggle to redefine their 'art', menaced by television (see Figure 14). Entering the intellectual centre of Paris, where the existentialists were producing their own myth, both jazz and film were "in the process of legitimation" (Bourdieu 1986, 16).

From around 1956, nevertheless, one particular phenomenon prevented jazz's smooth ascension to cultural heritage - rock 'n' roll and the BLOUSON NOIR (black leather jacket: a metonym of rockers). This new (black) American popular music divided the jazz community. Some considered it as a continuum of jazz, while others, because of the vulgarity of its music and dance - with which jazz itself had once been characterised - took it as music made to be commercial, or even as American capitalist exploitation of black art (see Tournès 1999, 294-5). Tournès (1999) highlights a set of distinction between rock n' roll and jazz audiences in the following terms:

> The term 'fan' is now applied above all to the audience of rock, whereas jazz fans are soon stamped as 'amateurs [enthusiasts]', term that signifies the reasoned and mastered passion of a person who has attained maturity, as opposed to the uncontrolled idolatry of the rock audience, often younger and of more popular origin. All the difference is there, between the "old and sage jazz enthusiasts" and the "young 'fans' of Elvis Presley," between the "students of the Sorbonne" and the "blousons noirs from the Porte d'Aubervilliers," [...] (368-9: contains quotations from *L'Express*, 26 October 1961)
For many jazz 'enthusiasts', then, rock 'n' roll was associated with the mediocre, right bank variétés genre (this partially explains why jazz re-established a distance from the right bank music-halls in the 1960s). Boris Vian, one of the prominent figures in Saint-Germain-des-Prés jazz circle, went so far as to release a series of songs mocking rock 'n' roll's bad boy posture, such as 'Rock-Hoquet (Rock-Hiccup)' and 'Va Te Faire Cuire Un Oeuf, Man! (Go and Take a Running Jump, Man!)' with Henri Salvador (alias Henri Cording) or 'Fais-moi Mal Johnny (Give Me Pain Johnny)' with Magali Noël. The taxonomic conflict also manifested in terms of recording formats – classical and jazz music tended to be released as the 33 rpm LPs whereas rock 'n' roll as the 45 rpm singles (see Figure 14).

It was, at the same time, a fragment of the jazz entrepreneurs that invested in rock 'n' roll. Edouard Ruault (alias Eddie Barclay) or Léon Cabat and Albert Ferreri, for example, had established their own labels, Blue Star (to become Barclay) and Jazz Disque (to become Vogue) respectively in 1945, for a better diffusion of 'real' jazz. As a matter of course, they gradually extended their catalogues to rhythm and blues and rock 'n' roll, while acquiring distribution licences from American labels such as Atlantic, Mercury, Prestige and Verve. They were also eager to contract local rock 'n' roll artists (whose music was to be called, in the 1960s, ya-ya-ye or YEYE after the Beatles' refrain, 'yeah! yeah! yeah! yeah!'). Eddie Barclay would organise le Barclay Club in Paris, showcasing his artists, recordings by his Blue Star (Barclay) label together with the latest dance steps, from the jitterbug to the twist. Many similar clubs emerged. Le Golf Drouot, the temple of rock 'n' roll and YEYE where Jean-Philippe Smet (alias Johnny Hallyday) and Claude Moine (alias Eddy Mitchell) were 'discovered', managed to impose its notoriety by limiting its client exclusively to the youths of 16 to 21 years old. Soon other clubs began targeting teenage audiences by launching afternoon rock 'n' roll parties. For those who could not quite make it to the high-end clubs in central Paris, local cafés and dancehalls undertook the principle roles. Owners investing in attracting and conserving their youth audiences, jukebox repertoires in the cafés where the BLOUSON NOIR frequented would be gradually appropriated (Lagree 1982, 20).

Certainly, rock 'n' roll and YEYE were more right- than left-bank, but it would be too simplistic to transpose this new taxonomic conflict onto the opposition between the left and the right banks of the Seine. The BLOUSON NOIR was again associated with the Parisian fear of the zone, extra-muros and banlieues (suburbs) – 'the Porte d'Aubervillers'. The principle explanation of the BLOUSON NOIR phenomenon, as Lagrére (1982) argues, resides "in this distortion, how frustrating, between the goals proposed by the society and the means accorded to realise them" (14).

For these youths, who very often are driven away from overpopulated or little welcoming homes, or simply who do not enjoy being with their families, the question is to create one's own 'home' which may well be outside. Their domain is the street, the quarter or the space that they have chosen for themselves and appropriated by a sort of common habitus. In that sense, the places that they have chosen play a role all as significant as the jeans, the moped or the rock records. (20)

This rather archaic – for we have seen the apaches and the zoniers half a century before – defect of Parisian urbanism remained persistent. For almost one century since Haussmann, the banlieues were left in chaos, apart from the dissolution of the zone and construction of HBM's (renamed as
Figure 14: Transformation of the Field of Media Institutions (France 1950s – 60s)

Source: Hennion et al. (1978), Calvet (1981), Gronow (1983), SNEP (Phonograph); CNC (Film); SJTI (Press); INSEE (Radio and Television)

N.B.: Columns with dotted line are estimated values from various sources. The 1951 value (5.45 million units of 78rpm(s), 5 thousand 45rpm(s) and 90 thousand 33rpm(s)) and 1957 value (0.8 million, 10 million and 9.5 million respectively) are given in Calvet (1981). Thus, the format ratio was estimated in linear proportion to these values. Pasqualini (1996, 72) indicates a 1952 figure, without justification, as 8.7 million units of 78 rpm, 150 thousand 45 rpm and 800 thousand 33 rpm. The difference of the figure estimated in the above method is indicated as a white bar on the top of the 1952 column. Hennion and Vignol (1978), relying on FNM (Fédération Nationale de la Musique), indicate more reliable valued from 1956 to 1967, though the formats are only isolated in terms of discs and magnetic tapes. As their 1956 value differs slightly from my estimation drawn from the calculation above, and 1957 value considerably surpass that indicated in Calvet (1981), the differences are represented as the white parts at the top of the years' columns. The isolated data favourable to our argument could only be found from 1968, which Hennion and Vignol compiled based on SNEPA.

Habitations à Loyer Moyen (HLMs: housing at moderate rent) in 1950). The spatial segregation was structural. Most of the metro lines had long refused to extend out of the city of Paris, the brick-coloured strip of HBM/HLMs that had replaced the fortifications remained the defining line of intra-muros and extra-muros Paris and, after the war, "enormous slums were extended to the ports, notably Gennevilliers, Nanterre and Noisy-le-Grand" (Menanteau 1994, 52).

From the middle of the 1950s, the Parisian banlieue finally took off with a series of concrete projects and plans. The suburbanisation was successful, at least during the immense economic growth from 1945 to 1975 – les trente glorieuses (the glorious thirty years) – which freed the most unqualified of workers from the anxiety of unemployment. In the space of two decades, the population of the Parisian suburbs grew from about 4.5 million in 1954 to 7.6 million in 1975, while the Parisian...
population declined slightly from 2.9 million in 1954 to 2.3 million 1975 (INSEE, see Figure 9 (p. 44)).

The operation was vast. In 1961, the district of Paris was administratively instituted and in 1963, the old three departments that constituted the Parisian Region were subdivided into the current eight departments (see Map 4) – Paris, the Petite Couronne (Small Crown: Hauts-de-Seine (administrative code of 92), Seine-Saint-Denis (93) and Val-de-Marne (94)) and the Grande Couronne (Great Crown: Essonne (91), Seine-et-Marne (77), Val-d'Oise (95) and Yvelines (78)). The entire region was transformed. The principle aim was to raze off and reconstruct insalubrious areas in and out of Paris, to de-industrialise the capital and to install villes nouvelles (a concept borrowed from the British new town project).

In 1958, the government defined the Zones à Urbaniser en Priorité (ZUP: Zones to Urbanise in Priority), which would be privatised as the Zones d'Aménagement Concerté (ZAC: Zones of Concerted Development) in 1969. The Parisian Region counted a dozen or so of the ZUP/ZACs by 1969. Both inside and outside of Paris, within the rayon of 30 kilometres, there constructed “some one hundred grands ensembles (high-raising housing schemes) comprised of 300,000 housings in which almost 1,400,000 people live” (Marchand 1993, 284). The grands ensembles:

are the object of all the critics today, since the ‘illness of the banlieues’ interests the public opinion, but were strongly appreciated by young households who moved in thirty years ago. Next to hovels and slums that fifty years of negligence had multiplied, the accommodations of the grands ensembles marked an immense progress: they were bigger than average French housings, but with more numerous and smaller rooms. The comfort was sufficient: much superior to that of Parisian housings at the time (water closet, bathroom, central heating in general and lift). (Marchand, 285-6)

Eight villes nouvelles were projected, of which five (Evry, Cergy-Pontoise, Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, Marne-la-Vallée and Melun-Sénart) were constructed between 1966 and 1969, planned to be interconnected by RER (Réseau Express Régional) train service. With the growing number of young
households, the banlieues were undoubtedly important markets for Yéyé genre, so much so that they appeared as an independent category in the regular concert announcement pages of Rock & Folk, a rock magazine initially launched as a special issue of Jazz Hot (Eudeline 2000: 47), unlike Jazz Hot itself in which they were divided into Paris and the provinces. To accommodate the vast number of their audiences, cabarets and music-halls clearly became too small. In the course of the 1960s "in Paris, only two grand music-halls resisted: Bobino and l'Olympia, the former specialised in intellectual chanson whereas the latter in yéyé" (Calvet 1981, 74). They were replaced by much lager venues, such as le Palais des Congrès, le Palais des Sports and le Palais Omnisport Paris Bercy, themselves products of the ZUP and the ZAC projects.

The emergence of Yéyé market and its expansion to the banlieues cannot be explained without taking into account the rapid extension of mediated social space and the mechanism with which to maintain authenticity of the music, life style or culture associated with it. The recording industry began playing a decisive role in determining popularity: in 1951, 5.55 million units of disc were sold in France, whereas 29.8 million units in 1960 and 62.3 million units in 1970 (see Figure 14). Its expansion was also mediated by many other non-musical actors that 'discovered' the teenagers. Eddy Mitchell's group, les Chaussettes Noires (Black Socks), was sponsored by a socks manufacture Stemm. Les Pirates which released 'Je Bois du Lait (I Drink Milk)' in 1961 was (obviously) sponsored by le Comité Français du Lait (French Committee of Milk). From 1963, le Golf Drouot started its famous talent contest, sponsored by a perfume maker, Coty, who launched its new product, L'Aimant. Yéyé was also heavily reliant on the electric media. Salut Les Copains (Hello Friends) was a decisive cornerstone of the genre, which also witnessed its decay towards the end of the 1960s. It was, in the beginning, a 30-minute weekly radio programme on Europe 1 started in 1959 (launched by the same director as Pour Ceux que Aiment le Jazz programme). Soon it became a two-hour daily programme and, in 1962, it launched a monthly magazine of the same title. National radio stations covering 'high' or 'middle-brow' ends of French music spectrum, and television replacing the radio as the central medium of familial domain and delivering VARIÉTÉS, the périphériques enjoyed great popularity in the youth market. Each station invested in recording companies or music publishers in one way or another and prioritising their artists and songs. Transistor radio and portable record player became indispensable for the youths. Brochand (1994, 660) indicates that the annual sales of transistor radio sets augmented rather drastically from 255 thousand in 1958 to 2.6 million units in 1963. In 1963, Europe 1 organised the Nuit de la Nation, a free rock concert at the place de la Nation, in the east of Paris, which mobilised 100,000 fans, despite expected 20,000.

The emergence of teenager was declared, and the terms designating this new market became abundant: les copains (the friends), les âges tendres (the tender ages), les jeunes (the youths), etc. On the first pages of the first issue of Age Tendre et Tête de Bois (Tender Age and Wooden Head: a leading teenager magazine that rivalled Salut Les Copains), read:

We are the youths! Yes, and to this title people impose us tastes and newspapers. They often make fun of us, sometime they do not even trust us. This all said, we want nothing special for us, and we are tired of all their childishness, of these old people who shower us
with moral, when their own newspapers are invaded by their chaos, their crimes and their stupidity. (Nov. 1963, 4)

However, at the same time, a new opposition within the teenage culture was also manifested in the same page:

"You'll see when you are my age". This phrase! Ah! This Phrase, we have heard it thousands of times. But, the future, it is us. At our age, we smile, we respire the poppies, the blue sky, we run fast, we dance, we sing, we have the right to love each other. It is our rage to live that protects us from being bourgeois. But, may our parents not be worried, we hate the blousons noirs, the broken chairs and the howls. (4)

Disco Revue, a sceptical rock magazine, on the other hand, released a four-page attachment entitled 'Copinorama' in its Oct. 1963 issue, mocking "union members of les copains, les amis, les âges tendres and les têtes de bois".

In February 1964, the Beatles performed at l'Olympia, with an unlikely yéyé singer, Sylvie Vartan. The Rolling Stones followed in October the same year, but from around that time, the distinction manifested as an antagonism between 'commercial' yéyé delivered by French artists and 'real' rock by Anglo-American artists. The October 1964 issue of Disco Revue, which changed its style into a tabloid format similar to the British NME (New Music Express), expressed its strong anti-yéyé statement — "the self-pleasing 'good French chanson' and national 'yéyé': they suck! All we want is some real rock — no matter if it's French (it hasn't been born yet) or foreign" (2). Overproduction, certainly, was one of the main reasons. Yéyé was available everywhere, and the most decisive boundary between yéyé and rock was television, which was one of the most deceptive media for the 'real' rock fans. Calvet (1981) points out one of its consequences as follows:

In 1963, by the grace magic of only one television emission, hosted by Guy Lux, an unknown young girl became famous with a song and bunches. The song was 'L'Ecole est Finie [The School is Over]', the ex-unknown, Sheila. Two years later, in 1965, another unknown finds a pathway to the glory by means of television: in the competition organised to commemorate Edith Piaf, Mireille Mathieu fought Georgette Lemaire by a narrow margin and became... Mireille Mathieu. [....] The technical progress, for instance the re-recording and the playback, made it, paradoxically, no longer necessary to know singing to be a singer! Within some twenty years of her career, Shiela has never stood on a stage and others of her colleagues, when they go up on stages, content themselves with playing to the audiences a track from their records, singing with a cut-off microphone. (73)

The integration of yéyé into the televised landscape was accelerated particularly after the inauguration of the second channel in 1964. With yéyé and television, recording companies and phonographic edition became a big business. Besides the AZ label prioritised by Europe 1 as it owned it (see Lesueur 1999, 14) and the Tréma label by a singer Michel Sardou, the success of Sheila, with more than 25 million copies of discs sold, allowed its promoter, Claude Carrère, to launch his Carrère label in 1967.

Television in France, with the lack of competition and feedback from viewers because of its almost 15 years of single-station policy, monopolised and censored by the government, was quite slow
to gain popularity and credibility. Figure 14 illustrates the rise and fall of the number of radio and television subscribers in France. Although radio license was included in television license from 1960, the radio curb depicts one out of every ten French contented oneself without television even in 1970. According to Barbier and Lavenir (1996), transnational satellite relay was not impossible from 1962, but was “extremely rare” (244) and:

at the moment in which, on American television screens, a song protesting the Vietnam war provoked the scandal, French television dismissed a woman announcer who had a short skirt that covered her knees, a very modest imitation of English miniskirt which was fashionable at the time. (243)

Even in May 1968, when a great number of students and workers revolted and confronted with the authorities (and it should be noted that it started from Nanterre, in a Parisian banlieue), only the radio relayed the events directly. Television remained silent, which resulted in the general strike of the Office de Radio-Télévision Française (ORTF, replaced RTF in 1964) television workers that lasted for more than a month (Cazenave and Ulmann-Mauriat 1995, 175-7).

The ‘real’ rock audiences (rock was to be called POP in France, as in the sense of ‘pop-art’, in the need to differentiate it from ‘rock’, a worn-out term designating Johnny Hallyday, Eddie Mitchell, Sylvie Vartan, etc.), then, began tuning to the emergent pirate stations, transmitted from the open sea, adjacent to the UK, delivering almost exclusively Anglo-American rock and contents that would be censored on the French radio. The Dec. 1967 issue of Rock & Folk, together with a history of the pirate radio and a list of the stations, read:

Soon, the homeland of Shakespeare will be saturated, locked up, crushed between the claw of these cargo ships equipped with long aerials that flood the country of pop music and wild hyper-rhythm. The generation of Mick Jagger and Paul MacCartney had enough of the Oxford accent of the presenters in this good old British Broadcasting Corporation! They so perfectly sent the boredom and the dullness of endless Victorian Sundays to their aerials. What was needed was the enthusiasm, dynamism, and humour. It needed to chase off the old people and turn over a new leaf. It must adopt a form of presentation that corresponds to the nascent frenzy. (32)

It is important to note that, while opposing to televised mainstream YÉYÉ, the ‘authentic’ position of POP genre was instituted in the same mediatised field. In the increasingly suburbanising Paris, the field of POP music, its ‘street’ distinction, was mediated by this obscure underground of airwaves.

In France, the emergence of youth market and the opposition within it imposed a sharp rupture on the structure of music production, resulting in the quasi-exclusion of French artists from POP genre. There seem several reasons. First, the shift in venues of musical performance rendered obsolete small cabarets and music-halls on which French popular songs had been reliant for more than half a century. Secondly, YÉYÉ, whose songs still largely based on the conventional star system based on the labour division of composers, songwriters and singers controlled by music publishers, artist management agencies and recording companies, confronted with the charismatic ideology and studio production of POP genre, in which artists exercised exclusive control over the entire production of their ‘works’ and out of which music publishers could profit much less. Thirdly, the legally ambiguous status of the
pirate radio stations which served as an important diffusion institution of POP made it difficult for local artists to institute their proper network of intermediaries to legitimise their authenticity. The increasingly heated competition for rock's legitimacy between Salut Les Copains and Rock & Folk magazines is symptomatic of the taxonomic conflict between the networks of YÉYÉ and POP production.

According to Lesueur (1999):

Rapidly [in the beginning of the 1960s], [...], SLC [Salut Les Copains] institutes the hit-parade that will bring about its popularity: a list of 50 most popular French titles and another list of 15 favourite foreign songs.

In 1970, conscious of the growing importance of titles in English language in the French market, the magazine abandons the format that brought about its popularity for half a decade. Soon, the classification shared even part for the two categories (Top 25 French songs and Top 25 foreign songs). (15)

The radio programme, Salut Les Copains, was replaced with Péripérik in 1969 and the magazine was transformed to Salut!, a teenage gossip magazine, in 1976. Rock & Folk, with a couple of new rivals such as Best, maintained its position as the reference of POP music in France.
Changing Terms of Local Identities

French pop groups found it quite hard to institute its own network of production. What they concerned most was a lack of space to perform their music. The state monopoly on broadcasting was reaffirmed quickly after the events of May 1968 and when, in October, the government introduced advertisement on broadcasting to finance ORTF, the two public television channels became overtly ‘mainstream’ to attract advertisers. Rock clubs, in Paris as in the banlieues, were disappearing one after another. A small article examining French POP in the Jan. 1971 issue of Rock & Folk illustrates the anxiety of Henri Leproux, owner of le Golf Drouot:

“In the beginning, [musicians] had 30-watt amps. Now they have 200-watt amps, sometimes two per guitar. We are with 130 decibels in the building....” Numerous club owners have ceased to contract pop bands because of the noise. “This year, we spent ten million to soundproof le Golf. The police headquarters came to check the noise level, which we measured it in a complaint’s. It shouldn’t surpass 30 decibels....” (1971, 63)

However, it is also this kind of exclusion itself that gave rise to a particular market of French pop groups. In and around Paris, the only space available to the often politically invested French POP artists were, as Calvet (1981, 75-8) points out, avant-garde café-théâtres, political festivals and charity galas. The Minister of Cultural Affairs, André Malraux, backed by the Gaullist expansionism, established a national network of Maisons de la Culture (MC: culture centres), Maisons des Jeunes et de la Culture (MJC: youth centres) and popular theatres financed by public subvention (like the Cartoucherie of Vincenne), which also could be used for their performances. These political festivals and galas, in one way or another, “played a non-negligible role in promoting artists” (Calvet, 77), and “this way, many careers started with numerous crossroads at the hall of la Mutualité, in Paris, on the stages of [political] meetings, in the factories in strike, etc” (77). Gradually, some of the prominent French chanson singers began adopting pop music: Leo Ferré, one of the most influential figures of chanson rive-gauche, collaborated with the Zoo, one of the most influential French pop groups, in 1968.

By the mid-1970s, when the Gaullist government came to the end, the opposition between YÉYÉ and pop became less salient.

The left-wing political festivals came to the end in 1975. The counter-culture and regionalism got out of breath, and a return to rock (the term soon replaced that of pop) became felt in the French music scene. Jacques Higelin abandoned the ‘rive gauche’ tradition for rock and Eddy Mitchell made a return to the sources. The Anglo-Saxon models diversified themselves as the mythic groups, such as the Beatles and the Rolling Stones, lost their prominence and as spontaneously-driven movements, such as pub rock and punk rock, developed. (Mignon 1991, 201)

Old rockers revived. Eddy Mitchell and Johnny Hallyday made their comeback in 1976. Rock and post-rock acts, such as Laurent Voulzy or the Téléphone, followed. For other ex-YÉYÉ artists, disco was the perfect style to adapt to. As if to recuperate the loss suffered during the pop era, the star system

- 69 -
stroke back with a number of revamped composers and arrangers, such as Marc Cerrone, Claude Carrère and Michel Polnareff, and some of the same old singers: Sylvie Vartan (‘Disco Queen’), Sheila (‘C'est le Coeur’, then the famous SBD), Michelle Torr (‘Discomotion’), Claude François (‘Magnolia Forever’) and France Gall (‘Dancing Disco’). The new media policy launched in 1974 by the new President of the Republic, Giscard d'Estaing, furthered television's diverting character, of whose landscape French musicians became an increasingly visible part. Giscard dismantled the ORTF in favour of regulated competition among seven nationalised companies: TF1, Antenne 2, FR3, Radio France (programming); the Société Française de Production (SFP: programme production); Télédiffusion de France (TDF: technical support and development); and the Institut National de l'Audiovisuel (INA: archiving and research).

Effectively, contrary to the commonly assumed anxiety, French artists dominated the French phonograph market during the 1970s. Hennion's (1981) detailed analysis on Hit-Parades Nationaux Du Disque during the 55 consecutive months between 1 April 1973 and the 31 October 1977 clearly shows that, even if the multinational recording companies operated oligopolistically in France during the period (63.1% of the hits were produced by the multinational labels and five leading companies out of nine dominated 61.2% of all the songs appeared in the hit parades), records by French artists ruled the hit-chart (74.9%). He concludes:

The multinational body of a firm like Phonogram-France does not stop almost 70% of its sales in France from being local production (singers and songs, but also arrangement, 'sound', voice, studios and style of recording); the ‘nouvelle chanson française [new French chanson]’ designated especially in the beginning the style of the young singer-songwriters launched by RCA, affiliate of an American group. The three French affiliates of American firms moreover had only managed to be implanted in France when they
adopted the French methods and personnel, or joined forces with local producers, as Warner to constitute WEA-Flipacchi. The success of CBS-France, which annexed Phonogram, owes much to a politics of very 'French' artistic production. (207)

The French phonograph sales grew more than two-fold in the 1970s. The total units of records and music tapes sold in France increased from 62.3 million in 1970 to 139.5 million units in 1979 (see Figure 15). On television, between 1981 and 1984, the number of hours dedicated to music and divertissement increased by 47% (Le Diberder and Pfieger 1987, 96: quoted in Pichevin 1997, 49-50), before the emergence of private stations in 1985 and inauguration of a dedicated music channel TV6 in 1986 (to become M6 in 1987).

Thus the 'Anglo-America' of rock, its foreignness and frightening meaninglessness, was gradually integrated into the French popular musical landscape, while generating its values and meanings as nouvelle chanson française, when, at the same time, a more substantial and vastly visible fear of foreignness of post-colonial immigration concerned France. According to the official census by INSEE, the number of foreign residents in metropolitan France augmented from 1.8 million (4.12% of the total population) in 1954 to 3.7 million (6.78%) in 1982. Immigrants from the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) and, more recently, from sub-Saharan Africa constitute the most rapidly growing component of the new influx of migration. The ratio of European (excluding ex-USSR): African: American: Asian (including Turkey) shifted from 79.1%: 13.0%: 2.8%: 2.8% in 1954, to 60.7%: 34.6%: 1.2%: 31.0% in 1975 and to 47.6%: 42.8%: 1.4%: 8.0% in 1982 (see Table 2). This migration, eagerly promoted by the French government and the (ex-) colonial authorities since the 1950s to counterbalance the lack of manpower in industrial and agricultural sectors in France, showed an acute concentration in urban and suburban areas, such as Paris, Marseilles or Lyon. The number of foreign residents almost quadrupled from 300,000 in 1950 to more than a million in 1975 in the Parisian Region, and increased slightly less yet importantly in Paris, from 136,000 (4.8% of Parisian population) in 1954 and 343,000 (16.6%) in 1982 (INSEE). The situation changed as 'les trente glorieuses (the glorious thirty years of post-war economic growth)' came to the end in the 1970s. Unemployment expanded, and once unemployed immigrant families found it much more difficult to integrate into society than the 'French' young suburban households did in the 1960s. The banlieues and the villes nouvelles, which had once seemed prosperous under the expansionism and progressivism in the 60s, became once again the central locus of the urban illness and fear.

The resurgence of the fear of banlieues, and consequential reaffirmation of the centrality of Paris to political, economic and cultural life of France, was also inscribed in the transforming landscape of Paris. The Parisian suburban development, promoted under the Gaullist regime, was brutally interrupted when the political climate changed under the presidency of Giscard d’Estaing. The Parisian Region was replaced by the region of Ile-de-France in 1976. Three villes nouvelles projects out of the planned eight were discontinued, and the existing five would suffer from a substantial reduction of public subvention. Trajectories for RER train service, projected in 1965 to interconnect

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5 These figures designate legal foreign residents in the French territory, and does not include migration from so-called DOM-TOM (Départements et Territoires d'Outre-Mer: Overseas Departments and territories), which are still administrated by France, and naturalised French citizens whose countries of origin do not appear in official statistics in France.
Table 2: Foreign Residents in France by Nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Europe (ex. USSR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>39,846,182</td>
<td>1,765,298</td>
<td>1,547,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>42,781,370</td>
<td>2,159,665</td>
<td>1,396,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>46,456,956</td>
<td>2,621,089</td>
<td>1,556,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>49,653,556</td>
<td>2,621,089</td>
<td>1,875,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>52,599,430</td>
<td>3,442,415</td>
<td>2,090,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>54,273,200</td>
<td>3,680,100</td>
<td>1,753,160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSEE

The villes nouvelles were substantially revised under Giscardian presidency. The two connecting stations planned in 1965, at western Invalides and at eastern Pont d’Austerlitz, to promote decentralisation of Paris, were unified to one central station, to use the subterranean gallery of les Halles in 1975 (see Map 4 (p. 64)). The centrality of Paris was reaffirmed by the series of architectural embellishment and gentrification projects in the city of Paris from 1975 – le Centre Pompidou (1977), le Forum des Halles (1979), le Musée d’Orsay (1986), la Villette (1986-90), l’Institut du Monde Arabe (1987), l’Opéra-Bastille (1989), la Grande Arche de la Défense (1989), le Musée du Louvre (1993), among others. Most of them were meant to re-valorise the peripheral arrondissements of Paris, yet as a consequence they effectively drifted out most of the industrial facilities, manual workers and out-of-workers to extra-muros. Paris, together with the quarter of la Défense, whose extension from les Champs-Elysées made it one of the few successful Parisian suburban projects, became “more and more a city of superior cadre and of liberal profession” (Marchand 1993, 338).

From 1974, the government intervened more rigorously against Third World labour migration and directly and indirectly urged the unemployed immigrants to repatriate to their home countries. In as early as 1976, the government launched, on the new FR3 television station, a regular programme, Mosaïque, entirely conceived for immigrants. The programme was very popular among the post-colonial ethnic minorities, but, according to Hargreaves (1997):

[Mosaïque] was hoped to prepare the way for their repatriation through a mixture of folkloric studio presentations and magazine items provided by home country television stations, broadcast mainly in the mother tongues of migrants and their families. Thus beneath a superficially multicultural production lay an entirely contrary purpose: far from making a space for minority cultures within French society, the aim was to prepare for their removal. (86: see also Humblot 1989)

The tacit expulsion of the post-colonial immigrants, however, was not incontestable and the immigrants gradually instituted their own space in appropriating available resources in the urban and
media landscapes. Thanks to the ever-cheapening communication technologies, especially that of VCR and non-terrestrial broadcasting, the post-colonial minorities instituted a differentiated network of culture and identity production. Hargreaves (1997) notes that "[the VCR] was for a considerable period one of the few consumer goods owned more frequently by residents of immigrant origin than by the general population" (93: see also Tribalat 1996) and that the same tendency is observable with regard to cable and satellite broadcasting in the 1990s (Hargreaves, 93-4). The north eastern (such as the district of Barbès) and the south eastern (the district of Place d’Italie) parts of Paris, where immigration concentrated (the number of foreign residents in south eastern 13th arrondissement increased by 533.4% between 1954 and 1975; north eastern 18th, 336.6%; 19th, 404.8%; and 20th, 280.8%), played particularly important roles, as they gathered merchants dealing with cultural commodities from their countries of origin, including both legitimate and pirate copies of music and video cassette tapes.

Pirate radio stations, no longer broadcast from the open sea but based in France and broadcast by French enthusiasts on FM wave band, also mediated immigrants’ production of alternative spaces from the mid-1970s (the first such station is often said to be Radio Verte, launched in 1971, and some 50-and-growing stations were active in France in 1978 (Hare 1992, 29)). Despite amateurish materials and contents, their social significance became politically implicated in the opposition to the state monopoly over airwave and censorship on freedom of expression. The Socialist Party and its presidential candidate, François Mitterand, engaged energetically in the airwave liberation, with its own station, Radio Riposte. Upon Mitterand’s election to the presidency in 1981, who announced the liberation of airwave and legalisation of radios libres (free radio), hundreds of stations gushed to take positions on the frequency dials – already 400 stations by September that year (Derderian 1997, 100). Some stations, such as Radio Beur, Beur FM and Radio Soleil, actively engaged in anti-racism movements in the early 1980s. According to Durmelat (1998):

The taking-off of radios libres, at least in their earlier days, allowed to amplify circulation of peripheral and popular words, in acting as a mediator to attain more extended audience and allowing it to listen to their own voice, all in exposing it to the eventuality of resumption and recovery by the mechanisms and markets of the mass culture. (193)

The Haute Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle (HACA: High Authority of Audio-visual Communication) introduced a licensing regulation and frequency attribution from 1982. 155 stations applied for the licence in and around Paris that year and 22 stations were licensed to become radios locales privées (RLP: local private radios) in 1983.

The election of François Mitterand and the Socialist in 1981 also promoted and subsidised, if ephemerally, multiculturalism and le droit à la différence (the right to difference), as they recognised the de facto permanent settlement of immigrant workers and their families in France. The government granted full freedom of association to foreigners in 1981 and, anxious of their social exclusion, encouraged their active participation to the emergent immigrant associations. These activities would then be converged to larger movements and manifestations trying to institute a space, not only for immigrants, but also for their children, citizens of France, born and grown up in France, who oscillated, as they still do, between construction of the parental cultural identities and
assimilation to the dominant French culture. One of the most significant events in this regard was la Marche pour l'Égalité et contre le Racisme (the March for Equality and against Racism) from Marseilles to Paris, from 15 October to 3 December 1983. As Durmelat (1998) illustrates, the March, through its mobilisation of dispersed regional anti-racism organisations and immigrant associations and through its mediatisation, became a national event, which also diffused the so-called Beur movement nationally (beur is said to be a Parisian banlieue backslang for arabe to designate their hybrid identity, but has a series of controversies regarding its origin and contents). Beur, then, gave name to a dispersed set of practices undertaken by the youths of immigrant origin who sought to construct their identity in France, in whose definition and validity the movement itself would be entrapped and consumed.

Many musical forms that immigrants brought from their countries of origin, and strongly supported by local associative radio stations, such as Algerian RAI and French Caribbean ZOUK, drew trajectories similar to the word beur through their insertion to the dominant taxonomy in France, ghettoised in the convenient and harmless label of ‘world music’, carefully segregated from the mainstream French (old or nouvelle) CHANSON and VARIÉTÉS. Tracing French media representation of RAI, a popular festive music emerged in Oran and other western parts of Algeria that became associated with the Beur movement in France, Warne (1997) argues:

> The glossing over of otherwise uncomfortable facts regarding Islam’s social significance replicated a concurrent dynamic in French press coverage of the Beur movement. The latter’s emergence was greeted with universal relief in progressive circles: young descendants of immigrants had definitively turned their back on their ethnic origin, but more specifically on the dreaded Islam, and were now confidently embracing Western liberal values. What was missing in this portrayal was an awareness that the people involved were rejecting not just monolithic Algerian or Arab identities, but also monolithic versions of French identity, or indeed any other monocultural tradition (including the liberal progressive one). (143)

On top of the internal discords, immigrants’ and their descendants’ effort to construct and insert their space in the French society was further undermined by the almost simultaneous spread of anti-immigrant, explicitly anti-Maghreb, popular racism and menacing rise of the far right Front National (FN: National Front), from the mid-1980s. The socialist government was obliged to retreat to the (re-invented) French republican tradition of assimilation and integration, instead of multiculturalism and racial/ethnic diversity. Dispersed anti-racism organisations and immigrant associations were replaced by a newly influential and increasingly integrationist anti-racist organisation, SOS-Racisme, founded in 1984.

*World music, or sono mondiale, is a fluid and inconstant musical genre, “a shorthand way of separating the musics of west and the rest” (Taylor 1997, 2). It is a cosy but constrained space that accommodates different, exotic and non-Western musics and that obliges its musicians to remain foreigners, exotic others. Like most of the non-Anglo-American countries, perhaps, what is particular about France is that the world music market, with its unprecedented set of opportunities to the international markets, attracted ‘French’ alternative rock musicians who not only borrowed from the
exotic musics but also exoticised themselves, their Frenchness, Celticness, Occitanness, etc, in the consciously global music market. One of the most remarkable components, les Négresses Vertes, commented:

Suddenly, there was a vacuum. Nothing new was delivered from England or from the States any more. [...] Helno [the lead singer] no longer found his way in punk, and turned toward something more personal, more Parisian. At the same moment, there was a click of world music with Africans and North Africans. For us, our world music is parigot [Parisian] folklore. And then, we grew up with Italian, Spanish, Algerian, Polish and we are ourselves of all these origins. All these met at the right moment and it worked. All is linked, as a preparation for a good chanson... or for a good couscous! (quoted in Cathus 1998, 55-6)

All this went in parallel with the desperate search for new music and talents by recording companies whose annual sales were dropping sharply from around 1982 (see Figure 15). It also coincided with the government’s attempt to valorise French cultural commodities in the transnational market: redefinition of francophonie, a ‘cultural’ alliance among French-speaking countries and regions in the world, as a significant alternative to the colonising Anglo-American cultural commodities (hence Jack Lang’s intervention at UNESCO World Conference on Cultural Policies in Mexico in 1982 (Mondiacult)), and, in the late 1980s, with the re-invention of France’s republican tradition – against multiculturalism now asserted as an Anglo-American model (see Silverman and Yuval-Davis 1996).

World music, with its given ‘post-modern’ capacity to cut and mix everything, in the course of the 1980s, became increasingly a fashionable means for a class of Parisian snobs to distinguish themselves, rather than that for immigrants and their descendants to constitute their own space. For those who were entrapped inside this category, it became a ghetto. Particularly among the youths of immigrant origin, it is a double-bounded pair of shackles as they seek for their own identity intrinsically different not only from mainstream France, but also from their parents. According to Hargreaves (1997), drawing on a number of recent studies on viewing habits in ethnic minority households in France, there is an observable difference in viewing habits of VCR and satellite television between old and young generations:

While enabling the older generation to reassert diasporic links drawing on ancestral connections, television is drawing the children of migrants into American-dominated forms of popular culture that are consumed with equal enthusiasm by majority as well as minority ethnic youths (96: see also Chaabaoui 1989; Ba and Diop 1996; Raulin 1990, 24). Disillusioned by the ethnicity-based, ghettoising politics, while living under the evident cultural, economic and geographic marginalisation, where else could they take position, rejecting French ethnocentric tradition and distancing themselves from the parental traditions and cultures that have segregated more than united in the distressed banlieues, apart from appropriating available US cultural commodities?

Most of the authoritative chronologies of French hip-hop refer to a nightclub called 1’Emeraude, “the only anti-disco discotheque” (Sidney: in Bocquet and Pierre-Adolphe 1996, 13), launched in 1976, featuring a black DJ and funk bassist by the name of Sidney, as the starting point of French hip-hop
culture. There were also some local FM stations, notably RDH (presented by Dee Nasty), Radio Carbone 14 (by Phil Barney) and Radio 7 (by Sidney: Radio 7 is in fact an experimental specialist FM station run by the state) that played US funk and emergent rap records. A more significant event, however, was New York City Rap Tour in November 1982, showcasing Africa Bambaataa, Grandmixer DST, Fab 5 Freddy, Futura 2000, the Rock Steady Crew, Mr. Freeze (French Puerto Rican), etc, in le Palace (9th arrondissement), le Bataclan (10th) and l'Hippodrome de Pantin (19th) in Paris and then on television (see Map 5). Apparently, as many suggest, what shocked the audience most was the breakdance. According to Fourneuf (1998), ex-breakdancer, rapper and manager of Paris' first hip-hop specialist shop, Ticaret, who witnessed one of the concerts:

When we saw the breakers, turning on their head, we said, "bullshit! Look, it's not even a dance, it's a gymnastic" [...]. We didn't even understand the rhythm. [...] Though there were Africa Bambaataa and DST at turntables, even they were not much appreciated because it was too much of a mess. [...] Then, as Mr. Freeze arrived with the moonwalk.... Straight on, all began exercising it from the next morning. And then, there was a film, Flashdance. We went to see the film nothing but for [the breakdance scene]. We went to a cinema and returned to it all the time....

“It was the first time,” Sear (1998), who launched Get Busy, the first hip-hop fanzine in France, also refers to the concerts, “that we saw guys doing graffiti, and the shock was above all the breakdancers – the breakers. All those who saw it became crazy about it...”.

The tour, however, was organised around a quite different set of concerns by Bernard Zekri, a world music journalist, and Jean Caracos, owner of a post punk/world music label, Celluloid. Based in New York, both of them were in close contact with its avant-garde art and emergent hip-hop scenes, among the likes of Charlie Ahearn (a creator who directed Wild Style), Bill Laswell (a leading world music producer) and Malcolm McLaren (a fashion entrepreneur and punk manager). Europe 1 and its label, AZ, in search for a new market stimulus facing the decline of disco and the flood of local FM stations, were persuaded to sponsor the tour. For the occasion, Celluloid and AZ co-produced five 12-
inch singles, including the aforementioned first French rap track, ‘Change de Beat’, participated in by Fab 5 Freddy and produced by Bill Laswell. The tour was not successful. Economically, it was clearly a failure. Culturally, Europe 1 listeners reacted strongly against the 12-inch singles produced for the occasion, and the station abandoned them. The appearance of the leading black American hip-hop figures such as Bambaataa or Futura 2000 on the stage as well as on the radio and television, had led to the ephemeral establishment of the French branch of Zulu Nation in 1984. However, it was to be confused with and consumed as *les zoulous*, a term the mainstream media invented not only to keep the French orthography, but to associate hip-hop with yet another juvenile delinquency in the *banlieues* (see Bazin 1995; Boucher 1998).

Hip-hop in France was thus inserted in the opposition between the rather intellectual and/or trendy association of post-punk and world music and the fragile youths of predominantly immigrant origin who tended towards constructing their cultural identity not around their ethnic marginalisation but around alliance with other youths of geographic and economic marginalisation. In 1984, Sidney, with TF1's artistic director Marie-France Brière, tried to launch a television programme dedicated to hip-hop, especially to smurf and breakdancing. His recollection reveals difficulty and inevitable censorship and co-option involved in realising the project with the mainstream television station.

We got to the meeting with documents in our hands. There were executives of TF1. Marie-France Brière introduced us. [...] She explained that smurf derived from [Marcel] Marceau's pantomime. [...] Moreover, 'smurf' was the name for *Schtrompf* by Peyo [a bande dessinée (comic strip) by the Belgian cartoonist. Quite a few bandes dessinées are drawn by Belgians, but often taken as a French tradition] in the United States. Thus hip-hop had a French cultural foundation! In the meeting, these guys told each other that Marie-France Brière was sick. Moreover, a programme presented by a Black, we ought not to think about it. (in Bocquet and Pierre-Adolphe 1996, 38)

The programme, *Hip-Hop*, was in fact the world's first regular hip-hop programme on television. Despite TF1 executives' incomprehension of the culture and their covert fear of launching a programme presented by a coloured person, it gained a phenomenal popularity. It is often referred to as the beginning of commercialisation of hip-hop culture in France, and indeed by the time the programme closed its short span of life next year, Sidney was a symbol of sell-out. Still, it is undeniable that the programme facilitated alliance of the youths from the same *cité*, or housing estate in the de-industrialising *banlieues*, to form posses or crews, of which prominent ones would monopolise the Place du Torcadero, in the 16th arrondissement, close to the Maison de Radio France where there was TF1 office.

The sudden discontinuation of *Hip-Hop* programme, or more precisely, the sudden infatuation of entire France for breakdance and ethnocentric fantasies of exotic immigrants and the wild *banlieues*, reconfirmed television's status as a deceptive space for the marginalised youths. The government finally took a decisive step towards its privatisation in 1984, which had in fact been gradually attained since 1974. In the space of three years from 1985, three private stations were newly launched (Canal Plus (decrypted pay television, specialise in film), la Cinq (divertissement programmes: discontinued in 1992 and replaced by Franco-Germany public cultural station, Arte) and TV6 (musical programmes: -77-
renamed as M6 next year), followed by privatisation of TF1 in 1987. Television advertisement of phonograph had been banned on account of its 'cultural' nature like books (although some of the prominent CHANSON and VARIÉTÉS artists, such as Serge Gainsbourg, had already been profiting from television tie-in in the form of advertisement soundtracks). In 1987, the advertisement restriction was relaxed by the Ministry of Culture, "to help French production against the menacing Anglo-American blight" (Léotard: quoted in Saint Dreux 1998, 61), accelerating the mainstream inclination of music on the television screen. The government expected more attractive programming and more competent national and regional production in introducing market competition into television, but, as Hargreaves (1997) suggests, "the result is an array of broadly similar general-interest channels, none of which can see any commercial incentive in addressing minority ethnic audiences" (88). Apart from the few serials, sit-coms and teenage soaps that Hargreaves counts to only five between 1984 and 1996 (91), television has been one of the main sources of the menacing representation of the population of immigrant origins and the dysfunction of banlieues, invoking shock and moral panic in the mainstream French society.

The denigration of mainstream television consequently led to the institution of 'underground' hip-hop authenticity with its own, often obscure, 'street' intermediaries. For a while, breakdancing was sustained in places like a rehearsal studio of Paco Rabanne that the designer gracefully let them. Nightclubs like le Bataclan and le Globo played central roles in Paris, its banlieues and beyond, but they increasingly suffered from negative image of hip-hop on the mainstream media, and the rigorous intervention of authorities against them (a violent incident at a Run DMC concert in Rex Club furthered the tension (see Cannon 1997)). Driven out of these spaces, some began organising illegal freejams or underground parties, of which the best known was held on the terrain vague (wasteland) beside la Chapelle metro station, organised by Dee Nasty, who comments that "with the overhead metro line [line 2 runs above the boulevards in this area], we imagined ourselves in New York" (in Bocquet and Pierre-Adolphe 1997, 49). Dates and venues were circulated by word-of-mouth and diffused through local radio stations.

Unlike the post-punk and world music rivals that tried to introduce rap and hip-hop intellectually, as an innovative musical trend, this underground scene is rather based on body – i.e. breakdance. Rap had not been important for breakdancing, and English was almost always preferred if rap was needed. Yet, gradually, no doubt because of the opposition against the intellectual and trendy labelling, lyrics in French became important and its message became associated with the racism, the banlieues and the youths. DJ Dee Nasty's Paname City Rappin' (paname is a slang term for Paris), was the first French rap album self-produced and released in 1984. It was followed by a 12-inch single by Destroy Man and Jhony Go, 'Egoiste/On l'Balance (Egoist/We Chuck It Out)', in 1986, from the Barclay label. From 1988, Radio Nova, a Parisian local FM, programmed a weekly two-hour rap show, Deenastyle, presented by Dee Nasty and Lionel D, who:

left their free microphone to all the upcoming rappers from the peripheries of Paris. The listeners discovered in direct NTM, Assassin, New Génération MC, EJM, Timide et Sans Complexe, Sleo, MC Solaar, Soon EMC.... Deenastyle became the rite of hip-hop: cassette
tapes of the programmes circulated in province, even to Africa. (Bocquet and Pierre-Adolphe 1997, 77-8)

Some of the Parisian FM stations "were the lifeline of hip-hop in late 1980s' France" (Cannon 1997, 157).

The opposition furthered as a new opposition emerged among different banlieues. In 1986, an association called 'Mouvement Authentik' was formed around an MJC in Chatillon, a southern banlieue of Paris, by New Génération MC, Little CM, Saliha, EJM, Timide et Sans Complex as "a response to the northern banlieue. We're from the southern banlieue: Vitry/Chatillon against St.-Denis [often associated with a posse called 93 NTM]" (in Boquet and Pierre-Adolphe 1997, 52). As a matter of course, towards the late-1980s:

the technique develops and the rappers seize their first samplers and rhythm machines to create the backing tracks that affirm, little by little, a French style. In Parisian region and in large cities, groups diversify and multiply that, soon, would not simply copy direct influence from America, but develop flows appropriated to the French language. (Boucher 1998, 66)

On the other hand, some of the post-punk/world music initiators, such as Caracos and Zekri, gradually became detached from the autonomising French hip-hop scene. Zekri, who wrote an article for Aktuel about prominent French hip-hop artists in 1986, recalls:

It was [the French artists] who made me discover France. Me, like all these idiots who live in the States and who take themselves as Americans, I thought of France as a small province. I discovered a modern France through them. I wrote about them with passion. By the time I have done with the article for Aktuel, my mind was no longer in the history like [it used to be] in New York. I did my journalistic work. I didn't want to enter in their histories, even if there was a temptation, [...]. It was not my history any longer, I was in another trip, that of journalist, no longer willing to be Mr. rap. (in Boquet and Pierre-Adolphe 1996, 55)

"Trendy Paris was burying rap," Zekri (1994) admitted, "but it was to forget the banlieues" (88).

In and around 1990, the geometry of hip-hop's 'street' would undergo a drastic transformation. A rap and ragga album, Rapattitude, was released from Label Noir, compiling Assasin, Dee Nasty, New Génération MC, NTM, Saï Saï, Saliha, EJM and Tonton David, followed by a single, 'Bouge de Lä (Get Out)', by MC Solaar from Polydor. Most of the artists participated in Rapattitude were signed by the major recording companies. In the case of MC Solaar, his first album, Qui Sème le Vent Récolte le Tempo (He who Sows the Wind Harvests the Tempo: 1992), attained the sales of 300,000 copies to be the first French rap hit. This generated a confrontation between Solaar, criticised as pandering to republican France (see Cannon 1997, 159), and 'hardcore' or 'underground' rappers, refusing to be confined in "a hegemonic political discourse of Right, Center or Left" (Gross et al. 1994, 23). Instead, the latter "propose multiracial alliance as an alternative to the 'old' politics" (23).

Rappers express disdain for the state [...] and the police. They dream of more money for the banlieues and none for the army [...] while advocating equal rights for immigrants [...]. French homeboys and homegirls refuse all media discourses (especially from the Right
and Center) which brand them as criminals and barbarians. This rap generation also promotes a renewed spirit of militancy, anger, and menace – self-consciously distinguishing itself from the pacifistic, bland, and mediagenic image projected by the state-friendly antiracists like SOS-Racisme [...]. (23)

It is not coincidental that NTM, consisting of a white rapper Kool Shen and a West Indian rapper, Joey Starr, entitled their first album, released in 1991 from Epic Sony, Authentik, claiming hip-hop's 'street' authenticity, its cultural, political and even economic autonomy.

Hip-hop in France was no longer a business of the wasteland. By 1990, French hip-hop would have a few media of its own. M6, in 1990, launched a programme dedicated to rap, Rapline. Get Busy, the first hip-hop fanzine in France, was also launched in 1990 by Sear and two others, initially on modest photocopied papers. In terms of geographic terrain, hip-hop in France, as Hugues Bazin (1995) remarks, “developed itself, in and around Paris, thanks to the link of the transport routes that they share, in particular the lines of RER north/south and east/west” (39: see also Map 4 (p. 64)). The Forum des Halles shopping mall, inaugurated in 1979 on the site of the demolished wholesale market pavilions, les Halles, underneath whose subterranean galleries three of the RER lines intersect, was, and still is today, one of the central topos at which politically, economically, culturally and geographically segregated youths of the dispersed Parisian banlieues meet each other and confront with Paris, to 'signify' their presence and construct their cultural space.

**Tokyo: New Music, Techno Pop and Hip-Hop**

By the beginning of 1970s, as the student and/or counter-culture movements ended with little positive consequence, Shinjuku's streets began to be felt exhausted and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government launched a profound redevelopment project of the area. The almost one-million-square-meter water filtration plant in western Shinjuku was transferred to a northwestern suburb in 1965, and was replaced, from 1970, by a series of high skyscrapers accommodating offices of major corporations. Other parts of Shinjuku gradually conformed to the redevelopment. Laibu housues (Live Houses) and underground theatres disappeared, superseded by sanitised shopping malls and department stores. At the same time, young students and workers, brought to Tokyo by the post-war economic growth and having constituted an important part of the UNDERGROUND FOLK and NEW ROCK audience, began leaving Shinjuku behind. By 1970, the population of entire Tokyo prefecture ceased to grow anymore, at the expense of rapid expansion of the population in its greater suburban areas embracing the six surrounding prefectures (see Figure 11 (p. 49)). Although the 20-25 age group resisted the suburbanisation slightly longer (Yoshimi 1987, 283-4), consequences of Shinjuku's redevelopment scheme were acute enough to press the baby-boomers to face the new urban reality. By 1971, the land price of Shinjuku overdid that of Ginza, which facilitated the dispersion. Moreover, from around 1978, most of the both private and public universities that had been located inside the circular Yamanote-line and particularly along the cutting-through Chuo-line, began their decentralisation from the central Tokyo for cheaper and larger sites in the suburbs, which gave a different notion of students. Large factories and industrial plants were also driven out either to the suburbs or to reclaimed land surrounding Tokyo Bay, mainly because of pollution problems. Less and less students and workers live in Tokyo urban area, much less middle-class families that had quitted central Tokyo before them.
In 1970, Japan hosted its first universal exhibition in Osaka, which urged, as it had in France a century before, the state to define its position in the international arena. By the same token, the post-war extensional globalisation intensionally engendered a form of cultural nationalism in Japan, or at least a quest for the essence of Japanese uniqueness. According to a marketing expert, Nomura Research Laboratory, out of almost 700 books and articles published under nihonjinron genre from 1946 to 1978, 58% was released after 1970, and more than 25% within the space of three years from 1976 to 1978 (quoted in Sugimoto and Mouer 1995, 27-8). Wilkinson (1991) argues:

When the Japanese post-war generations were in their teens, the image of the USA (as opposed to US culture) was declining fast, partly because of the scenes of domestic violence there, mingled with the pictures of the war in Vietnam and the US withdrawal which appeared on the TV screens of their childhood. Also, by the end of the income-doubling decade for the sixties, the Japanese had acquired the desired symbols of the US dream, the ‘three treasures’ (TV, refrigerator and washing machine) and the ‘three Cs’ (color TV, camera and car). (77)

These new currents of cultural nationalism no longer rejected the ‘West’, and particularly the USA, but based on acquisition and naturalisation of advanced technologies, once considered as ‘the desired symbols of the US dream’, and their transfiguration as a Japanese assiduous achievement. Yoshimi (1997) illustrates, through corporate image strategies of National, a domestic brand of Matsushita, how the focus on technological advancement by the Japanese home electronics industry shifted from a pursuit of American way of life in the 1950s, to a delighted achievement of Japanese dexterity in the world in the 1970s, and finally to a pluralistic “self-exoticization” (198) and de-centralisation of ‘home’ in home electronics articulated by National’s prominent rival, Sony, in the 1980s (199-200).

The disillusion of the ‘West’ and insertion of the reflexive consciousness of being in such a world influenced many domains of cultural production in Japan. UNDERGROUND FOLK/NEW ROCK genres were particularly salient, as many of the artists engaged in political protestations against the US authority – the Vietnam War, the renewal of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, etc. As Hosokawa (1999) points out, “[T. Matsumoto, of the leading Japanese-singing rock group Happy End], and other critics, saw [English-singing Japanese rock musicians] as ‘fake hippies’ producing ‘Black Ship Worshipper Rock’ [the ‘Black Ship’ refers to the US battleships forcing the Tokugawa shogunate to open the country in 1853]” (119).

In this regard, singing in Japanese was not simply automatic but rather a deliberate choice in order to experiment with how the language could express new feelings, sentiments and meanings (albeit over a North-American-derived beat). By singing in Japanese, Matsumoto aimed to overturn the American hegemony of rock music (which he perceived as simultaneously repressive and gratifying). This ambivalence to U.S. culture was best articulated in the track Sayonara America, Sayonara Nippon (Farewell America, Farewell Japan: 1973) […]. (119)

It is interesting to detect, as Hosokawa (1999) argues, an almost identical trajectory to the nationalistic discourses described above that Hosono, another member of Happy End, traced after the breaking up of the group: to the “deconstruction of orientalism by mimicry” (120) in so-called Soy Sauce Music
Trilogy, and to the international success of Yellow Magic Orchestra (YMO), “a symbol of the internationalisation of Japan’s incomparable techno-culture” (140). For the present study, it seems worth examining a broader set of oppositions in social space in which such music and nationalism made sense.

Happy End, in 1973, accompanied an emerging female singer-songwriter, Yumi Arai (Y. Matsutoya after her marriage) who distinguished her musical style from UNDERGROUND FOLK/NEW ROCK in referring to them as ‘yojo-han’ folk (a ‘yojo-han’ refers to a narrow bed-sit, dwelled by the likes of poor but revolutionary students or activists: sad losers by implication in the 1970s). From around the time, once anti-establishment UNDERGROUND FOLK and NEW ROCK artists began to be accepted by the mainstream audience and transformed to all-encompassing NEW MUSIC, a generic term originated in recording companies needing to classify the unclassifiable music, much like the nouvelle chanson française in France. The distinction between KAYO-KYOKU and NEW MUSIC, at least initially, was quite acute in many ways. The latter refused to show up on television, flooded with the former. NEW MUSIC artists and groups were capable of composing, writing, arranging and recording their own songs with sophisticated technique and knowledge of recording and acoustic technologies, whereas KAYO-KYOKU artists were above all singers, relying on professional composers, songwriters and producers. If KAYO-KYOKU singers more or less relied on quick turnover from 7-inch single sales, NEW MUSIC artists promptly began to adopt concept album format as their means of expression, which had previously been reserved for prominent Anglo-American folk and rock artists. In 1974, Yosui Inoue’s Kori no Sekai (World of Ice) became the first million-selling album in Japan. Figure 16 shows that the annual sales of album formats (33 rpm LP) records began to grow steadily from around 1973, replaced by CD from 1984, whereas the single format (45rpm) hit the ceiling in 1979.

It coincided with a structural transformation of the music industries in favour of the formation of NEW MUSIC production network. The consumption ratio between records released by domestic
labels outdid those by foreign labels (which included a portion of Japanese artists released under foreign labels) in 1967, after almost 20 years of market domination by the latter (Kawabata 1993, 335). This inversion, as Kawabata suggests, was not derived from the revival of the genres of music generally considered as ‘Japanese’, such as ENKA and KAYO-KYOKU, but from the rise of Japanese groups adopting predominantly Anglo-American popular music styles. According to Kawabata, “from about 1966, [...], Japanese record companies started to use the A&R in their yö-gaku [International] divisions as A&R for the hoş-gaku [domestic] popular music too” (338).

The staff diverted to the hoş-gaku division produced more yö-gaku-like hoş-gaku. But such staff (working with publishing companies) also introduced the foreign label contract method to hoş-gaku. With this method of doing business, folk and rock artists were able to enter the popular field. Not only the ideas, words, melodies of each song, but the total sound changed, and the hoş-gaku popular music business took a yö-gaku-like form. The foreign affiliated joint venture was established [from 1968], and the major companies introduced foreign capital. These events further promoted the business change to the yö-gaku system. (338)

What is noteworthy here is the fact that, as foreign capital investment furthered, ‘Anglo-America’ of folk and rock became ‘Japanised’, so much so that the terms of joint ventures for the transnationals shifted from integrating the Japanese market to sell their international catalogues (which was, above all, the initial motivation for the Japanese companies to start the joint ventures), to gaining more profit out of Japanese artists by buying up more capital from local labels. The joint ventures broke their equilibrium after Polygram purchased 1% of Japanese Polydor’s capital in 1978, while, at the same time, material resources for and technical knowledge of musical production became more accessible and transgression of national or cultural frontiers became easier than ever.

Television companies were struggling as their musical programmes saturated the screens and bored their young audiences. Throughout the 1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s, musical programmes on television had relied almost exclusively on pre-packaged products proposed by the POPS production companies and publishers. Their market domination was gradually undermined, in the course of the 1970s, as television companies began embarking on music publishing business themselves. Yet, as the plethora of rather redundant hit-parade programmes, musical award ceremonies and televised musical festivals in the 1970s could not generate but indifference among its young spectators, television companies gradually became inclined toward NEW MUSIC artists. Compelled by the (potential) size of their audiences, some NEW MUSIC artists embarked on explicitly commercial ventures, while others, remaining sceptical of television, hesitantly let television companies relay their concerts or use their songs in advertisements or as opening themes for soap operas. In 1975, four of the leading NEW MUSIC artists, Takuro Yoshida, Yosui Inoue, Hitoshi Komuro and Shigeru Izumiya, launched their own For Life Records, financed and distributed by a branch of Fuji television, Pony. In the next year, the two independent UNDERGROUND FOLK and NEW ROCK labels, URC and Elec Records, became practically discontinued because of financial difficulties. The turning point was thus cleared, and from around the time, some NEW MUSIC artists, including the ex-members of Happy End, with their sophisticated musical skills and business knowledge, began intervening in
In the midst of incorporation of rock and folk into the mainstream, a few managed to take advantage of television in claiming for a market previously dominated by Anglo-American artists: simple and straight rock 'n' roll, as a revolt against musical sophistication and middle-class aspiration of NEW MUSIC. The resurgence of rock 'n' roll in the 1970s is not a phenomenon unique to Japan—we saw the revival of Eddy Mitchell and Johnny Hallyday in France. However, unlike in France where revived rock 'n' roll has become one of the popular music and dance styles acceptable to and even encouraged by middle-class parents, it was quickly associated with juvenile delinquency in Japan. Unlike NEW MUSIC artists, the Carol, as its frontman Yazawa affirms, considered the television appearance as "a chance" (Yuasa 1999, 9) and released singles almost monthly to attain the status of 'rock 'n' roll king' quickly. According to Oyama (1998):

The Carol delivered not only American fifties rock 'n' roll tunes but also their own rock 'n' roll titles in Japanese mingled with English phrases, with an outfit resembling to a motorcycle rider: regent hairstyle, a leather jacket and a pair of leather pants or jeans. Their style, especially their leather jackets, shared in common with that of sakitto-zoku ['speedway gang'], later boso-zoku [motorcycle gang]. The Carol was enthusiastically supported by these gangs that began troubling the society as juvenile delinquency [...]. (30-1: see also Oyama 2000)

The FIFTIES style, as they became called, distinguished itself from politically and often intellectually invested UNDERGROUND FOLK and NEW ROCK and from increasingly mainstream and diluted NEW MUSIC by their particular style of outfit and behaviour: 'regent hairstyle, a leather jacket and a pair of leather pants or jeans', as opposed to hippie-oriented long hair, Indian calico and bell-bottom jeans. In 1974, a dedicated rock 'n' roll bar, King Kong, was opened by an enthusiast, who, with its success, launched a dedicated FIFTIES boutique, Cream Soda, in the Harajuku quarter in 1976. Around this time, BOSO-ZOKU (motorcycle gang) began dancing to rock 'n' roll in the open streets of Harajuku. Their teamed practises, occasioned by inter-gang fights and reckless motorbike ridings, often raised the eyebrow of the authorities and neighbouring communities, sometimes ending up with heated confrontation, which eventually drove them from central Harajuku to the so-called hoko-ten area, a part of the six-lane street along the Yoyogi Park, adjacent to Harajuku, open for pedestrians on Sundays.

The nationwide expansion of the FIFTIES style had a complicit relation with the mainstream media that began sensationaly associating the FIFTIES and BOSO-ZOKU gangs with urban vandalism, violence in schools and assault on the authorities (Oyama points out the first media coverage of the FIFTIES and BOSO-ZOKU gang to date from 1977 (1998, 48 n. 12)). For NEW MUSIC artists and fans, likewise, rock 'n' roll of the Carol and its followers was a degrading "katakana enka [reprise of outmoded ENKA disguised as rock; katakana is a set of Japanese characters often used to spell foreign words]" (Yoshihara 1999, 50). "Even the baby-boomers who had previously been totally immersed in the hippie movement deplored it," a cynical journalist remarked (Takarajima 1990); "with such a peculiarly non-sense comment as 'the 1950s was a conservative period', and PTA nationwide expressed their hostility" (17). By the end of 1970s, some 30,000 BOSO-ZOKU teams were identified in Japan. They were mostly teenagers from working class neighbours: in the Tokyo region, namely, from the
Shitamachi area and farther northern, southern and eastern suburban prefectures, such as Saitama, Ibaragi, Kanagawa and Chiba (see Map 3 (p. 58)). However, for certain urban ethnographers, BOSO-ZOKU’s mode of confrontation with the society marked the end of a period. Miyadai (1997) points out that BOSO-ZOKU gangs “embody collapsing local community” (145) in that their identity was still reliant on its negative reference against the local authorities, such as PTA and other neighbourhood associations. The suburbanisation had already stretched out way beyond Tokyo prefecture from around 1960, and its commuting area extended to comprehend as large as 50 kilometre radius from its centre by 1970 (Yoshimi 1987, 305). This abrupt suburban migration in the 1970s, as Miyadai (1997, 136-9) argues, destroyed neighbourhood community and introverted its dense social relation, which used to extend to an external communal space, into a small atomised familial space, with large part of the communal social relation replaced by its mediated representation.

If the above is the first step in the decaying process of communal space derived from the suburbanisation in Miyadai’s (1997) argument, its second step took place in the course of the 1980s, in which community, or even family, no longer holds. In 1979, the common first-stage university entrance examination started, and this common exam, he argues, decisively installed quasi-standard values with which to judge youths homogeneously in their school, in their families and in the local communities. The problem was that potential contestant to such values, like the ‘negative community’ of BOSO-ZOKU, was disappearing. Firstly, facing the so-called ‘third post-war peak’ of juvenile delinquency (the first being the rockabilly boom in the 1950s and the second being the electric guitar band and GROUP SOUNDS boom in the 1960s), police asserted the FIFTIES and BOSO-ZOKU as the source of all the social dysfunction. On the first day of December 1978, the tightened Road Traffic Act was reinforced to restrict their teamed wild riding and reckless vandalism. BOSO-ZOKU gangs tried to act against it the week before, but the lack of organisation undermined their manifestation. Secondly, the outbreak of the disco boom and the subsequently tightened Entertainment and Amusement Trades Control Act destroyed smaller local dance venues which had been run more or less on underground premise, thus giving a mythical atmosphere to be in the know and in the community. Disco became clearly mainstream and commercial, hence did not risk accepting minors that consisted a major part of the FIFTIES and BOSO-ZOKU. Notably around and after the 1978 release of the film, Saturday Night Fever, the entire nation appeared to be covered by large-scale chains of mammoth discotheques in urban centres. By the end of the 1970s, thus, all leapt in broad daylight, depriving the deviant youths of their own cultural space. The rebellious rock ‘n’ roll and dance became tamed and consumed as their simulacra on the mass media. The commercial success of a new, carefully marketed rock ‘n’ roll group, Yokohama Ginbae, and the equally popular success of some merchandising goods, were “a symbolic event with which the significance of the unruly as a revolt of the angry youths was relativised as a mere fashion” (Oyama 1998, 34).

It is in this advent of levelled simulacra that “a more serious, controlled techno-orientalism” (Hosokawa 1999, 140) of Hosono’s Yellow Magic Orchestra founded their techno pop market. Instead of vulgar ‘street’ disposition already occupied by the FIFTIES and BOSO-ZOKU, they, with their punk and new wave counterparts, sought for an intellectual ‘deconstruction’, through a nomadic, schizophrenic and post-modern knowledge, “knowledge as ‘play’ (tawamure; yūgi), a game suitable for the
generation that has been labeled apathetic and superficial" (Ivy 1989, 28). Ivy (1989) argues in her account on so-called 'new-academism' in the mid-1980s, that what characterised this particular 'post-modern' phenomenon in Japan in the 1980s was the conflation of knowledge and commodities, "announcing the death of these self-same 'masses' and describing the emergence of the 'fragmented,' the 'micro,' or the 'meta' masses" (33). She continues:

Meta-mass maintains that Japanese culture today no longer exhibits the vertical cleavages of the past – the distinctions between high culture and mass culture, dominant culture and subculture, no longer apply. A hierarchical model of culture no longer fits reality; instead, culture today is a mosaic of cultural styles. Culture is dispersed, fragmented, and decentered. Intellectual distinctions are leveled; [...]. (35)

For the popular and post-modern artists, any musical difference, avant-garde or folklore, foreign or Japanese, was a matter of multiple-choice of signs and technical manipulation. Even television, by mid-1980s, when second television set and/or VCR became more available and most of the private television stations began late-night or all-night experimental programmes mainly targeting university students and the like, quickly became a means of punk and new wave dissemination in Japan.

Development of the Shibuya district, mobilising sophisticated market segmentation strategies, precisely aimed at this new sensibility of young, suburban and meta-mass consumers. Its spatial structure was, as Yoshiimi (1987) points out, attentively invested in by some department stores, such as Parco, a brand of Seibu conglomerate. Parco opened its first shop in Shibuya in 1973, whose eccentric location connected Shibuya to Harajuku. From the late-1970s, Shibuya saw the launch of some more Parco shops and that of Tokyu Hands, a stylised version of DIY shop by another conglomerated of department store and railway and suburban development company, Tokyu group. A meta-mass rhetoric can easily be found echoed in Parco's description of its spatial strategies in the Shibuya quarter:

Above all, it is fundamental that the quarter be exclusively comprised of segmented markets. The word 'segment' here does not mean such simplistic categories as housewives, students, youths or neighbourhoods, but requires as presupposition that it brings together those who share their values. Those who do not share the same value must be excluded. We must fling off such a logrolling idea that the street is for everyone in the community. [...] Such a quarter gathers only the super-sensible people. (Across Apr. 1983, 34-5: quoted in Yoshiimi 1987, 298: my italics)

The meta-mass rhetoric would be taken up more or less simultaneously in other quarters in Tokyo, each aiming at differentiated 'segment' of the 'post-modern' consumers. These quarters, Shinjuku, Harajuku, Aoyama, Shibuya, Jiyugaoka, Daikanyama, Hiroo, Roppongi, etc. were no longer neighbourhoods in which to live, but to commute to, pass by and stroll around, all of which were mediated not only by the advent of the rapid transportation system interconnecting Tokyo and its dormitory, community-less suburbs, but also by the mediatisation of Tokyo's social space through television, magazines and other mass media prescribing where to go, what to do and, most importantly, what to buy.

The embedding of the transportation and information media, all together, "de-constructed the
distance-based perspective that we had long been familiar with, and re-organised the spatial interrelation less in terms of geographic adjacency than of mediation by these media. Consequently, each place emerged less as a 'destination' than, increasingly, as an 'option' (Yoshimi 1987, 308). It went hand in hand with the radicalised breakdown of communal space in the suburbs in the 1980s. According to the data compiled by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, the proportion between daytime and night-time population in the 23-wards area of Tokyo augmented from 108.0% in 1965 to 127.3% in 1980, and then 141.0% in 1995. In other words, daytime commuting population to the 23-ward area of Tokyo augmented from on average 2.47 million daily in 1975 to 3.64 million in 1990, of which 1.00 million from Saitama prefecture, 0.96 million from Kanagawa prefecture, 0.85 million from Chiba prefecture and 0.69 million from the other part of Tokyo prefecture (TMG 1998, 8-14). The centre of Tokyo, as Roland Barthes (1982) would have it, became empty. Throughout the century, we observed its slipping foundation, in terms of popular entertainment, from Asakusa, to Ginza, to Shinjuku and to Shibuya. In 1991, as if to confirm the evasive nature of the central Tokyo, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government itself was transferred from the old centre of Tokyo, to the new one, in Shinjuku, into a pair of new high-rising office towers modelled upon the Gothic architecture of the Notre-Dame de Paris.

The empty centre, however, has not simply produced a post-modern supremacy of signs and simulacra. According to Miyadai (1997), the atomisation of suburban nuclear families in the 1980s, which coincided with the intensification of homogenisation of social values in which the scholarly performance became a single and decisive reference to judge children, gave rise to "the fourth space" (143), as opposed to the first (home and family), the second (community and neighbourhood) and the third (educational institutions). If the 1970s destroyed local community and introverted its social relation into familial and mediatised space, the 1980s dismantled the very family, each of its member has come to have one's own stereo set, walkman, television, telephone and so on, living in different worlds while sharing a same space. The youths in such suburban realities, especially when they could not quite meet the demanding educational standard:

cease to form a 'negative community', like yankii [yankee: a synonym of BOSO-ZOKU], opposing parents, teachers and neighbours in home, school and local community. Instead, they begin ease off "loose" in the apathy of "the urban reality", in which nothing concerns seriously and none of the above surveillance can intervene. Yankii in suburban convenience stores [the likes of Seven Eleven and Spur, open 24 hours, function as the late-night hangouts for them] disappeared and replaced by 'teamers' [flocks of youths that hang around as teams] in the streets, nightclubbers in building basements or high-school girls prostituting in telephone sex clubs or date clubs. They encounter each other as "anonymous presence" emerged from homogeneous landscape of the suburbs, consume sparse communality, and disperse instantly. (1997, 144)

In Harajuku in the 1970s, as we have seen, it was still its neighbouring communities that drove away the FIFTIES and BOSO-ZOKU gangs to hoko-ten, whereas Parco's Shibuya project in 1983, cited above, clearly disregarded local community as 'a logrolling idea'.

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Table 3: Foreign Residents in Japan by Nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Total Foreigners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>83,200,000</td>
<td>598,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>93,419,000</td>
<td>650,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>9,827,000</td>
<td>665,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>103,720,000</td>
<td>708,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>111,940,000</td>
<td>751,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>117,060,000</td>
<td>782,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>121,049,000</td>
<td>850,612</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What really mediated the apparent liquidation of cultural distinction in Japan and the emergence of meta-mass consumers was the shrunk time and space – progression and distance – felt between Japan and the (imagined) West (Table 3 shows evolution of registered foreigners in Japan). Even in terms of popular music, growing ‘yen power’ facilitated many leading Anglo-American artists including Tokyo or Osaka in their world tour schedule, while many Japanese artists cut the national boundaries to collaborate with Anglo-American artists. Harootunian and Miyoshi (1989), however, detect a form of persistent cultural nationalism behind the mythical death of meta-narrative and opposition:

when any consideration of Japan’s postmodernity is yoked to the larger discussion concentrating on Japan and the West, [...], the discourse on the postmodern can never hope to be anything more than an inexpertly concealed attempt to cover up the aporias that dogged the earlier modernist discourse, even as it seeks to fulfill the role of a simulacrum. (xvi-vii)

Even if live concerts of Anglo-American super-stars became more available, greediness of these artists was a repeated grumbling whenever one found high entrance fees deceptive and their performance negligent, and its flip side was YMO’s world tour (in 1979 and 1980) and Japanese media’s patriotic coverage of their international success (Hosokawa 1999, 140). Moreover, in celebrating the death of hierarchy and the age of globalisation, post-modernism transfigured Japan as one homogeneous nation, now deemed superior to the ‘West’. The re-invented image of homogeneous and ageless Japan, despite the proclaimed disappearance of meta-narrative, masked internal oppositions (of politics, ethnic, gender, class or generation). What is crucial here is, as Ivy (1989) suggests, that the other side of the “accelerated flows of energy and innovation in consumerism” (1989, 44) was the “demanding system of production” (44) and the “tightly programmed Japanese educational system, in which the exigencies of the exam system – the ‘examination hell’ – almost completely determine the chances of knowledge” (29). Clearly, it is those who failed to accomplish in this ‘hell’ that were virtually erased from the Japanese post-modern scheme. Then is it not just logical for the excluded youths to take their position in Tokyo in appropriating hip-hop, a cultural imagery from the United States against...
which the homogeneous Japan has been defined?

We must, then, re-examine the spatial segmentation of Tokyo in the 1980s, especially that of the Shibuya quarter, as a (quintessentially modern) process of struggle between what Parco referred to as the ‘super-sensitive people’ and the ‘excluded’. It is precisely this light that we have to recast on the hoko-ten street, locating nowhere but between Shibuya and Harajuku (see Map 6). Beside the FIFTIES and BOSO-ZOKU gangs and in the midst of disco and techno pop boom, around 1980, hoko-ten accommodated a new group of teenagers, equally from the suburbs, commonly known as TAKENOKO-ZOKU (bamboo shoot tribe, named after a boutique in the Harajuku quarter where they bought their flamboyant costume), dancing to disco hits and YMO’s techno pop tunes. Like the FIFTIES, they were rejected from discotheques in Shinjuku, because of their age, and from Harajuku, because of the noise and public disturbance. Hoko-ten accumulated, as its ambivalent location indicates, suburban teenagers who, with abundant of information on the media, hanker for the ‘super-sensitive’ quarters of Shibuya and Harajuku (hence appropriation of trendy music of the time) but who, with little consumption power, were ‘excluded’ by these quarters (hence mobilisation of the cheapest expressive instrument available: body). Hoko-ten allowed the youths, with its complicit relationship with mainstream media’s sensationalism, to produce their difference most effectively at the least economic expenses – perhaps the first publicly dancing bodies since dance was “cooped up in a cage” (Nagai 1991, 72). Then, it comes as no surprise that, as Crazy A, a pioneer breakdancer and future head of the Rock Steady Crew Japan, anecdotally recounts that after watching a film, Flashdance, in 1983, he got to hoko-ten one day, and:

Instinctively, I felt here must be it, and waited. Then gradually, people looked like me gathered around and, one by one, each began showing off what one could do. [....] And we began talking to each other. [....] None of us had known each other before. [....] Then a day passed, with the scarce information, in talking all about dance. [....] Then we said to each other that maybe we could do something here every Sunday. Since then, it rocked.

(in DJ Krush et al. 1998, 12-3)

Gradually, hoko-ten accommodates different performers and spectators.
However, it was a circle of post-punk and new wave musicians — "the privileged classes, in a sense, undertakers of subcultures at the time," as a rapper ECD (in Goto 1997, 68) puts it — that picked up scratch DJing and rap music in the early 1980s. They had more or less readily had production means at their disposal, and for them, hip-hop was, above all, a new stylistic option in the market in which they "greedily desired a beat derived from new street music, no longer punk nor new wave" (Kodama: in Goto, 20). Kodama, of the Mute Beat, the first Japanese reggae-dub band, recollects:

The decade from the beginning of the 1980s was a period in which information was accumulated, perhaps even too much, and within it, it seemed a question of selecting the right thing. I think it was quite natural that we were drawn to hip-hop as a relief, a breakthrough, from such a situation. [....]

It was a genesis, as the mixture of what each of us had been experimenting and a sort of texture derived from emergent hip-hop resulted in rather chaotic music. On top of it, we tried to balance it with our ambition to break with the old, standardised rock-like approach to our music. (in Goto, 22)

Rap was mediated less through the (US) black music scene than through the (UK) post-punk scene via ska and reggae or new wave scenes by prominent figures such as Tom Tom Club, Blondie or John Lydon. Some American rap records had already been played in a number of discos in Tokyo, particularly in the Shinjuku and the Roppongi areas, but a nightclub called Pithecanthropus Electus ('Pithecan' for short), opened in 1982 in the Harajuku quarter, was the first to give space for these musicians experimenting cut 'n' mix DJing and live happening shows, which brought together leading 'post-' artists and groups, such as the Mute Beat (the aforementioned dub band), Seiko Ito (an editor of a fashion magazine), Haruo Chikada (a multi-musician debuted in 1974), the Tiny Punx (Kan Takagi (an ex-vocalist of a punk group, Tokyo Bravo) and Hiroshi Fujiwara (a winner of a nightclub London fashion contest and DJ)), etc.

Hip-hop's institution in Tokyo was mediated by this opposition between the 'super sensible' and the 'excluded'. Hip-hop was quickly exposed to a wider audience through the media. A late-night music video programme, Best Hit USA, launched in 1981, delivered Michel Jackson's 'moonwalk' on television. The film Flashdance was released in 1983. Grandmixer DST visited Japan for promotion of Herbie Hancock's 'Rock It' and opened a DJ workshop in October the same year. About a week later, at the release of a hip-hop film, Wild Style, about 30 US rappers, graffiti artists, breakdancers and DJs including Fab 5 Freddy, the Rock Steady crew, Double Trouble, Cold Crush Brothers and Futura 2000 visited Tsubaki House (in Shinjuku) and Pithecan, among other venues in Tokyo (see Map 6), financed among others by the film's distributor, Kuzui Enterprise inc. In 1984, another film, Breakin' was released. In 1985, Africa Bambaataa and Soul Sonic Force threw gigs in Tokyo (although Bambaataa did not turn up on the first day). While the post-punk musicians flocked to the live shows to find their music "avant-garde" (Takagi: in Goto 1997, 35), "bricolage" (Ito: in Goto, 56) or even "not particularly innovative structurally" (Chikada: in Goto, 37), those "mobs whose lives hip-hop saved" (Cake-K: in DJ Krush et al. 1998, 29) found breakdancing "a real man's thing" (Crazy A: in DJ Krush et al., 11) and began performing on the hoko-ten street. By 1985, when Seiko Ito, and other frequenters of Pithecan tried Japanese rapping in Gyokai Kun Monogatari (Tale of A Fashion Industry Worker), an album he
produced in collaboration with Hot Dog Press, the fashion magazine he was editing, hoko-ten accommodated a several rival crews and posses (such as Tokyo B-Boys, B-5 crew, B-Bop crew, Funky Rock Crew or Mystic Movers), occasioned by participation of visiting US dancers and by a number of dance battles, between the crews or between Tokyo and Yokohama (DJ Krush et al., 23-7, 36-8).

From around 1987, particularly after the international crossover success of Run DMC and their live show in Tokyo in December 1986, the post-punk musicians gradually established themselves as the central figure of the emergent nightclubbing scene. They launched their own labels (BPM by Haruo Chikada in 1987, Major Force in 1988 by the Tiny Punx et. al.), developed Japanese rapping technique (the Tiny Punx, Ito Seiko and Haruo Chikada performed as a curtain raiser for Run DMC), contributed to fashion and cultural magazines (*Takarajima*, *Weekly Playboy*, etc.) and even appeared on television late-night programmes (*FM TV*). Equally important was the revision, in 1984, of the Entertainment and Amusement Trades Control Act that authorised late-night bars, which gave rise to more genre-specific and small DJ-bars and nightclubs than worn-out and gigantic discos. Pithecan closed down in 1984, but in 1986 a nightclub called Hip-Hop opened in Shibuya, followed by J-trip Bar Dancehall in 1987, again, in Shibuya. Murata, a leading club organiser, defines emergent club culture against disco, and along the 'super-sensitive' line:

> Club DJs were, unlike disco DJs [...] , trying to distance themselves from what the masses wanted, and tended to push their egos, believing in their sense. [...] The reason why they left disco is that they were not satisfied with the music available at the time, and decided to pursue a position with which to explore and offer new musical possibilities, and stuck to club with conviction that there would be people who need their sensibility. As a result, as if stimulated by their conviction, more and more people with rich sensibility gather in clubs, which explains the nightclubbing scene today. (in Anzai 1997, 26)

Geographically, these clubs were often located slightly off the conventional location of discotheques, notably in the Shibuya and the Nishi Azabu areas (Climax, 328, P. Picasso, Inkstik Roppongi and Shibaura, Tool's Bar, Warsaw, etc.). Toward 1990, the waterfront area of Tokyo Bay also became important with larger dance/live concert venues, such as MZA Ariake (1988) and Club Gold (1989).

Simultaneously, a series of DJ contests and shows began from 1987. DJ Underground Contest organised by a DJ equipment manufacturer, Vestax, served the emergent dance music labels like Major Force as a showcase of its artists, and became a site of confrontation between the ex-post-punk artists, often participating in the contests as a panel, and the hoko-ten breakers and other emergent rappers, to be called the anti-Major Force artists, participating as, obviously, contestants. For the labels, and certainly for Vestax, the aim of the contest was to pick up interesting DJs and rappers to differentiate rap and club culture from other existing musical genres (Chikada, president of the BPM label, commented, “at any rate, everyone thinks kayo-kyoku crap, new music trash and Japanese rock rubbish, no wonder they fade away. And we'll beat them rapping [in Japanese] vigorously” (*Music Magazine* Jan. 1987, 39-40)). For DJ Krush (1998), who joined the hoko-ten crews from around 1985 and who participated in the first DJ Underground Contest in 1987, however, “[the Major Force] aren't from the same root and I didn't find them wicked” (41). The contests and shows, held in halls or clubs, allowed the hoko-ten crews to define themselves as 'real' b-boys in a more professional milieu, which
in turn channelled the breakers toward rapping, from hoko-ten to clubs. MC Bell, one of the central figures of the hoko-ten crews, contests:

if we are dancers, we can't beat [the Major Force rappers], I mean, they'll destroy us. We really felt menaced. And, we were already..., at the moment, which I'm sure all of us are on the same wavelength, they were absolutely no b-boys. But us, me, Krush, Crazy A, Kenji, all of us, we are b-boys, aren't we? Then it was this itch that made us start rapping.

(in DJ Krush et al., 49).

In 1988, MC Bell, Cake-K (alias Kenji) and DJ Krush formed an “anti-Tiny Punx” (MC Bell, in DJ Krush et al., 50) rap group, B-Fresh 3, who, eventually, signed a recording deal with the Major Force label.

In and around 1990, the transition of 'street' topos accelerated drastically. Some of the artists and groups discovered by Major Force were featured in its compilations or, in the case of Scha Dara Parr, an album in 1990, which became an instant crossover hit and led them to the first ever deal as a Japanese rap group with a major label, Epic Sony, next year. On the other hand, in 1989, the confrontation between B-Fresh 3 and the Major Force label became re-intensified over so-called the Jungle Brothers controversy, in which B-Fresh 3 was accused of performing a particular DJing technique, 3-trick, in the opening act, before the US rap group that prepared to show the same thing off later. In short, they upstaged the main performers of the night. Consequently, they were deprived of the recording deal and all scheduled live appearances. DJ Krush withdrew from the group, while the rest, renamed as B-Fresh, joined a late-night dance contest television programme, Dada LMD (later Club Dada), started in October 1989, “because we did not want to lose this fight” (Bell: in DJ Krush et al., 118). The programme, shot in a number of leading clubs in and around Tokyo weekly and gathering more and more young dancers, proved highly successful with the outbreak of NEW JACK SWING boom. In August 1990, another dance contest programme, Dance Koshi-en, started, this time, in prime time (a Freudian account of Japanese 'black' dance boom may be found in Cornyetz (1994)). Scha Dara Parr's mainstream success brought Japanese rap to major music business, while attracting as much criticism as sell-out. B-fresh's phenomenal success mediatised the hoko-ten street, whose street performances gathered hundreds of spectators every weekend, but in turn pushed out other artists and groups from the hoko-ten street to nightclubs. DJ Krush formed Krush Posse with Muro, an old-timer of the hoko-ten b-boy zone, ex-'security guard' for B-Fresh 3 and future rapper for a hardcore group, Microphone Pager and released, with other groups, an explicitly anti-Major Force compilation album, Yellow Rap Culture, in 1990, whereas others, such as DJ Honda, East End, ECD, You the Rock & DJ Ben, Rhymester etc, mostly came to know each another through the contests and shows, gigs and parties in various small clubs, began to form new units.

The centrality of Tokyo hip-hop scene shifted from the weekend hoko-ten street to a growing number of nightclubs, invading, in the end, the spaces designed for the 'super-sensible' people a decade ago. By then, most of the 'super-sensible' post-punk musicians left behind rap and hip-hop, pursuing other careers (Goto 1997, 189), while the department stores of Shibuya "begins accumulating irritations, as the quarter attracts a mass of young people who do not spend as much as they expect" (Across 1995a, 38-9). Unlike the US or French counterparts, most of the Japanese hip-hop artists,
mainstream or underground, concern little about where they are from, but about where they hang around, where they get together. It is, as I argued earlier drawing on Miyadai’s (1997) notion of ‘the fourth space’, in fact, a continuum of suburban youths manifesting on hoko-ten street since the mid-1970s. That is, if the FIFTIES, emerged in the mid-1970s, would ride up to hoko-ten on their customised motorbikes from their hometown to signify their opposition, TAKENOKO-ZOKU, in 1980, would commute by trains in ordinary clothes, change (in bushes of the Yoyogi Park) to the flamboyant costume, dance in anonymity, change back to the ordinary clothes and go back to their suburban home. In the course of the 1980s, hoko-ten shifted its meaning from a place to represent where one comes from, into a communal space in itself. It may also be consequential that in Japan, given dancing bodies have been concealed in invisible spaces for almost a century, neighbours rarely organise dance party in community. Deprived of local communal space, hip-hop identity in Tokyo is constructed as a thread, rather than a space, weaving stratified, entangled and dispersed points in the physically cramped social space.
Part III. HIP-HOP SCENES AND STREET INTERMEDIARIES

The physical and discursive borders erected by the organizational arrangements and knowledge practices of the contemporary music industry have meant that rap music and musicians have not been 'co-opted' or invited into the broadroom in quite the same way as have other types of music and their makers, most notably the way in which rock moved from the street to the executive suite.
Negus 1999, 102

However, the translator's task to put this book into easily accessible Japanese turned out extremely difficult because of the very characteristic of the book in which vivid street-level spoken language plays an important role. The author, certainly to transcribe the narratives of rappers as truly as possible, tries to maintain the way they are expressed, but the kind of typically Black English delivery is hardly translatable. I have to admit here that it was a very demanding job to convey the live feel of the rhythmical languages of rappers in which "fuck", "muthafucka", "shit" and "knowwhatimsayin'?" are repeated. J. Ishiyama: translator's note in Fernando Jr. 1996, 386-7.

With a view to clarity, most of the typical terms or expressions were kept in English – certain words, signalled by the * sign, are defined in the glossary, page 389. Finally, even if rap is above all an oral musical culture, we find it helpful to translate the lyrics of songs, not with the intention to draw rap songs in French from them, but to make the text more explicit. A. Réveillon and J.-P. Henquel: reader's advisory in Fernando Jr. 2000, 11.
In Japan, as we have seen, globalisation of the recording industry means various joint ventures between domestic and overseas corporations. The capital ratio varied from Sony Music Entertainment Japan (SME Japan), 100% owned by Japanese Sony, to Warner Music Japan 100% owned by American Time-Warner, via Toshiba-EMI, shared between British EMI (55%) and Japanese Toshiba (45%). The ratio changes constantly, because either of acquisition and merger of overseas headquarters (as in the case of Polygram and Universal) or of decision made by Japanese investors (as in the case of MCA and Matsushita). How such changes of ownership, and forms and practices of the globalising music business, are understood to affect day-to-day work within recording companies today? On the job, most of the personnel I interviewed in the transnational major labels did not seem to consider ‘nationalisation’ or ‘transnationalisation’ of their companies’ capital to directly alter the music they deal with. For example, when I interviewed a senior director of BMG Victor few days before Japan Victor Corporation (JVC) entirely withdrew from the joint venture, he told me that there would be little change in daily working practices. According to the senior director:

The reason why BMG let JVC hold the 10% capital for the last couple of years is to deal with social welfare system in this country which might complicate the launch of BMG in Japan, and to evade the initial confusion, as BMG at the time was not well known in the business and some might well think we’re a background music [BGM] company or something. Putting the Victor brand along with BMG would certainly help quicker grasp of what we are. (Yokota 1996a)

Another quite peculiar consequence of globalisation is that, because Nihon Columbia and Nihon Victor (today’s JVC) have existed since the pre-war era and have promptly registered their trademarks ever since (they could not come to term with their overseas licensors in the 1960s), Sony Music Japan, dealing with the Columbia label, and Toshiba-EMI, dealing with the HMV label, have to settle an annual royalty for using their registered trademarks (and hence all the overseas Columbia Sony catalogues are dealt with by the Sony Music label in Japan).

Apart from these, the transnational major corporations prefer conservative and locally appropriated strategies in Japan. What they care about most is in fact not the transformation of the market in which they participate, but adaptation to it. According to the same senior director, “we’re dealing with the Japanese market in which domestic repertoire sales share 72 to 73% as opposed to about 28% for international ones. We need to struggle, with other major companies, for a wider market share. As a business, it makes much better sense if we invest in domestic production” (Yokota 1996a). Japanese Sony acquired American CBS in 1988. Yet its Japan branch, SME Japan, was re-bought by (the electronics corporation) Sony Japan from SME International based in New York so that SME International no longer intervenes in domestic acts in the Japanese market. This measure, too, was not taken to alter the conventional structure, but rather to sustain the working practices developed
under their joint venture, CBS-Sony, before Sony's acquisition of CBS. If the market obliges the transnational majors to invest in domestic catalogues, 'national' major labels, too, cannot really claim that they have better knowledge of the domestic market. Older companies, such as King records, Victor Entertainment (JVC), Nihon Columbia or Nihon Crown, in fact suffer from their brand values and administrative structure being too obsolete and too ENKA and KAYO-KYOKU. Newer ones, such as Avex, For Life Records or Toys Factory, are struggling to impose themselves by adopting a transnational flavour in their products as well as more flexible business administration strategies.

If for majority of the recording companies in Japan globalisation means participation and competition in this second largest phonograph market in the world and adoption of and adaptation to its local tastes (which are increasingly marketable in an emerging market category of Southeast Asia), certain fragments of the industry, particularly small, specialised or independent labels, recognise globalisation often in more culturally or politically invested ways. Two such strategies were identified. The first is to actively produce a difference of Japanese popular music in the transnational market. An example may be drawn from Edo-ya Records, an independent label launched in 1988 by a Japanese rock artist, Char, who, in the 1970s, sang in English. As its A&R, Unemoto (1996), commented, "the label name, Edo-ya [Edo is an old appellation of Tokyo], expresses that, in doing the worldwide business of rock music, in order to think globally, we ought contradictorily to recognise where we stand. That is, put it in another way, it's no longer London or New York. Now, it's Tokyo." Unemoto suggested the global awareness of Japanese producers and consumers may open up a new network of distribution without relying on the major labels. He went on to argue:

I don't think groups in Manchester are considering the social backgrounds of teenagers in this Far East island when they write their songs. They are simply talking about their own Manchester lives, which is accepted worldwide as it were. Even the Japanese youths can relate to them. I think that's what rock is all about. And it's high time Japanese artists developed such an open perspective.

For Edo-ya records, like some other labels, globalisation proposes a set of new possibilities to break into overseas markets with Japanese artists.

The other form of transnational awareness can be described as a disposition that tries to equate Japanese artists to overseas artists. Okada, hip-hop A&R of File Records, a sub-label of Epic Sony, pointed out the importance for her Japanese rap artists to associate with US artists on equal terms. For this, she selected four Japanese rappers to collaborate with their favourite US artists to produce a compilation album that she wanted to release both in Japan and in the USA. She (1996) explained:

All I want is that, by doing so, my artists acquire confidence that they are rappers just as US rappers are, on the same ground. [...] Actually, most of them remain simply fans of US rappers: they would worship DJ Premier as their god, a supernatural being. I want them to go beyond – they are both hip-hop artists. Okay, the language is different, but if they are both hip-hop artists, then they ought to find a way to compete on the same ground.

As we will see, in Japan, an important key to hip-hop's street legitimacy is to bridge between Japan and the USA. It is not simply about going to and knowing about the USA, but, as she suggested in the
quote, bringing, embodying and embedding it in Japan.

Each in its way, recording companies seek to take advantage of the globalising music business. With massive financial resources, the majors invest both in producing million-selling domestic artists and marketing international artists. Smaller labels seek to go beyond the imposed boundaries in exploiting the shrunk temporal and spatial distance. Yet, it is misleading to assume that these contrasting strategies as an immediate effect of their confrontation with globalisation. The dispositions of small sub-labels and independent labels are a product of their distrust of the Japanese market, its mainstream music and working convention imposed by the majors. Behind Unemoto’s (1996) assertion of rock’s universality and possibility for Japanese artists in the transnational market is “a criticism against the major makers from the beginning” and an exploration for “an alternative way of delivering our music to our customers outside of the major companies’ structure”. Okada (1996) also expressed her strong scepticism of the major labels as “the major companies introduce someone totally unknown in the scene as a rap artist, and destroy the scene we have built with painful efforts”. Globalisation is, and has been, translated as a local opposition between large-scale and small-scale producers. I shall later return to a set of subtle but important differences between Unemoto’s what may be called post-hip-hop rock group, the Tokyo No. 1 Soul Set, and Okada’s hardcore Japanese rap groups, Microphone Pager, Rhymester and Soul Scream. Here I would like to focus more broadly on how hip-hop’s opposition to the mainstream is disposed to generate its own space within the recording industry and to transgress one of the most normalised and least questioned musical and corporate taxonomies in the industry— that of international and domestic music.

Labels, Regions and Genres.

As elsewhere, larger recording companies in Japan manage their products primarily in terms of domestic and international repertoires, whose operation and knowledge involved differ from each other in many ways. Domestic production embraces actual signing, recording and packaging of predominantly Japanese acts, whereas international production entails co-ordinating of marketing, releasing and image management of overseas acts readily packaged by a foreign affiliate or partner. As in Yokota’s earlier quote, the ‘international’ repertoires share a limited space in Japan, and the lack of demand seems hard to get around, even if international A&Rs are constantly urged to market and promote overseas, mostly US, rap artists whose names may appear on a number of influential chart magazines such as Billboard. “In the age of the Beatles, things must have been a lot easier,” Miyai (1996), Epic Sony’s international A&R, expressed his dilemma of marketing rap in Japan. “If they said like, ‘Okay, this time, we go for India’ or ‘now, it’s time for psychedelia’, then the entire world would automatically follow. But today, even when Nas proclaims ‘If I Rule the World’, who cares?” The general lack of demand for international repertoires, and consequent overall priority placed on domestic artists and repertoires, tend to be reflected in the way budget, time and human resources are allocated to domestic and international acts. “It is,” an international marketing officer suggested, “impossible for our international department alone to feed the entire company of 300 employees, and without million-selling domestic artists, our department couldn’t sustain its activities” (Tanaka 1996).

The way international repertoires are sub-divided into a range of functional categories varies from one company to another, one department to another but, conventionally, each international A&R
is assigned to one or more overseas partner label(s) under a larger umbrella of administrative and budgetary management. In some newer musical genres including rap and hip-hop, however, division by A&R's personal preferences in terms of generic categories seemed increasingly superseding the conventional, label-based management. According to an international A&R department manager, working on a label line makes it easier to align promotional strategies with promotional department to construct a coherent label identity of which record shop buyers can be sensible (Shioda 1996). On the other hand, working on a generic and personal preference line “allows each A&R to deepen knowledge of a particular genre or scene, which in turn enables him or her to initiate a more insightful marketing and promotion operation” (Endo 1997). With ever-diversifying customer tastes, it is increasingly important to employ and train personnel capable of discerning generic difference and of linking it to a particular market cluster today. In hip-hop, generic identity seemed prioritised over functional efficiency: it is not rare that Japanese international A&Rs sign foreign rappers or hip-hop labels exclusively for the Japanese market even if they are signed by a rival company for other markets. Relativity and Penalty, American independent labels without major distribution in the US market at the time, for example, were directly signed for the Japanese market by Ozeki, Sony Records Japan's international A&R specialising in hip-hop.

Dividing repertoires along generic line cuts across not only the corporate and label boundaries as above, but also the taken-for-granted division between international and domestic acts within it. Yanagida (1998), chief product manager of Mercury's international production department, suggested that “though restricted mostly to club music, an increasing number of Japanese talents are being recognised abroad”. He continued:

What is happening is that our international department has reached a stage where we cannot categorise music along international/domestic lines. Like some other companies, we now actively recruit domestic acts to our department, as well as signing talented yet unknown international artists directly for the Japanese market, whether or not Mercury International signs them at a global level.

Similarly, Sony Music Japan's Ozeki (1996) claimed:

In the international production department, our role has long been basically that of marketing directors. That is, when we receive new releases from 'over there', we arrange them to fit the Japanese market. But now we are increasingly aware of the implication of the title of our department – international production.

Ozeki signed a Japanese hip-hop artist, DJ Honda, and directs him as an international artist from his international department. “He's an artist I found and I happen to belong to the international production department,” Ozeki argued. “He has talent and has been recognised in the New York underground scene” (see Yasuda 2000).

If international production departments become open to produce and promote a number of Japanese hip-hop acts internationally (I shall return to a specific set of criteria for the selection later), stronger discomfort seems felt by those who want to break through with newer musical styles, including rap, within domestic production departments. For Japanese rappers and hip-hop A&Rs, the taxonomic convention of the large-scale music business in Japan are often considered too heavily
laden with obsolete pro-rock and anti-dance ideology. There is an apparent vicious circle. Namely, on the one hand, as Morikawa (1996), general manager of WEA Japan's domestic department, suggested, there are very few personnel who specialise in rap and hip-hop in Japan (another insider estimated them to be only 50 in the entire music industries). On the other hand, most of the chief A&Rs for the major labels I interviewed answered only evasively that they would not mind dealing with rap only were there anyone familiar with it in their departments. One of its consequences is that quite a few hip-hop A&Rs, regardless of their company and department, admittedly feel more at ease with hip-hop A&Rs from other labels or departments, than with KAYO-KYOKU or NEW MUSIC A&Rs in their own offices. Little understanding, or what some referred to as 'marginalisation', of rap and hip-hop in the mainstream music business dislocates hip-hop intermediaries from the functional boundaries of labels to construct a space in which the structural division between international and domestic musics is eagerly transgressed.

The hip-hop disposition has partially been translated as majors' attempts at so-called sub-label projects and signing of distribution deals with potential independent labels since the late 1980s. One of the profits is to extend the corporate space into relatively autonomous small units and to internalise the external musical spaces into their administrative structure. For Sato (1996), an A&R for the Endorphin label, a sub-label of JVC specialised in dance music, to launch the new label is "to give name to our activities, to make them visually distinctive from JVC's overall activities". The strategy is not simply derived from the generic or cultural needs within the recording companies. The development of import record business, notably so-called transnational megastore chains such as HMV, Tower Records and Virgin Megastore, increasingly influences the way both domestic and international music is produced and packaged in Japan. Morikawa (1996) for WEA Japan indicated when he explained his new sub-label project dedicated to dance music:

\textit{In a daily sense, there isn't much communication between the domestic and the international departments, even if we sell products in same shops. However, because domestic artists are increasingly promoted like overseas artists today, we may well use some know-how developed in the international department to market and promote domestic artists. The transnational megastore chains have become very influential. Then we could propose our domestic artists with a label named and an image constructed in a certain way [to fit the international, trend-setting images of these megastores].}

Namely, we ought to consider a broader structural shift in the music industries in Japan to understand the ways in which Japanese rap and hip-hop are produced and consumed. The parallel-import record shops, stocking both domestic and international catalogues while carefully maintaining a 'global' touch, propose a different set of taxonomies which favour hip-hop intermediaries in Japan that seeks to transgress the boundary between 'international' and 'domestic' for its generic identity. Now I move on to outline the process of localisation of the transnational megastore chains and their socialisation with the Japanese recording industry.

\textbf{Public Enemy vs. Public Enemy}

\textit{Import Records and Quest for Control}

Record retailers in Japan have been protected by \textit{saihan-seido}, a retail price maintenance
system derived from the post-war necessity to protect the destroyed retailing network. Because imported records are not liable to this system, an identical overseas recording is priced differently in different record shops. In a conventional record shop, one can find, for example, a Public Enemy record, pressed and packaged in Japan, with a detailed Japanese sleeve note containing artist profile, commentary, lyric transcription and translation (and sometimes some 'bonus tracks'), may be priced at around ¥2,500. In an import record shop, one can find the same record, save Japanese sleeve note and bonus tracks, imported from the 'original' US label at as low as ¥1,280. The price reduction is a consequence of a series of incidents. In 1972, Japanese yen adopted a floating exchange rate system and the country has seen a steep rise of its currency from around 1985. In 1988, the Compact Disc format outdid vinyls in terms of units produced annually, revolutionising the distribution with its smaller size and lighter weight. Around the same time, Tokyo and other larger cities saw inauguration of their second private FM station, most of which adopted music-oriented formats that clearly contributed to the popularisation of overseas artists whose records became available in the parallel-import record retailers. The subsequent situation is the inverse of that in the 1920s where an imported record cost more than three times as expensive as a domestically pressed one. As an international A&R suggested, "[the import record retailing] brought about a very qualitative transformation" (Miyai 1996).

Parallel-import record retailing is not a particularly new form of music business in Japan. It has existed for quite a while closely in conjunction with second-hand or collectors' record shops. Most of the shops that have today attained an influential status in the Tokyoite hip-hop scene were very small then. Their commodities were chosen mostly in reference to Anglo-American leading chart magazines such as Billboard, Cashbox or New Music Express and their business was far smaller-scaled than what we would imagine today in Tokyo. Even Tower Records' former Shibuya shop, launched in 1981, targeted mainly a small number of enthusiasts, or 'heavy users', as its public relation officer, Yagawa (1997), put it. During the 1980s, according to him, "listening to imported discs was not as widely popular as today, and, for that matter, overseas music itself had a very limited market".

The volume of our business was not considerable. There wasn't this 'impact from foreign capital investment' that we talk about repeatedly today in the music industries. Put it in another way, domestic [record] makers did not bother much of us, or so it seemed to us at least. No one thought of us becoming such a menace as we are called today. (Yagawa 1997)

It is only after 1990, with the growth of yen, that the import record business became a 'menace' to the recording industry. In September 1990, the first Virgin Megastore opened in Shinjuku, as an 'import record shop on the high street', followed by HMV that opened its first shop in Shibuya the same year. Ever since, the import record business has mutated from a small business on the urban fringes aiming at (often male) enthusiasts to high-street business designated, as Virgin Megastore Shinjuku's manager put it, "to attract a wide range of customers from simple passers-by to informed enthusiasts" (Iwai 1996).

On top of the price difference, imported records are available simultaneously as they are released abroad and often considerably quicker than their domestic package. This has made local
'production' of international catalogues central to the working practices of those dealing with 'international' repertoires. As Miyai (1996) for Epic Sony pointed out, "in the eighties, we could define the meaning and colour of our products and introduce them as such, but it's impossible now: our products have already had their meaning and colour in the market before we release them". To differentiate a domestic package clearly from an imported one at the shop front, an alternative sleeve photograph may be prepared and exclusive bonus tracks are eagerly sought for. In some cases, an album is compiled in Japan so that it is not available in the import record market. In other cases, track lists (the order of songs in an album) are altered domestically not only for it to be different from its imported counterpart, but also to hook customers in front of an in-shop CD player to readily exposed hit tunes in the album. Some A&R and marketing staff argued that even these strategies were obsolete.

Particularly rap, it is a very local kind of music. I'm pretty sure, Public Enemy does not talk to anyone but black Americans. Dr. Dre simply wants to communicate with blacks in L.A. [...] Then we have to tell them that there are fans in Japan, too, by intervening in production process. [...] We've been currently trying to get on with in this way. We're even talking about setting up a section specialised in products for the Japanese market in our New York headquarters. It arose from a pure marketing demand. We cannot do anything for the US artists if their information is more quickly available in record shops. So we - call it simpleminded - decided to couple an overseas artist with a Japanese artist, to change songs' arrangement for the domestic release, or to ask Japanese DJs to remix tracks by overseas artists. (Miyai 1996)

Cerainly, the kind of active localisation strategy is only applicable to a handful of established US rappers because of the considerable investment their Japanese branches have to cover and, according to a casual estimation, as much as 90% of the entire US hip-hop releases are almost simultaneously released in Japan, of which only 10% are properly localised, packaged and promoted by the Japanese affiliates of the transnational labels.

What is important to note is that, as both original US Public Enemy records and domestically packaged ones are available, the former, available only in import record shops, have acquired certain immediacy to the 'original' hip-hop scene, as opposed to the latter, ubiquitously available in any record shop. As indicated in the above quote, import record retailers can be more knowledgeable and informative of overseas scenes than recording company personnel today. Moreover, they are not necessarily bound to a particular label, nor to formal constraints that prevent the majors from dealing with smaller independent labels and bootleg or pirate producers, whose breakbeat samplers and mix-tapes are important constituents of hip-hop culture. The establishment of import record retailing business as a key prescriber of the meanings and values for a particular range of music has drastically changed the way international catalogues are packaged domestically, in whose process music itself changes its shape and textuality: Public Enemy may not identically be a public enemy in Japan. Today, the parallel import records shops assume different roles, more closely collaborating with the recording industry, as they become influential on musical cultures of the Japanese youths. In what follow, I examine two of the new aspects of the parallel import record business, emerged as it develops a mutual relation with the recording industry. The first concerns how import record shops become recording
companies' market pilot to test newer 'international' genres and artists. The second, by the same
token, sees the way they propose a transgressive cultural space between the 'international' and
'domestic' for a carefully selected 'domestic' genres and artists.

**Cultural Economy of Import Records**

By the mid-1990s, with the same reason that drives the transnational major labels to invest in
domestic production in the Japanese market, the transnational megastore retailer chains are urged to
deal with domestic artists, in order to attain a certain level of space/sales efficiency, and consequently
establish a more mutual business relationship with the recording industry in Japan. Initially,
according to Yagawa (1997) for Tower Records, most of the recording companies were overtly dubious,
because of the obvious thrust with the cheaper parallel import records. However, Yagawa continued,
“people began talking about us like the utmost trendsetter of popular music culture in Japan – true or
not. Then gradually, [record] makers, if reluctantly, accepted us. In the long run, Shibuya is a perfect
place to carry out their promotional operation”. The resulting interdependence enables the
transnational majors, in turn, to dissuade the parallel-importers from negotiating independently with
overseas labels and distributors, and oblige the import record retailers to buy in commodities from
them: either as a domestic package or, when it is not the case, an overseas package that is import by
themselves from their overseas partners, branches and affiliates. Consequently, the transnational
megastore chains began stocking both imported and domestic packages of a same recording – “it’s
entirely up to customers,” Yagawa (1997) asserted, “whether they choose a domestic package for bonus
tracks and translated lyrics, or an imported one for the price”. Today, about 70 to 80% of products
import record retailers deal with are said to be imported officially by the Japanese branches of the
transnational record companies.

The main interest for the recording industry is not the direct economic profit from wholesaling
import records, but the benefit of directly surveying their market performance, which helps shape
marketing and promotion strategies of the products. “Today,” an international department manager
suggested, “we are less concerned with releases by uncertain overseas artists. To be frank, we aren’t
really bothered anymore” (Shioda 1996). Hip-hop titles often fall into this ‘uncertain’ category, hence
available more often in import record shops and, in turn, these shops are increasingly considered as a
perfect site for marketing and promotional operation. According to Yokota (1996a) for BMG:

[BMG’s import section] doesn’t do vinyls, for they aren’t very profitable in Japan. But
when we get a sample tape from the US and we don’t really know if it works or not in
Japan, then we can now import about 5,000 copies of it – we can order from about 3,000
copies a title a time – and let Tower have 1,000 of them, HMV 1,000 and Virgin 1,000
and just see what will happen. If it sells 10,000 unexpectedly, we’d release a domestic
package. It’s getting more and more important.

The problem previously has been that both production and promotion departments could not obtain
promotional budgets for imported titles, as the profit from its sales would be reflected on neither
department. Yet, the climate is changing. Ozeki (1996) for Sony Music, using Sony’s network and
budget properly allocated for promotion, lays in every promotional hip-hop 12-inch single title directly
from Columbia Sony US and passes them to leading DJs before any import record shops. According to
Ozeki, "whether Sony Music Japan is willing to release them domestically or not, my concern is not promoting records, but the artists who produce them. The promotion starts when import records reach the Japanese market". Promotional copies must be exposed to some key tastemakers before they are available in import record retailers and acquire their 'meaning and colour'.

The transnational major companies still prioritise domestic packages because of a larger profit margin. It also is a cultural consideration. One prevailing belief among many international department personnel is that beside those who buy imported rap records for the price are serious b-boys and b-girls who care to spend a bit more for information on the artist and the US scene on the liner notes of domestic rap packages. According to Tanaka (1996) for BMG:

Before, people concerned more on sounds than on lyrics, as they didn't understand English, much less black American slang. Today, more people want to know more about the artists. As the market grows, central people want to invest more deeply in artists and the culture. Releasing domestically pressed records, thus, has this role of developing a fan base.

Transcription and translation of lyrics are, for hip-hop and rap artists, very important and much demanded. Endo (1997), an international A&R of East/West, suggested, "explanation of slang terms is very much appreciated by the youths". Ozeki (1996) for Sony Music explained, "you can come across rap tracks in which there's nothing discernible as lyrics, but someone has to pick up what they are rapping about".

Given the cultural and economic investment in packaging international catalogues domestically, it is hardly surprising to find a series of ideologies and assumptions involved in the selection of artists worth domestic packaging and localised promotion. Many suggested that rock fans are more visible and loyal, and sales more predictable, hence domestic packaging profitable. On the contrary, rap fans are considered invisible, unpredictable and chaotic. Rap is politically, economically and culturally marginalised as such in a large part of the Japanese recording industry while, as many suggested, rap's unprecedented popularity in the course of the 1990s coincided the development of import record retailing business in Japan. File Records' A&R, Okada (1996), argued:

Public Enemy, which was the first US rap group largely exposed to the Japanese market, was rapping anti-social lyrics, as blacks. In the same way, for the Japanese b-boys and b-girls.... Of course, they are not blacks, they don't have such a racial demarcation, but they understand the anti-social message as they are equally minorities. [....] Certainly, I am in Japan most of the time. We are simply in Japan, but this doesn't prevent us from identifying ourselves with their marginality.

Cornyetz (1994), in her observation of Japanese television programmes and popular literature, associates 'blackness' in Japanese hip-hop as "phallic empowerment" (121), but it does not seem to hold at least in a case like this. As we have seen, it is quite difficult to assume that, for example, Public Enemy is talking the same fight in Japan and in the USA and, as Okada (1996) argues, "the more you're into hip-hop, the less you're concerned with tanning salons". Television is not the central site, nor is black skin an "essential signifier" (Cornyetz, 113) of the hip-hop legitimacy in Japan.
International Touch to Domestic Catalogues

The outgrowth of the import record retailing business in the 1990s has transformed recording companies' position in the field of popular music production in Japan, resulting in their surveillance of import records as an important means of marketing and promoting their artists. Perhaps more significant is the particular way in which the import record retailers have adapted to the Japanese market in dealing with domestic catalogues. HMV, taking advantage of its stylish image as a genuine British megastore chain while covering domestic repertoires to respond to market demand, proposes a new trend commonly called Shibuya-kei (Shibuya connection) — a style and musical taste that does not distinguish overseas and Japanese popular music as far as it is 'good'. Shibuya-kei style is often associated with HMV Shibuya shop, but it does not result entirely from their conscious effort to pick up all that is trendy and fashionable: it is because of a firm business relation that it has established with the Japanese recording industry. According to HMV Ikebukuro shop manager, Kawazu (1997), branches of HMV in Japan other than those in Tokyo, especially one in Sendai city, in the north of Japan, "could not maintain their business without domestic repertoires". As a domestic A&R director argued, the transnational megastore chains "have developed a very particular way of dealing with recording companies in Japan [...], in that they successfully fused the existing 'Japanese' record retailing business and the trend-setting, international feel that they constructed in Japan" (Imamura 1996).

Many domestic A&Rs pointed out that megastore 'shop front' was the most influential medium today for "new kinds of music, including [Japanese] hip-hop" (Hamano 1996). The foreign-owned, trend-setting megastores on the high street, with their rapid nationwide growth and vast shop size previously unimaginable as a record shop in Japan, propose a culturally invested space to domestic producers that outmodes conventional 'Japanese' record shops, by defining itself as 'American' or 'British', and hence bridging some Japanese artists to 'international' — Anglo-American — music scenes. Megastores are often considered as a '3-D magazine' with their vivid in-shop display schemes, trial CD players, in-shop free magazines and recommendation cards on CD shelves. They are also important sites for unestablished artists to diffuse videos, as the chance of television exposure is very limited in Japan. According to Harada (1996), chief promoter of For Life Records, "these days, nothing happens if promotion does not start from megastores" and "only if we could collaborate with them properly, then radio stations would pick us up". Some estimated that about 30% of consumers decide to buy records when browsing in these shops. As the megastores become central to youth cultures in Japan, they significantly play a role radio would play in other markets like the USA, the UK and France.

The flip side is an intensive promotion war: to obtain a space for displaying a new release; to secure its place in an equally limited space in an in-shop trial CD player (allegedly some labels go so far as to give away in-shop multiple CD players to have their products prioritised favourably); or to have it reviewed favourably in recommendation cards and in-shop magazines. The intensified competition reinforces the mutual relation between the transnational megastore chains and domestic repertoires. As Tower Records' Yagawa (1997) suggested, "dealing with domestic repertoires involves a dose of domestic [record] makers' politics and investment, including their co-operative financial supports...". The megastores eagerly seek for more expensive strategies as straightforward differentiation schemes
have become outdated (such as publication of in-shop free magazines and installation of purpose-
made racks and utensils to all shops under a given chain to retain its unified corporate identity). These
involve, for example, in-shop live concerts or music workshops and give-aways for those who book a
copy of a new release in advance and it is where labels' 'co-operative financial supports' kick in. For an
in-shop concert, the shop would only offer its floor, while the rest of expenses would normally be
covered by a label in question. Free give-aways such as a toothbrush set I got for a copy of Guzen no
Alubamu (Accidental Album: 1996) by a leading Japanese rap group, Scha Dara Parr, in Tower
Records Shibuya (had I booked it in HMV Shibuya, I would have got something else) would again be
taken care of by a concerning recording company, providing a chain or a shop guarantees a certain
quantity of order at the time of release. These strategies are only possible for selected artists for whom
their labels can provide sufficient amount of promotional budget and time, and whose sales record
shops can expect to be big enough. Nonetheless the mutual reliance is apparent when Tower Records
inaugurated its gigantic eight-story 'global flagship shop' in the centre of Shibuya in 1995, purposefully
designating each floor's landing area dedicated to promotional display for recording companies.

Import record retailers, for a range of domestic catalogues, are more influential than press
reviews or radio airplay in Japan. As it changes the way international catalogues are produced and
marketed, the import record retailing business increasingly channels and transforms the way Japanese
popular music is produced. Morikawa (1996) for WEA Japan consciously referred to the import
record retailers in explaining his sub-label project:

The theme, above all, is low budget, low price. We don't need to spend much to produce.
Instead, we can reduce the price of our products. The conventional pricing is at ¥3,000,
isn't it? But in reality, facing all these megastores in which one can get an import record
for about ¥1,580, we ought to set the price that does not remind customers of such a
difference. We want to attract customers in these shops who may be after overseas dance
catalogues, but eventually purchase our domestic catalogues. With or without Japanese
lyrics, we want to produce something that transcends the barrier between the
international and domestic. [....] If we press 10,000 copies, it would be more interesting
to distribute 100 copies of them to 100 megastores in limited urban areas than three
copies to 3,000 shops nationwide indiscriminately.

Okada (1996), who, too, launched her own label, Next Level Recordings, inside File Records, suggested
that hip-hop fans would consider labels and producers carefully before buying a record, hence "it is
reasonable, at least as an image strategy, to introduce my artists under a new label, rather than under
File Records".

I am not suggesting that acceptance to the transnational megastore chains automatically leads to
an instant success or an immediate transgression of the international and domestic boundary. To the
very contrary, the megastore chains attract genres that are split from the conventional route to the
success. Okada (1996) for File Records suggested:

Conventional shops and media still take hip-hop as a peculiar, difficult genre. So, the
situation is quite unfavourable. We still have to struggle as ever. We are still considered
ephemeral, apparently. I mean, we can get an advertisement space in Fine [a 'street']

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fashion magazine] but not in Seventeen [a teenage female fashion magazine]. We are accepted by Tower [Records] but not by Shinsei-do [the leading Japanese retailer chain established in 1949]. Tower [Records] or HMV understand what we do, so we have a stronger chance to have our products displayed beside imported US rap record. The gap’s still undeniable. Especially in so-called traditional Japanese record shops.

The Shinsei-do chain, for example, with its more than 300 shops nationwide (as opposed to Tower Records, HMV and Virgin Megastores totalling to less than 90 shops), in fact is much closer to and still very influential on million-selling success. Yet, import record retailers, whether megastore chains or small independent shops, mediate a particular audience to a set of music with a particular disposition. This disposition is also lived by many A&Rs I have interviewed. Unemoto (1996) for Edo-ya Records, for instance, explained his motivation for entering the music business not because he loved Japanese popular music, but because he had been frustrated by it and wanted to change it.

There are two types of music in Japan. One is available in any record shops, whereas the other almost exclusively in import record shops. Shibuya, where these megastores and specialist import record shops are concentrated, is the most important place for the latter, of which hip-hop is an important part. As far as these relatively newer genres are concerned, even the major labels with a more balanced and undiscriminating national distribution strategy, in the end, tend to get their products returned from other places whereas Shibuya shops order more. According to Morikawa (1996) for WEA Japan, Shibuya-kei artists can sell thousands of copies of their records in HMV Shibuya shop alone. Shibata (1996), who manages the Natural Foundation label, also claimed that, by all means, his label must keep a stable business relation with HMV Shibuya, the originator of Shibuya-kei style, and that promotion ought to started from Shibuya, even if he aimed at a nationwide exposure of his artists. Okada (1996) for File Records reckoned, “in terms of quantity, megastores in Shibuya, like Tower or HMV, are our best clients”. For small and specialist labels, Shibuya also proposes an ever-increasing number of small specialist record shops. Many of these independent labels often send their staff to assist these shops taking stock and doing other chores.

The import record retailing business, thus, has come to assume an influential role in the way both international and domestic music is produced in Japan. It is manifest, for example, in Tower Records’ in-shop free magazine, Bounce, which adopted a foldable double-faced front cover in 1995 when its new flagship shop was opened in central Shibuya. By capturing a photograph of a Japanese artist on one side of the cover and an international artist on the flip side, it proclaims that Tower Records now seriously deals with ‘domestic’ artists, while maintaining its reputation as an accurate and up-to-date information source for ‘international’ artists. Transnational megastores offer a much wider range of products than the Japanese recording industry does, while at the same time providing credible information for enthusiasts. If megastores assume the role of mainstream radio stations, small specialist shops would play the role of local community stations. As Sato (1996) for JVC pointed out:

Today, in Shibuya, all these import record shops co-existed symbiotically: HMV has MHV customers, Tower has theirs, Wave [a ‘national’ megastore launched as one of the meta-mass projects by Seibu conglomerate], too. And on top of it, there are Cisco Records and
Manhattan Records [two of the leading independent import record shops]. They all deal with hit records, but apart from them, each proposes different products. The problem today is that we, recording companies, may not be sensible enough to these subtle differences.

The most distinctive of these 'subtle differences' is the one between all-genre megastore chains and genre-specific record shops, of which the recording formats – CDs in the former and vinyls in the latter – are a clear demarcation which is more or less homologous to the structural division between 'sell-out' and 'hardcore' hip-hop. With these consequences of the import record business in mind, I now would like to explore the processes through which hip-hop and rap are understood and instituted within the recording industry in a more detailed way. It should also be understood as an attempt to reconstitute a history of Japanese hip-hop as partially narrated in Part II, as seen by recording industry personnel. In doing that, I would like to focus firstly on an internal opposition in the Japanese hip-hop scene between a class of artists often categorised as 'Little Bird Nation' and another called 'hardcore' style, secondly on some consequences of a million-selling hit, 'Da Yo Ne', by a rap group East End x Yuri in 1995.

Where's Hip-Hop?

Instituting Hip-hop Market and Internalising Conflicts

A surprising, if in a way predictable, reality I have come across while doing the interviews was a firm belief, even in the late-1990s, in melody – and disbelief in rhythm – among a large fraction of the recording industry staff, and most often, this melody-centrism is tied to explain the Japanese popular taste. Indeed, many A&Rs, international or domestic, justified their reluctance to invest in rap as it does not have a melody line, thus "it is not complete as a piece of music" (Shioda 1996). The explosive popularity in Japan of so-called West Coast G-Funk tunes around the LA-based producer, Dr. Dre, was also explained in terms of their more discernible presence of chord structure and melodious synthesiser riffs. Harada (1996) for For Life Records went so far as to assert, "there hasn't been any percussive instruments in Japan for almost 2,000 years. At last, with the sampling technology we're about to get there". Other A&Rs pointed out that the Japanese language is not suitable for rap's rhythmic delivery and that the Japanese have little political and emotional investment in US racial politics, ghetto poverty and gun- and drug-related crimes which are ubiquitous constituents of hip-hop culture and rap music in the USA. Certainly, it may be true that, in Japan, racial and ethnic antagonism and social class conflict have not always been clearly articulated and that dancing bodies have been concealed in invisible premises by the authorities (the issues of social and ethnic segregation have been little dealt with in Japanese rap apart from a few exceptions (see Condry (1999)).

Even then, it does not prevent Japanese rappers from expressing their marginalised and anti-social sentiment and Japanese b-boys and b-girls from hanging around crowded nightclubs: despite the political intervention and regulation, people indeed have been dancing through the century in obscurity. It is this marginal obscurity – of rap artists and audiences, and of the social position they partake in – that the Japanese hip-hop community mobilises to construct its authenticity.

This obscurity is equally a product of a comparison with the rock market in Japan which, as I have argued earlier, is believed to embrace a more faithful, thus predictable audience in which a label
can easily invest its time and resources. Ueda (1996), deputy general manager of Victor's international department, said that he was dissuaded from investing in rap acts by the lack of suitable personnel in his department and, more crucially, by the lack of diffusion channel with which to reach an audience. There are, as he suggested, few rap tunes on the radio, much less on television. The structural deficiency is immediately translated into a cultural one: for him, dance music is not even taken up seriously by music critics and the distinction between rock and dance music in Japan is comparable to that between sushi and oden, Japanese dishes of which the former symbolises the luxury, and the latter the gutter. According to Miyai (1996) for Epic Sony, "the essential problem of Japanese hip-hop is that most of the artists and industry personnel fail to identify their audience. Or at best, they only look at a very limited number of people who hang around in Shibuya around midnight". Even among the black music specialists, the continuity of black music and hip-hop in the Japanese market is persistently questioned. Sony Music’s Ozeki (1996), on the contrary, keeps a pragmatic distance from this opposition between rock and rap, for, "viewing the history of hip-hop, it arrived at Japan only 10 or 11 years ago. Generally, it is said that rap started in the late-1970s, in 1979 if you like. [...] But the fact is, in Japan, and if you're over 30, then there was no hip-hop when you're a teenager". It is nonsense to pretend continuity between post-hip-hop and pre-hip-hop black music in the Japanese market. That is, to institute hip-hop’s autonomous market, Ozeki accepts the fact that hip-hop may not make sense to the senior executives in his company and that rap music may not be 'naturally' branched out from pre-existing genres in the Japanese market. Consequently, he has to start with informing the older generations who “don't believe hip-hop would sell, although it does” (Ozeki 1996).

Then how at all is it possible to produce a market for hip-hop and rap in Japan where, as it were, there is no apparent racial conflict and no visible dance culture? The introduction of US hip-hop and rap acts has not been an easy affair. Most A&Rs agreed, and as I explored in Part II, that Run DMC’s 1986 crossover hit, ‘Walk This Way’, marked a turning point of hip-hop and rap in the Japanese market with its melodious hook and rock guitar riff of Aerosmith. As Yabushita (1996) for Soytzer Music publisher pointed out, “naturally, it attracted more of the post-punk current. It was certainly 'fashionable', but was not 'black' at any rate”. Miyai (1996) for Epic Sony more overtly admitted that hip-hop was introduced inadequately in Japan.

Hip-hop was not correctly introduced to the Japanese market. It was promoted as if it were the latest fashion trend, and before we could convey its politics and message, it became about wearing a pair of Adidas and a gold chain.... I have to admit, it's a very bad habit of the recording industry, for it's easier to do so: it's more immediately profitable to introduce a new style of music as a fad in spite of its social message. [...] But, in the long run, today, we are suffering from what we've done. A lot of media people today think hip-hop has long been gone out of fashion and are not interested in it anymore.

Thus, despite that hip-hop and rap expanded its market and developed a variety of branches and schools in the USA, they were almost forgotten in the Japanese mainstream market. In 1991, Billboard magazine changed sampling methods for its hit charts from the one based on radio airplay to that based on computerised retail monitoring system (Soundscan), which resulted in an (unexpected) penetration of rap tunes into the mainstream hit charts. In the USA, it aroused a controversy as to
who (blacks or whites) is the rap audience (see Samuels 1995 and Rose 1994). In Japan, as Tanaka (1996) for BMG suggested, “those companies whose rap repertoires suddenly reached top 10 of these charts would have to make their best effort to sell them in Japan, otherwise there’d be a pressure from headquarters”. Despite the pressure, most of them failed to market US rap acts in Japan. “So everything was rather pathetic,” Tanaka continued, “for we got all these artists on the US hit charts, without knowing how practically we could market them in Japan”.

Miyai (1996) admitted that he told Epic Sony’s New York headquarters that rap would not sell in Japan. Others, including Tanaka and Ozeki, sought to collaborate with the import record retailers which, as I argued earlier, would play key roles in the emergent hip-hop market in Japan. However, despite their efforts, and even when the import record business became established and some Japanese DJs began making noise in the early 1990s, hip-hop and rap hardly constituted a stable market. Tanaka (1996) for BMG explained the difficulty in terms of international production.

In Japan, I would say there was neither rap nor hip-hop until three or four years ago. I mean, before that, hip-hop fans were a fragment of black music fans that were again a tiny fragment of international repertoire fans which shared less than a third of the Japanese record market. I’m not even certain if there existed the term ‘hip-hop’ at the time. It was all called ‘rap’.

In domestic divisions, too, there was what is often referred to as ‘the winter of rap’ in the early 90s. According to Okada (1996) for File Records:

> When we released our first records, the situation was rather severe. At that time, to which we often refer as ‘the winter of rap’, rap didn’t sell at all. We would have been extremely happy if we had managed to sell 2,000 copies. As it were, there was nothing that may lead us to breaking into the market.

File Records, in fact, is an offspring of the Major Force label, launched by pioneering Japanese DJs leading the emergent nightclub culture in Tokyo. Yet, as Sato (1996) for JVC suggested, “the artists at the time were simply amazed by the club and DJ culture”. Okada, all in respecting them as pioneers, sought to collaborate with the next generation of artists, such as Rhymester, a leading rap duo, and Muro, the ex-rapper of Krush Posse and original member of Microphone Pager, “who thought could do better than the previous Major Force artists”. At any rate, as many A&Rs suggested, hip-hop and rap were almost indiscernible or, at best, considered as a part of the vague category of ‘club’ and ‘dance’ music at the time.

In the early 1990s, Ozeki (1996) for Sony Music was promoted from a disco promoter to a dance music A&R. He expressed a strong frustration he had had at the time:

> I realised that the company’s division had always been rock, pops and dance – as it still is in most cases – but within dance category, we’ve got house, techno, etc. And hip-hop, though you call it dance, it’s really hard to dance if you really want to do it right. So, I found it slightly different from the dance genre. I wanted the division to be like rock, hip-hop and dance. I said so to the company, and I was allowed to do so, but to do it by myself. That was five years ago.

A few Japanese rappers, with or without recording contract and regardless of cultural and political
disposition, tried different styles — altering languages, changing themes, inventing new rhyming and
delivery, elaborating on backing tracks or integrating some new dance styles, but the subtle differences
these artists tried were hardly intelligible, when hip-hop itself was not clearly discernible.

In 1992, Ozeki decided to organise a series of parties called Japan Hip-hop Movement in Sony
Music's building.

At the time, what we call hip-hop today was called ‘R&B’ in one magazine, ‘rap’ in a chart
and ‘black’ in another, then I was suggested to invent a new catchy term for the music I
was dealing with. It may be easy for other genres, but hip-hop is the name that, despite
its shifting shapes, has never changed since the beginning. [...] Because it's a culture.
[...] Hip-hop doesn't change. I couldn’t coin any new term, as anything appeared
deceptive. So I invited all these people to this party and said, “we all love hip-hop” — I
mean I invited press people, radio programmers as well as club DJs — I said, “if we all love
hip-hop, why don’t we express it? Let’s make an environment in which those who love
hip-hop can claim that they love it”.

I am not arguing that Ozeki’s Japan Hip-hop Movement was the decisive moment of the institution
of hip-hop market in Japan. A&Rs in other labels I interviewed could well be uninformed of it, and
apparently the party itself was not held more than a couple of times. The point instead is that there
has been a systematic negligence of hip-hop within the music industries which rendered it so
fragmented and invisible as to press concerned A&Rs like Ozeki to unite, define and articulate its
boundaries.

"The capacity of [hip-hop and rap] artists is quite ripe and ready today," Yabushita (1996) for
Soytzer Music argued, “but the industry isn’t”. Most of the hip-hop A&Rs I interviewed considered the
existing value judgement and decision making structure of the recording industry to be too
conservative. Ozeki (1996) expressed his irritation that the entire Japanese music industries were too
archaic and too heavy to adapt to hip-hop culture. Shibata (1996) for Natural Foundation argued,
“kayo-kyoku dominates this country and whether [the majors] pick up hip-hop artists or not depends
on how much their songs incorporate a kayo-kyoku structure”. Unemoto for Edo-ya Records saw the
kayo-kyoku domination as a consequence of the heavy decision making structure of the major
companies, asserting that “there undeniably is a system with which the majors operate in Japan” and
that “the majors may sign 20 artists a year, of which one or two are expected to be successful”. “I think
[producing million-selling KAYO-KYOKU singers] makes sense as a business,” he continued; “but if I
consider how I cannot produce music I like, I find the entire system quite heavy. We need to find a tie-
in partner before releasing a record and sell an awful lot of records before exposed on television”.
Okada (1996) for File Records, who entered the music business as a sales representative for Sony
Music only to quit it ten months later, also argued that the majors' business did not convince her, for
“when the company tells you to look right, you must look right” and “it was so painful to have to sell
something that I didn’t like”.

Yabushita (1996) saw the structural conflict as one “between younger personnel who try
seriously to pursue their cultures and senior personnel who exploit them”. He argued:
Recording companies are in their senility. Even in the newer companies established after the Second World War, the first generation employees still strongly influence decision-making processes, although they began retiring. They wouldn't understand rap, would they? If they don't assign more power and confidence to younger personnel, there wouldn't be any subculture. Without a structure that can effectively reflect tastes of younger A&Rs, the entire industry would be in peril soon. [...] Few even try to understand rap. There is no sympathy. All these rock generation people think that it's easy to rap, and don't even consider it as music. But it's not that easy to do it – don't you think so? – as there's an issue of respect and culture. It's like forcing painting students who are inspired by [Jean-Michel] Basquiat or [Keith] Haring to paint Renoir and Van Gogh.

He said he was determined to stand against “the homogenisation of Japanese market [by the mainstream Japanese music],” accusing a number of so-called ‘freelance producers’ who “steal hip-hop and jungle for kayo-kyoku,” which “would not change anything fundamentally and is an exploitation of youth culture”.

I am not quite sure if we could draw a clear-cut line between pro- and anti-hip-hop music industry personnel simplistically in terms of generation or administrative structure and business size of each label. As hip-hop and rap make their noise heard the major companies attempt to collaborate with independent producers. In fact, most of the smaller and specialist labels I referred to so far are related to major recording companies in one way or another. File Records is financed and its catalogues managed by Epic Sony. Edo-ya Records is distributed by BMG. Natural Foundation is heavily reliant on Toys Factory that is in turn reliant of Vap Records. Cutting Edge is a label and specialised promotion project team derived from an international production department – “never mind we don’t speak English” as its A&R, Fujiwara (1996), amusingly put it – of Avex groups, arguably the only major label in Japan whose business is “driven by dance music” (Fujiwara 1996). In terms of generation, too, there seems a mutual relationship. When I interviewed him in WEA Japan office, Morikawa (1996) introduced me to his two university graduates with whom he was to launch the sub-label, suggesting that “this year, exceptionally, we decided to appoint the novices, for they are armed with their passion for the current music scene”. Clearly, there is a set of confrontations regarding hip-hop legitimacy in Japan. Yet the line in the recording industry that divides hip-hop and non-hip-hop may be more complex. In that account, there is more than one hip-hop, more than one network of hip-hop production with which to seek distinction, the conflict among which construct the hip-hop authenticity. Already in Part II, we have seen two mutually opposing positions and dispositions within the emergent Tokyoite hip-hop scene in the late 1980s: i.e. the Major Force artists and the anti-Major Force artists. The distinction between ‘high-brow’ and ‘low-brow’ hip-hop is more or less reproduced in the mid-1990s as an opposition between so-called 'Little Bird Nation ('LB' for short) rappers and ‘hardcore’ rappers. The two positions confront each other in many ways. Here I want to examine some of the aspects with which they take their positions in the recording industry in Japan, particularly regarding the distance they keep from both the US hip-hop scene and the Japanese post-punk rock scene, which generates clearly differentiated production, marketing and promotion.
strategies to reach their audiences.

Two Networks of Japanese Hip-hop

If 'hardcore' rappers pursue an uncompromising attitude against the existing networks of popular music production in Japan in claiming hip-hop's aesthetic autonomy ("if artists' skill improves, the market grows" (Kakurai 1996)), 'LB' artists consciously compromise with them, particularly that of rock, so as to reach a wider audience. Because there is as yet any 'hip-hop' in Japan, most of the 'LB' protagonists argued, it is meaningless to differentiate rap from other genres and is inevitable to integrate melody, chord structure and other more accepted musical and visual features. Yabushita (1996) for Soytzer Music who once directed Scha Dara Parr which, with other artists such as the Tokyo No. 1 Soul Set and Kaseki Cider, leads Little Bird Nation, commented that it was pointless to divide rap into various sub-genres as rap music itself was not autonomised; hence the necessity to market rap as a parasitic sub-genre of established rock. Unemoto (1996) for Edo-ya Records described his Tokyo No. 1 Soul Set as a "future form of rock band - Bob Dylan in the 90s" and deliberately differentiated the Soul Set from hip-hop, even if the group appropriates some hip-hop and rap aspects and some music journalists categorise it as a rap group. Shibata (1996) for Natural Foundation who directs Kaseki Cider argued that "even if we want to acquire the style and identity of black Americans by doing hip-hop, it is so obviously impossible". He pointed out:

I personally like both rock and rap, so there is no problem [to have his artists accepted by other music industry personnel]. But, for ['hardcore' rappers] [...]. They invest so heavily in the culture that they cannot go beyond a small circle of hip-hop enthusiasts - so much so that they're very narrow-minded, at least so it seems to me. They could be more flexible....

Certainly, as Shibata admitted, "both ['LB'] artists and so-called 'hardcore' artists want, simply, to do it like black Americans," but, clearly, each of the two currents tries to distinguish itself with a set of mutually exclusive strategies that may be implicated in their opposing visions of and attitudes towards sonic texture, recording format, gender, cultural nationalism, social reality and so on.

Appropriation of hip-hop and rap sound production methodology, songs sampled, flow and grain of rapping voice, among other aspects, are sharply contrasted between 'LB' and 'hardcore' artists. 'Hardcore' artists are often described as 'difficult', 'maniac' and 'narrow-minded', whereas 'LB' artists claim themselves to be more 'down-to-earth', 'open-minded' and 'creative', thus more accepted by the market. That is, as Yabushita (1996) suggested, 'LB' artists tend to approach hip-hop and rap music more "originally," in that they appreciate cultural genres other than hip-hop and rap, such as painting, photography, literature or films and that their starting point tends to be their knowledge on pop art. Shibata (1996), claiming the sound production of Kaseki Cider to have been "much ahead of the time" since he debuted, described him as follows:

He doesn't listen to hip-hop, or for that matter, he doesn't listen to any music. Well, of course he does, but music is just one of his choices and not different from reading books, for example. He's not the one who goes and digs for vinyls. Namely, he is not a musician type and that's why he produces interesting music. [....] For example, now, at this moment, rap is the most convenient medium to express what he wants to say, but if one
day he finds writing serves better for his expression, he may well become a writer. It's a medium. Rapping is just like a toy that is given to him.

It is not difficult to hear the *meta-mass* rhetoric (see p. 86) echoing here: Kaseki Cider sampled a song by Happy End, the originator of Japanese-language rock I referred to in *Part II*, and was applauded by its original member, Haruomi Hosono. Yabushita (1996) equally described Scha Dara Parr's originality as applying hip-hop methodology to Japanese youth culture as it is, as they often sample old and rare Japanese records, instead of Anglo-American rare grooves.

'Hardcore' artists regard 'LB' artists' approach as abusive, compromising and sell-out, for they "deal with hip-hop as if it were a toy" (Ishiyama 1996). Maki (1996), a DJ and A&R of Vortex Records, contested that "those who have been listening to hip-hop insulate themselves from ['LB'] artists and wouldn't accept them". One of the two young A&Rs assisting WEA Japan's Morimoto for his new sub-label project, Ochi (1996), pointed out a kind of rude posture in Japanese hip-hop, a continuum, as he suggested, of *boso-zoku* that simply switched their symbol from a motorbike to a low rider [an (often American) car customised to give an emphasised low profile, often equipped with highly powered audio system], a BMX, hi-tech basket shoes or a skateboard. He claimed:

Read *Front* [a leading Japanese hip-hop magazine] or fanzines like Rugged, and you'll find interview articles with Japanese rappers. They're getting mellower and mellower. I mean increasingly hardcore and underground. There is emerging an underground hip-hop scene in Tokyo, and in Japan, that is not bothered with flattering girls and kids. They have, apparently, a very particular social and political consciousness, like, "beware that you are controlled by the Japanese society. Better realise it right now, or it'll carry you away. You've gotta tell the real from the fake". That's why they claim themselves to be 'real', 'hardcore' and 'underground'. "You who lose sight of the real are scum, so are you who come to nightclubs because it's trendy". "Get lost mother fucker DJs who do it because it's trendy, sucker DJs". These messages are very firmly implicated in their lyrics and sound production today.

Okada (1996) for File Records equally suggested that hardcore artists were less compromising with the conventional music production system in Japan. She sharply denounced "those who scoop up the surface of hip-hop culture and destroy what we have built from scratch". This is why she launched her Next Level Recordings: to "release only artists who have attained the 'next level'" of hip-hop authenticity.

On linguistic plane, Soytzer Music's Yabushita (1996) pointed out that 'LB' rappers are inclined to use *hiragana*, the Japanese cursive syllabary used in plain and feminine language, whereas 'hardcore' rappers tend to use *kanji*, a set of ideographs derived from the Chinese often used in more political, official and masculine language. He continued to argue that 'LB' artists would seek for a rap style that can make the most of the Japanese language, whereas 'hardcore' artists tend to translate US style directly into Japanese, hence the former would rap about daily reality and the latter try to invent or exaggerate 'street life' of which they are not likely to be a part. On the other hand, Sato (1996) for JVC, like some other A&Rs, acclaimed hardcore artists such as King Giddra in that they directly take issue with social dysfunction in Japan such as the Kobe earthquake, the Ohmu Shinrikyo massacre or
seemingly bottomless political corruption, etc, unlike other self-named hip-hop artists who “don’t have any doubt about the society and the education system in this country and rap about lost love, broken heart and things like that”. Kakurai (1996), director of one of the leading underground labels, Vortex Records, argued that some Japanese rappers – such as Muro and Twigy (of Microphone Pager), Zebra (of King Giddra) and Rino (of Lamp Eye) – had accomplished their own skill of rhyming, flow and delivery and suggested Japanese ‘hardcore’ rappers unfaillingly had given voice to the youths who identified with hip-hop culture but could not previously quite express themselves in their own language – at least, “they can now rap along in a car in Japanese”.

Clearly, a gender division is implicated in the political and social awareness and the choice of subject and language that divide both subjective disposition and objective production of ‘LB’ and ‘hardcore’ networks, in terms both of audience and working practices of music professionals. As in Ochi’s argument quoted earlier, the Japanese hardcore rap attracts a predominantly male audience (and not ‘girls and kids’) seeking rude, vulgar and masculine distinction, whereas ‘LB’ rap draws a predominantly female audience that may equally be active in rock genre. According to Shibata (1996) for Natural Foundation, Kaseki Cider’s concerts are attended by more than twice as many girls as boys. Unemoto (1996) for Edo-ya Records also suggested the constant audience for the Tokyo No. 1 Soul Set tends to be university and polytechnic female students and increasingly teenage girls. A female rapper I encountered during the research told me that she was feeling privileged as there were very few female artists in Japanese rap, whereas Okada (1996) for File Records, from her own experience as one of the few female DJs in the wake of Japanese hip-hop, viewed such an attitude too optimistic that would end up bitterly and described hip-hop culture as “a men’s world” in which “the strong rules”. What she suffers from most is, as she pointed out, to establish a credible relation with personnel in other sections of the music industries who do not recognise woman’s participation in hip-hop production.

But, frankly, in most cases, I have been in the scene much longer than they have, and I have been living hip-hop real time. Then they would finally realise, “hey, this woman knows something”. That’s how everything starts. Then I have to see them more often and stick with them longer than what’d be necessary if I were a man.

Being ‘in the scene’, as she argued, is also a key to the ‘hardcore’ authenticity and the male-dominated business environment.

The appropriation by ‘LB’ artists of rock’s established production and promotional network and its resulting wider acceptance in the market further divides the two networks in that the ‘LB’ network focuses its promotion strategies on megastore chains based almost exclusively on CDs, unlike the ‘hardcore’ counterpart that is more inclined to small specialist record shops and packaging of vinyls. It corresponds to the potential size of audience and geographic area to which each music is delivered: with the transnational megastores, CDs circulate nationwide, whereas vinyls rarely reach beyond a closed network of small specialised record shops – particularly those in the Shibuya district. Kakurai (1996) for Vortex Records reckoned that Tokyo was the single largest market for his label and that orders from areas beyond Tokyo would not be more than two or three copies a time, of which one or two may well be for the personal collection of the buyer who orders them. On the contrary, as his colleague Maki (1996) suggested:
As far as specialist record shops are concerned, Japanese rap sells clearly more than US rap in Tokyo. In general, a record by an overseas group may sell somewhere between 2 to 3,000 copies, whereas a Japanese title constantly sells more than 10,000 copies. In terms of CDs that are distributed nationwide, established artists sell much more, but in terms of vinyls, the inverse is the reality. In the limited area of Tokyo, our art and culture are recognised at last.

Small independent labels do release CDs, so that their music reaches a wider market, yet, often, they leave CDs to any of the major recording companies with whom they signed distribution contracts, while feeding small shops and nightclubs by themselves. As Kakurai (1996) put it, "dealing vinyl is just so fun".

If 'LB' artists claim their music to be more adapted to daily realities of the Japanese youths and their art more concerned with 'Japaneseness', 'hardcore' artists are disposed towards a re-embedded, imagined (or 'fetishised' if preferred – but what is not?) black-America. This disposition, as I have argued earlier, is an intrinsic product of the very denigration of KAYO-KYOKU or NEW MUSIC and the conventional Japanese music production system that is understood to be responsible for rap's lack of market acceptance. Shibata (1996) for Natural Foundation considered 'LB' as a sort of 'natural' product of rap's Japanisation comparable to GROUP SOUNDS (GS) boom in the 1960s.

You may substitute yourself with symbols like B-this or G-that, but in the end, you eat rice. Frankly, you eat rice and you may well love a teriyaki fish. And you take off your shoes at home. It's crucial. Because of this, good old group sounds tells us so much. At the time, seeing the Ventures live, everyone wanted to play like them, resulting in the GS boom in Japan. When they imitated the Beatles, GS bands produced something completely different.

'Hardcore' A&Rs, to the contrary, pursue embodiment of the abstracted USA into their professional practices, ranging from rather naive imaginations (such as a paralleling of Tokyo and Osaka in Japan with east coast conscious rap and west coast gangsta rap in the USA) to more solid considerations (such as adoption of the producer system and the street marketing strategies, often said to be the 'norm' in the USA (see Negus 1999, 83-102, for an insightful account of street promotion in the USA)).

The 'imagined black America' resonates, as in Okada (1996)'s argument I quoted earlier, with an anti-social posture of rap and hip-hop. Ishiyama (1996), an A&R of a black music specialist label, P-Vine Records, who produced one of the most critically acclaimed Japanese rap groups, King Giddra, in 1996, suggested that it became pointless to argue that Japanese rappers were fake imitators of US counterparts, and that 'hardcore' artists were no longer inferior to the US counterparts in terms of their musical compositions and social commitment. K-Dub Shine, one of the two King Giddra rappers, started his career in Oakland, USA, initially rapping in English before realising its limitation and deciding to rap in Japanese to convey the message. Kakurai (1996) for the Vortex label argued that Japanese rap tracks became played and mixed with US tracks interchangeably in nightclubs these days and that if DJ's mixing was smooth, he would have problem telling Japanese tracks from American ones. Fujiwara (1996) for Cutting Edge justified his international department's commitment to the Japanese hip-hop scene – "some people don't understand rap, but then who the hell is the number one
on the Billboard Hot 100? A group called A.T.C.Q. [A Tribe Called Quest]. They're number-one like Michael Jackson was. That's the reality”. Buddha Brand, one of the rap acts on Cutting Edge, also started their career in the States.

**On and Around 'Da. Yo. Ne'**

In 1994, Scha Dara Parr’s ‘Konya wa Boogie Back (Boogie Back Tonight)’ featuring a Shibuya-kei rock singer, Kenji Ozawa, attained an unprecedented hit chart success as a Japanese rap tune. Later in the same year, another group, East End x Yuri, achieved a million seller hit with their ‘Da. Yo. Ne. (Isn’t It So)’ for the first time as a Japanese rap act. In 1999, a Japanese NEW MUSIC group by the name of Dragon Ash managed to penetrate to the hit charts with their rap-influenced tune, ‘We Love Hip Hop’. Beside the ‘LB’ and the ‘hardcore’, there has also been those often regarded as ‘sell-outs’, like those who became televised together with NEW JACK SWING boom in the early 1990s. If ‘hardcore’ artists pursue hip-hop autonomy and ‘LB’ artists take advantage of rock, ‘sell-out’ rappers are seen by many as appropriated by the mainstream. In this section, I take a closer look at and around the commercial success of East End x Yuri, a calculated blend of a ‘hardcore’ group, East End, and a female KAYO-KYOKU idol singer, Yuri Ichii. In June 1996, a hardcore group known as Soul Scream ‘dissed’ East End x Yuri in a party, which resulted in a violent reaction from sympathisers of East End x Yuri. Rugged, a fanzine edited by Okada for File Records, reported that a comedian and singer, Brother Corn, who led the incident, swore at Soul Scream, “don’t mess around with the show business conventions” (Yamamoto 1996, 10). For the ‘hardcore’ community, East End x Yuri is a complete sell-out figure that butters up the convention of and the hierarchies in the show business and the KAYO-KYOKU industry.

Paradoxically, the ‘hardcore’ denunciation of East End x Yuri as a commercial ‘sell-out’ brought about expansion of the ‘hardcore’ market itself. From around this time, record shops and nightclubs have mushroomed, specialised hip-hop magazines have emerged and radio and television, if hesitantly, picking up some rap songs, pushing the major and ‘senile’ recording companies more actively towards sub-label projects and distribution deals with independent labels. Discontinuity between old black music fans and contemporary hip-hop fans is still frequently questioned, and the perceived lack of social conflict and racial and class segregation in Japan is referred to by some sceptical professionals and critiques, yet, as in Ozeki’s (1996) argument quoted earlier, the continuity with pre-hip-hop black American music is not a necessary condition for hip-hop legitimacy in Japan. At any rate, as many hip-hop A&Rs underlined, more and more youths today listen to both US and Japanese rap records or even only Japanese rap. Unlike the previous generation, today’s Japanese rap fans have grown up with hip-hop and rap.

East End x Yuri is often considered as a typical product of major’s sub-label strategy. East End, comprised of DJ Yoggy and MC Gaku, is a rap unit from an underground posse called Funky Grammar originally signed by File Records. Yuri Ichii was a member of a KAYO-KYOKU idol group known as Tokyo Performance Doll signed by Epic Sony. The project started as an experimental and ad-hoc live act within Ichii’s own concert. Okada (1996) suggested:

East End had been in the scene for a fairly long time but had a difficulty in earning popularity they’d expect from their career. The collaboration with Yuri was quite
incidental, which turned out to be interesting. So we decided to release a mini-album \textit{[Denim-ed Soul (1994)]} on a one-off, fun-seeking basis. Then Epic Sony advised us to cut "Da. Yo. Ne" single under the Epic Sony label as it was thought to sell.

Through the collaboration, lyrical contents, proposed gender roles and sonic textures were carefully co-opted. Epic Sony's A&R, Hamano (1996) described the project as follows:

First of all, Ichii is an idol singer who is fond of hip-hop, but not into it completely. Hence useless to pretend to be so-called hardcore, underground hip-hop. Instead, we thought of experimenting with a rap song that can be sung in karaoke boxes like any other hit tunes. This is why the lyrics of "Da. Yo. Ne" does not share much with any other existing rap tunes and, indeed, there hasn't been any rap unit that embraces a female and a male MCs at once. Because there are a boy and a girl on the stage, we could draw in a kind of daily conversation of a teenage couple, in a way. In this sense, we could show the fun part of hip-hop and rap very effectively. I mean, of course, we aimed at it.

By the time "Da. Yo. Ne" single achieved a platinum disc for selling more than a million copies and the group attained a constant mass media exposure, subsequent singles and a re-recorded album \textit{(Denim-ed Soul II (1995))} became dealt with by Epic Sony.

Unlike Okada's (1996) insistence on ad-hoc, fun-seeking nature of the project, Epic Sony's Hamano (1996) had a clear intention to mobilise File Records:

Around 1994, music trends became unfailingly set by the transnational megastore chains, such as Tower or HMV. Yuri having been marketed as an idol, we wondered how we could reach these trend-setting shops, and concluded that, strategically, it would make a better sense to release it on an indie label. We could, certainly, released it on our own label, but we'd rather have these transnational megastores and FM stations involved in the promotion process by doing it from the indie label. The number of copies an independent label presses initially is much smaller compared with a major label, but, well, it was to make a difference. Anyway, we thought we'd continue the project only if we got any reaction. And we organised in-shop promotional events, a lot of them.

As anticipated, but not without hesitation, the market reacted favourably. The mini-album, \textit{Denim-ed Soul}, was released from File Records in June 1994. "Da. Yo. Ne" single was released from Epic Sony in August. As the year turned to 1995, they were exposed on television. In February 1995, when "Da. Yo. Ne" was about to reach a million-seller, the group was featured in a number of television advertisement campaigns. The next single, 'Maicca (Never Mind)', was chosen as an opening theme for a television soap opera — a prevailing tie-in strategy in Japan — and marked an instant million-selling hit. A makeshift group, West End x Yuki, comprised of two comedians and one female idol singer from Osaka Performance Doll released 'So. Ya. Na', an Osaka dialect version of 'Da. Yo. Ne', followed by 'Da. Cha. Ne' by North East x Mai in Sendai, 'Da. Be. Sa' by North End x Ayumi in Hokkaido, 'Da. Ga. Ne' by Chubu End x Satomi in Nagoya, 'Ho. Ja. Ne' by Oyster End x Yuka in Hiroshima and 'So. Ta. I' by South End x Yuka in Hakata, all released by Epic Sony, which Okada (1996) acutely denounced as a totally nonsense and shameful pursuit of commercial profit.

Understandably, the entire project attracted sharp criticism from both 'LB' and 'hardcore' circles
that saw it as the major labels' cunning exploitation of their culture. "If [Epic Sony] really wanted to engage East End," Yabushita (1996) for Soytzer Music argued, "they'd release it from Epic from the beginning". "Obviously," he went on, "they didn't think it would sell that much – the prevailing recognition of hip-hop culture is no more than that, in the end". However, as commented in their casual autobiography (1995), East End, even before the project with Yuri Ichii, had been dreaming of making living out of rapping and longing for a larger market in which hip-hop and rap music are accepted. Okada (1996), too, admitted that she had considered the project as a big chance for East End, at least in the beginning. In this light, it would be misleading to attribute the 'sell-out' process simplistically to the profit seeking major label. The 'Japanese rap (J-rap)' boom brought about by East End x Yuri, first of all, disposed hip-hop and rap to be distinguished from other mainstream musics. Then the subsequent 'bandwagon' disposed each act to be distinctive from others, hence instituting a clearer and sharper distinction between the 'authentic', 'street' and 'hardcore' hip-hop and the ‘fake’, 'ochanoma (sitting room)' and 'superficial' rap. It also goes intrinsically with the professionalisation of hip-hop production. Many 'hardcore' artists and producers began pursuing more organised, conscious and reflexive strategies to define, maintain and expand their 'street' legitimacy.

As Hamann (1996) for Epic Sony admitted, East End x Yuri's success owed much to the fact that rap had been new among the mainstream audience, hence their songs stood out more impressively. Shortly after their success, many of the major companies rushed to sign potential rap acts to follow East End x Yuri. Sato (1996) for JVC told me that he was approached by a number of advertisement agencies at the time that were eagerly looking for "catchy rap artists" who were said to be in demand, for instance, "to advertise sweets or beverages". Unemoto (1996) for Edo-ya Records commented:

All of a sudden, hip-hop became the trendy key term in Japan. It was a perfect timing in a way, because desperate media picked up anything appeared hip-hop and rap and even contacted us to interview the [Tokyo No. 1] Soul Set. I thought it was fine, for, by all means, I needed to expose the group to public, even if we considered ourselves as a rock group.

Vortex Records, originally an entrepreneurial entity called Otanoshimi Kenkyujo (Fun-seeking Laboratory) running a nightclub called the Cave in Shibuya, was launched with financial and distribution support by Mercury Japan only after East End x Yuri's success. It was only later that it abandoned the deal – because "Mercury simply wanted to promote their label image as committing to so-called club culture scene in Japan" with "little attachment to our label and artists" (Kakurai 1996). It subsequently established itself as one of the active underground labels in Tokyo. Okada (1996) for File Records suggested that her artists began taking their business seriously. She regretted that "so far, they simply dig down their art deeper and deeper without expanding its width." Fujiwara (1996) for Cutting Edge suggested that the chart success of East End x Yuri helped his colleagues to persuade the executives in his company to launch their Japanese hip-hop project. "While record sales of major rap groups have not gone beyond 250 to 300,000 copies," Yabushita (1996) observed the consequence of the 'J-rap boom'; "many hardcore artists have come to sell 20 to 30,000 copies constantly". It was, in the end, the 'hardcore' hip-hop community that profited most from the million-seller rap songs, reinventing hip-hop as a 'lifestyle' as opposed to a 'boom'.
The wider acceptance of rap music resulted in its exposure to a wider space previously unavailable for hip-hop and rap in Japan. As Hamano (1996) suggested, once 'Da. Yo. Ne' entered the hit charts and music programmes on the radio and television, it had to compete with other leading KAYO-KYOKU and NEW MUSIC artists. "Of course," he continued, "[East End x Yuri's] songs are produced consciously to hook the audience when they are programmed on the radio along with Dreams Come True, Mr. Children and Sharan-Q [three leading NEW MUSIC acts]". In the same way, 'hardcore' rappers were put under competition with their US counterparts in specialist music programmes on satellite and cable television and late-night terrestrial television networks. Notably, MTV Japan's localised hip-hop programme, MTV Jams, began featuring Japanese hardcore rappers. Okada (1997), who decided to produce a video for Rhymester's 'Mimi wo Kasu Beki (You Ought to Listen to Us)' (1996), suggested the importance of sufficient investment in video production as "the difference is too evident between a video [for a Japanese rapper] made with half a million yen and a video [for an American rapper] made with two million yen". Fujiwara (1996) for Cutting Edge, dealing with some of the most active hip-hop artists such as ECD, Buddha Brand and You the Rock, blatantly claimed that their aim was to bring 'underground' dance music (which he said he did not consider as 'underground' in the first place) to the mainstream audience. He continued:

Rather than disputing on hip-hop legitimacy, we'd concern more with how each artist is interesting as an individual. We'd consider it as pop music above all, and in this light, I am sure that You the Rock can penetrate into the mainstream hit charts. [....] The 'scene' is of course very important, but it is equally important to show each artist as an individual with an outstanding personality [to a wider public].

Both in mainstream and underground terms, insertion of hip-hop and rap in the mass media, and competition with other genres, have given rise to a new set of strategies, no longer centred around articulation of the generic term, 'hip-hop' and 'rap', but specifically around distinction of each artist.

Sampling and CHOSAKU-KEN clearance is another controversial aspect of hip-hop business that the million-selling success of some Japanese rap songs has brought about. 'Da. Yo. Ne' was sued for its unauthorised (and too obvious) sampling of a George Benson guitar riff which allegedly resulted in a millions-of-yen indemnity. Dragon Ash's 'We Love Hip Hop' was also implicated in a lawsuit for its equally obvious (and predictable) appropriation of Joan Jett and the Blackhearts' 1981 'We Love Rock 'n' Roll'. "For the major labels," Morikawa (1996) for WEA Japan suggested, "sampling costs a lot". He continued, "we're well aware that, today, sampling becomes a prevailing method of popular music production all over the world, but artists and producers have most imperatively to note and report all materials they sampled, as they are so easily lost and jumbled in the messy processes in recording studios". For the major companies, sampling clearance becomes quite tedious a task as it costs a considerable amount of time and money. It is often deplored that the system is unprepared in Japan regarding sampling. There is also an apparent confusion of the system: some said that one can sample any song up to four measures; some said four measures for a US record and two measures for a UK record; others neglected the existence of such an allowance scheme itself. Price quotes vary from one song to another, and negotiation often takes a long time because of the lack of specialised organisation.

Sampling, obviously, is an important part of rap composition. Materials sampled and the ways
these are re-integrated into a composition often express the artistic position with which one identifies, and the knowledge on sampled songs and the capacity to discern them from a completed song often constitute important capital for 'underground' authenticity. Imaginably, smaller labels waver between the professionalism and the street principle. Some deplored artists' and producers' naivety in general and were worried about the possible strain they would have to carry once some careless projects were found culpable. Others considered East End x Yuri or Dragon Ash simply unlucky and copyright clearance mostly unnecessary, as the public awareness of CHOSAKU-KEN was low in Japan. Some also pointed out that, by naively asking for permission, they could be refused by the right holder, which would further complicate the production process. In one very particular case, I was informed of a project of launching a label specialising in black American music and acquiring the concerning rights for the Japanese market, so that the Japanese artists the label signed could sample freely from its catalogues. In most of the cases, however, 'underground' labels adopted what can be described as an organised disorder – prioritising materials to declare in relation to their importance and obviousness, while discouraging artists from using anything too evident. The fact is that, unless the sales eventually reach the level of 'Da. Yo. Ne' or 'We Love Hip Hop', as an A&R suggested, "suing an artist whose record sells only tens of thousands of copies for unauthorised sampling would not bring any benefit to the plaintiff".

It seems to indicate, among other things, the distance Japanese rappers perceive to the overseas markets in producing their music. That is, contradicting to their claimed and dislocated identification with black America, Japanese 'hardcore' rappers and producers assume their songs rarely draw US artists' attention. On the other hand, equally contradicting to their claimed adaptation to the Japanese mainstream youths, 'sell-out' artists and producers are more readily 'Japanese' for global consumption. East End x Yuri, for example, drew attention of a leading German artist management company and was introduced to Germany at the peak of their success. According to Hamano (1996):

> In the German market, [a Japanese pop group] Pizzicato 5, which has been seriously marketed and promoted in the US and European markets last couple of years, becomes very popular as a trendy urban music. Their songs are mainly in Japanese, except for some that are in English, which somehow prepared a foundation to accept songs sung in Japanese. Then they were looking for a next big thing from Japan, which they found to be East End x Yuri.

There is, as many A&Rs admitted, a big gap between 'Japanese rap' and 'rap in Japanese' once in the global market. Outside Japan, the artists have to be 'Japanese' before being 'hip-hop' to make difference and, as Yabushita (1996) pointed out, "the Japanese imageries in the Angophone sphere are hard to reverse. If Japanese artists penetrated to the overseas markets, their voice should immediately be muted, like DJ Krush and DJ Honda".

Except East End x Yuri's case, where a certain fan base was envisioned for Japanese songs, and few other cases where Japanese rapping was used much as a witty, effeminated gimmick like Scha Dara Parr and Kan Takagi in De La Soul's 1993 song, 'Long Island Wildin', Japanese rappers are more often than not deprived of voice – the very raison d'être of a rapper – in the global arena. Ishiyama (1996) for P-Vine Records revealed:
Basically, it's lyrics [that dissuade overseas labels]. Unless competing purely in terms of sound production like [DJ] Krush, [introduction of Japanese rappers to the global market] seems completely impossible. Of course we send our samples to overseas labels to see at least their reaction, but most of the times, they don't even bother replying. If they do, all say that the track is fine but the lyrics cannot be in Japanese. [...] Apart from collaborating with US rappers or abstracting lyrics into something indiscernible as Japanese, it's too unrealistic an idea. I mean, for a message rap group like King Giddra, the overseas markets are very difficult. Their conscious lyrics, acclaimed in Japan, would be hard to convey.

Okada (1996), who was, as I mentioned earlier, working on an album compiling Japanese and US rappers and trying to release it in both Japan and the USA, feared that US labels were likely to reject her offer because of the Japanese rap tracks.

Ozeki (1996) for Sony Music, too, had struggled with his company to sign DJ Honda as an international artist until he mentioned that Honda is a DJ and his collaborators would rap in English. For Ozaki, nonetheless, the language problem may be reconcilable.

I think there's a space for Japanese artists [in the US market], but few Japanese artists we see today would make it. Okay, they produce perfectly American sound with Japanese lyrics, but, personally, I don't find it interesting. If you try a hip-hop club in the States, you often have reggae half the night. The thing is, these Jamaican musicians speak in patois, which nobody understands, yet the entire club grooves. I think that this level has to be attained. American track with Japanese lyrics is not interesting. For that, we need to construct a Japanese sound, which may be different from today's beat. I like some Japanese rappers but I always tell them, "Okay, underground's fine, but have some sense of market".

The 'Japanese' sound which would eventually satisfy both the Japanese and the global hip-hop markets is yet to be seen, but one thing clear is that the more Japanese hip-hop community identifies 'black America' as its source of legitimacy, the less they are likely to be accepted outside the Japanese market, or the more they are irretrievable from the Tokyoite street. This 'black America', just like the "Japanese imageries in the Anglophone sphere" in Yabushita's argument quoted earlier, is a local artefact, constructed at the intersection of hierarchised positions and dispositions in the structure of the recording industry into which external social relations are constantly internalised. In this account, perhaps it is less meaningful to denounce it simplistically as American imperialism or fetishisation of blackness. Instead, in the next chapter, I examine how such internal and external relations are brought into the process of producing a rap song and how it extends the boundaries of the recording industry to a network of 'street' intermediaries.
A Day in Recording Studio

Budget, Creativity and Authenticity

On a winter afternoon in December 1996, I met a rap group, EDU, in Nihon Crown's own recording studio in Akasaka, Tokyo. EDU is organised around MC Umedy and DJ Etsu who, despite their long career in the scene, had difficulty to get on (see Condry (1999) for a detailed ethnography on this group). They have their own small production and management company called Kitchen Records in the Shitamachi area of Tokyo, organising parties, managing some other artists and packaging and selling their repertoires to recording or related companies. The recording session in question was not for their own project, but for one of the series of albums compiled by Nippon Crown called The Best of Japanese Hip-hop in which they were to include their hip-hop R&B tune, 'Baby, Come Back to Me'. Initially I thought, when told to join them for the recording session, the date to be just one day in a long process in the studio but, to my surprise, that was the only day in which the song was recorded, mixed down and completed. I was told to join them at 14:30, which I did, and the process, beginning with having a brief lunch, followed by an engineer downloading a pre-produced backing track and defining it, the MC recording a vocal track, a guest keyboardist, Como-Lee, recording with his tone modulator and finally adding effects, balancing and equalising to mix down, turned out to be rather quick and ordered. We got out the studio before 19:00, leaving the engineer at the mixing console who said everything would be completed by midnight. Only later I was told that, apart from the few artists signed by the major labels and thriving to sell more than their previously attained sales, it usually takes only a week or two to complete one hip-hop album of some ten songs.

Many A&Rs and producers I encountered characterised hip-hop and rap with its low production cost, stressing the spontaneity of the art. Nakamaru (1997), manager of Paco, a leading DJ equipment specialist shop in Shibuya, argued:

[For hip-hop,] you only need a small mixer and a pair of turntables. To produce tracks, add [a sampler]. Simple as that. Once you get serious, then you'll want to customise the sampler to obtain para-out [parallel output for each sampled channel] and get a small 16-channel mixer and a couple of effecters, which will let you compose in your room. [...] Add a digital multi-track recorder, and you can rap on your track and produce your records. Hip-hop is cool because it's such a simple kind of music. That is, if you don't get this attitude, you cannot really produce anything cool. You can get by only with a sampler. Look at DJ Krush [...].

Much of hip-hop literature equally celebrates the revolutionary (black) dexterity of DJing and rapping to produce pleasure out of the most ubiquitous materials in the street (see Part I). But how much does this actually hold? Certainly, a turntable might be more readily available than a guitar or a drum kit, and DJing might presuppose less trained musical skills, yet, in reality, to be recognised as a hip-hop DJ, one is disposed towards a particular range of turntables and other materials with specific configurations and a specific range of the 'must-have' records. Some told me that a record for a DJ is a consumption article just like a string for a guitarist, then DJing can be much more expansive than playing the guitar, for few guitarists proudly collect thousands of strings in their shelves.
Rapping, too, cannot be completed only with spontaneity as it involves embodying of elaborated skill of rhyming, flow and delivery, which is increasingly canonised as it develops its aesthetic autonomy. Indeed, the impression I had during the recording session was the opposite to an untrained, spontaneous dexterity and the way MC Umedy sang and the way his voice fitted into DJ Etsu's backing track were consciously defined through repeated references to other artists, songs and audiences external to the recording studio. For example, the song was referred to as "a slow and sexy hip-hop R&B that hasn't existed in Japan before". MC Umedy was related both to US artists (as "a Japanese Barry White") and Japanese artists (as "hip-hop industry's Akira Fuse [a Japanese male crooner], in dinner jacket with a bunch of roses"). The audience, too, was envisioned as mature lovers, for "it is high time we graduated from flirting teenagers". These perceived external relations were to be strategically inscribed in the magnetic tape. MC Umedy had to deliver with a "cool, distant voice," without Japanese accent on eventual English phrases in the rhymed lyrics, and the song was to be finished with added sound effects of falling rain, the vain noise of a stylus running on a vinyl and a chorus with the tone modulator which was frequently used in US G-funk style at the time.

Hip-hop production per se, in this account, is not cheap, nor is it an immediate expression of artistic creativity. Rather, it is placed at an intersection of a set of particular conditions that translate low production cost into spontaneous creativity. Certainly, in most of the cases, producing a rap album does not require months of processing in recording studios which costs quite much to the label concerned. Because of the digital nature of the process that requires little acoustic recording, backing tracks can be pre-produced even in a bedroom studio. Once in a professionally equipped recording studio and the pre-produced digital data uploaded, most of the time, recording a vocal track and mixing-down are all that are left to do. This cheapness can not be attributed to hip-hop's own characteristic, for it is rather the market size that limits the production budget. "Experienced artists finish one song per day," Maki (1996) for Vortex Records told me. "Of course, slower artists can frustrate me. Sometimes I really go, 'damn!' I mean, if they are struggling positively and productively, it's Okay, but sometimes they say, 'I cannot get an inspiration' and just sit down on a chair for two hours. I see banknotes flying away...". Budgetary limitation is an important factor to make hip-hop production cheap. I might sound obvious here, but what I am trying to argue is that there is a mutual reliance between hip-hop labels' budget and hip-hop artists' pre-production which is somehow articulated to hip-hop's street distinction.

Ishiyama (1996) for P-Vine Records who supervised the two-week long recording of King Gidra's album, Sora Kara No Chikara (Power From the Sky) (1995), characterised hip-hop production in terms of artist's capacity not only to create music but also to "manage the entire production, being an A&R, director and producer at once". He continued:

I think there's been no music like this before, but within the last couple of years, quite a few emerging artists consciously thrive to earn their living out of their favourite music in various ways. Some are running hip-hop related shops, for example. They are trying many ways to make money out of hip-hop. In the end, they love money, don't they? So, they are quite keen and positive regarding this side of the things. I think that the role of
an A&R in hip-hop is to support their activities, help them when they lack specialist knowledge, and of course pick up and develop talents in such a network.

Hip-hop's pre-productivity, in fact, stretches far beyond a recording studio. Some of the leading hardcore artists run restaurants, bars, hip-hop boutiques, record shops, work as editors or journalists for hip-hop related magazines and so on, beside the recording business. Others hold their own parties regularly in nightclubs or organise their own shows by themselves. I have come across many occasions in which artists, including EDU, propose their pre-produced tunes in these parties to see the reaction from the dance floor. In some cases, strictly speaking, these are not even 'pre-produced' for future record releases, as recording labels often offer recording deals after artists establish certain notoriety among club audiences. Be that as it may, by the time a pre-production is up-loaded to the computer in a recording studio, the scene is already inscribed in these digital data.

The choice of a recording studio also seems crucial to realise not only 'budget' but also 'hip-hop' production. A&Rs constantly calculate cost and processes required for recording, and price and facilities proposed by a recording studio. In the case of The Best of Japanese Hip-hop series, Nihon Crown's own studio was used. In other cases, labels are obliged to choose out of a small range of 'budget' studios in and around the Shibuya and the Shinjuku areas, offering computerised mixing facility and a competent recording engineer from around ¥100,000 per day. The number of recording engineers who can generate hip-hop's particular sound is limited, but “it wouldn't sound right if we worked with engineers specialised in other genres” (Maki 1996). The economic, material and technical limitation tends to bind Japanese hip-hop artists to a small circle of people, institutions and spaces that they share in Tokyo. Released records, too, draw more or less similar trajectories, particularly regarding vinyls, for their circulation, as I argued earlier, is limited in a closed network of specialist record shops in and around Shibuya. More than business consideration, pressing vinyls is an important key to maintain artists' connection to the scene, as they are not only appreciated by their customers but also played in various nightclubs and other venues frequented by them. The scene here is quite physical an entity, inscribed in the geography of the Tokyoite streets.

For the sake of this 'street', A&Rs who care to release vinyls try hard to keep the price low and accessible. Okada (1996) for File Records suggested, “pressing and selling 8,000 copies of vinyls and making a million yen in fact generates little profit” but she would not “see any negative element in releasing vinyls because the demand is high in the scene and we don't at least lose any money, all in all”. For a 12-inch single of Rhymester, one of the leading Japanese hardcore rap units, she managed to get a budget of about ¥900,000, with which to rent a recording studio for six days, to record two new songs, to remix one of them. She said she would press 30,000 copies of it in an American pressing factory and finally to import, stock and distribute them. Pressing in the USA is cheaper (at around two to three dollars per 12-inch record) and quicker than in CD-dominated Japan where there is practically only one factory with analogue pressing facility that quotes up to twice as high a price and is booked up by major artists. There is of course a cultural consideration. Okada (1996) pointed out that a record pressed in the Japanese factory is too thick for scratching, a material for record sleeve is not as cool. Okada (1997) also suggested:
Even in the same United States, each press factory has a different cutting engineer, so I did a bit of research to know which label uses which factory. For instance, I said, Gang Starr's 12-inch sounds great and the quality of disc is very fine. Then why don't we use the factory they use?

Recording a rap song embraces and brings into a recording studio different time – pre-production, actual recording and post-production which obviously fuses with another pre-production – and different space – a bed-room studio, dance floors, specialist record and other hip-hop related shops and even pressing factories in the USA. Within the interwoven network of these 'street' intermediaries intrinsic to the production of hip-hop's meanings and values, low budget is translated into hip-hop's distinctive creativity.

**Professionalisation and Rationalisation of Street**

In hip-hop, a record is not necessarily the final product. Its meanings and values are added, and profits generated, through a web of intermediaries that constitutes the 'street' network. However, it does not lead from this that artists are not willing to record and release their repertoires: quite to the contrary, artists are eager to obtain recording deals and have their music listened and danced to, so much so that, as some A&Rs deplored, some of them took releasing a record as a kind of memorabilia, without due professional consideration of marketing, promotion and distribution. Other A&Rs, on the contrary, accused the recording industry for being reluctant to recognise hip-hop culture and to engage rap artists on long-term basis. Indeed, apart from a few distinctive artists, such as Scha Dara Parr, the Tokyo No. 1 Soul Set, Rhymester and Buddha Brand, most artists are signed on a so-called 'one-off' or 'one-shot' deal only after their 'buzz' is established in the 'street'. It is favoured by small labels as it covers the often insufficient budget for a promotional operation, while enabling them to propose a raw sound that is really happening in the scene to a more or less predictable number of 'core' fans.

Ishiyama (1996) for P-Vine Records, who, too, contracted King Giddra as a 'one-shot' deal, told me as follows:

There was an obvious noise in the scene that expected [King] Giddra to be the next big thing to come. We signed them in such a situation. Everything had already been set up, and we didn't need any promotion - well, not much serious promotion. By the time we signed, we could clearly foresee a satisfactory sale after the release. [...] As a result, it has sold well above 20,000 copies and now is reaching 30,000. It is remarkable for an independent label.

However, for Ishiyama, this is also where he feels the limitation of a 'one-off' deal and an independent label. He went on:

Well, I think - it's my personal impression - that now we've reached a certain stage. The record sells well, and it's very constant. Then I think, perhaps, it could have sold even more. It's not of greed, but if I think of the artist and the future of the scene, I feel somehow powerless. Okay, we have achieved a remarkable result, but, then, there's nothing that follows. We cannot offer a durable support [to one particular artist], and other artists are already on the waiting list.

Consequently, artists are obliged to wonder from one contract to another, from one label to another,
which, on the one hand, as some A&Rs argued, shapes a sense of community beyond labels and, on the other, as other A&Rs struggled, makes it hard for each artist to be distinctive.

The lack of durable support from a label often results in a lack of stable artist management. Many artists have to struggle by themselves to organise their gigs, parties, recording sessions and other activities. Moreover, because hip-hop is disposed to weave diverse activities distinct from mainstream KAYO-KYOKU and NEW MUSIC and external to the recording industry, the existing artist management system is often felt to be incompetent. According to Ishiyama (1996), "if we are to establish a hip-hop scene, someone ought to start [professional artist management]. We ought to build our own core with which to challenge the mainstream". Each artist strives to find a way. Some launched their own small production companies, like EDU's Kitchen Records, trying to manage and produce their artists and proposing them to a recording company as a package. Street Flava, organised around a posse called Kaminari, has realised a series of records including Shogen (Testimony) by Lamp Eye (1996) and Double Impact E.P. (1997) by T.O.P Rankaz (including Zeebra of King Giddra) from Polystar Records. Okada (1996), too, highlighted the urgency of reconstruct her label's administrative structure. She argued:

Because [Japanese artists] leave all their rights to other people, without doing anything themselves, so many just end up with being totally ignorant of the system and the business rules. I think, after all, whether an artist is clever or moron, whether or not one can survive and make it in this domain, depends on it. [...] In the States, in hip-hop, particularly, producers obtain a certain budget, with which to achieve an expected result. Their take is what is left when the result is accomplished. Then they would obviously think of the best way to satisfy the label without spending too much. In Japan, there is no system like that, and an artist spends a wastefully long time in a recording studio, assuming that the bill goes to the label. Surely, you can get the same, fixed money, but if you were clever, you'd get more. I think it to be one of the big reasons why hip-hop artists cannot expand their business, and we have decided to do this in our label recently.

Clearly, there is a strong aspiration to rationalise, reorganise and reintegrate the disperse intermediaries of the 'street' network.

The Cutting Edge label consciously attempts to redefine the 'street' intermediaries with its street promotion strategies consisting of on-site distribution of flyers and stickers and mobilisation in a word-of-mouth network. It is crucial, as Fujiwara (1996) for Cutting Edge suggested, to focus on a specific set of institutions in particular areas — Shibuya and Shinjuku, evidently. Nightclubs, specialist and second hand record shops and hip-hop related boutiques are very important because, as he argued, "our sales representatives and our distributor [Toshiba-EMI], concentrating on dealing with the larger megastore chains, wouldn't talk to these people". Consequently, he and his colleagues would list up and carry with them names and addresses of potential venues all the time. He continued:

[Street promotion] is quite awkward and troublesome. It's time-consuming as well. But nothing compares to its instant effect at the street level. If I take some flyers with me to a gig, and distribute them there, some may be drawn and hooked. Some of the flyers are
directly about our records, but most are for gigs and other events, with the announcement of a record release, for example.

Many music industry personnel I interviewed pointed out a 'fair wind' of Japanese hip-hop from around 1996 and 97, which may be confirmed by the long-lasting popularity of 'LB' artists, notably Scha Dara Parr, the steady activities of some of the 'hardcore' Japanese rappers in their shifting formulations and units and the spectacular success of Dragon Ash and other so-called Japanese hip-hop R&B acts today. Most of them reasoned this in terms of a much broader space than the recording industry: to record retailers, nightclubs, the music press, radio stations, fashion magazines, etc. So far, we have seen how these social relations are internalised into and rationalised by the recording industry to distinguish hip-hop from other genres of music, and how it mediates rationalisation and redefinition of the 'street'. Precisely at the same time, in each domain in the music and other related industries, different objections are confronted and conflicts struggled to institute a route of hip-hop culture in Japan. In what follows, I would like to explore how the external intermediaries subjectively co-opt and objectively construct the 'street' as a distinctive cultural space in Tokyo.
Field of Media Institutions and Street Intermediaries

Record Retailers

Megastore Chains

Abstraction of Music World and In-Shop Distribution of Genres

The 1999 edition of Record Map indicates that there are 40 Tower Records shops, 21 HMV shops and 21 Virgin shops (including smaller non-Megastores) in Japan. Not surprisingly, most of them are located in big cities such as Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Sapporo, Sendai and Fukuoka. It is also clear that there is a dense concentration in Tokyo and its suburbs, of which the area circumscribed by the circular Yamanote railway line alone accommodates 13 megastores (Shibuya (a Tower Records and an HMV), Harajuku (an HMV), Shinjuku (a Tower Records (there were two outlets at the time of my research, which merged in one in 1999), two HMVs and a Virgin Megastore), Ikebukuro (a Tower Records, an HMV and a Virgin Megastore), Ginza (two HMVs) and Ueno (an HMV)), covering almost 16% of the nationwide 82 shops. As a general tendency in Tokyo, according to Nishizato (1996), a black music buyer in Tower Records Shinjuku East, his shop sells more rock and pop catalogues. As for hip-hop, he reckoned Ikebukuro shop was popular among gangsta rap buffs, whereas hardcore b-boys and b-girls would flock to the Shibuya shop. A buyer in HMV Shinjuku South agreed on another occasion, “Shibuya reigns when it comes to hip-hop. Rock and alternative rock are in demand in Shinjuku”. In Shibuya, regarding Japanese hip-hop, most of the ‘LB’ A&Rs I interviewed prefer ‘sophisticated’ HMV, from which Shibuya-kei style emerged, whereas ‘hardcore’ A&Rs prioritise ‘American’ Tower Records.

The megastores basically offer a comprehensive range of products including both international and domestic catalogues through their nationwide chains. Their location is often restricted by its crucial necessity for a large surface in dense urban areas (an average Tower Records shop in Japan embraces 580 to 680 sq. m. floor surface, and its Shibuya shop offers 1,400 sq. m.; a Virgin Megastore worldwide requires at least 1,000 sq. m. to be called ‘Megastore’). In all cases, their in-shop space is divided in terms of musical genres and tastes, according to customer’s consumption patterns and sales performances, or, more precisely, depending on how these criteria are interpreted and applied as a differentiation strategy from other shops. Apart from the ‘pushed’ products at the most eye-catching point in any shop, the floor is divided into ‘classical’, ‘jazz’, ‘international pop’ and ‘Japanese pop’ sections. The most popular (hence most profitable) genre tends to be situated closer to the entrance, and classical and jazz sections are often treated with differentiated utensils and furniture. As classical and jazz genres and pop genres tend to attract different customers, the distance between them is often covered with intermediary categories such as ‘film soundtracks’ or ‘world music’, and in-shop music from each of the sections is often acoustically adjusted to avoid interference. While the ways music is further divided than these relatively broad categories vary from one chain to another, and from one shop to another, there seems to be one commonly applied logic. That is, the more music is subdivided, the more it gives a committed and knowledgeable feel to the shop. HMV shops, for example, subdivides ‘international pop’ into ‘rock’ and ‘black’ and, in some cases, ‘black’ is further subdivided into ‘R&B/soul’, ‘house/techno’, ‘rap/hip-hop’, etc. Tower Records, in contrast, adopts “basically the
simplest method with which our customers – light users – have no difficulty” (Yagawa 1997), and integrates the entire 'International pop' under one comprehensive 'pops' flag with “uncomplicated A to Z classification” (Yagawa 1997).

There is also a subtle difference in in-shop spatial distribution and commodity range among shops in a same chain, depending on their location and customers. The two Tower Records shops in Shinjuku, which are united in one large shop in 1999, were a good example of this. The one, in an old cinema building in the eastern area of Shinjuku station, would cater for enthusiasts, hence detailed sub-generic classification and shelving, whereas the other, in a newer clothing shopping complex in the southern area of the station (i.e. closer to the new Tokyo Metropolitan Government office and other skyscrapers: see Map 6 (p. 89)), catered for mainstream customers with more conventional and broader ranged shelving. The basic rules described above, therefore, did not apply to Tower Record Shinjuku East, and 'International pop' would be “subdivided into 'soul', 'rap', 'pops' and 'techno’” (Yagawa 1997). Kawazu (1997) for HMV Ikebukuro admitted the difficulty involved in maintaining corporate identity and catering effectively for tangibly different customers each shop has and this seems where conflict and confrontation transpire between interests of a corporate administration and a local shop management. In the aforementioned new HMV Shinjuku South shop, its general manager roughly planned floor distribution firstly, and then buyers disposed the commodities, anticipating the flow of customers. As one of the buyers, Suina (1996) pointed out that “there are a couple of points that actually are quite dodgy,” a series of trial and error processes would be repeated before it reaches unspoken consensus between the shop and its customers. “Above all,” he described its strategy, “we need a constant flow of sure-fire mainstream hit products, [...]. The thing is that we have so little clue as to what sells in the shop that everything counts. Everything's worth just buying in and experimenting". Here, we could also detect a series of interests and expectations intersecting at the shop. Shinjuku ward wants to reinvent itself by renovating its southern area in which the shop is situated. Takashimaya department store expects a 'shower effect', a benefit from letting its top floor to HMV which drains its customers downwards to other tenant shops. The customers also take their parts, whose mile-long queue on Takashimaya's inauguration day was instant news coverage.

Music is thus classified into generic categories that are reflexively attributed to a set of consumer clusters and re-distributed into abstract in-shop space in a megastore. In order that the in-shop musical space makes sense, the spatial distribution channels customers as much as it is channelled by them. The new Tower Record Shibuya shop, opened in April 1995 and conceived to represent its corporate identity in Japan and in the world, accommodates: a coffee shop on the basement floor; new releases on the ground floor; ‘J-pop’, computer games and CD-ROMs on the first floor; ‘international pop (in which rap has a dedicated shelf)’ on the second; ‘world music’, ‘reggae’, ‘film soundtracks’ and ‘video’ on the third; ‘jazz’, ‘country & western’, ‘blues’ and ‘new age music’ on the fourth; ‘classical music’ on the fifth; books on the sixth; and a purpose-made event hall on the top floor. According to Yagawa (1997):

The first [Japanese pop] and second [international pop] are the most popular floors in our Shibuya shop. The higher one goes, the less popular and more selective music becomes. The ground floor, as the shop is in fact way too large, gathers together all the
genres that we deal with. We simply want it to be a sort of an attraction which people can simply come in and out, whether or not they purchase something.

Space allocated to each musical genre turns out to be dynamically transformative depending on anticipated musical dispositions and knowledge of its customers in a record shop. Definition and position-taking of a musical genre in a megastore is, therefore, mediated not only by the necessity to devise an appropriate way for consumers to find what they are after with “no difficulty,” but also, as Yagawa (1997) suggested, by “a fairly arbitrary and administrative necessity for the shop and for the [record] makers to grasp their commodities.” Where and how, then, is hip-hop genre defined and positioned in the megastores?

**Hip-hop Buyers and In-Shop Reconstruction of Street**

'International pop' and 'Japanese pop' are as significant classifiers as 'classical' and 'jazz' in the megastore floor arrangement. The same is also true concerning rap genre – US rap acts, which are classified under the 'international' category, do not normally intersect with Japanese rap acts, classified under the 'domestic' category. That is, the taxonomy between international and domestic overrides hip-hop as one cultural category, and doing so makes better sense to most of the megastore customers. In Tower Records Shibuya, Japanese rap records are located beside the 'Japanese independent labels' section on the 'J-pop' floor, whereas US counterparts are shelved in the separate 'rap' section on the 'international pop' floor. The underlying logic is a recognition that, to borrow Yagawa's (1997) passage, "when it comes to hip-hop, American acts are far more popular than Japanese ones [thus the independent 'rap' section]," and "for Shibuya shop [which counts tens of thousands of customers daily], it would be confusing if international and domestic weren't classified simply". Suina (1996), a Japanese pop buyer in HMV Shinjuku South similarly suggested:

Although more and more people are talking about Japanese rap, most of them are initiated into Scha Dara Parr, East End x Yuri and the likes, for good or worse. So, naturally, for a majority of our customers, it is far more convenient to have them shelved in Japanese pop section. Likewise, if we didn't apply a rigid framework to commodities, it would be, as you imagine, too complicated for us to take inventory and manage products.

Signed by one of the major labels that spends fair amount of time and money to promote them, and enjoying, as a consequence, favourable mass media exposure, major Japanese rap artists such as Scha Dara Parr and East End x Yuri, are classified so that everyone can locate them, with or without investing particular emotion and knowledge in hip-hop.

By contrast, for Ichikawa (1996), a black music buyer in the same HMV shop, some Japanese hip-hop artists must be treated equally as US counterparts. He argued, "I decided that certain Japanese hip-hop artists should be displayed with American artists, as they are dope and real. But not the rest. As a Tokyoiite b-boy, I have a responsibility to tell the good from the bad. I just cannot give any false information to my customers". Nishizato (1996) for Tower Records Shinjuku East also told me that he would shelve Scha Dara Parr and East End x Yuri in Japanese pop section, whereas a limited selection of Japanese hip-hop artists have crossed over to and been shelved in US rap section, including groups such as Buddha Brand and Microphone Pager. As in Okada's (1996) argument quoted earlier, the transnational megastore chains propose a particular cultural space in which a
number of Japanese rappers may be related to the US scene and distinguished from other Japanese rappers. In the abstracted music world of megastore in-shop space, therefore, are two contested definitions of rap hence distinguished – those commercially successful but culturally false *Japanese rap*, and those commercially marginal but culturally ‘dope and real’ *rap in Japanese*. The distinction is concretely materialised, in that two almost mutually exclusive trajectories are drawn in the same shop for each definition. For ‘real’ hip-hop fans that represent the Tokyoite street, it is much more convenient to reach their favourite Japanese artists without going to petty ‘Japanese pop’ section and it makes much better sense that recordings by ‘real’ Japanese rappers are shelved with those by American artists.

Buyers in megastores are granted rather important roles in deciding which products to buy in, which artists to push and how to display them, in order to secure the depth of commodity range. Depending on a strategy of each chain, commodities they desire would be ordered either individually by each shop, or collectively by a chain’s headquarter. In all cases, each buyer contributes to produce a ‘culture’ shared with his or her customers by controlling atmosphere, commodities and background music in the section of which s/he is in charge. Buying as an occupation is founded not only on business competence and economic calculation, but also on passion for and knowledge of the music that s/he deals with. Buyers often contribute to in-shop promotional magazines and pen up recommendation cards displayed with products they push. More often than not, buyers’ musical activities and personal relations go beyond the shop – some buyers from different chains are not only often found to know each other, but also linked to people in other areas of music production, such as music journalists, DJs, artists, A&Rs, producers and so on. HMV Shinjuku South’s Ichikawa has his own rap group. Tower Records Shinjuku East’s Nishizato is also known as DJ Toshi to the Tokyo hip-hop scene, and was about to launch a hip-hop label when I met him. It is not rare that some megastores actually handle legally obscure mix-tapes. It was also often the case that I was proposed to purchase a tape mixed by a buyer.

Hip-hop buyers in megastores re-construct the ‘authenticity’ of the Tokyo hip-hop scene in the in-shop space by introducing a set of social relations with which to exclude the fake. Indeed, knowing how to add extra value turned out to be crucial to the buyer profession. According to Nishizato, the key to be a good buyer is to “cling to the latest information but never be fooled with wrong one. Accuracy counts – it yields credibility and loyalty. Accurate and up-to-date information is of great value”. Hip-hop is so hectic a genre to keep up with – its product life is very short and new releases vigorously come and go – that release information from Tower Records’ US headquarter is not just good enough. He would enquire the ‘reality’ through internet, specialised US magazines and, simply, direct calls to overseas labels. These information-gathering activities easily transcend the business purposes and merged into off-duty hours, or inversely, their private activities inform their business dispositions. Buyers give life to the packaged music that they deal with – and add extra value to the products which are technically identical in any other shops – by bridging the abstract *in-shop* music space that displays music as commodities and the *out-of-shop* social space where music is actually produced and consumed.
Specialist Record Shops
Shibuya Record Village and Black America

Figure 17 illustrates the topological distribution of musical genres in terms of small independent record shops in Tokyo. One of the characteristics of Tokyo is the swift disappearance of small or specialist record shops in older quarters like Ueno or Ginza (and genres such as classical or jazz), at the expense of the disproportionate eruption of them in newer quarters, notably Shinjuku and Shibuya (roughly homological to rock and dance genres). There is a significant concentration of hip-hop specialist shops in Shibuya, particularly in Udagawa-cho, known as the reco-mura, or 'record village'. The 'record village' accommodates 40-some small specialist import record shops at the centre of Shibuya, originally developed by Seibu and Tokyu conglomerates (see Part II). Some of the shops established as hip-hop specialists in this particular area today date from the 1970s and were based in other parts of Tokyo when these conglomerates were embellishing the Shibuya quarter. Cisco in the 1980s dealt mainly with the US or UK chart hits, and it was its Shinjuku shop that served earlier Japanese hip-hop heads, including the Major Force rappers, as the window to the New York music scene. Manhattan Records, one of the shops rivalling Cisco, ran a small second-hand record shop off-Shibuya before moving to the current address at Udagawa-cho. Dance Music Records, another well-established shop in the 'record village', moved from Koenji, a western extension of Shinjuku, in the early 1990s. At the time, according to Muranaka (1997) for Dance Music Records, “there were only a few record shops around [Udagawa-cho]” and, according to Shimizu (1997) for Manhattan Records, “we're much more into house and disco classics, but hip-hop turned out to sell against our expectations". We must not, given this, regard the specialist record shops as determined and determining agents of hip-hop's 'street' legitimacy in Tokyo. Instead, we ought to examine their phenomenal intrusion to central Shibuya in relation to the development of the megastore chains against which they increasingly define themselves.

The specialist import record shops differentiate their clients from those of the megastore chains by dealing almost exclusively with vinyls, which conjugates with their importance for construction of the 'street' identity of Japanese hip-hop. The demand for vinyls is disproportionately high in Japan. Some importers estimated that only 10% of vinyls of an American artist pressed in the USA would remain in the US market and another 10% reach Europe, while 80% fly straight to Japan. Cisco imports directly from the USA, the UK, Jamaica, Germany and some Scandinavian countries, from which products are delivered on daily basis. To Manhattan Records, some 15,000 records are delivered weekly from abroad, of which 10,000 from the USA. Dance Music Records receives a ton of records (about 3-4,000 records) twice a week from abroad. Even smaller second-hand record shops that import used 12-inches and promotion samples mainly from US DJs receive tens of boxes of records from the States weekly. Unlike the transnational megastore chains that are obliged today to buy via the Japanese branches of the transnational major recording companies, most of the specialist record shops import directly from overseas labels or third-party distributors. Relying on the major companies certainly secures constant flow of products and saves cost for their storage, yet they often do not trade vinyls that small record shops are eagerly after to distinguish themselves from the megastore chains and other conventional record shops.
If the megastore chains are disposed to a more compromised relation with the major labels and domestic artists, hip-hop specialist shops pursue the opposite distinction, the 'purest' side of which is disposed to the US scene, simultaneously disembedded from its origin and re-embedded into Shibuya 'record village'. In order to keep it 'real', and to buy and resell 'authentic' products quicker and cheaper than other shops, each shop sends its buyers frequently to the USA or establishes as a partnership with US leading record shops and DJs. Dance Music Records counts some 18 buyers. Manhattan Records accommodates about 30 buyers. Cisco employs some ten staff specialising in hip-hop, of which they allocate four to its Shibuya head shop. Thanks to the advanced communication and transportation technology, they receive literally hundreds of fax messages, mails, phone calls and e-mails daily from various labels and distributors, and products ordered are delivered within no more than three or four days. Shrinking of time and distance to US independent labels clearly facilitates the legitimisation of the street authenticity of these shops. Visits of US artists, in time off during their promotion visits or concert stays in Japan, substantiate their status as the authentic window to 'black America'. According to Shimizu (1997) for Manhattan Records:

Because many US artists that visited our shop are fond of us, and tell their friends that Manhattan [Records] is the must when visiting Japan, they drop by anytime, during the ordinary business hours. Or, sometimes, concert promoters contact us so that fans may see and get autograph of artists. The Japanese love autograph, don't they? We have done, among others, Biz Markie, Mob Deep or Pete Rock. Japanese fans really appreciate autograph. We get at least 100 people every time we have that kind of event, on a first come, first served basis.

Being black does not seem to be sufficient for such a reception. A French rapper, MC Solaar,
Manhattan Records, which, as Shimizu (1997) admitted it, caused a bit of bafflement as Solaar could not speak English that seems to reign as a quasi-universal language even for an exchange among non-anglophone hip-hop artists. Solaar's visit to Japan is a product of his acceptance in the USA, notably through his collaboration with US rapper, Guru. As Japanese artists, French artists hardly reach beyond France and the surrounding francophone markets without acceptance in the anglophone market. Besides, in Japan, Solaar is more often classified as 'world music' than as 'rap' or 'international pop'.

'Underground' products, such as bootleg breakbeat samplers, not-for-sale promotion 12-inch singles or mix-tapes are also vital means for the specialist shops to distinguish themselves from the megastore chains. It also facilitates constructing their 'underground' legitimacy disposed to the US 'street' scene, because their legally obscure, 'street-savvy' nature necessitates the latest and freshest knowledge and insight of what is really happening in the street of New York or Los Angeles. Given the lack of systematic surveillance, the bottomless demand for vinyls and the boom of DJ culture, Japan is indeed an ideal market for overseas bootleggers. The shops' quest for rarer and more authentic hip-hop recordings directly means Japan's notoriety, for better or worse, as a 'bootleg paradise' among informed overseas producers. However, at the same time, there is a set of quite rigid rules in this 'underground' market. Despite the claimed 'underground' and 'outlaw' authenticity, no Japanese artists are pirated and no Japanese promotional samples retailed. Moreover, if importing US 'underground' commodities is tolerated or even considered positively for the development of the Japanese scene, Japanese bootleggers who pirate US recordings are acutely denounced as avaricious. The legitimised street authenticity is nothing but a local construct, a product of local competition not only between the megastore chains and the specialist shops but also among the specialist shops. Bootleg records, promotion samples or mix-tapes are often produced of complicated, conflict-laden relations of artists, A&Rs and labels in the USA, and they take an undeniable importance in hip-hop's 'street' struggle. In Japan, such 'street' survivals translate into a means for a specialist hip-hop record shop to compete with its rival shops, to valorise the 'rare' and 'street' commodities it obtained. Clearly, it is more dependent on the shape of Japanese market than what is happening in the US 'street'. What seems also remarkable, moreover, is that, because of the competition for rare and authentic commodities, the range of recordings available in Japan differs significantly from that in the USA. Many buyers I interviewed admitted that they were aware that some of their commodities would never be retailed in the USA.

Construction of Street and Legitimisation of Japanese Rap

Because they deal with imported records, hip-hop specialist shops are not liable to the saihantei system, and an 'official' US 12-inch release may be laid in at around three to four dollars and retailed at about ¥800 to ¥1,000 a copy. A 12-inch by a Japanese artist, on the contrary, may retail at slightly higher prices, between ¥1,200 to 1,500 a copy. More than economically, however, there is a cultural and musical consideration before Japanese hip-hop records enter the hip-hop specialist shops: on the one hand, the specialists are conscious of the development of the Japanese hip-hop scene and willing to collaborate with Japanese artists but, on the other, are wary of getting carried away by the commercial rap and DJ boom in Japan which, as some argued, digresses from the 'real'.

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prevailing common sense among these shops is, with various degrees, that "the starting point of US hip-hop and that of Japanese hip-hop are entirely different" (Shimizu 1997) and "Japanese hip-hop is clearly behind, including MCing skill, and I personally find it very strange that these records sell" (Muranaka 1997). Muranaka (1997) for Dance Music Records argued as follows:

Rapping in Japanese on such a [naive] theme! Do it in the Bronx, and everyone laughs at you, unfailing. [...] Well, I wouldn’t say that all the Japanese artists are like that, and in fact some are quite good. Nonetheless, we assume that we have to lead the scene... I mean, today, everyone talks about 'J-rap [Japanese rap]', but we can't accept it uncritically as it is. If needed, we would rather propose Japanese artists who are ignored by the boom.

In Dance Music Records, Japanese rap records represent only 1% of the entire stock. He argued that the boom would be gone sooner or later and that he would rather keep a critical distance from the hype.

For Japanese hip-hop artists, acceptance by the specialist hip-hop shops is an essential key to hip-hop legitimacy, furnished by the intimate connection with the US 'street' scene embodied by the specialist shops. Maki (1996) for Vortex Records, for instance, argued:

As a director, the most important task is to keep in touch with record shops. In so doing, and if they say they appreciate our attitude, then there’ll be a massive difference in the amount they’ll order. It also provides me with information on the latest musical and consumption trends.

Some A&Rs argued that the acceptance of Japanese rap was also mediated by younger staff and customers that these shops employed and attracted as their business grew, who had less dismissive ideas about Japanese hip-hop artists. Shimizu (1997) for Manhattan Records argued:

The Japanese hip-hop has only started since two or three years ago, hasn’t it? The style has changed to a serious one around that time. I mean, there were only frivolous bits before that. [...] [From around that time,] customers’ demand for Japanese rap artists became higher and, what’s more, some of our customers began recording and they came up to us saying they wanted us to sell their records.

To be recognised as ‘real’ requires much specific cultural knowledge and human trust. Casual judgement of whether one is knowledgeable of the US hip-hop scene and is known to the ‘real’ shops seems an important aspect of the deal.

Today, as in Maki's (1996) passage quoted earlier, Japanese hip-hop artists have surpassed US artists in terms of quantity of record sales in and around the ‘record village’, and some shops go so far as to distribute Japanese independent hip-hop labels, such as the Get A Point label by Cisco or the Spellbound Records by Manhattan Records. As the local scene gets bigger, the shops become conscious of their role in it, for, as Shimizu (1997) for Manhattan Records pointed out, "dealing with Japanese artists means that they can frequently come and see how their products are displayed and sold. To pay them a respect, we now assume a certain responsibility for the Japanese rap scene". Like the hip-hop buyers in the megastore chains, the specialist import record shops co-opt and propose the ‘real’ from the ‘fake’, in mediating between artists and their audiences. However, unlike the megastore chains that internalise social space into their in-shop musical space and diffuse such a rationalised
space more or less homogeneously nationwide (and worldwide), the specialist record shops more actively mobilise or take advantage of the very urban geography of Tokyo. Clearly, in Tokyo, the farther one distances from the ‘record village’ of Shibuya, the less likely hip-hop and rap are classified as an autonomous genre in shops at the expense of, for example, rock in Shinjuku or KAYO-KYOXU in Ochanomizu/Akihabara (see Figure 17). Certainly, as we have seen, the megastore chains adopt a similar taxonomic strategy in classifying Japanese rap records, yet specialist shops tend to take a more culturally invested attitude to it with which they become a ‘street’ medium.

Appropriating the geography of Tokyo, materialising and re-embedding the ‘street’ reality of the US scene and admitting a number of Japanese hip-hop artists, the specialist import record shops play key roles in diffusing hip-hop related information and in instituting a word-of-mouth, ‘street’ network, to which hip-hop A&Rs are very sensitive. Most shops accept flyers that artists, A&Rs and promoters bring in, for to do so is “the proof of the real, street information” (Yamaguchi 1996) and it “vitalises the scene, which would work in favour for us as well” (Sato 1997). They would display numerous flyers that inform which DJs are playing at which nightclub on which day, the latest release information of foreign artists and even arrival date of bootleg records, mix-tapes or promotion sample from the USA. Such information cannot be obtained otherwise, and it becomes an important ritual for Tokyoite b-boys and fly-girls to hang around those record shops, boutiques and nightclubs. If these shops care to deal with “something entirely unrelated to the chart hits outside our shop” (Kawai 1996) or promote “records other people wouldn’t recommend” (Muranaka 1997), it is because they “are antithesis to the major labels” (Kawai 1996) and “want to convey as real information as possible” (Muranaka 1997). To prove their respect to black American music, for instance, Manhattan Records launched its own label in New York, even if, as Shimizu (1997) admitted it, “the difficulty is that few black American artists are interested in releasing from a Japanese-owned label, and it’s not a matter of money here”. Some of these shops also frequently sponsor minor US artists to throw gigs in Japan and Japanese artists to organise parties at Tokyoite nightclubs. Some shops open until about midnight to cater for DJs before or after they perform in neighbouring nightclubs.

Television and Radio

Terrestrial and Satellite Television

Sell-out Space

Even if US hip-hop and rap videos were diffused in Japan in programmes on terrestrial television stations, such as Best Hit USA (from 1981) and digest MTV (from 1984), few Japanese hip-hop and rap artists have been televised. Certainly, in the late-80s, some of the Major Force artists appeared in a late-night programme and, in the early-90s, a series of programmes such as prime-time Tensai Takeshi no Genki ga Deru Terebi and late-night Dada LMD (later Club Dada) gave rise to the NEW JACK SWING dance boom. At the same time, it was considered as quite ‘dubious’, in another corner of the Japanese hip-hop scene. Shiraishi (1997), a DJ and editor of a specialist hip-hop magazine Front (known as Blast today), suggested, “hardcore emerged as an antithesis to [the televised dance boom]. It was too ridiculous”. There also is a general lack of music programmes on television in the 1990s, as opposed to the previous decades, mainly because of the decline of KAYO-KYOXU and the emergence of NEW MUSIC whose artists stubbornly refused television exposure. The major labels
instead pursue so-called television tie-in operations, in which a song may be featured either as an opening or closing theme for a primetime soap opera, or 'trendy drama' as it is called in general, or as a theme for a television advertisement. East End x Yuri's million-seller success owed much to this strategy, which was also sharply rejected by the 'hardcore' community. Therefore, although a few A&Rs scheme to impose their artists and their videos to the television screens, terrestrial television broadcasting is often denigrated as a commercial, artificial and 'sell-out' medium.

Because of its increasingly nationwide networking and the consequent urge to gratify the largest number of spectators, terrestrial television prioritises a specific type of programmes, in which hip-hop and rap, if ever accepted, are often treated as a fad. Miyai (1996) for Epic Sony, for example, argued, "in commercial terms, we must target the masses and prioritise the media. [....] [Media for international artists are limited], but Coolio, for example, has a strange hairstyle, doesn't he? Let's say everyone in L.A. has that hairstyle. Then we'd go, 'let's organise a Coolio hairstyle contest on TV'". Production costs of a television programme are very high, and, in most of the cases like Miyai's example, recording companies are likely to cover them. For smaller labels, it is clearly too heavy a burden, and there are only handful of Japanese rap acts that have their proper videos to be diffused at best on time-filling, computerised hit chart programmes after midnight. According to Okada (1997) for File Records, "nothing will change if we simply accept the fact [that there is no television exposure of Japanese rappers]," yet "it is practically impossible to scrape up a budget for promotional video when the item to be promoted sells only 10,000 copies". Similarly, according to Fujiwara (1996) for Cutting Edge, "naturally, promotional budget differs importantly for artists selling millions of records and for those selling only tens of thousands," and "even though Avex [Cutting Edge's parent company] has a television programme and a large nightclub, it is not easy to use them for our [hip-hop] artists. I mean I don't refuse the possibilities and I want to use them when the time is ripe". Some of these videos, deprived of broadcast opportunities, end up in megastore shop-front.

**Satellite and Cable TV and Hip-hop**

"The problem," Yabushita (1996) for Soytzer Music pointed out, "is that information is way too expensive in this country". He, like others, argued that terrestrial stations were irretrievably dependent on advertisement revenues, and there were alliance and monopoly by a few corporations unwilling to lose their cosy positions. This, as was often denounced, results in a lack of investment in newer media and interest in alternative channels such as non-terrestrial television services. As seen in Part II, the private terrestrial television services have been a very influential promotion tool since their inception, and continue to be so even after emergence of folk, rock and NEW MUSIC genres by means of tie-in deals. From the mid-1970s, television stations began actively buying into recording and music publishing business. A tie-in deal most typically shares CHOSAKU-KEN and its peripheral rights among a recording company, a television company, an advertisement agency and so on. Consequently, a television broadcaster could exploit a tied-in song freely in the name of promotion. The situation shifted when, from the early 1980s, international music video programmes such as *Best Hit USA* and *MTV* emerged on terrestrial television. In the fear of losing potential customers by home VCRing, the recording companies began charging the programmers for using their 'promotional' videos. *MTV* suffered from the consequence and was obliged to re-launch itself on satellite/cable services, whose
reach are severely limited in Japan (in 1996, out of almost 36 million NHK licensees, satellite shared less than a quarter. MTV subscription amounted only to 1.5 million households in the same year (MTV Japan 1997)). Today, there are two competing non-stop music video stations on satellite/cable television in Japan: MTV, proposing mainly overseas catalogues, and Spaceshower, dealing mainly with domestic catalogues. Both of them, while terrestrial stations may broadcast videos freely, are likely to be charged for exploiting artists and songs. Fees may vary from zero to hundreds of thousands of yen per song per year, depending on labels’ attitude towards promotion and video, which imaginably influence programming policies of the two stations.

Consequently, these stations seem more receptive to newer genres of music, including hip-hop and rap, as they can deal with each other with more or less equitable interests. Unemoto (1996) for Edo-ya Records suggested that when the Tokyo No. 1 Soul Set made a video:

The buzz started from the music press, like Rockin’ On Japan, followed by people in Spaceshower. It is a very new medium and, unlike the private terrestrial stations, accommodates a lot of young personnel. So, they are very open to new acts. Our video satisfied them and we received a wonderful support from them.

Okada (1997) for File Records found "MTV has a better vibe than Spaceshower". As an apparent tendency, ‘Japanese’ Spaceshower favours ‘LB’ artists, whereas ‘American’ MTV, as a part of its ‘localisation’ strategy, favours ‘hardcore’ Japanese rappers. According to Hiramoto (1997), a producer/programmer of MTV Japan, although almost 80% of its music programming are of US and other international titles, most of its contents are locally edited, apart from Beavis & Butt-Head, Top 20 and Yo! Rap and a few other programmes. He went on:

Our target this year is to increase airplay of Japanese titles to 30% on MTV Japan. We’re thinking of backing up some Japanese artists’ live concerts, and launching various campaigns and music-related events in places like Shibuya and Harajuku to promote a more domestic image of MTV today.

Apart from Yo! Rap programme, Japanese MTV viewers also enjoy MTV Jams, a locally produced rap programme presented by a female VJ known as Riko. There are two interesting contrasts between the two rap programmes on MTV Japan. Firstly, in Yo! Rap, packaged in the USA and liable to its censorship codes, swear-words and images (brand logos, marijuana leaves, the middle finger, and so on) are erased or obscured, whereas in MTV Jams, all are diffused uncensored as English lyrics are not subject to the Japanese broadcasting codes, which gives a localised US authenticity to it. Secondly, unlike 100% American Yo! Rap, MTV Jams offers Japanese rappers to have their videos programmed and delivered to a nationwide audience, the size of which is clearly larger than the reach of the specialised record retailers, if limited by the satellite/cable infrastructure.

According to Hiramoto (1997), "Jams deals with Rhymester, T.O.P. Rankaz, Lamp Eye or Buddha Brand, among many others" and some of the hip-hop promoters “are probably the keenest of all because they know and they love what they’re promoting”. Targeting teenagers back home from school, Jams would be broadcast daily from 19:00 to 19:30 (rebroadcast from 0:30 to 1:00) and its Weekend Edition, featuring live concerts and interviews on Sundays from 17:00 to 19:00 (rebroadcast on Fridays from 15:00 to 17:00 and on Saturdays from 1:00 to 3:00). Unfortunately, MTV audiences,
of which 55.4% are female and 66.7% belong to 16 to 24 age group (MTV Japan 1997), did not share the vibe.

I was very sure that MTV Japan needs Jams, not least because I happen to be its producer. But when we conducted a survey... I think Japanese people don't understand what hip-hop and rap music are. I mean, some consider hip-hop as, say TLC or something like that, whereas others consider it all identical, like "I have a difficulty in listening to rap, particularly all these self-praising hardcore people". When we conducted an audience survey called Most Dislikable, I think because most of them did not know about rap music, black music, they elected hip-hop and rap as the most disliked music.

From April 1997, MTV Jams was reduced to a weekly programme broadcast on Fridays from 1:00 to 3:00 (rebroadcast on Tuesdays from 11:00 to 13:00, Thursdays from 17:00 to 19:00 and Sundays from 17:00 to 19:00). Hiramoto (1997) suggested that "MTV Jams is quite influential among a 'core' audience" and "Yo! Rap and Jams have the highest 'pass-along rate' of all MTV programmes among high school students". Yet, hip-hop still seems marginal in the television screen, particularly when facing wider audiences.

Radio Stations

Japanese Rap Embargo!?

Most of the hip-hop A&Rs and promoters I interviewed considered radio as 'the next great wall' to overcome if hip-hop were to expand its realm. More than television that presupposes an extra budget for video production and unlike the music press that only talks about music, radio is considered more intimate and immediate as it directly delivers music itself to the audience. However, again, a lack of channel troubles hip-hop intermediaries. The structure is often disputed to be obsolete and stations too big and inflexible to integrate newer music. An insider told me that Japan is one of the few industrialised capitalist countries that have a smaller number of radio stations than television stations. I briefly mentioned earlier the inauguration of the second private FM stations in larger cities in the late-1980s. Therefore, until 1995, in Tokyo, beside 'square' NHK-FM, there were only two private FM radio stations (Tokyo FM and J-Wave), as opposed to two NHK and five private terrestrial television stations. In 1996, two new private FM stations were added to the list. One is InterFM, conceived to cater for foreign residents in Tokyo mostly in English. The other is Shibuya FM Voice, a 'community FM', whose reach is limited within not more than a few kilometre radius from its aerial.

As radio broadcasting itself was realised as a consequence of the Great Kanto Earthquake (see Part II), the launch of these stations was largely facilitated by the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995. The government and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication were urged to provide increasing foreign residents in urban areas with practical and daily information, and local communities with more adapted information. Due mainly to the narrow waveband allocated to FM radio broadcasting and condensed urban surface, there is a physical limit to the number of radio stations in Japan. Consequently, apart from Shibuya FM Voice, to which I come back later, all the larger stations adopt, in order to attain the largest possible listenership for advertisers, an all-genre, generalist format in one way or another from which hip-hop and rap, particularly Japanese ones, are often excluded.

J-Wave was launched in 1988 as the second private FM station in Tokyo. To differentiate itself
from existing Tokyo FM, J-Wave considers itself as a background music supplier for urban office workers, with its ‘more music, less talk’ format (80% music, 10% talk and 10% advertisement). Despite its predominantly Japanese listeners, the station favours ‘international’ music, for “an English broadcasting can be a rather comfortable background music for most of [the urban Tokyoites]” (Sugiyama 1996). Namely, “if radio sings, 'aishi teru ze [I love you]’ in Japanese, it sounds too direct. But if it sings, 'I wanna make love to you’ in English, it doesn’t sound as direct. So we decided to prioritise songs in English over Japanese songs, in the beginning”. InterFM, on the other hand, adopts so-called HAC (Hot Adult Contemporary) format, envisaging as its potential audience not only about 400,000 foreign residents (and some three million temporary visitors and tourists annually), but also 37 million potential Japanese listeners within the reach of its airwave (its own listener survey in May 1996 reveals that 75% of its listeners turn out to be Japanese). Each in its way, they try to deliver right music to right listeners at a given moment and, as J-Wave’s producer, Sugiyama (1996) suggested:

> It is evident that rap is favoured by a very tight range of age group, by teenagers basically, or by those in their twenties at best. We have to balance this and an audience whom we mainly target. If we’re to produce, for example, a programme aiming at 25-35 age group and we lose listeners more than we gain by playing rap tunes, then we ought to stop playing them. [...] By all means, hip-hop is rarely played in an adult-oriented station or programme anywhere in the world.

Most often, on both J-Wave and InterFM, weekday is divided into early morning (7:00 to 9:00), late morning (9:00 to 12:00), early afternoon (12:00 to 16:00), late afternoon (16:00 to 19:00) and evening (19:00 to 23:00), which basically corresponds to an assumed daily routine of their target listeners – office workers.

The only time grid proposed for rap seems that of midnight and weekend, quite distant from the ‘average office workers’, “to satisfy music enthusiasts” (Sugiyama 1996) or “to give a certain musical character to the station” (Yamawaki 1997). According to InterFM’s programmer, Yamawaki (1997), the time zone starting from 20:00 on Saturdays and Sundays is called the ‘maniac zone’, in which rap tracks may be played, leading Japanese DJs featured and some Tokyoite nightclubs relayed, “as we want to show our commitment to Tokyo’s music scene”. Certainly some ‘international’ rap hits, such as those by Coolio, Puff Daddy, Wil Smith and the likes, get 24 hour ‘heavy rotation’ as the labels concerned may care to off-set broadcasting fees. Yet, money is not all that counts in radio programming. As Sugiyama (1996) for J-Wave suggested, relying excessively on recording companies can often “result in a grave discredit of our station’s musical quality” (Sugiyama 1996). In fact, more than a straightforward economic transaction, for a rap tune to bear airplay during the day time, it has to be, as Sugiyama (1996) put it, “melodious” and “not too hip-hop”. In InterFM, targeting foreign residents, the DJs are obviously refrained from using English swearwords and, if needed, are advised to play radio – clean – mixes. J-Wave, as it contracts quite a few Westerner DJs (called ‘sound navigators’), takes the same decision.

If US rap tunes are occasionally on the radio, Japanese ones are scarcely on it. The increasing importance of Japanese listeners rendered InterFM more susceptible to Japanese pop titles and, from April 1997, it proposes Sunday J-pop Countdown from Tower Street Studio, the satellite studio in
Tower Records Shibuya shop. However, despite its enchanted slogan that reads “Your Window the Inter-Cultural Harmony” (InterFM 1996), “Japanese hip-hop is no match for the real [US] thing, and I don’t think our station will be bothered” (Yamawaki 1997). As I have argued earlier, Japanese rappers are ‘muted’ in front of the foreign audience. Sugiyama (1996) for J-Wave, while insisting on a key role his station has played in the success of East End x Yuri or Kaseki Cider, argued:

In terms of quality, compared with the originator, even without understanding English lyrics, we could easily judge its quality. Given this, few Japanese artists attain that level.... As we introduce high-quality music, we don’t want to degrade the quality by playing Japanese rap only because it’s Japanese. This applies to rock or any other genre. Quality matters in J-Wave.

On top, Japanese ‘hardcore’ lyrics trouble J-Wave as much as English lyrics. Apart from a few exceptions, Japanese A&Rs were said to be careful enough to self-censor offensive words and obscene phrases in a recording studio. Yet, as Sugiyama (1996) argued, “if we’re producing J-Wave to provide offices with quality music and a fine atmosphere, I don’t want that vulgarity and obscenity”.

Tokyo FM, on the contrary, considers Japanese lyrics more conscientiously. The station was launched as the first private FM station in Tokyo in 1970 and had enjoyed its “30% classical, 50% international pop, 10% Japanese pop and 10% talk show” (Kumagai 1997) format until the emergence of more music-oriented J-Wave. In 1990, on the occasion of its 20th anniversary, the station redefined its corporate identity and, from 1992, launched its ‘Japanese Pops Refrain’ campaign, in re-valorising domestic titles and programming 70% Japanese and 30% international songs. Like InterFM and J-Wave, Tokyo FM’s timetable is divided into different time zones corresponding to a basic daily routine, if more inclined to housewives during the daytime and without any fancy Westerner DJs. Despite the apparent ‘untrendy’ profile, Tokyo FM offers the first radio programme in Japan that contains ‘hip-hop’ in its title, Hip-hop Night Flight. Its producer, Morita (1997), expressed his view that draws an interesting contrast to that of J-Wave:

I suppose hip-hop emphases on language, lyrics or the content of its poesy more than music itself. Although US rap songs sound interesting to my ears, nonetheless, because I cannot understand their lyrics, they don’t move me as sharply. So.... Obviously I understand that black music fans, these purist soul music freaks and black music enthusiasts are aroused by the smell, or a kind of mood derived from US rap songs, but Japanese rap is something listened to by those who were not previously interested in that kind of music. Instead, they are thrilled by its lyrics, its wordings, its flow, its rhyming in Japanese.

Like Japanese rap vinyls negotiate their way to the specialist record shops, in the programme, Japanese rap tunes are dextrously mixed with US counterparts by some of the leading Japanese hip-hop DJs, and one can also enjoy freestyle improvisation by Japanese rappers.

The programme is held on monthly basis on Monday morning, from 2:00 to 5:00. Technically, no broadcasting is allowed at this time every week in Tokyo because the Tokyo Tower, the aerial for all the television and radio stations, is closed for maintenance every Sunday from the midnight. Morita negotiated exceptionally to secure one Sunday night a month for this low-budget programme – “a
rather chaotic, totally free three hours without time signal nor commercial interruption” (Morita 1997). Because of its irregularity, Hip-hop Night Flight does not appear on Tokyo FM’s official programme grid. Instead, Ota distributes handmade flyers to the specialist record shops in the Shibuya and the Shinjuku areas such as Cisco and Manhattan Records. He added, “it’s a bit like a secret club, whose reputation entirely relies on a word-of-mouth street network. But it marks a reasonable rating only with this. There is a firm fidelity of listeners that can only be obtained through such a network. It’s very important”. As I have been arguing, import record shops play a crucial role as a street intermediary in Tokyoite hip-hop culture. In April 1997, J-Wave finally launched a predominantly US rap oriented programme, Hip-hop Journey: Da Cypher!, featuring Riko, the VJ for MTV Jams, from 3:00 to 4:30 in Sunday mornings. Enormous posters were pinned up in leading specialist record shops in Shibuya announcing the launch of the programme, and to get the 12-inch records Riko introduced on the programme, there allegedly is a long queue in front of these shops next morning. You cannot listen to the radio unless you are street-savvy in the Tokyoite hip-hop scene.

Shibuya FM Voice and Community

Shibuya FM Voice has a very weak transmitter (10W, as opposed to, for example, 10 kW of the other stations) which limits its reach to almost one or two kilometres radius covering Shibuya and its surrounding areas. Tachi (1997), its programmer, suggested:

Given the area covered and the size of business, we cannot really compare our station with the other stations. Having said that, because the number of listeners is limited, we certainly have to attract listeners with a certain precision. Considering the characteristic of the Shibuya area, apart from residents, there is an acute increase of population in the daytime, be they commuters or simple fun-seeking passers-by. I consider it essential for us to target and reach them.

We have seen in Part II that long before Shibuya FM Voice, sense of community has been dismantled in Tokyo and its suburbs. Despite the title ‘community’ FM, Shibuya FM Voice targets youth listeners fled to Shibuya from the dispersed suburbs. Namely, apart from 7:00 to 10:00 morning grid “entirely devoted to local information for residents” (Tachi 1997) that the station estimates to be 1.8 million, Shibuya FM Voice consecrates the rest of its programme grid to the in-coming population, estimated to be 6.5 million. Evening and midnight hours are almost entirely filled with hip-hop, reggae or techno music, which Tachi (1997) referred to as “the true colour of Shibuya”.

Hip-hop and rap occupy the largest space in this ‘Shibuya sounds’. There were, in March 1997, a daily hip-hop show, Tokyo Clubmix Show Case, a weekly Japanese hip-hop programme, Word On Da Table and a weekly DJ, rappers and rockers audition programme, Voice Que Selection & Gong Show. The station also maintains a close relationship with forty-some nightclubs in the covered area to supply the latest information on Shibuya’s nightclubbing scene. On the contrary, KAYO-KYOKU and NEW MUSIC are rarely programmed because, Tachi (1997) argued:

Shibuya is a city that transmits various cultures and, musically, it’s one of the cities that lead the global trend. On the contrary, most of the Japanese pop songs today sell because their labels spend so much on promotion to cover their poor musical quality. We insist
that music shouldn't be like that. Music is not a matter of money, and there's a whole lot of good music in the world. Our DJs and we want to propose this to our listeners.

Like many other 'community' FM stations, the number of which is rapidly increasing in Tokyo and other parts of Japan (nine stations in Tokyo, 25 in the adjacent Kanto region and 137 in Japan in August, 2000), up to 80% of their programmes are produced by themselves in which, because of the budgetary limitation, most DJs participate on almost voluntary basis. Still, passion for music seems to overwhelm economy when they can do what they really want to do and propose the music they love. Shibuya FM Voice does not strictly censor lyrics, and instead fears that the authorities might impose stricter codes, for, if it happened, “places for music would be limited to live events and nightclubs” (Tachi 1997).

The station suffers from the gap between its given role of serving its neighbourhood community and the practical collapse of the 'community' it serves. For example, because the vast majority of its targeted listeners, who keep coming in and out of the covered area, audience rating seems very hard to establish, which obviously undermines its sales edge. The station is urged to “visualise the way we are appreciated” (Tachi 1997). In order to reach its listeners, it networks what are called 'supporter shops' in Shibuya and ask them to play its broadcasting while they are open. Internet radio, too, is also an indispensable means for it to expand its listener cluster beyond Shibuya. In 1999, it also launched its own record label, Siburai (derived from Shibuya and Samurai), whose first album, *Shi-con (Samurai Spirit: 1999)*, compiled some of the leading Tokyoite DJs. However, despite its commitment to Shibuya’s music scene and 'community', many hip-hop A&Rs seemed indisposed to consider it as a promotional tool because, from their perspective, it is rather predictable and meaningless for a 'community' FM station in Shibuya to propose 'Shibuya sounds'. In other words, even if it proposes the 'Shibuya sounds', its function does not really excel the flyers in specialist record shops and nightclubs in the very same area. Unless living in Shibuya and its surrounding areas, not many incoming hip hop heads have the opportunity to listen to the station: few carry radio with them when they are 'digging' records, much less dancing in a nightclub. From a certain aspect, Shibuya FM Voice most manifestly fixes a particular set of sounds to Shibuya, which is channelled by various 'street' intermediaries in the music industries in Tokyo both objectively and subjectively. Yet, from another viewpoint, that Shibuya FM diffuses 'Shibuya sounds' is hardly meaningful, for Shibuya sounds are, if anything, products of its insertion to areas and markets beyond Shibuya, and it is precisely because of it that hip-hop A&Rs consider the broadcasting media important, yet difficult to access.

**Music Press**

*To Be Black, or To Be Hip-hop*

Like any other section of the music industries, a magazine publisher classifies the social space into various categories and, if affordable, proposes a range of titles of which hip-hop means a particular market cluster. To illustrate, *Front* (renamed from January 1999 as *Blast*), the only magazine devoted to hip-hop, is published by Shinko Music Publishing that embraces 19 titles ranging from heavy metal to Japanese rock via reggae and hip-hop. *Rockin' On* proposes seven titles including *Rockin' On*, a leading Anglo-American rock magazine, *Rockin' On Japan*, its Japanese version branched out in 1987 and *Buzz*, launched in March 1997 covering alternative and dance music.
including hip-hop. *Groove*, a magazine focusing on DJ technique and sound production technologies, is one of the 10 magazines Ritto Music proposes. Equally like any other section of the music industries, the size of the hip-hop market is often considered small in the magazine publishing industry, and the economic denigration is often translated culturally. We have seen earlier that hip-hop and rap audience is considered by a majority of recording industry personnel as invisible, disorganised and unpredictable. In the music press, too, hip-hop journalism had been marginalised and its readers failed to be identified until quite recently.

An external, economic factor restricted hip-hop and/or dance music magazines from materialising. Because of the imported nature of most of the US rap records, publishers could not count on advertisement revenue from the Japanese branches of the transnational major labels. Needless to say, all the music press rely with various degrees on recording companies’ promotion budget to produce their pages, but for imported records, as we have seen, the budget is difficult to scrape up. Certainly, such transaction is not the decisive factor to select which artists to feature and interview, yet, in general, there is an undeniable interdependency between the artist covered and the records advertised in a magazine. Moreover, relying on domestic packages saves time and money, and improves publishers’ mobility as they can obtain various mutual supports from the labels, such as free review records, artists’ photograph and profile, perhaps an interview if artists visit Japan for promotion and, eventually, an invitation to the USA or elsewhere to interview them. In this sense, the hip-hop press had not been feasible until the mid-1990s when, firstly, the transnational major labels began regulating imported records and allocating promotional budget for them; secondly, with the DJ boom, leading specialist record shops and DJ equipment manufacturers extended their business and became active advertisers; and, finally, the emergence of million-selling Japanese rap acts gave rise to the ‘hardcore’ scene.

There was also a cultural constraint that kept the Japanese hip-hop scene from instituting its own journalism: conflicts over the definition of ‘hip-hop’ and the legitimacy of ‘black music’ in Japan. Hip-hop, particularly Japanese hip-hop, could not find any position in the established taxonomy of the music press for a long time. According to Wakano (1997), chief editor of *Remix*, a pioneer club music magazine launched in 1991, “there was no magazine focusing on club culture and dance music when we started *Remix*. All available in the market were rock magazines, and a few others specialised in black music”. Certainly, there was high-brow *New Music Magazine* (today’s *Music Magazine*) that covered some of the Major Force artists in the late 1980s and there have been a few hip-hop ‘freezines’, such as *Phat Jam* or *Rugged*, which are in fact edited and published by enthusiastic hip-hop A&Rs and diffused in record shops. Yet, most of the black music magazines, notably *Black Music Review*, established in 1975, refused to associate with Japanese rap. The chief editor of *Black Music Review*, Kochi (1996), questioned if hip-hop is listened to as black music in Japan, in that today’s hip-hop fans belong to a generation that does not know the old school era, that they do not necessarily have affection for black music before the sampling technology and that they are not interested in blues, R&B or soul except those sampled by hip-hop artists. Despite many in-depth articles on the US hip-hop scene, the magazine spares only a page or two for Japanese artists even today. Even if its own label, P-Vine Records, releases a series of albums by Japanese rap groups initiated by King Giddra’s *Sora kara*
no Chikara (1995), there was, according to some informants, an internal confrontation regarding the meaningfulness of releasing Japanese rap acts under P-Vine that had established itself as one of the rare, independent black music labels in Japan.

Consequently, earlier Japanese rap artists, particularly 'LB' artists, relied on, adopted to and compromised with rock magazines, most notably Rockin' On Japan, a Japanese rock magazine launched in 1987. Scha Dara Parr has been favourably covered by some rock magazines. Unemoto (1996) for Edo-ya Records argued that he gave little consideration to hip-hop or other dance music magazines and focused specifically on Rockin' On Japan from the very outset of the Tokyo No. 1 Soul Set's promotion. Shibata (1996) for Natural Foundation equally suggested that, rather than focusing on specifically hip-hop or dance oriented magazines, he would prioritise magazines like Rockin' On Japan, Music Magazine, Bar-f-Out and megastores' free in-shop magazines, such as Bounce by Tower Records and The Music Master by HMV, for they are “open to various genres,” which allows “rock and rap to co-exist”. However, Japanese rock journalism is crucially indifferent to dance culture and communal identity in the scene. The chief editor of Rockin' On Japan, Yamazaki (1997), expressed his view as follows:

Hip-hop is very difficult to deal with in that it favours a sort of spontaneous vibration in the scene. I don’t take part in this ‘scene’ – their parties, nightclubs or anything like that – and I don’t understand this vibration shared in the scene. Namely, I only come in touch with hip-hop in the form of CDs and solo concerts, just as I do with any rock bands.

'Hardcore' artists and journalists blame rock journalism as such for, as Hirasawa (1997), chief editor of Front (Blast), put it, it “mistakes hip-hop as a simple dance fad”. The contrast between 'hardcore' hip-hop magazines and 'LB' rock magazines is also clear in terms of their readership. Both Front (Blast) and Rockin' On Japan mainly target a high-teen readership, yet, according to its own readership survey in 1996, 69.3% of Front readers are male. On the contrary, dominant Rockin' On Japan readers are, according to Yamazaki (1997), female.

Like 'LB' artists approached rock magazines, until the mid-1990s, most of today's leading hip-hop and/or club culture related magazines derived from or started as rock magazines (and not black music magazines). Remix, for instance, "did not have any generic preference [when launched], except that we started as a magazine of newer music young people listen to" (Wakano 1997). It initially devoted 60 to 70 % of its pages to rock because, according to Wakano, "we had to compromise in order to materialise our ideas as a magazine". It was not until 1994 that the magazine employed an editor specialised in hip-hop. Groove, similarly, was branched out in 1995 from Sound and Recording Magazine which deals with a broader set of studio recording and sound engineering technologies as, according to its chief editor, “dance music became an autonomous genre” (Ishiwaki 1996). The autonomisation of the dance culture in the field of music journalism coincided with the recording companies' changing attitudes towards imported records and DJ culture described earlier. Integration of imported records to record reviews and charts enables these magazines to represent the scene more truly and to provide readers with the latest overseas information. Increasingly, most of the magazines develop their own networks overseas, while overseas artists and labels become more receptive to the growing interest in hip-hop and rap in the Japanese market. Wakano (1997) for Remix, for instance,
affirmed:

For the artists whose records are released domestically, we'd rely on Japanese labels. Artists may be visiting Japan, or, concerning new releases, we might either directly call them or commission co-ordinators overseas to interview them. If Japanese labels were not involved, then we'd directly contact artists or their agents anyway.

He suggested that because he would have to obtain imported records from a retailer, the review cannot proceed the release date, while it became increasingly the case that some overseas labels send him review copies in advance.

If *Remix* and *Groove* pursue a broader approach to dance music and nightclubbing culture, of which hip-hop is a sub-genre, *Front (Blast)* seeks its distinction by “affirming only hip-hop and hip-hop R&B” and “not flirting with rock and club music” (Hirasawa 1997). The magazine assumes it of utmost importance to “go to the scene as often as possible” (Hirasawa 1997). *Front (Blast)*, too, was started as a part of an Anglo-American rock magazine, *Crossbeat*, until October 1994, when it was branched out as a quarterly. Hirasawa (1997), its chief editor, herself originally was an editor for *Crossbeat*, argued:

It is quite an achievement in itself that Front was able to start despite that it was understood as a black music magazine, because our company is a very ‘white’ and ‘rock’ publisher. Initially, it was a quarterly and few colleagues paid attention, but it quickly became a monthly magazine. So, in terms of our company’s range of products, we consider it not meaningless that we featured black music in our magazine.

*Front (Blast)* co-operates with American *Vibe* magazine and commissions quite a few Japanese journalists and co-ordinators in the United States, thanks to whom it can “obtain various artists’ interviews and offer deeper angles to readers, such as focusing on a particular US independent label” (Hirasawa 1997). Due mainly to a budgetary limitation, *Front* started up with appropriating the same paper and format as *Crossbeat*, which is associated with cut ‘n’ mix principle of hip-hop culture, together with the fact that “its position in the company was quite marginal”.

However, despite its acceptance as a black music magazine in her company, Hirasawa (1997) considers *Front (Blast)* as a hip-hop magazine that transcends nationality. Namely:

We began viewing it increasingly inapt to call *Front* a ‘black music magazine’. In Japan, from the outset, hip-hop wasn’t culturally emerged [like in the USA]. Japanese artists, too, treat it as a Japanese thing, then how much do we need to call it ‘black music’? As this kind of doubt emerged immediately after we launched the magazine, I knew – well in fact it had been a concern since I was in *Crossbeat* – that *Front* would have to deal with Japanese rappers sooner or later. [...] Okay, for R&B, it may be another thing, but for hip-hop I think each country may well have its own particular hip-hop.

Hip-hop journalism, in Japan, emerged not from black music journalism. While admitting the importance of filling the gap between ‘hip-hop’ journalism and ‘black music’ journalism, Hirawasa (1997) described the (pre-hip-hop) black music fans as “elder”, “intellectual” and “collectors”. Hip-hop journalism takes a quite different position from that of black music journalism that tends to downplay Japanese rap. While bridging Japanese readers to the US hip-hop scene, *Front* “tries to support the
[local] scene" (Hirasawa 1997). Remix, too, is "willing to deal with Japanese artists actively, [...] as readers have a sense of affinity for them" (Wakano 1997). Its hip-hop editor, Kido (1997) also claimed: Regardless of American and Japanese, if a good artist releases a good record, I'd try to get an interview. [...] What I concern is that, as hip-hop becomes diffused as such in Japan, there are people who're up to no good. So I don't support music they make. If I support them, readers might misunderstand their music as good. If this occurred, it would destroy the scene. Policing of the scene is obviously as essential for hip-hop journalism as being in it.

Hip-hop journalism, distinct from both rock journalism and black music journalism has thus been instituted and autonomised. The commitment to the scene is vital to hip-hop journalism, and power geometry of the scene ought to be embodied by its journalists and has to be inscribed in the pages they compose. According to Hirasawa (1997), the scene:

is unfailingly Shibuya, and our staff had spent all the Golden Week [a consecutive bank holidays around 29 April through 5 May] there. We cannot just get there arrogantly as journalists. We started as kind of total strangers. People were very suspicious, but they kept performing, and we kept attending their performances. Then gradually, they began admitting us and our magazine. Today, we have just begun to know each other and see each other in private as well. If anything, hip-hop is music founded on a very firm kinship and if we don’t participate in it, we cannot acquire any credibility from it.

All of Front’s editors spin frequently in nightclubs, whose music selection she hopes to be reflected in the magazine in order to keep it ‘real’. They also are encouraged to go to record shops in Shibuya where possible, even during the busy office hours. Consequently, Front (Blast) sells best in Shibuya, not in bookstores but in record shops that are not included in the regular network of book distributors, hence does not, unfortunately, contribute to its circulation figures.

Nightclubs

Club Space, Dance Regulation and Street

During the research, I came across arguments both for and against club promotion. Some, like Sony Music’s Ozeki (1996), take it of utmost importance for the development of hip-hop scene in Japan. Others question its efficiency, as there are not many nightclubs exclusively dedicated to hip-hop in Tokyo. In terms of Japanese rap, there seems a distinctive difference between ‘LB’ and ‘hardcore’ attitudes regarding club promotion. Namely, if the former considers nightclubs as an obsolete institution that “no longer transmits any distinctive culture” (Yabushita 1996), hence “does not expand the market” (Yabushita), the latter refers to nightclub as the ‘scene’, in which their art is generated. ‘LB’ artists may not need nightclubs any longer, given their capacity to fill larger venues, while it derives exactly from this same material condition that ‘hardcore’ A&Rs tend to take club promotion more seriously. Fujiwara (1996) for Cutting Edge reckons:

I go to nightclubs by myself to hand sample records to DJs and distribute flyers. Its impact may not be apparent, but if it makes some noise that circulates by words of mouth, its potential is immeasurable. What’s more, today, most DJs are freelance. So, if our record stays in their record bag, it travels with them to Osaka or Nagoya....
Even without conscious efforts as such, as many A&Rs suggested, artists distribute their records to other DJs as they themselves spin in nightclubs. Nightclubs, thus, are an important social space for 'hardcore' hip-hop in Tokyo, most of which are located, again, in Shibuya.

Like the shop-front operation discussed earlier, club promotion is a local process, limited to urban areas where a label can find a sufficient number of competent staffs. Even though most labels adopt more efficient mailing list or DJ seminar systems with which to give away sample records, its principle remains, as Ozeki (1996) put it, "an everyday thing – you've got to be there, anyway, because you cannot ask them to play your music if you only see them occasionally". For some, club promotion is not particularly a new strategy. According to Yokota (1996b) for BMG who was a disco promoter in the 1970s:

Bowling boomed in Japan in the early 1970s. When it's gone, the alleys were often converted to discotheques. Owners of that kind of establishment have to change their business one after another. Some may be related to the sex industry. [...] Disco was one of these businesses that successfully became surfaced as youngsters began claiming it to be of their own. [...] Dance music promotion of a recording company, when a particular song must be pushed, consisted of diffusing an original step, contracting an opinion leader of disco culture who taught the step to clients. Each song has a distinctive step: the dancer would invent a step and we'd print it on a record sleeve.

Because dance venue has been 'one of these businesses', it has always been liable to rigorous regulation by the authorities.

"It is not easy to run a nightclub as it appears," a nightclub manager by the name of K (1997) heaved a sigh in his hip-hop/reggae nightclub in the basement of a building in the midst of neon-lit, sleepless Kabuki-cho, Shinjuku. "You get only about thirty clients on weekdays, and hundreds of them on Friday and Saturday nights. It's just like a roller coaster that is repeated weekly". He continued:

The most costly stuff is the soundproofing. So much so that most of the nightclubs have nowhere other than underground to reside. I'm lucky because Kabuki-cho is not residential, otherwise there would often be a protest of residents. Big clubs like ours have to obtain trade authorisation [which restricts late-night business]. Consequently, we have to hire security guards in order not to cause problem late night. To make up the loss on weekdays over the weekend, the size of the floor is very important. Too large, and the rent will eat up the takings. Too small, and you cannot accommodate all the clients. Nightclub is just like a great salamander – an endangered species – in that it cannot exist unless all the necessary conditions are met.

Figure 18 depicts the relationship between days of the week and musical genres of parties and events in Tokyoite nightclubs during the four weeks from 15 March to 11 April 1997. We could easily identify the shape of 'roller coaster' peaking at Saturday and free falling at Sunday. House/Disco and Soul/Funk genres dominate Tokyoite night in the sampled period. Hip-hop is fairly present, but its occurrence decreases towards the weekends, suggesting that it is not the most attractive genre to programme at the peak of the 'roller coaster'.

With the DJ boom and nightclubbing fad, there appears to be a proliferation of salamanders in
Tokyo. However, as K suggested, "nightclubs barely manage to maintain their legality" because these are spaces tightly regulated in various terms such as location, illumination, noise and business hours. Among other conditions, the current Entertainment and Amusement Trades Control Act dictates that, to obtain authorisation for dance-related trades, the interior of the venue should not be easily visible from outside and that the venue should imperatively close after midnight (National Police Agency 1994, 73-114).

Dancing body is still concealed from public eyes and many discotheques and nightclubs are suffering from the apparently impractical regulation. Dance culture is still associated with a regressive image and, as K alerted, driven to "nowhere other than underground". Still, nightclubs are where artists and their audience intimately share time and space. In Part II, I outlined that Tokyoite dance venues have been land-sliding westwards throughout the twentieth century, from Asakusa to Ginza to Shinjuku to Harajuku and Shibuya. I also underlined how the Entertainment and Amusement Trades Control Act has mediated both the landslide and the way youth culture and music have been produced and consumed in Tokyo. Here, I would like to examine its consequence on the Tokyoite hip-hop scene, the way its music and dance are lived as common experiences in the concealed space called nightclub, and how the club space is associated with a distinctive culture.

The Entertainment and Amusement Trades Control Act was revised in 1984 and previously interdicted late-night restaurants and bars became authorised. According to the revised act, entertainment and amusement trades are classified into 14 categories, for each of which location, interior structure, bearable noise limit, floor size, illumination, opening hours, clarification of tariff, propriety of 'reception', that of touting and outdoor advertisement, working and entrance of minor before and after certain hours, etc, are regulated. Of the 14 categories, only 'dance hall' and 'late-night restaurant, bar' concern club culture. Although there are two categories of 'cabaret' and 'nightclub', they signify more of striptease bar and escort club than their 'original' sense in the West, a product of its eroticisation in Japan. Namely, despite their appellation 'club', none of the Tokyoite nightclub is categorised as 'nightclub' under the existent law. 'Dance hall' category requires authorisation from the Metropolitan Public Safety Commission, whereas 'late-night restaurant and bar' only have to report their establishment to it. The dividing line is, as in K's quote above ('big clubs like ours have to obtain trade authorisation'), the size of its dance floor or surface liable to be considered so. Authorisation of a 'dance hall' presupposes the dance floor not smaller than 66 sq. m. and the interior not darker than 11 lx. Late-night business, surpassing of defined noise level and entry or working of minors less than 18 years old are forbidden. As for a 'late-night bar', to the contrary, it suffices to report no later than 10 days before its inauguration. Instead, illumination (not less than 21 lx.) and noise-level (45, 50 or 55...
dB depending on location) must be controlled, and it is forbidden to possess any dance-related facility and to entertain clients with show, dance, karaoke, etc after mid-night. In other words, technically, no one is allowed to dance, and there is nowhere to dance, after midnight.

However, to say the obvious, people go to a club expecting a climax after the midnight, and most club owners and event organisers book the main artist or DJ at around midnight, projecting the climax at around one or two o'clock in the morning. Namely, in practice, the act is interpreted in a very diverted way. To shun the public eye, and to clear the noise level, most nightclubs favour underground floor or upper floor of a building in an entertainment quarter. As for illumination and late-night business, to borrow K's (1997) passage, "the only way I could do is to hire security guards by myself to avoid trouble, for, like any other clubs, I've got gangsters entering and clients fighting and so on". A surprise inspection of illumination and noise level is also not uncommon. “Because nothing can be public and I know I take a considerable risk, I have to use my brain in full" (K). Similar difficulties are also shared by small clubs that report themselves technically as 'late-night restaurant and bar’. For instance, in these 'clubs', there is always at least one set of a table and a chair on 'dance floor' on which, technically, people are not suppose to dance.

What is, then, this club space, almost entirely driven out to underground and concealed from the outside world both acoustically and legally? A club space brings in and binds people with a variety of interests including, but not limited to, recording companies' club promoters, and mediates their encounter, association or dissociation. Many music industry personnel I interviewed, A&Rs, promoters, record shop buyers, journalists, radio programmers, etc, with or without business interest and inside or outside of business formality, considered it fundamental to be in a selection of clubs. It is also not rare that they themselves are performing or DJing in the clubs. The music press reports the latest topics in the leading clubs. FM stations directly relay club events on weekends. In this sense, a club space serves as a hub in hip-hop's emergent network of music production. Interaction between artists and their audience, which would be prolonged until the final stage of music production in rock and other conventional production networks, is very much central in the club space. Instead of emerging from behind the stage and withdrawing equally quickly once performance is over, artists tend to be on the dance floor with their company. Certainly it is more likely so in a smaller club, yet it is not rare to see them on the floor or at least in the VIP lounge in a larger club. Presence of well-known artists, particularly that of overseas artists visiting Japan, like the specialist record shops, legitimise the authenticity of the club concerned, reinforcing its reputation. Inviting an artist costs money to a club. However, as the club, on the one hand, can attract clients and as the artist, on the other, can benefit from using the club as a regular meeting place and pilot-testing pre-productions in observing the floor's reaction, the cost is often off set, except for particular events. It is often the case with independent producers and labels, as I pointed out earlier, to pick up artists in such an occasion whose songs have already known in the club space.

However, beside these culturally invested aspects of the club space are numerous small and obscure clubs. As a domestic A&R for a major label grumbled, "club culture surely has a lot of potentials, but its management is so irresponsible that it ruins the potentials". Larger, trend-setting clubs under a solid corporate structure disposing a dedicated artistic direction may construct their
identity in carefully selecting genres, artists and clients, and usually tie in with other interested parties such as a recording company, a beverage marker, a sportswear brand, etc. Smaller clubs in which a manager would also have to administrate scheduling and other chores, on the contrary, how many friends/clients a DJ can bring in can be more important than artistic quality of the DJ. It is also often the case that when a group of university or vocational school students propose a project, the number of tickets they can sell in their schools overrides the musical and cultural conception of the project proposed. Running a nightclub is unfailingly a hard business, and its management has constantly to balance art and economy. As weekdays’ loss has to be recuperated over the weekend, their locations are inevitably limited to crowded entertainment districts, hence reproducing the significance of areas around Shibuya and Roppongi as hip-hop’s centre in Tokyo (see Figure 19). Whether or not to specialise in a particular musical genre to establish venue’s reputation also swings between aesthetic and economic decisions. A manager who launched a dedicated hip-hop club in 1996 in Roppongi, admitted, “listening to the same kind of music all the time helplessly bore both our clients and our staff. So, we decide to change genres daily. Besides, I used to set Wednesdays and Fridays as ladies nights, but because they don’t drop any money, I gave up”.

The club space is not homogeneous and always contains classes of clients. For example, during the research, I often came across situations in hip-hop clubs and events in which lines of male clients crowded in front of the DJ booth, whereas female clients, almost always less numerous, tend to form small groups and dance at margins of the dance floor. As they still need clubs for distinction and socialisation, b-boys tended to be more concerned with sound and contents and hence to peep in the DJ booth, which Muro (1979), a leading DJ and rapper, alarmingly referred to as “severed heads on the booth” (19). Similarly, as music counts before dance, a male audience is more receptive to Japanese rap than a female counterpart on the dance floor. A DJ suggested that he would alter sets of records, depending on the expected proportion of male and female clients. Others suggested that hip-hop’s dance is too sophisticated to attract clients. Certainly, there are clubs that hire claque dancers to liven up the floor, yet if they are too good, then actual clients can easily be dissuaded from dancing. Because failure of such an operation would directly affect the reputation, management is very prudent. Some clubs apparently go so far as to keep professional dancers from their dance floors. Hip-hop
artists, rappers and their fans often define themselves against the authorities as represented by the Entertainment and Amusement Trades Control Act. Yet, dance does not seem so obviously and necessarily a central interest of people who gather in a club. Contradicting as such, such is the practical sense in place and, at the same time, is a source of distrust as expressed by the A&R quoted earlier.

The relation among music, dance and nightclub did not turn out to be as evident. The contradiction is apparent in K’s (1997) own ambivalence. On the one hand, he argued, “club culture is a universal thing, and, undeniably, a society needs fun and dance like this. It is inevitable for the youths. I mean, we cannot say that Japanese youths should content themselves with karaoke, can we?” On the other, “if they really love music, then they’d stay in front of their hi-fi sets home [...] But if they take the pain of coming here through the hustle and bustle of the city, they are not here to listen to the music”. During my research, on the one hand, I have seen many teenage breakdancers, too young (or too honest) to enter nightclubs, dancing literally on the street in the evening, often in front of large lit-out show windows that they use as a mirror. One of them told me that he danced because he could not find anything else interesting and decided to live on what he loved. A sixteen-year-old female DJ I encountered told me that she could not get on with the education and hip-hop and DJing were the only thing with which she could distinguish herself from other “ordinary people who manage to go on to senior high school”. The owner of the club at which she worked suggested that there would be many ways to dodge the police regarding her age. On the other hand, nightclubs often accommodate those who simply kill time until the first morning tube starts, those who opt for casual encounters or those who just enjoy drinking. Dance, music, rap show or freestyling are certainly central in hip-hop parties, but clients they attract may not necessarily be coherent. It is, thus, quite misleading to understand deviance of hip-hop, regression of dancing bodies and undergroundness of nightclubs as an immediate expression of opposition against the authoritarian regulation like the Entertainment and Amusement Trades Control Act. Without ‘street’ intermediaries, disposed not only to define the ‘street’ identity against the ‘good public morals’ or the ‘clean environment’ that the act advocates, but also to cohere the otherwise orderless club space in excluding other, none can be understood as the scene, or the ‘street’, in and from which something distinctively hip-hop is produced and transmitted. I want to develop this notion a little further in conclusion, while our immediate task is to explore how similarly and differently hip-hop’s street legitimacy is constructed in Paris, France.
Paris, France

Recording Industry and Internalisation of Hip-hop

**Taxonomy in Record Production**

*Globalisation and Recording Industry in France*

By a simple comparison, the French record market is about three times as small as the Japanese one in terms of units sold annually (see Figure 2 (p. 13)). All the transnational major recording companies are active in France, yet because of the different structure of the market, they seem to pursue a set of strategies different from what we have seen in Japan. Many recording industry personnel I interviewed in France reflexively viewed its business size to be rather small. Gomis (1998), a domestic A&R of Sony France's Columbia label, referred to it in the following terms:

> It's a very small business in France. The recording industry is very small, [...]. It's not like in the USA or in the UK where there are multiple labels and independent labels everywhere. There are very few independent labels in France. There are less and less of them, they have less and less means to survive.

There is a slight deviation from a statistical reality, for, according to the annual sales statistics compiled by IFPI, the French market is only a little smaller than the UK market (see Figure 2 (p. 13)), and much smaller markets such as Mexico or the Philippines seemingly have larger proportion of local independent labels (see Figure 3 (p. 14)). Yet what is important is that such a working perception of a position in the world is often a product of comparison with Anglo-American countries (and not Mexico or the Philippines), and is reflected on either the justification or denigration of the French music industries and the music they produce.

During the period of my research in France, a series of mergers and acquisitions of transnational recording companies took place, notably EMI’s closure of its US office in 1997, resulting in the passing over of its repertoires to Virgin USA and Capitol USA, Canadian Seagram’s acquisition of Polygram in 1998 and, finally, Universal’s merger with French Vivendi in 2000. Yet, most of the staff in transnational recording companies I interviewed did not seem too concerned with the ownership transfer as such. LBR (1998), a renowned DJ and club-promoter of Delabel, a sub-label of Virgin France, explained it as follows:

> Virgin group belongs to EMI, but maintains its artistic independence everywhere in the world. That is, Virgin in the USA [...] recuperated all EMI's signatures in the USA, but elsewhere in the world, there is one EMI and one Virgin and they are independent, apart from that we use the same stock management and information network structures. But that's all. We have independent juridical, financial, promotion and artistic services. It's really like two totally different companies that joined only at the top of the pyramid.

Transferring of ownership is in fact less about the substitution of existing corporate identity, signatures and catalogues with new ones than about the acquisition and exploitation of them.

Instead of forcefully transforming the local music market by imposing foreign musics and cultures, the transnational major recording companies rather adopt locally appropriated, conservative strategies, as in Japan. According to Beguin (1998), an international marketing director of Island-
Remark, a label of then Polygram:

We are quite active in selecting what to release in France. Island US and Island UK sign a lot of acts. And given the share of international catalogue in France, it is obvious that there are many acts that we are obliged to and willing to release in France. As far as U2, Cranberries, Pulp or Stereo MCs are concerned, we don't even pose a question.

Yet, precisely because of the size of the market and the importance of international catalogue within it, the 'active' selection is preconditioned by a well-proven, obstinate principle. He continued:

On the other hand, Island UK as Island USA – it's the same for Polydor, EMI, etc – the more they sign, the less we are able to work on every proposed act. So we exercise an artistic selection: we’d say, "no, it sounds too British, it wouldn't work in France unless it becomes enormous in the UK". [...] There are plenty of acts in the UK, and if it doesn't work in the UK, why bother in France. If it doesn't work in the UK, there's little chance it will work in France, [...].

That is, in order for an 'international' artist to be marketable in France, i.e. to fit most easily into the audience's expectation, s/he first of all must not be 'too Anglo-Saxon' but accepted in the Anglo-American markets. To administrate various European markets efficiently, and because of this de facto trend-setting role of the anglophone markets, most of the transnational major labels co-ordinate and manage the European markets from London, UK. Even though, on per capita basis, an average Norwegian (62.63 US$/year (IFPI 1998)), Danish (50.47 US$), British (48.39 US$) or Swiss (43.84 US$) spends more or almost as much as an American on records (49.25 US$), the actual size of the entire European market barely matches the size of the US market and the management efficiency often overrides regional differences.

It leads from this that, compared with Japan into whose limited 'international' market artists strive to squeeze with various localisation strategies, the production of international repertoires in France is rather systematic and straightforward. Beguin (1998) continued:

Like any international department, we have a very direct relationship [with overseas affiliates], regarding everything that concerns so-called a posteriori promotion and marketing. Namely, we don't intervene in the creative process: we don't intervene in the production of the video or of the sleeve. All these are already done [...].

Today, increasingly, an 'international' repertoire is exposed to France even without a French international A&R, through the transnational media such as MTV, the international press and import records, or through intensifying migration of the young population in Europe and beyond, and, as Malherbe (1998), a product manager of EMI's Chrysalis label, put it, "in any case, [an 'international' act] works". He continued:

Working with a French artist is, almost, more interesting than working with a US artist. When you produce a sleeve [for a French artist], the artist is here. You find a promotion strategy... when promoting a US artist, the product has already been fully packaged before [entering France], whereas with a French artist, we go to radio, press, television by ourselves.

The production of local artists, therefore, seems to be considered more artistic, creative and even
privileged and, on that account, France is one of the few record markets in Europe, together with the UK and Italy, in which domestic catalogue sales share almost 50% (see Figure 4 (p. 16)).

The transnational major companies have been active, in this light, to buy into local acts and labels since the 1980s: Barclay was absorbed by Polygram in 1978; Pathé-Marconi by EMI in 1989; Carrère by Warner in 1990 (renamed as East West in 1995); and Vogue by BMG in 1992. It is difficult to tell the cultural implications of these acquisitions, given that being a ‘national’ major is observed not to be particularly advantageous in Japan. What is clear, however, is that the transnational majors recognise the importance of local musical development in this market, investing a considerable amount of time and money in local repertoires. Polygram (today’s Vivendi-Universal) thus has the Mercury and Polydor labels that “aim at local production for mass audience” (Azoulay 1998). Gomis (1998) for Columbia Sony suggested:

Columbia is a major label, a large structure, so there are many A&Rs, because it’s large, and has an important artistic resource. I came here to bring in a bit more to its catalogue. It’s a bit like the role of each A&R. [....] That said, Columbia has a more generalist approach in its catalogue, compared with labels like S.m.a.l.l., for example, which is first of all, much smaller.

S.m.a.l.l. stands for Sony Music Associated and Licensed Labels, aiming at developing so-called newer, alternative or specialised genres of music, including rap. In and around these new musical domains, which embrace a growing number of new local talents and small experimental labels with various degrees of independence from the major companies, globalisation proposes at least two possibilities.

One of the possibilities is a widened potential market. Particularly for small or independent labels and distributors, globalisation means extension of their network to neighbouring European, dispersed francophone and then global market configurations. Kponton (1998), commercial director of Chronowax, one of the few French independent hip-hop distributors specialised in vinyls, pointed out:

Today, we’re really trying to turn toward export. [....] Last month, 48% of the turnover was exports. We did 1/4 to 1/2 in Switzerland. There, people are rich, it’s francophone, they’re the largest clients of French hip-hop around here. And then Belgium and Quebec. Quebec is seeing an explosion of French rap, really.

Also on a desk in his office was a book on business in Japan on whose immense vinyl market Chronowax was eager to embark, which partially explains his eagerness to accept my interview. Grenfeld (1998), an A&R of XIII bis Records, one of the few surviving French independent labels, also suggested that the francophone markets were something they cared a lot for, and “other markets like Japan, for sometimes [French artists] work better in Japan than here, as in the case of Tricatel”. The Tricatel label embraces a few neo-retro French POP artists, introduced in Japan as Shibuya-kei acts (see p. 104).

The other possibility is a flux of knowledge and human resources to and from other parts of the world — notably, regarding hip-hop and rap, the USA. Mande (1998), president of Payback Recordz, suggested that it is “truly important to have all these American engineers because we work on the real American sounds”. For this, in the recording session I visited, he contracted an American recording
engineer, Prince Charles Alexander, for his artist, Sté Strausz, one of the few female French rappers. The overall project director of the label, Sulee B. Wax, himself one of the pioneer rappers in the French language for a group known as Da Lausz (ex-les Little MCs), explained, "above all, we rap in French but we don’t do French rap. That is, French rap doesn’t exist. Rap comes from New York, [...] so we do rap à la française. We rap in French and we don’t do French rap. I mean, we have not invented all this". The transnational influx is not limited to dislocation of artists and producers. Texaco (1998), who founded France’s first street marketing company, Wicked, trained himself in the USA to launch his profession in France:

I started the promotional business in ’93 and I left for the States in ’94 or ’95 to Loud Records, because they have a company called SRC.... I was with the street team, I was with the guys of DJ promo and those of radio promo. I saw how all these are really linked to each other. All is really co-ordinated not only with everything that happens in the street but also with other things like sending samples to DJs, etc. (see Negus 1999, 97-101, for the emergence of Loud Records in the USA)

Reference to the USA is essential for French hip-hop authenticity. Yet, it is also important to note that, as in Japan, behind such dislocations is their denigration of existing French market and music. That is, as Sulee B. Wax put it, it is crucial that music of Payback Recordz is “completely ahead of France”.

**Labels, Regions and Genres.**

For international A&Rs specialised in hip-hop in France, who therefore look to the USA rather than the UK in which hip-hop is “almost absent” (Malherbe 1998), the UK-centred pan-European administrative structure is a considerable obstacle, as they often find US hip-hop acts offered through and by London too obsolete or inadequate for the French market. Malherbe (1998) for EMI’s Chrysalis label expressed his dilemma between repertoires EMI’s London headquarter proposes and these he and the French audience expect:

> We’re dependent on England. If England says, “look, the next album of Gang Starr, it’s gonna be an internationally simultaneous release,” then that’s fine. But it could also be that… For us the centre of business is London: [...] even though, in terms of rap, I’m very attentive to all that is happening in the USA, it’s England that tells us about it [...]. So, it could happen that England goes, “Gang Starr releases their thing on the 15th of March in the States, and international release date is the 18th of April”. In that case, I say, “no way. I wanna get them right now”. Then they say we cannot do that because we have our common factory in Europe that is not scheduled so, etc.

The concern of international A&Rs and marketing or promotion personnel in such a case is not only the potential obsolescence of products by the time they are released in France but also, as in Japan but much less in quantity, parallel import record retailers: “the prescribers” in which “people who want to buy hip-hop spend much time” (Malherbe).

As elsewhere, the French branches of the transnational major labels manage repertoires in terms of geographic regions and of corresponding labels. Because of the smaller market size and influence on international production, the division between international production and local production seems relatively unquestioned in France. Yet, such an assertion seems to stand only concerning a
limited number of established international artists, labels and genres. Some A&Rs for the major labels expressed their discomfort about working within this kind of heavy administrative structure. Gomis (1998) for Columbia Sony, for example, acknowledged:

> [Working in a major label] requires a lot of energy. [...] [A&Rs] are at the heart of the entire music business here – artistic direction is important and we have elements to cater for other departments concerned. So sometimes it’s great because there’s a team work and all that, but at the same time there’s a problem because we have our point of view that we try to defend, but people don’t always understand us and they end up saying, “oh, you’re artistic, and don’t understand...” you know what I mean? It’s not easy, but it’s like that. (my italics)

For a large part of producers dealing with local talents and new, alternative or experimental genres in small or independent labels, the existing music industry structure in France is felt to be more acutely hostile. Firstly, “international production weighs heavily on the level of sales” (Chazelle 1998) so that it undermines their local artists to produce a meaningful difference. Secondly, the existing structure for domestic musical production is heavily dependent on the VARIETÉS convention in which “a guy who sang 30 years ago is still around – on television, he still sings the same song – and, I’m not kidding, his concert is always full” (Sulee B. Wax 1998).

To reduce such a structural stress, the major companies launched so-called experimental sub-labels, such as Sony’s aforementioned S.m.a.l.l., EMI/Virgin’s Delabel, etc. whose role and artistic philosophy are often pronounced as a music laboratory. Grenfeld (1998) for XIII bis commented:

> Today... it depends... but inside a major label, there are some labels divided by nationalities, others by genres like global hip-hop.... Sony has, for example, a hip-hop label in which French and international artists are signed. It’s possible. So that international artists may be promoted in the same channel as French artists, or French artists play with international artists depending on availability.

Increasing need is felt to co-ordinate international and national artists under a specific genre. Beguin (1998) for Island-Remark reckoned that “product manager treats French projects as international projects” in his department regarding hip-hop because this specific market, as he argued, “is not divided in terms of national and international artists, it would rather be in terms of the musical style”. Malherbe (1998) for Chrysalis proclaimed that he worked on hip-hop regardless of the nationality of artists, and that he would not mind calling New York headquarters to lay in US 12-inch singles directly, or to even press it locally at his own risk “before London proposes the same product three months later” if he found the product indispensable for the hip-hop scene in France.

Then, clearly, hip-hop A&Rs and marketing or promotion staffs are transgressing the label and regional boundaries as practised conventionally. Both in terms of artists and audience, as many insiders agreed, hip-hop has “a particular behaviour” (Azoulay 1998) in the market. This ‘behaviour’ became all the more significant in around 1998 when hip-hop saw a phenomenal outburst, often referred to as the déferlement ’98, or upsurge ‘98. Sulee B. Wax (1998) for Payback Recordz remarked:

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There was no rap on French radio eight months ago, I assure you. [...] But do you realise this? In eight months, Ado FM, Skyrock, NRJ, you see, Fun Radio. These are large stations, you see, that used to play only crap, only variétés, but in just eight months, you got the four radio stations, the largest ones, 80% of the programmes becomes rap. On Ado, it's 100%. On Skyrock, 20% dance and 80% rap, and NRJ, 3-40%. Fun is less rap but still. [...] Do you understand the implication? In eight mouths, the change that rap has undertaken is incredible.

This 'upsurge' is often explained both positively and negatively in terms of nationwide FM networks' adoption of French rap as a means to maintain their attraction to young listenership and to dodge the francophone song quota introduced in 1996. The quota, nonetheless, was not expected to favour rap music and hip-hop culture in France and, as many insiders pointed out, French rap had already been ripe and mature before 1996. What happened was that its insertion to the nationwide radio landscape transformed the way hip-hop is produced and consumed in France.

**Premier sur le Rap?**

**FM Radio Networks and Cultural Economy of Format**

In the course of the 1980s, the partially state-owned *périphérique* stations, Europe 1, RTL and RMC became privatised and shifted to FM band. Most of the local FM stations were no longer run by volunteers and amateur organisations. Commercial advertisement, authorised from 1984, gave rise to mergers and acquisition of some stations by others, and led the principal stations, such as NRJ, RFM, Radio Nostalgie, Skyrock and Fun Radio, to the national network via satellite. In turn, from 1989, the government and its new agent, the CSA (*le Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel*: Higher Audio-visual Council), reorganised the existing stations into five categories in protecting non-commercial and local and regional stations. Yet, the undeniable tendency was that larger stations bought up smaller stations and regrouped them into a package of different age groups for advertisers (see Hare 1992, 32-4). With these, as Dauncey and Hare (1999) argue, "France was to enter the era of niche broadcasting where American models of broadcasting and American music were to dominate" (95). Today, according to the above authors:

After a decade and a half of rapid change the position in French radio in the late 1990s is that, of the 3050 frequencies allocated to private broadcasting, some 800 are used by the 500 or so non-commercial or community radios, 600 by the 250 local commercial independent stations, 700 by stations that are franchised to the big networks, and 950 by the commercial thematic networks and *périphériques* (96: see also Gustave and Jarno 1997).

As an operational terminology within the music industries, Gildas Lefeuvre (1998, 243) categorises FM stations into "*périphérique* stations (RTL, Europe 1, RMC, Sud France) and France Inter [a public service station]" (243); "large FM networks: NRJ, Fun, Skyrock, Europe 2, RTL 2, Nostalgie..." (243); and "local FM stations, which may be regrouped into two categories: commercial radio strongly implanted in large cities (which are rarer and rarer because of acquisitions by the networks) and associative radio stations, which offer more adventurous programming because they are not constrained by profit-making objectives" (243).
The tighter market competition, more established position-takings and a settled sense of differentiation among these operational, economic or even philosophical categories of radio broadcasting brought about a set of increasingly precise strategies of distinction: ‘formatting’.

According to Garcia (1998), a music programming director of Radio France:

Before ‘81, there only were large general stations, Europe 1, RTL, RMC, Radio Sud and the public service. [...] So, we had to do a bit of all the sensibilities, [...]. What is new of the emerging stations is that they’re specialised like jazz radio, classical radio, rap radio, dance radio, etc. It corresponds to formats – this notion of format emerged. [...] [Radio stations] are segmented and, from that moment, [listening] practices change.

Consequently, as he continued, “marketing becomes dominant so that recording companies and radio stations have extremely precise ideas about where to display the records”. Many recording industry personnel expressed their firm belief that radio, through exposure of songs and artists, “is the most important medium that pushes forward the record sales” (Azoulay 1998). “In a very, very substantial way,” Garcia reckoned, “something like 80% of record purchase is motivated by its radio airplay”. Yet, as Garcia also suggested, there is “nonetheless a gap” between recording companies that want “radio to diffuse only their new releases” and radio stations whose interest is not that “[their listeners] are going to buy records” but that “they are happy with the music [they play]”.

Recording companies, therefore, ceaselessly try to fortify their tie with radio stations through various operations, persuading radio stations, their programmers and DJs, that their products interest listeners, hence beneficial to the stations. Radio stations, in turn, as Amiaud (1998), RTL’s music programmer, suggested, ensure, with various degrees depending on their status and disposition, “that there is a [recording] company behind [a song programmed] that can commercialise [the song] well, because when we play a record, it is important that the record can be found in record shops”. One of the most prevailing operations is co-edition of a (compilation) album – on top of the shared profit of record sales, the label can benefit from its guaranteed exposure on the partner radio or television, while the station can benefit from omnipresence of its logo on each package sold and each advertisement launched by the label. “Disguised purchase of space” (Hidoux 1998) for some, it is an important means of constituting an audience. According to Amiaud:

It’s to communicate with the audience interested in our station by the artist we propose, to associate the station’s image with that of the artist. So, it's to show that we're a radio station that develops artists, that recommends things of quality. It is to benefit, in turn, from the credibility of people who buy the record. Image that becomes affected to an artist, that defends the artist. [...] There are two axes: either to demonstrate that we’re associated with the release of a record or the launch of a concert of a very big French artist, or to mark our difference by positioning ourselves on acts unknown at the moment but we think will be important soon.

Most of the commercial stations in France, the périphériques (Europe 1, RTL, etc) or the youth national networks (NRJ, Fun Radio, Skyrock, etc), have been engaging in the kind of tie-in strategy while differentiating from each other by genres and artists proposed. Since the emergence of pirate FM stations and their establishment as young, anglophone rock/POP radio (from which NRJ, Fun
Radio or Skyrock were developed), the périphérique stations, despite their pronouncedly 'Americanising' role regarding jazz and yéyé from the 1950s, have become disposed to defend francophone artists since the late 70s (on this account, Dauncey and Hare's (1999) association of the current niche broadcasting with American style is arguable).

Apart from the established (or promising) artists eligible for these operations, there is tough competition among artists and their labels for national diffusion through airwave. Gomis (1998) for Columbia Sony suggested recording companies “spend more time with radio stations, and much more money, too”, yet the space available on play-lists is limited, and music is clearly over-supplied. According to Chazelle (1998), a product manager of Shaman, a label integrated to Polygram:

The profession of attaché de presse is very hard.... Radio has very few places regarding their programming grids, and, in general, [programmers] have an immense pile of records to programme that they receive every day, every week. [...] Naturally, there are titles that don’t enter the grid. Some may be proposed again the week after, or in two weeks time, still nothing is sure at all because, in the meantime, there are also new titles coming in.

On top of overproduction, the working ethics of larger radio stations can further keep certain music from national diffusion and, in turn, reshape the way music is produced. She continued:

It is either programmed, or not. That is, there may well be another kind of censorship: there are radio programmers who judge that it’s too disturbing and don’t play the song. Or, title enters radio and afterward they stop playing it because of this and that. We had a problem with Billy Ze Kick when she made a CD, because she talked about shit [drugs] and all that, she was censored because they found it an incitement to consumption.

Gomis (1998) for Columbia Sony also argued that “if [the song] is not sufficiently white and French, they wouldn’t programme it, because la France profonde [provincial France] may be shocked, particularly if it’s a national network”.

None of these youth FM networks – NRJ, Fun Radio or Skyrock – considered French rap suitable for their format up until the late-1990s, firstly because of, as mentioned above, their identification of listeners through Anglo-American rock and pop genres, and secondly because of the escalated competition to deliver ‘better quality music’ in their own terms. Texaco (1998) for Wicked viewed it as follows:

For a long time, there was a huge problem regarding the promotion of rap in France. Rap in general. That is, the recording companies knew how to promote with big radios, big television stations and massive press campaigns, but did not.... Namely, if they realised that none of these media reacted, they did not know how to market the products, because rap was refused.... It was refused by the three national FM networks. On television, there were few music programmes in France anyway, [...], and the press did not talk about it....

The tidal acceptance of French rap from around 1997 by the ‘Anglo-American’ youth FM networks was a by-product of the francophone song quota, “essentially to force the three youth networks (NRJ, Fun and Skyrock) to programme more French artists – some programmed only 5% of [francophone songs] three years ago” (Bouton 1997a, 419). The 1996 quota obliges at least 40% of music on every radio
stations authorised by the CSA to be songs of 'French expression', i.e. songs sung in French, of which 50% must be either by 'new talents', i.e. those who have not had a gold disc (100,000 copies sold) or 'new productions', i.e. those commercialised within the last six months for a single and an album and three months for songs not single-cut from an album. The three youth FM networks were urged to redefine themselves, while maintaining their young listeners and this, despite the expected protection of 'French' popular music and support for its young talents, gave rise to rap and hip-hop culture in France that is disposed not to French variété, but to the USA, the hypothetical enemy inscribed in the very quota law. The quota has undergone a slight revision in 2001, basically to adapt to the practical situation that I outline below.

**State, Media Quota and Popular Music**

The French government, with its Ministry of Culture and Communication, has been actively intervening in French and francophone 'popular' music production since the Mitterrand era of which the liberation of FM radio itself is a product. In 1986, *le Centre d'Information et de Ressources pour les Musiques Actuelles* (Centre of Information and Resources for Contemporary Music: IRMA) was launched to monitor situations and necessities of today's musical creation in France. Jacques Lang, Minister of Culture at the time, introduced his *Plan Rock et Variétés* in 1989. In 1990, French Music Office (FMO), a governmental trade agency, was inaugurated in New York to facilitate global exposition of French and francophone musicians and, in 1993, *Bureau d'Export*, a similar organisation targeting the European markets, was launched. The francophone song quota is one such governmental policy with which to define French 'popular' culture and to valorise it in the new global cultural economy. The quota had been a subject of incessant lobbying since the end of 1980s among the state and a concerned fragment of the French music industries facing the gradual decline of record sales of domestic repertoires and the consequent augmentation of international repertoires in France around that time (see Laing 1992). Gildas Lefeuvre (1998) reasons the decline of domestic catalogue sales in the 1980s in the following terms:

> We must certainly see principal reasons of the inversion of tendencies in the arrival of FM stations in 1981 (while what we call périphérique stations had always been more sensitive to French production), and that of CD format, with the more and more exhaustive concentration in the market. (42)

Lefeuvre argues that most of the mainstream French artists and labels relied on 7-inch single hit in the 1970s (as opposed to LP-oriented Anglo-American rock and pop artists) (36-8). Quite systematically, the permeation of CD format, and the subsequent disappearance of 7-inch single format, more or less corresponds to the decline of domestic catalogue sales from 1990. There also seems a correspondence between the gradual resurrection of domestic catalogue sales from 1993 and the market acceptance of 2-title CD single that replaced 7-inch single and the application of the francophone song quota, voted in 1994 and enforced from the 1st of January, 1996.

However, the quota, as far as the opinions I came across are concerned, is "not really to the point" (Chazelle 1998). Cynical observers such as Rémi Bouton (1997a; 1997b; 1998) remark that the quota dissuades radio stations from programming music, it encourages them to play a smaller number of successful songs with higher rotation frequency, it does not really help young and new genres and
artists and, finally, it decreases radio listeners. García (1998) for Radio France observed:

It is not perhaps done in a subtle way – a French singer who sings in Spanish or English counts as international, while Elton John sings in French phonetically counts as national. Despite all the musics in the francophone space, [some of them] count as international. Evidently, it becomes more difficult for Youssou N'Dour to plug on the radio, because he is, in some part, in competition with Michael Jackson, while it would be more logical if he were in competition with national – well, in the same category. So, there are some imperfections.

The quota law also obliges the media to programme new French talents or productions. This, too, however, does not quite match up to what was expected. Grenfeld (1998) for XIII bis Records argues:

In France, there's a ban of English. Well, no English songs, namely French singers singing in English, are ever played on the radio. It's almost impossible. [...] It was already so before the quota, but it's much more difficult today. For this, because they are not programmed on the radio, all the interesting [French] rock groups who choose to sing in English are produced by independent labels and producers.

Bouton (1997a) argues that “a large number of French artists, and often those who start to be accepted in the international markets (DJs, African artists produced in France) are excluded from the quota” (420). Techno/dance music, of which France has become one of the leading global suppliers with acts like Daft Punk, Laurent Garnier, Dimitri from Paris, Saint Germain, etc, is not considered as francophone music because of their almost exclusively instrumental, vocal-less style. Gomis (1998) for Columbia Sony argued, “in this quota, with its 40% of French songs, there are many genres: in the 40%, there may be 25% of French singers who have been there for 20 or 30 years and it's simply what we heard before”.

In the end, precisely as in Lefeuvre's (1998) reasoning above, the quota favours either established or promising French variété artists founded on the established marketing and promotion conventions based on single-cut songs on the national network stations, apart from one significant and rather unexpected exception: French rap. In an interview with one of the leading hip-hop magazines in France, Groove, Laurent Bouneau (in de Bure 1998), Skyrock's music programmer, explained, “Skyrock had been behind its rival, Fun Radio, so we had to react. Then the quota on French songs was imposed and rap seemed to me to be the most interesting current. It had acquired an artistic maturity” (84). His ‘gamble’, as it were, turned out to be successful. Bouton (1998) suggests that, unlike Fun Radio that “ran in all directions in its search of a new identity after having abandoned avant-garde, progressive rock programming” (64):

Skyrock set the tone in disrupting its harmless format, to dive body and soul into rap, becoming, this way, the first national network formatted on a genre of popular music, rather than on an age group. From September 1996 to September 1997, the station increased rap airplay from 30% to 70%, with sure-fire success. The station, that largely exceeds the 40% francophone music quota, programmes up to five singles from a same album simultaneously. [...] this small revolution allowed Skyrock to catch up with Fun
In the year-end survey, and to outdo it if we consider the initialised population.

The annual music airplay survey conducted by Ipsos (1998) shows that NRJ broadcast pop/rock most in 1997, Fun Radio, dance/techno and Skyrock, rap. Skyrock, despite its nominal reference to rock, broadcast 25% more black/dance music (90% of total music broadcast annually) in 1997 than in the previous year (29), claiming itself to be the 'premier sur le rap (no. 1 rap station'). Skyrock's success with French rap urged other stations, such as Ado FM and Générations, to follow the trend.

All of a sudden, the larger FM networks become open to French rap artists and, by the same token, became the central means for hip-hop promotion in France. Malherbe (1998) for Chrysalis commented, "there's less and less difficulty in programming French rap. Before, it was very, very difficult. But today, you have Skyrock that plays rap all day, and Ado FM, and all the small local radios in the provinces have rap programmes". Grevery (1998), administrator of Double H Productions, a hip-hop label founded by five leading French DJs, commented:

It's legitimate, in that [radio stations] want to make money, they want to find an audience, I mean, for them, an audience is money. [...] What's essential is that you have a radio like Skyrock that says, "yeah, Skyrock, the no. 1 rap station" and then you'll get others like Ado that say, "yeah, it's a great niche, so we do what Skyrock does". So, they follow hip-hop. There's no problem. We're not against this kind of thing. You see. We ourselves consider these stations help our products.

Texaco (1998) for Wicked saw the situation inevitable, as the French popular music production had been too conservative:

Given that in youth music there isn't any rock in France – few, practically none, and most of them do it in English anyway. [Dance/techno groups such as] Daft Punk etc don't count because there's no French text, you see. So, after that, what's left? You have boys bands, variétés and rap. Well, despite everything, among these three, it's French rap that pleases the listeners, it speaks of.... That is, except rap, there are few engaged and militant singers anymore. You see, boys bands, what do they talk about? Love and flowers, etc. French variétés, it doesn't speak to the youths. For the youths, it's rap, you see?

The francophone song quota was practised quite differently through the process of its socialisation. Despite the initial, rather conservative and protectionist expectation, it has given rise to music, strongly associated with youth culture today, that challenges the very protectionism of variétés and chanson.

**French Domination and US Collaboration**

The francophone song quota brought forth an unprecedented and unexpected outbreak of French rap to the nationwide youth audience. Rapidly, as Beguin (1998) for Island-Remark noted, "French hip-hop has become dominant over US hip-hop". Namely, "most of the US artists sell less than before simply because the kids buy French rap much more easily and French radio programmes French rap more easily than US rap". Certainly, as Chazelle (1998) for Shaman observed, "some room was remained for [US rappers] and [radio stations] always programme international artists, as they
have big stars”. Yet, a significant consequence is that, the quota being hostile to non-francophone repertoires, the transnational major labels have become obliged to concentrate on the crossover success of established US rap acts that are more easily accepted on the national FM networks and more likely to recoup the necessary investment than new, unknown and underground US acts. This seems to have had a set contradicting effects. First of all, the explicitly crossover-oriented promotion of some US rappers in France invited criticism against the US hip-hop scene. Malherbe (1998) for Chrysalis, for example, argued that “today, French hip-hop is more authentic than US rap” because “in the USA, they do so often to make money, to make records and make money. Often, more and more, they don’t really care about breakdance, graffiti and DJing”. The linguistic capacity of French hip-hop fans, too, often contributes to widen the gap between French and US rappers. Gomis (1998) for Columbia Sony observed, “if you go to a concert of a US rap group in Paris, [...] sometimes [French young spectators] are insulted by the group on the stage, but they don’t even understand and applaud, instead. US rappers have an irrespectful attitude”.

Secondly, the quota mediated identification of the French hip-hop scene as one that has been as important a source of its transnational development as the USA. “In France,” LBR (1998) argued, “there are many people who know the history of hip-hop just like Americans, as we have always followed it since its beginning”. Azoulay (1998), a domestic A&R of Polygram’s Polydor label, observed:

Two axes exist between New York and Paris. It’s certain. These two cities are very rich regarding hip-hop. In the beginning of rap, there was a lot of talk about ‘nation’ and all that [as in the ‘zulu nation’ or the ‘hip-hop nation’]. It’s true that Paris and New York are the axes. The connection goes as far back as in 1988 when Akhenaton [of IAM] sang with MC Choice. The first time we heard Akhenaton on the record was in an American record called ‘This is the B-Side’.


Despite the pronounced connection with the US scene, these collaborations aim almost exclusively at the French market. The Franco-American collaborations, as it turned out, materialised as a result of two underlying strategies in the increasingly francophone dominant hip-hop market in France. First of all, Franco-American collaboration facilitates US rappers introducing themselves into the French hip-hop scene. Partnership with a French rapper enables a US rapper to “introduce oneself more, in a more impressive way, to the French market” (Chazelle 1998). Participation in a French title also facilitates a US rapper being programmed on the radio more easily because the song is considered as francophone. “Americans,” argued LBR (1998), “have understood something in looking at France”.

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Before, [US rappers] had plan dicta, saying “we want this and we want that”. [...]. They began taking one thing into account: Public Enemy had sold 100,000 copies of *Fears of the Black Planet* album in France [released in 1990], whereas, today, MC Solaar’s last album sold 900,000 or almost 1,000,000. Guys like IAM sold almost 700,000 and Doc Gynéco, 600,000. That is, French artists make six times as large sales as them. So since then, [US rappers] began to say, “what should be done to enter the French market?” [...]. They have understood that it is indispensable to have connection with French artists. Similarly, they began considering us almost as part of their family. Because, before, they really took us as a joke, and sometimes it is still the same, but in general, today, they want to join our radio shows like Radio Nova.

Marketing of US rap artists in the French market involves, as in Japan, a significant degree of localisation and, in France, too, Public Enemy may be talking a different fight.

The other motivation behind Franco-Americans collaboration is that performing with an established US figure legitimises French artists’ hip-hop authenticity. Chazelle (1998) for Shaman pointed out:

> In general, it happens with a French artist who is obtaining certain popularity, who, so, sings with an American artist. Well, it’s nice, in that for the French artist to establish popularity, you see, if there are already good media images among the audience, it does nothing but solidify the establishment: in one go, the artist becomes more credible. Because it is credible to sing with an American big name.

The expansion of rap market in France, and subsequent recognition of its importance by US artists, circumscribes a space differently from *variétés* and *chançon* genres, in which French rappers can be displayed and associated with US counterparts and legitimised as ‘authentic’. She continued, “like in any other places, the States is the reference in France. You see, being ‘big’ represents the power and all that, it must be the same in Japan, even if it’s a fake. Everyone knows it’s a fake but... It’s a kind of ideal dream, which is stupid, but...”. There is a complicit relationship between US and French artists that conjures the ‘USA’, a product of its denigration of French *variétés* and the obsolete music industries structured to produce them. The quota, despite its expected effect to undermine anglophone domination in French popular music, mediates and even further reproduces the division between francophone-friendly, périphérique stations, that have been in decline in the advertisement market for consecutive years since 1996 (Bouton 1998), and the youth FM networks, that, instead of Anglo-American rock and pop, managed to materialised the ‘imagined USA’ as a daily reality, much like the transnational megastore chains in Japan, with the rapid expansion of local rap.

The acceptance by the youth FM networks or collaboration with US rappers, nonetheless, does not simply mean an incontestable success for a French rapper. Even though the rap and hip-hop market in France has expanded, *variétés* and (Anglo-American) pop/rock still dominate the French market in terms of radio airplay. Ipsos (1998) reveals that, of all the musics diffused on its 28 panel stations in 1997, French *variétés* shared 33%; pop/rock 27% (of which French rock 4% and pop 3%); dance 10%; soul 8%; rap 8%; slow 4%; funk 3%; and others (23). Only a limited number of established French rappers are accepted to the national networks. It is also the same limited number of artists
who are eligible to collaborate with US rappers, given all the efforts required to communicate with the USA to arrange it. LBR (1998) for Delabel suggested:

Often [a collaboration is arranged] by labels, because it's too difficult to join managers in the States that, most of the time, arranging within a same label is much easier to manage than going and getting an authorisation from another label for using an American rapper. Moreover, to contact other labels is wearing and tiresome. It would benefit rivals as well.

So....

A Franco-American collaboration is, as some insiders pointed out, all marketing and little to do with artistic concerns. It does not always impress an audience, and an artistic or economic ego can sometimes ruin the whole project, resulting in US names vainly credited on record sleeves. This is to say that the francophone song quota not only structurally divides French VARIÉTÉS on the generalist périphérique stations and Franco-American rap on the youth FM networks, but also, within French rap, divides 'commercial' rap through big FM stations and 'underground' rap based in smaller, local FM stations. In what follows, I would like to examine how these both cultural and structural divisions and subdivisions are internalised and structured in the recording industry, reconstituting a historical narrative of French hip-hop partially outlined in Part II. In particular, I consider the oppositions among so-called 'le rap cool (cool rap)' represented among others by MC Solaar, Menelik and Soon E MC; 'le rap hardcore (hardcore rap)' represented among others by Assassin, Mafia Underground, Ministère A.M.E.R. and Suprême NTM; and finally 'variétés rap (sell-out rap)' particularly around artists such as Alliance Ethnik, Doc Gynéco and Stormy Bugsy.

Where's Hip-hop?

Instituting Hip-hop Market and Internalising Conflict.

Once its first boom, brought about by Sidney's televised Hip-Hop show on TF 1, had rapidly gone out of fashion, for a moment, hip-hop was not quite discernible once outside a particular milieu. “It took quite a long time,” Gomis (1998) for Columbia Sony observed, “and there wasn’t a big distinction [of rap music]. People were initiated to it and began talking about it, many things were based on the US model”. The negligence, seen today, is often associated with cultural and social particularity of France. Chazelle (1998) for Shaman argued, “in the 80s, all the influences of American rap that disembarked in France were not the same thing. It think that it was not experienced in the same way”. Malherbe (1998) for Chrysalis described the difference between the USA and France in terms of marketing and promotion of hip-hop as follows:

Simply that the fan base [in the USA].... There are 100 times as many ghettos in the States and 100 times as many blacks in the States who listen to this music. So you can produce a record that stay in the street, purely on hip-hop principle – which allows some artists to sell, whatever happens, 200 to 300,000 albums without a crossover.

Even the US rappers were not as exposed as today. As many suggested, there was a total media ignorance of hip-hop: television and radio considered rap was finished and the rock press “spitted on hip-hop” (Sear 1998) in the latter half of the 1980s.

Hip-hop production at the time suffered from what Azoulay (1998) for Polydor called “heavy obscuration – the only alternative for hip-hop to develop was to go underground where things didn't
go though the normal circuit of distribution”. It was centred on live performances in nightclubs, rap programmes on small radio and a handful of private releases of 12-inch singles, and only tagging and graffiti interfered in the mainstream Parisian landscape. Sear (1998) for Get Busy recollected as follows:

There was a handful of, I would say, les purs et durs (the hard-liners) that remained and still clung to [hip-hop] in underground, be it the wasteland in [the Place de Stalingrad], where there was all the graffities and where Dee Nasty put his turntables outdoors and all that. The police came around, etc. [...]. It was really the place where there were the hard-liners. And then, it spread up in Paris with tagging and graffiti. Graffiti was everywhere and the media was interested in it once again and in fact they found out that these were the same kids that had smurfed and breaked in 1984.

Hip-hop’s presence and identity were shaped rather through the denigration of the mainstream sensational media. It is misleading, however, to assume these ‘underground’ activities, thus understood, were autonomous from the capitalist, consumer social space with which mainstream France is often characterised. It is, on the contrary, this invisibility and ignorance that Parisian ‘hard-liners’ wanted to overcome and for that, they took more or less concerted, organised actions.

Already, in 1986, the first hip-hop shop, Ticaret, was opened in Stalingrad, just beside the wasteland where DJ Dee Nasty held ‘underground’ parties which served as an important hub of the emergent hip-hop scene in Paris. In the beginning, Ticaret, according to its manager, Fourneuf (1998), who was also a breakdancer at the time, “dealt with women’s dresses, for elderly women, and it didn’t really work because I’m black and all that”.

After six months, almost a year, I asked my associate in New York to find me a belt with a nameplate buckle. [...]. I still liked dealing with women’s dresses, but I did [the belt] for breakers. I told them that I had it, and within three days, a Swiss and a Belgian phoned me to buy it. Then I said to myself, “gee, it’s only three days and I got one call from Belgium and another from Switzerland. It works. A conversion: from now on, I’ll go for hip-hop”. Once I decided to do hip-hop, everyone supported me. Because of this, Ticaret was a phenomenon.

Ticaret, as he proudly called it, “was a mailbox for hip-hop”. “Americans, Italians or Germans,” he continued, “once they have something, they left it in our shop, even some messages, graffiti sketches.... Guys in Paris, who didn’t live at home, who didn’t have a job, for once they had something to do, they’d say, ‘I dunno, shall we meet up at Ticaret?’ So, in fact, everything happened here. It was here...”.

It is true that the recording companies paid little attention to French rap until around 1990 or, if they ever did, they did so only on a short-term basis. The first potentially long-term contract was signed between a rapper Lionel D and Squatt, Sony’s sub-label, in 1990, but the result was rather disastrous, in that the label considered rap as a passing fad and tried to forge him into a disfigured, mock imagery of Public Enemy, what Bazin (1995) calls “the star system” (64) in France that favours the erasure of hip-hop’s spirit. Lionel D (in Bocquet and Pierre-Adolphe 1996) recollected:

I didn’t have the look, no baseball cap, I did not want to disguise myself. The managers told me, “dress you up a little more rapper!”. Basketball shoes, a belt with my name, an
alarm clock, gold chain, for the telly, photos.... Me, I didn't want it and it raised some
tensions. [...] The product manager called me saying, "behave like an artist...". The
managers at the time were like, "you're not grateful, you're not happy with what we have
done for you at all". (93-4)

In his unfortunate case, Lionel D, who is often referred to as a victim of the major labels' commercial
politics, was withdrawn shortly (see Bocquet and Pierre-Adolphe 1996; Boucher 1998). Sulee B. Wax,
who abandoned a recording contract with Polygram as a member of les Little MCs for independent
Payback Recordz that he launched with other members of la Mafia Underground, spoke of his
experience with major labels as follows:

[Recording companies] need to take risks, they have to take risks, because we're in France
and by habit you get all this bad taste they have and it's always shitty. [...] [Most of the
major companies] don't really know [hip-hop culture]. They sign easy ones. They never
try to.... At times, I was told, "Sulee, it's really great the music you do. It's superb, but
your artists are too underground, too rap!" I said to myself, "is he mad?" Frankly, "it's
too rap," well, they rap, don't they? You hear things like this.

Despite his insistence, few of the major companies dared to take risks and the few major rap releases
around 1990 were, like Lionel D, either infantile exploitation of les zoulou as a fashionable fad or
deceptive mockery of banlieue youths, such as ‘Mais Vous êtes Fou (But You Are Mad)' (1990) by
Benny B or 'Y'en a Marre du Rap (Fed Up With Rap)' (1992) by a comic group les Inconnus (see Prévos
1996, 714).

Hip-hop tended to be defined against this persistent VARIÉTÉS star-system for which the entire
music industries were thought to be structured. SACEM, the world's first musical author's rights
institution, was one of the establishments frequently challenged by the emergent hip-hop scene, for
being little adapted to their culture. Loïc Dury (Bocquet and Pierre-Adolphe 1996), one of the
founders of Roger Boîte Funk, the Friday night hip-hop party at le Globo, Paris, in the late-80s,
commented:

We managed not to pay to things like SACEM [for exploiting records in the party],
because we made ourselves recognised as a club d'Art et d'Essai [of experimental art].
[....] We didn't want to pay because we only played imported US 12-inches, and we knew
that if we paid the fees, the money would be transferred to Johnny Hallyday or Charles
Aznavour, because, after all, the fees that aren't attributed to anyone are returned to the
best-selling artists. (60)

Hip-hop DJing was simplistically considered as copying and stealing of existing recordings for a long
time, even if, for some French rappers, it is rather French VARIÉTÉS that has “this tradition of
plagiarism: in the 70s or in the 60s, Claude François emerged with songs from the USA, changed lyrics
and he just sold them on his name” (Guyot 1998). Certainly, the manual juxtaposition and digital
sampling that characterise hip-hop composition invites a set of polemics and conflicts with author's
rights/copyright system elsewhere, as in the USA or in Japan as we have seen. Yet, here, SACEM,
despite its tradition, was seen as the world's oldest, most obsolete and least up-to-date structure in the
service of French VARIÉTÉS.
"France is of this ancient mentality," contested Sulee B. Wax (1998). "It's old. It's about people clinging to their values, it's incredible". For Kponton (1998) for Chronowax, such conservatism is understood as the structural obsolescence of music industries — "France is a country in which you have plenty of barriers". He continued:

The French recording industry is quite old concerning the people who have power. France, on cultural, musical level, is quite poor. I think you'd notice it regarding other countries, even smaller ones like Sweden or Holland. Anyway, culturally, it's very poor — ten years ago, if you had come to France and listened to music in France.... It was mad. It was far behind. It has always been behind. Because the industry is controlled by the ancient show-biz heads. So, for us, it's really been a war. They were extremely behind. It's clear.

Many A&Rs and marketing or promotion staff in the major labels I interviewed, regardless of their dealing with international or domestic catalogues, admitted the lack of flexibility and the presence of a certain 'generalist culture' in their working environment. "We don't have a means to reach people with a varied taste," Malherbe (1998) for EMI's Chrysalis label argued. "If we employ five people for each musical taste, then the company becomes too heavy". Instead, they either launch small sub-labels or contract independent producers for promotion and/or distribution. In a general tendency, since the 1980s, the majors "don't even need to control indies, because they are market researchers and the cultural laboratory of the majors, totally financed by them" (Grenfeld 1998).

The release in 1990 of the first compilation album of French rap, Rapattitude, from Label Noir (future Delabel), a sub-label of Virgin France, was a good example of the sub-label strategy. Emmanuel De Burtel, then a music publisher, future founder of Delabel and today's PDG (président-directeur général: chairman and managing director) of Virgin France, who negotiated with Virgin France to sign and finance the project, in the end, managed to carve out a little space in the major labels for hip-hop. Despite a few oppositions — the executives of Virgin France could not see its saleability and SACEM refused to register the compiled artists as songwriters and/or composers — Rapattitude was released on the 27 May 1990. It was not an instant success either: it took more than two years before it attained gold, i.e. the sales of 100,000 copies, and its sales owed not to rappers, but largely to reggae/ragga artists compiled together, such as Ton Ton David and Sâî Sâî (Bocquet and Pierre-Adolphe 1996, 101). Yet, as LBR (1998) for Delabel commented on his label:

[De Burtel] has a heart, even before Delabel, he had his own publishing company and he created the label, Delabel, because he intended to develop new musics. [...] He wanted to sign all new tendencies of music, whether rock, rap, techno, anything, so that it would be a laboratory, a music laboratory. [...] He adopted this policy so that we're as close to artists as possible, distribute as well and rapidly as possible, sign an artist as closely and rapidly as possible. A major label like Virgin can't go down in the street, in nightclubs and all that. That's why we have Delabel, [...] it's to say that we're close to the street.

Malherbe (1998) for Chrysalis argued, "before, there were very few [labels interested in French rap]. In the beginning, it was really a headache, but there are two or three majors, of which one, Virgin with Delabel, it was the first major that gave a real chance to French rappers to release a record".
Given the mainstream and/or intellectual acceptance of world music in France (see Part II), it is hardly surprising that Rapattitude sold because of reggae/tagga that is more often categorised as world music in France than explicitly urban and industrial hip-hop and rap. In this light, it is also not very surprising that some of the first French rappers that attained notoriety outside the initiated hip-hop circle were those associated with world music rhetoric, such as Marseillais IAM, Occitan Fabulous Trobadors or Senegalese descendant MC Solaar, whose 'Bouges De Là' (1990) became the first French rap that was played on one of the youth rock FM stations, NRJ (and Skyrock was the last youth network to programme it). Certainly, Solaar's commercial success invited others to criticise his music as mainstream assimilation, yet it is equally true that, as we have seen in Part II, some 'underground' artists were also signed by major labels and released their albums around the same time, while insisting on their banlieue origin. It is only then that the division between 'cool' rap and 'hardcore' rap became salient in France, and French rap gradually attained its position in the recording industry. "As time goes by," Gomis (1998) for Columbia Sony suggested, "because there are some that become real artists from that initiation, artists that obtain their proper personality and begin talking about things that concern us in France". Thus, as in Japan, it is reasonable to understand that there is more than one hip-hop in France disposed to different strategies of distinction and different networks through which to construct and define their meanings and values.

Be Black, and Sell-Out

Although MC Solaar is considered today as “an artist for the masses” (Azoulay 1998), as his A&R for Polydor put it, it certainly fails to do justice to the history of French rap to simply denounce him and his 501 posse as a ‘sell-out’. So-called ‘cool’ rap and ‘hardcore’ rap are, as much literature of the time suggested, two halves of the one entity. Namely, as Dee Nasty (1991: quoted in Bazin 1995) pointed out, “soft rap legitimises hardcore rap, and vice versa” (252). What is important is that the French hip-hop scene gradually attains its own autonomy through this opposition, so much so that its authenticity becomes judged with logic internal to its own field. If ‘hardcore’ rappers, such as NTM, Assassin or Ministère A.M.E.R. seek to autonomise their art as uncompromising objection against the social injustice in certain disadvantaged banlieues, which are more or less associated with imageries of US ghettos (despite a large observed gap in reality (see Wacquant 1998)), ‘cool’ rappers, such as MC Solaar, Soon E MC and Menelik, aspire to an intellectual distinction in appropriating the legitimised arts of jazz and chanson, negritude literature, afro-centralism and world music to show that black people in France are not simply “destroyers with a ghetto blaster” (Solaar 1999, 13). Unlike most of the ‘hardcore’ rappers, MC Solaar is not only from the Parisian banlieue (he came to France, to Saint-Denis, at the age of 4, then moved to a housing estate for civil service employees in Evry and then to Villeneuve-Saint-Georges), but also from a university milieu – a student of Université Paris VII and Charles V English Institute and frequenting Université Paris VIII – Université de Saint-Denis – where a philosopher and urban ethnographer, Georges Lapassade, opened the campus for hip-hop artists and inaugurated a course unit on hip-hop for DEUG (diplôme d’études universitaires générales: university diploma taken for two years’ study) in communication science in 1989. Lapassade recollected, “others, we had to urge them to read French poets. The West Indians did not know Césaire…. I was convinced that Solaar or Menelik read Césaire, Villon, Ronsard or Valéry attentively, as Brassens” (in Bocquet

MC Solaar is quite conscious of his choice of musical composition and message. According to his original DJ, Jimmy Jay (Bocquet and Pierre-Adolphe 1996, 112), it was rather because they were fed up with the stereotyped hardness of rap at the time that they began the project which “was cooler” (112). Solaar is also concerned with a black universalism in bringing forward his black African origin: his parents are from Chad; he was born in Dakar, Senegal; and brought up in Cairo before moving to France. Unlike hardcore rappers that tend to prefer their images to be associated with banlieues, Solaar’s media images are often connected to his acceptance in foreign countries, particularly those in Africa. Lapassade took Solaar, Menelik and other French rappers to Italy for an Italian television station, RAI 3 in 1990. Solaar’s interview in 1993 with Desse (Desse and SBG 1993) depicts his African tour in 1992, as well as his lively and spontaneous experiences in Russia, Poland, Senegal or Guinea-Bissau (105-8). He is also the most widely known French rapper in the world: American rapper Guru, of Gang Starr, collaborated with Solaar for his Jazzmattaa (1993) album. British producer Giles Peterson released Solaar’s first two albums, Qui Sème le Vent Recolte le Tempo (1992) and Prose Combat (1994) on the anglophone markets on his Talkin’ Izud label. In a recent interview with a French hip-hop magazine, Radikal, Solaar (1999) commented:

Look to your parents because, in the period of native tongue and Public Enemy, Americans searched for Africa, and us, we looked to the United States. But despite the big difference, the thing is that Africans, they are cultivated, intelligent, artists, poets, writers, rappers, painters, singers, ragamuffins and they are looking for a culture. The great memory down there is that there was a man, when I was just to take the boat, who told me, “Solaar, never forget your roots. You can do your rap, but to recharge yourself, you have to come back here”. It’s so true, you know, when you do something, you always have to recharge yourself somewhere. One may recharge oneself in a banlieue, one always looks for a sort of authenticity, like “I represent something,” but to have a real reality of life [...] one must look to one’s parents. Africans are strong for that. (14)

It is fairly certain that MC Solaar, as Bazin (1995) argues, “is not a salvage dealer. [...] He has chosen to make those who do not like rap like it” (254).

Sear for Get Busy, however, considers Solaar as “a swindle” (in Desse and SBG 1993, 136). He claims that afro-centrism in France is nothing but a fashion: “in the States, I can understand. They are so much in the shit, but it’s just a gadget. Already, their version of Islam is Westernised” (135). He continued:

What Blacks live through here is not the same thing as down there, but they consider themselves as leaders [in French hip-hop]. In fact, they are only doing a photocopy of a trick that is readily very dodgy in the States.... It’s a phenomenon of the banlieues. [...] Even from a musical point of view, those who listen to funk, soul in the banlieues are the Arabs. When Blacks disembarked here, there was plenty of West Indian music. I’m not accusing them, but nightclubs in Paris, le Pacific or l’Emeraude, where we listened to jazz, Barry White, soul, were full of cailleras reubeux [caillera is an inverted slang of racaille, or scum, and reubeux derives from beur, or the Arab]. (136)
Guyot (1998), a young white rapper I encountered, observed similarly that, “in the USA, there are racial ghettos. It’s blacks that created this movement and this music. [...]. In France, there’s a general identification of lower social class with hip-hop phenomenon, even if many blacks listen to it in France”. He hesitantly alerted that the black predominance in French rap might be a “counter-racism”. The problem, as he put it, is that he cannot get around with it nor implicate it in his own rap lyrics – “I’m in this domain and I have many black friends. Often I tell them that they have prejudice against whites, and they don’t want to admit it. Well, at least I think they don’t want to”.

It is certain that, the US hip-hop scene, with its black nationalism or its revolt of post-industrial ghetto hardship, has been an important source of hip-hop legitimacy in France. Yet, in the process of localisation, (American) black nationalism seems peculiarly translated as a kind of assimilation to the French republicanism and (ex-) colonial paternalism, whereas the banlieue hardship, dissimulation. That is, as Malherbe (1998) for Chrysalis suggested:

It’s not to say that [rappers like MC Solaar or Menelik] do not come from the same cité [housing estate] or same ghetto. Simply they decided to, maybe because they don’t have the same integrity or they don’t want to remain in the street, and they said to themselves that they have to make a crossover to get out of the street. And you’ve got other artists that come from the same ghetto and they remain hip-hop. That’s what counts.

In 1998, MC Solaar was selected as a member of the jury of the Cannes film festival, which invited very harsh criticism from the underground hip-hop community. Many disputed the fact that, unlike groups like Assassin, IAM, la Cliqua, les Sages Poete de la Rue, Ministère A.M.E.R or la Mafia Underground that have collaborated with French films such as La Haine (Hatred) by Mathieu Kassovitz (1995), Ma 6-T Va Crack-er (My Hood’s gonna Crack) by Jean-François Richet (1997) or Taxi by Gérard Pires (1998), Solaar had done very little in film production, hence his inadequacy as a jury member. Kponton (1998) for Chronowax argued that Solaar was elected because “he’s such a perfect figure to show off republican integration in an important international affair like the Cannes,” because, as he cynically put it, “he’s so completely black and capable of handling the French language sophisticatedly for his rhyming more than an average French person”.

The opposition of ‘cool’ rap and ‘hardcore’ rap, of two visions of the social reality, of two dispositions to and from the disadvantaged banlieues and the legitimised French cultural heritage, generates mutually exclusive strategies for their linguistic and sonic texture, gender role, commodity format, and geopolitics with which to circumscribe their territories. On the linguistic level, there are opposed dispositions between ‘the sophisticated French language’ and ‘street expression’. Azoulay (1998) for Polydor who directed MC Solaar argued:

I think in France, a French rap really exists that is independent from the US rap [...]. The French language sounded wrong in soul and all that, but in rap, it brings in something because of the richness of the language and, in one blow, it allows to practise. I think the real difference of French rap which would differentiate it from Anglophone rap or any other European rap is the richness of the language, and by the same token, the capacity of playing with it because it is a little bit like that – rap is a word-game.

It draws a sharp contrast with Sulee B. Wax’s (1998) claim quoted earlier that ‘French rap does not
exist'. Namely, as he argued, "all we want to do is rap, à l'américaine, but, as we're French, we do it in French". Stylistic appropriation of phrases such as 'yo', 'cheque ça (check it)', 'nigga' or 'un, deux (one, two)' is important to "be recognised that we're hip-hop" (Sulee B. Wax). It certainly is not limited to that. Gomis (1998) for Columbia Sony suggested:

There's NTM that emerged from Saint-Denis [a northern banlieue of Paris] and who used the word, Nique Ta Mère – fuck your mother. It's a kind of expression people in the street still use, and they understand it immediately. It's a group from 93, Seine-Saint-Denis [93 is the administrative code of Seine-Saint-Denis department]. So, there you have it, they're proud of their banlieusard [suburbanite] origin, [...].

LBR (1998) for Delabel argued that, "on a linguistic level, we have our own language, our own slang like Americans, our own way of speaking and it is these that we have to defend". It is not simply about American phrasing and accent, but more importantly about speaking from and for the banlieues. When Ascoli (in Bocquet and Pierre-Adolphe 1996, 113), then Polydor's A&R, signed MC Solaar, it was because the other artist he proposed, NTM, was immediately rejected by the management once they understood that NTM stood for Nique Ta Mère (NTM also signifies le Nord Transmet le Message, or the north transmits message, with 'the north' indicating the department of Seine-Saint-Denis).

The opposition between 'cool' and 'hardcore' networks of hip-hop has a gender implication. Whereas 'cool' rappers are expected to be listened to by both sexes and a wider range of age, 'hardcore' fans are often envisaged to be 15-25 age group males. It is also clearly observable that, within the hip-hop milieu, the wider the market appeal of an artist, the greater the likelihood that there are female members of staff in production. Namely, in my research, the more I got down to the 'underground' labels and the 'specialised' media, the less I came across female professionals, apart from secretaries and other occasional exceptions. Guyot (1998) argued that, in terms of artist, "there aren't many interesting female rappers in France yet" because "there isn't any competition among female rappers," but "there are more and more girls who appreciate hip-hop today" because "[hip-hop] conveys something of a man that girls appreciate: combat, courage, frankness". Gomis (1998) for Columbia Sony suggested:

[Working as a woman] is hard. It's hard in general, but especially in the hip-hop milieu, which I think is quite macho and often people are very close-minded. People who do hip-hop listen to nothing but hip-hop and few listen to other things. I find it a real pity, I find that music has good things in its all styles. But when it's a woman and if she wants to propose new, different ideas, it's sometimes more difficult, because they assume that a woman is perhaps more sentimental, sometimes more starry-eyed about certain things. She argued, "I think we can talk as women without taking part in hardcore, gangsta and all that. We can talk like women, for women. We can tell a story about a woman, and doing so, we can attract men".

The problem, however, is that she has not yet encountered any artist adequately able to exploit that side of rap. As many argued, female participants in hip-hop are liable either to abandon their femininity or to submit to males as femmes objets.

Another line that divides 'cool' and 'hardcore' rap is the record format, and its trajectories in the social space, i.e. the distribution of CD format in high-street megastores and 12-inch analogue format.
in specialised shops. The major labels, particularly those dedicated to artists with large audiences, consider analogue 12-inch singles no more than a promotional means and are not very willing to manufacture them for commercial exploitation. It is as cultural a consideration as it is economic and institutional. Economically, "apart from specialists who are active in the scene, there aren't many people who have a turntable. Most people have CDs today" (Gomis 1998). Institutionally, a complicated procedure required before manufacturing and distributing sound recording disfavours commercial exploitation of the vinyl format in France. Before duplicating cassettes, vinyls or CDs, artists or DJs automatically need to be members of SACEM. That is, to duplicate recorded music, they need an authorisation from SDRM (Société des Droits de Reproduction Mécaniques: Society for Mechanical Reproduction Rights) that asks SACEM if all the rights are cleared. The institutionalised surveillance of record manufacture by SACEM and SDRM obliges clearance of author's rights fees, whereas such fees can be much smaller or even reduced to zero if declared as 'promotional samples, forbidden from public retail' (Nicola 1998). Not surprisingly, few manufacturers found it reasonable to go to the bother of an extra procedure to package vinyls for its very restricted market that buys only 1 to 2,000 copies. At best, a vinyl would be released only after the CD confirms the success.

On the 'street' side, however, as Grenfeld (1998) for XIII bis Records pointed out, "vinyl is linked to social practices that are about parties and DJs. As soon as hip-hop fans get further into listening to and making hip-hop, vinyl is necessary". Independent labels and distributors observed that "today, there really is an explosion of young DJs, who buy only specific records, like breakbeat samplers and battle beats, who love everything related to DJing, DJ culture and all that" (Kponton 1998). Unlike CDs, vinyls are used by DJs as an instrument for collective experience, for their parties or mix-tapes that circulate through less legitimate, 'street' media. Mix-tapes were also claimed by many street DJs to be an important means of promotion, for fans to get the sense of the latest musical trend, and enlightenment, for amateur DJs to acquire technique. The structural incompatibility and the lesser tolerance in the guise of economic transparency and governmental surveillance of cultural production in France displace its rappers and DJs beyond the national boundary. According to an insider:

In New York, there is a supportive base for mix-tapes.... It's illegal but, despite that people say they will slow down the sales of the records used, they don't disappear, they are a very important means of promotion.... But in France, normally, licensees pay authorisation fees for all the music used.

A DJ, by the name of Freddy France (1998), told me that some even press vinyls abroad in order to dodge the SACEM/SDRM schemes. There are many mix-tapes by credited 'street' DJs such as DJ Dee Nasty, DJ Cut Killer or DJ Poska, but 'cool' rappers and DJs are very absent in this landscape.

Black nationalism fails to circumscribe the hip-hop community in France, while hardcore hip-hop is inscribed geographically to challenge the French mainstream culture as in the multi-ethnic banlieue alliance of NTM, Assassin or Ministère A.M.E.R. The issue of nationalism and geopolitics in French hip-hop became all the more acute in the mid-1990s as it became menaced by another form of nationalism: Front National. The explicitly anti-immigration Pasqua law legislated in 1993 that authorised the national riot police to check the paper of coloured people at random. Popular xenophobia increased as in the (in)famous 'cry' of Brigitte Bardot (1996) on Le Figaro. In 1995, the
then Minister of Interior Jean-Louis Debré lodged a complaint against Ministère A.M.E.R.'s 'Sacrifice de Poulets (poulet is a slang for police officer)' in the soundtrack of Kassovitz's film, La Haine. In 1996, NTM was sentenced to three month of prison, 50,000FF in fines and was banned from exercising their profession for "verbal defamation of representatives of the state" at SOS Racisme's free concert held in Seyne-sur-Mar, Var, in protest of the elected FN mayor of the city the year before. In 1997, Jean-François Richet's film about youths in the banlieues, Ma 6-T Va Crack-er (1997), was withdrawn by the distributor on account of trouble-making clients and violent contents. While MC Solaar became "a black artist who works in France, who enters top 50, the only one, for many years since Henri Salvador" (Ascoli in Bocquet and Pierre-Adolphe 1996, 113) and sold almost a million copies of his second album, Prose Combat (1994), containing 'Le Nouveau Western' based on a looped sample of Serge Gainsbourg's 'Bonny & Clyde' (1968), NTM's controversial third album, Paris Sous Les Bombes (Paris Under the Bombs: 1995), sold 500,000 copies despite media censorship on the single, 'Qu'est-ce Qu'on Attend (Pour Foutre le Feu) (What Are We Waiting For (To Start the Fire))' (the title is a parody reference to the song, 'Qu'est-ce Qu'on Attend (Pour Etre Heureux) (What Are We Waiting For (To Be Happy))', by a chanson singer, Charles Trenet). 'Hardcore' rappers took a position, decisively in France, against both mainstream France and their immigrant parental homeland. Sulee B. Wax (1998) argued that, "if you want to do French rap, you need to erase all that is James Brown, all the American heritage – the beat, the sounds, the samples – and instead you take Edith Piaf and all that" and "when we make music, when we write lyrics, we don't say that we're in Paris. We say that we're in Vitry-sur-Seine [a southern banlieue of Paris] and Vitry-sur-Seine is a New York banlieue". They take their position in their banlieues and in the dislocated imageries of the US ghetto, but not in Paris.

Alliance (Ethnik) that Divides...

In 1995, Alliance Ethnik sold one million copies of their first single, 'Simple & Funky' (1995), becoming "an European phenomenon" and "the first dance-floor hit of rap" as De Burtel, PDG of Virgin France, put it (in Bocquet and Pierre-Adolphe 1996, 163). As the name suggests, the group, Alliance Ethnik, unites five members of different ethnic origins: K-Mel, rapper, is of Kabyle origin, Méder, rapper, is of Congolese origin, Fast Jay, DJ, is of Jewish origin, Gutsi, DJ, is of Italian origin and Crazy B, DJ, of French origin. Unlike 'cool' rappers, they are all from the 'hardcore' milieu. Fast Jay collaborated with artists who appeared in Rapattitude album such as Saliha and New Generation MC. Crazy B participated in the production of Rapsonic, a group known today as Raggasonic. The recognition of the group in the underground scene and its celebration of multi-ethnic banlieue alliance are in one way a positive manifestation of French 'hardcore' hip-hop ideology. Yet, on the other hand, their commercial success gave rise to a new sense of competition, a new set of strategies with which to define hip-hop's 'street' legitimacy.

One of the obvious consequences of the commercial appeal of 'hardcore' rap is its sudden acceptance into the nationwide mass media and the major recording companies' rush to sign French rap acts. The implementation in 1996 of the aforementioned francophone song quota law did nothing but fan the flames. Simply in terms of the number of record releases, as compiled by Bocquet and Pierre-Adolphe (1999, 239-251), there were nine full albums, three compilations and nine singles of French rap in 1994, as opposed to 52 full albums, 14 compilations and 40 singles in 1996. In terms of
sales, *Première Consultation* (First Consultation: 1996), the first solo album of Doc Gynéco, an offspring of controversial Ministère A.M.E.R., achieved the sales of 600,000 copies and IAM attained the same level with their *L'Ecole du Micro d'Argent* (The School of the Silver Microphone: 1997), followed by solo careers of the two original rappers of Ministère A.M.E.R., Stormy Bugsy in 1996 and Passi in 1997. Gomis (1998) explained the marketing strategy for Stormy Bugsy as follows:

He's a kind of comedian, Stormy Bugsy. He has a very flashy side. So, we tried to differentiate him a little bit and explain and present his personality to many people. The hip-hop scene knows him, but the mass audience much less, so the hip-hop scene knows him as Stormy Bugsy, a member of Ministère A.M.E.R., but here, his solo album is his own interpretation of his personality. So, we may well differentiate things. It's for this reason that we have chosen an option like this, in presenting him in an evening suit.

Many other corporations new to hip-hop culture began investing in rappers as fashion leaders, as they began appearing on the radio, television, fashion magazines, films, etc. Stormy Bugsy, after a period of adjustment, became the 'prince des lascars (prince of devils)' or 'gangsta d'amour (gangsta of love)'.

For the 'hardcore' community, the sudden commercial interest in hip-hop appears as nothing more than an uncomfortable and menacing exploitation of their culture. Mande (1998) for Payback Recordz denounced Stormy Bugsy's commercial incorporation as follows:

The major companies invest in the promotion of their artists in such a way that people like them in the end. For example, Stormy Bugsy didn't work at all in the beginning. His label made a video, it didn't work – and a video costs 600,000FF. Second video didn't work... the third.... Once it worked eventually and they pushed and pushed, they spent and spent until it works. The album he did, the label re-recorded it the entire thing and re-mixed it, and re-mastered it. So that it works more.... That's what the majors do.

The majors are also accused for censoring hip-hop's raw creativity and for imposing marketing constraints on artists so that the song is favoured on the radio, on television and other mass media. Mande continued:

After the parade of legal proceedings [like the cases of NTM and Ministère A.M.E.R.], there is censorship, auto-censorship. The majors habitually try to avoid disturbance and say, "we have to trim these words so that it's less aggressive," etc. [...] I wouldn't say, "well radio stations will like it or not, the audience will like it or don't like it". I just let my artists do what they want.

Censorship divides hip-hop into the commercial, sell-out VARIÉTÉS rap and the uncompromising, underground and street hip-hop, which seems to be translated also into spatial terms.

"[Street identities] are completely cliché," argued Gomis (1998) for Columbia Sony who managed Stormy Bugsy. "There are people from the street who become lawyers, who become rappers, actually" and today, "it could be simultaneously bourgeois kids in the 16th arrondissement [of Paris] and kids in Saint-Denis who listen to the same thing, just because they have access to them, in listening to the radio or watching television, etc". If some A&Rs and marketing directors replace banlieue identity with a more widely applicable youth – 'kids' – market vocabulary and expect banlieue to be little more than a fashionable and symbolic alibi of hip-hop authenticity, others feel...
urged “to say to ourselves each time that hip-hop is a music principally for those who live in the *banlieues*, in *cités*. It may sound a cliché, but it still is so, in reality” (Mande 1998). Chazelle (1998) for Shaman argued that “at a given moment, [some commercially successful rappers] become incapable of saying anything, because they only say, ‘rap, it’s rap and it’s rap, rap’”. She continued:

It’s a kind of attitude, it’s about clothes and, you know, it’s a fashion, really. But, above all, all these clothing advertisements, I don’t know, it’s for girls to wear a pair of basketball shoes with 10-centimetre heels. It’s ridiculous. Frankly, basketball shoes with heels, what does it mean? It’s a fashion....

There was a manifest confusion of hip-hop’s symbolic order during the period of my field research in France. It is true that, for many hardcore hip-hop artists, particularly rappers, who now are proud of having survived the ‘obscurity’ of the late-1980s, the situation is something that has been “dreamt of for a long time” (Sulee B. Wax 1998), while, as Sulee B. Wax continued, “now, it’s getting crazy. It’s on television, people outside [the milieu], all of them. It’s rap, rap, rap”.

As the commercialisation of *VARIÉTÉS* rap escalates in the late-1990s, ‘hardcore’ hip-hop is increasingly disposed to re-define its hip-hop legitimacy against it. In so doing, however, the professionalisation and expansion of its own territory are naturalised. Nicola (1998), a producer at Crepuscule France who worked with 2 Bal 2 Neg’s critically acclaimed album, *3 x Plus Efficace* (*3 x More efficient*: 1996), argued:

The album of 2 Bal 2 Neg, for example, is extremely authentic and it’s absolutely anti-commercial. They have small budget. You see? It’s really a product made on a shoestring. And it sounds like that, too. The mix is not perfect, the sound is a little bit obscure, etc, which makes its own charm. It’s not commercial at all. In the end, to understand it, you’ve got to be in it.

The celebrated album sold 50,000 copies – a remarkable result for an independent label. The withdrawal of the film, *Ma 6-T Va Crack-er*, as Nicola (1998) observed, “did not prevent [its soundtrack] from selling well”. It is also in 1997 that 18 rappers joined forces to release *11'30 Contre les Lois Racistes* (*11'30 against the racist laws*), from Crepuscule, selling in total 70,000 copies, of which “vinyls sold very well” (Nicola 1998). Sulee B. Wax (1998) was puzzled when I told him that some promoters in the major labels consider the fan base for hip-hop to be only 3,000, and argued, “no way. Because in the majors, people want to say rap exists thanks to the mass audience. Because they don’t want to admit that they failed to consider hip-hop interesting a couple of years ago”. His colleague, Mande (1998), quickly added, “it has to be said that in each city in France, there is a suburban project, there are HLMs and all the young people who are grown up with hip-hop”. The size of the hip-hop audience they estimated, without doing crossover, was “70,000 – it’s hip-hop. And then 80,000, 90.000, 100,000... and then it’s not hip-hop any longer” (Sulee B. Wax).

To reach them inevitably necessitates a complicit relationship with more professionalised milieus of popular music production. Malherbe (1998) for Chrysalis argued:

What’s important is to produce a record that sells with a good promotion, but there always are rappers who keep their integration [to the street] and sell well. So much the better. NTM or IAM, you know, their integrity.... I’m not talking about the fact that they
want money or not – everyone wants money, whatever one does – but the same money
can rot music. They don’t make the music for money. Busta Flex, Brother Akim, Dee-
Nasty. All these guys want to protect their hip-hop universe. It’s certain that the
explosion to the mass audience owes much to radio, but it’s not them who invented hip-
hop, never in their life. [...] We should not forget the origins.

Indeed, the youth FM networks, as we have seen, are not the inventors of French rap. Within the hip-
hop community, before 1996, Skyrock, Fun or NRJ were often referred to as tasteless. Yet it is also
from 1996 that the French hip-hop market saw the emergence of its own specialist magazines with
national circulation (Radikal and RER (standing for Rap Et Ragga) were launched in 1996 and Groove
in 1997), and numerous small boutiques and record shops in and around the Châtelet-les-Halles
district of Paris that trade mix-tapes and distribute flyers.

Specialised hip-hop departments emerged in some major labels also from this period. Beguin
(1998) for Island-Remark suggested that “hip-hop has been one of our choices for the last three or four
years to develop, among others, in our catalogues” and “we have notably two artistic directors one of
whom does nothing but hip-hop”. Virgin France launched a strictly hip-hop label, Hostile, in 1996.
Similarly, larger distributors such as PIAS, Night and Day or Musidisc, or eventually the majors, began
contracting independent hip-hop labels for distribution from around this period. For independent
labels, it is “the most subtle strategy [...] to have their products distributed by the majors [...] because
indies don’t have access to [large] record shops...” (Grenfeld 1998). Double H Productions, that has
released DJ Cut Killer’s compilation, Cut Killer Show (1997), with sales attaining 80,000 copies, began
relying on Sony’s distribution network, as they concluded that distributing more than 20,000 copies
by themselves would not be manageable. Grevery (1998) for Double H Productions explained:

We wanted to move to another level, you know, we couldn’t reach large-scale distribution
until then, you see, at a national level. [...] You know you got large retailing chains to
which major labels distribute to, like Virgin, FNAC, Nuggets, Madison and all that. This,
now, is assured by Sony because they have contacts for that. Then we take care of the
base, you see, small shops through people we know [who] have contacts with all the small
shops which Sony wouldn’t go to. So, Sony does Sony’s network and we do ours.

It is a mutual process. Almost all the staff in the independent labels I interviewed claimed their
creative autonomy and disposed a set of precautions against the majors’ intervention, such as those
concerning auto-censorship, while those in the majors expressed their desire to internalise the ‘street’,
transforming their own corporate structure quite decisively.

The same process of professionalisation seems to have brought hip-hop’s ‘street’ musical
production into confrontation with SACEM once again. On the level of majors, as Azouley (1998)
argued, “it isn’t a problem today. It’s a part of our business. All these songs are now completely
recycled. It’s good for [the original artists]”. Yet, as I argued earlier, DJing and sampling are not fully
recognised as a musical composition method, and permission is often unfavourable to rappers and
hip-hop artists. Fast Jay, Alliance Ethnik’s DJ, commented that “‘Fat Come Back’ (by Alliance Ethnik
(1999)): 100% of rights go to the original publishers (‘I.O.U.’ (1983) by Freeez for the Streetwise label
and ‘Come Into My Life’ (1987) by Joyce Sims for the Sleeping Bag label), so it’s ridiculous” (in
Nicola (1998) for Crepuscule told me that a hip-hop artist that Crepuscule publishes used a sample from a well-known song written for France Gall. They managed to obtain a "very equitable" proposition. He said they were lucky "because it had already been recorded and mastered". It is almost impracticable for a hip-hop artist to compose a song after obtaining authorisation, as it would limit his or her musical choice. Hence, sometimes, the song may not be economically viable or the artist may not be recognised as its author, as in the case of Alliance Ethnik cited above. Many A&Rs and music publishers dealing with rap titles, instead, suggested that it was only worth declaring when the material sampled was too obvious or the work realised was expected to be exposed to a large audience. An insider claimed:

For the moment, it's not a problem. Well, now, it remains to see if it is because of the underground side of the business. There are samples that are used and that are sampled from – I don't say which artist because I want to avoid problems – anyway, there are samples from well-known titles but they are so elaborated and modified that they're not recognisable.

At any rate, the insertion and institution of 'hardcore' hip-hop in the music business make underground producers increasingly sensitive to author's rights, not only because of the problems involved in sampling existing materials, but also, as they become recognised as an artist/author, because of their increasing liability to be sampled, copied or pirated.

In April 1997, SACEM finally acknowledged two new categories of author's rights holders concerning music composed with sampling: DJ remixer (DJ-remixer) and DJ producteur (DJ-producer). The former category recognises a DJ as a creator, providing s/he is a composer member of SACEM, who is entitled to receive 1/12 of the fees SACEM collects from organisers of festivals, parties and nightclubs in which s/he mixes existing recordings live. The latter, DJ-producer, recognises the registration of a musical composition in its phonographic form, i.e. as a sound recording, instead of as a transcribed graphic form, i.e. as a musical score. Obligatory transcription of recorded sound prevented many DJs from subscribing to SACEM who, unlike traditional musicians, are not necessarily familiar with musical notations. In these measures, despite SACEM’s wish to recognise the new styles of music and composition, rap music is peculiarly absent. In terms of the DJ-producer, SACEM only refers to techno, house, jungle, trip hop, ambient, trance, groove, garage, hardcore, dub, breakbeat, acid, drum’n'bass, big beat, etc – namely, all the genres and sub-genres of a similar foundation as rap, but without lyrics. In terms of DJ-remixer, DJ Cut Killer, for Double H Productions, argues:

The recognition has only been given to techno DJs so far, because there is a work of mixing and creation. Now, for so-called 'rap' DJs, musical arrangement is limited to that of scratching and the working of tempo. So far, we have not yet been contacted, not even consulted [by SACEM] concerning these measures, which is a great pity. (in Gutman and Preney 1999, 214)

Despite the similarity of the method used for mixing and composition, rap is treated as less creative, particularly regarding live mixing, than techno that is considered as a creation. Like some of the pioneer hip-hop DJs in Japan, some French hip-hop DJs, such as Dimitri From Paris and Pigale
Boombass (who produced MC Solaar), shifted from hip-hop to techno as hip-hop became ‘hardened’. It is not to say that they did so because SACEM recognises techno music, but to say that there is a certain difference in hip-hop and techno dispositions regarding intellectual and cultural legitimisation. It may also be significant that Radio Nova, the most important radio for the Parisian hip-hop scene at the end of the 1980s, gradually turned to techno in the course of the 1990s and Jack Lang, ex-Minister of Culture, who once “enthused seeing rappers and taggers” (Bourg and Sear 1998, 62), also turned to techno, in organising the Parisian Techno Parade from 1998.

The expansion of hip-hop market in France also exposed French rappers to the foreign markets, but it presupposes a set of conditions that may also be understood as a line that divides French rap and French techno. Clearly, language is a significant obstacle. Gomis (1998) for Columbia Sony who deals with DJ Cam pointed out that “DJs are lucky here, as they don’t have a problem regarding language,” whereas Azoulay (1998) for Polydor who dealt with MC Solaar argued that even though “Solaar is the best known French rapper,” “it is francophone people that we aim at because it’s important in rap to understand lyrics”. She continued:

Today, I’m convinced that to export our tracks, it is also important to modify and adapt them to the language of a country. I think if MC Solaar had rapped in English, even with French accent, it could have worked better. But, of course, it is also important for an artist to define oneself – I understand that it is also hard for the artist.

As in the case of East End x Yuri in Japan, because ‘hardcore’ artists tend toward the US trends, artists considered as inauthentic in the French ‘hardcore’ terms are often found more original – more ‘French’ – once outside France. Kponton (1998) for Chronowax that deals exclusively with ‘authentic’ French hip-hop vinyls argued that French ‘hardcore’ rappers rarely go beyond the francophone markets, such as Belgium, Switzerland and Quebec. Some make their way to Africa, but the downside there, as he pointed out, is that “they don’t do vinyls: they do cassettes, and it’s all pirated”. The next target of Chronowax, as I mentioned earlier, was the Japanese vinyl market. Curiously enough, despite the dislocated identification to the USA, French ‘hardcore’ rappers are often considered unmarketable in the USA. Kponton (1998) expressed his hesitation to embark on the US market:

In the USA, for the moment, breakbeat samplers may work, or tunes that feature Americans. But the USA – it’s quite another thing, it’s quite another market. The Americans don’t understand French – they like ‘comment allez-vous’ and all that, but it’s not yet... I think that the USA would be the last country in which we can correctly sell French rap as export.

As in Japan, the imagined US ghetto is a product of its insertion to France’s local social space. Rather than trapped in the state-centric ideology of Americanisation, in what follows, I explore how the opposition between different hip-hop dispositions, internalised within the recording industry as we have seen, extend to and intersect with external institutions so as to form and transform the ‘street’.
Round about Midnight in St-Denis Radio Station

Commercialism, Creativity and Authenticity

On one dark, warm evening in May 1998, I joined Clarel, hip-hop programmer of a Parisian associative radio, Fréquence Paris Plurielle (FPP), in his station in Saint-Denis, an immediate northern banlieue of Paris. His programme starts at 22:30 and lasts until 1:00 every Friday night, so I tried to get there to see him producing the programme. I took the metro to the Porte de la Chapelle, but the bus I was advised to take was not in service – it was too late – so I walked across a wide boulevard and passed beneath a busy interchange of the circular périphérique motorway, into quiet extra-muros Paris, to a vacantly broad street, face-lifted for the up-coming World Cup '98, of which the final match would take place on the new pitch of adjacent Stade de France. The radio station was not far from the périph, but its entrance was hard to find as it was in fact situated at the end of a byway between garages and warehouses. Opening a tag-covered iron door and going upstairs, I got to a dim hallway covered with traces of removed stickers, on the other end of which was a friendly-looking black guy, Clarel. There was no one else – no director, no timekeeper, no secretary, no sweeper. Clarel played some records, noted their titles and announced them to the microphone (no scratch mixing as the turntables were "rotten" and he was looking forward to obtaining a fund to replace them with some "serious Technics"). Apart from a handful of administrative directors, all the 200 or so personnel that take care of 50 programmes are all volunteers. Therefore, at night, each is in charge of everything concerning the programme broadcast to Paris and Ile-de-France, about a 50km radius from its aerial located at the Porte de Bagnolet, an eastern extremity of Paris. The station is entirely subsidised by the state, hence there is no advertising. "We're not commercial," Clarel said, "we're an association, or we have some associations that come to do their programmes".

"It's a militant radio," Clarel (1998) claimed, "it's a banlieue radio [...] and [the concept] is to denounce what is happening in the banlieues a bit". FPP, as the name suggests, tries to reflect plurality of Paris and its banlieues. Beside news and cultural programmes, there are programmes about prison, ecology, feminism, racism, homelessness or education which are presented by Turks, Africans, West Indians, South Americans, Algerians or Maghreb communities, to name a few. "And then," he went on, "you have hip-hop programmes that share a big part because it denounces social wrongs. Because it's a music that denounces them, we have chosen hip-hop". Like many 'hardcore' A&Rs and producers, he was explicitly dubious of the francophone song quota and the subsequent commercialisation of French rap. He argued:

We've been dealing with hip-hop a long time. Before, hip-hop was not like what it is today. It was only people in the know that talked about it. Today, hip-hop really is appreciated by the Chanel people. Tasteless! Other stations don't do the same thing as us. It's not the same mentality. It's not like here. There's no group that talks direct. It's not a real street. Us, here, we're really street. Street and it's people in the street that come and see us.

Indeed, the transformation of Skyrock as 'the no. 1 rap station' – it has become the world's largest rap radio in terms of area it covers and listeners it reaches – raised a polemic among small forerunner
media over hip-hop legitimacy. Malherbe (1998) for Chrysalis claimed that “one sure thing is that it's not NRJ that invented rap, much less Skyrock” and “Skyrock doesn't play the most underground rap – it only plays obvious rap. So, it's already this. There's no national broadcasting [for underground rap tracks]”. In terms of hip-hop's so-called media 'upsurge', Grevery (1998) for Double H Productions wittily suggested, "well, we don't have it. Then, we've never had it here. So, there's no problem". In terms of censorship, Clarel (1998) proclaimed that “we say what we want here. At least our guests can. If I say, 'nique la police (fuck the police)' and the CSA listens to it, it would attack the station because I'm its DJ, but if it's you, they have nothing to say. So, there is no censorship in this station”.

Clarel's disapproval of the commercialisation of rap and hip-hop, however, actively valorises the rap tracks he programmes and the artists he invites to his weekly show. Moreover, his claim on 'street' legitimacy takes its position in what can be described as the field of radio stations. In this light, this 'street' is shared abstractly through the airwaves by his audience that he described as:

Youths, from 15 to 25 years old. These are the youths of banlieues, and some in Paris but originated from the banlieues living in Paris and who know a bit of the movement. Youths in Neuilly [an affluent western suburb] wouldn't know us. They don't know us at all, because it's not their thing. It's not of their home. They'd listen to techno and all that.

Certainly, artists, with or without a recording career, join his show on a non-remunerated basis and each of the 200 members running the station “out of a passion” and with “no business behind,” even contributes 50 FF monthly to maintain the premises and the materials, instead of being paid. Yet, at the same time, it is undeniable that, for some, particularly young members, to work with FPP, being known through it or acquiring experience in it can lead to insertion in more professional organisations and that, for artists, to be invited to his show offers possibilities to be exposed to a specific fragment of hip-hop audience. When I joined him again the following week, a rap group from a local secondary school that was recording an album performed their freestyle, a DJ who had just released his mix-tape joined in to give away some copies, telephones kept ringing to pass on information about concerts, festivals and parties and event organisers and artist promoters dropped by with flyers, stickers and cassette-taped jingles for event announcements of which Clarel would select and play one every week. Being non- or anti-commercial does not prevent the programme from producing values and meanings for selected music and musicians.

Many hip-hop artists and producers said that hip-hop is cheap to produce. However, the production budget referred to during my research ranges from 10,000 FF of an entirely self-contained production of Guyot (1998) to “astrological budgets” (Nicola 1998) of established artists such as IAM for Delabel, NTM for Epic Sony or Doc Gynéco for Virgin. The difference is not simply about the quality of sound production and the quantity of fabrication: it is also more significantly related to promotion and distribution. The problem of small-scale production, as Guyot (1998) claimed, is “the lack of distribution,” because “above all, rap is a music of protest with engaged lyrics, etc, so, obviously, rich people [i.e. major distributors] wouldn't like us”. Without a contract with a distributor, the records pressed would not go anywhere much beyond the local area of the artists' activities. Almost all the self-producing groups I encountered mentioned the system of dépôt-vente (often small record shops in which records can be sold on commission), but it seems rather inefficient. Kponton (1998)
for Chronowax, an independent hip-hop distributor, illustrated a case of a Lyon rap group:

Who in Lyon are you going to see to distribute your records? Are you gonna go to FNAC who’ll say, “Okay, but we only do dépôt-vente for 60 days and I only can take 10 copies”, whereas you, above all, you need to sell at least 500 copies to break even? [...] So you have FNAC at Lyon who take 10 copies, then you have to do other record shops. You’ll look into minitel [an on-line telephone directory] to find other shops and call each of them. It’s too hard.

He said that Chronowax was made for such independent hip-hop groups. However, they too are obliged to “choose what’s good, what can sell quickly” because they cannot afford to stock products for too long.

Producing a rap record in a material sense may be inexpensive, but it is quite another thing for it to have its value and meanings, to be purchased and appreciated. Mande (1998) for Payback Recordz suggested that “a group must not be too pleased [by the fact that it produced a record],” and unless the group is already known, they had better not spend the budget on a good recording studio and a sound engineer “because, after that, there won’t be any advertisement”. Grevery (1998) for Double H Productions agreed that promotion is more costly than actual production, claiming, “often guys say they’ve recorded and pressed it but don’t have enough money for promo. I would say that they ought to invest more in promo as it would allow them to recoup the money quickly”. Unlike the majors that can afford entire failure of their so-called artists in development, small and/or independent labels, as Grenfeld (1998) for XIII bis Records suggested, “try hard every time to see whether an action of promotion, etc, can lead to a result”. Of the significant success of 2 Bal 2 Neg’s 3x Plus Efficace (1996) album, Nicola (1998) for Crepuscule suggested:

The group had done a very long tour and the group had a very good image in the underground, so we played with this sympathy. It’s a group that has never been exposed like IAM or others. It always remained, how to put it, inside the hip-hop world. Anyway, you see, the advertisement campaign was aimed at the underground community with stickers, flyers, no posters, well, nothing official, that is, with only street tricks.

To be distributed to a wider market, an artist has to be distinguished, and in the restricted milieu called ‘underground’ or ‘street’, the quality of a finished product, i.e. record, is secondary to, or at least no more important than, the presence in and the acceptance by the milieu as such, which explains the traces of removed stickers in the hallway of FPP station (Clarel said unfortunately he had to remove them all otherwise it would be chaotic) and the visits not only by artists but also by event organisers and artist promoters to the station. What is important is that, gradually, as the hip-hop market becomes wider in France, the strategy of ‘street’ distinction becomes professionalised, rationalised and dealt with by specialised independent organisations often referred to as street promotion teams.

**Professionalisation and Rationalisation of Street**

Street promotion, as Grevery (1998) for Double H Productions claimed, “is just an extension of what we’d been doing before, like we did tags and stickers, you see, so it’s always been a bit savage, you know, it’s in that same spirit”. A crucial difference is that, today, it is done in an organised and reflexive way. As hip-hop becomes a major genre in France, street promoters, be they initially derived
from labels' ambition to market their artists or from b-boys' enthusiasm to circumscribe the scene correctly (quite a few ex-graffiti artists run street promotion companies), institute themselves as independent enterprises that propose this specific service as a commodity. In general, it consists of two principle operations. Firstly, the distribution of promotional sample records and other materials to so-called 'tastemakers', such as DJs, radio programmers, journalists, etc “who'd have an influence on people they contact in their daily activities” (Texaco 1998). The second operation is the billing and distribution of flyers, stickers or demo-tapes at carefully chosen topos in cities by way of multiple 'street teams'. The materials required are provided by a label according to the image strategy of the artist in question, or street promoters propose some ideas for the artist to stand out from others in the street terms. Demo-tapes, often not lasting more than 10 minutes, are carefully made not to devalue the product under promotion. According to Grevery (1998):

We drop by a label to get hold of flyers and promo samples, and we distribute them, depending on duration. I don't know, on an operation we did for Funky Family, it lasted three weeks. There, you go down to the street to distribute, in the provinces and Paris, at certain strategic points in Paris. We have people who, if we wanted, would find places in other cities to distribute flyers for us.

The fundamental aim of the operation is to create a 'buzz' in the underground milieu before the official release of the product so that, as Texaco (1998) suggested, “it will have been longed for once it's released”.

For the majors, which cannot operate effectively when it comes to St-Denis, Vitry-sur-Seine or Sarcelles, “[street promotion] is,” as Beguin (1998) for Island-Remark put it, “a means, a technique to find the initial audience – the closest media to the movement, as [a product] has to be distributed in the right place in the right time”. Recognition in the ‘street’ seems fundamental even for major artists. LBR (1998) for Delabel, himself an influential DJ and member of Double H, observed:

To have a street base, namely recognition in the street, is really important, for all rappers, French or American. First of all, the recognition in the underground milieu and then, afterwards, crossover. If you reached the top of the mass market from the beginning, it wouldn't really work.

Once the street base is built - “the Parisian milieu is not as large as that of New York, so it's rapid, within two or three weeks” (LBR 1998) - they move on to a conventional promotion: rotation on nationwide FM networks, reviews or interviews in the press and videos on television, etc. In the case of Les Tentations (The Temptations: 1997), the first solo album of Passi, one of the original members of Ministère A.M.E.R., the street operation began three months in advance, with one of the most 'hardcore' titles from the album, 'L'Engreneur (The Engrainer)', distributed exclusively to tastemakers. Once the base is built, more melodious 'Je Zappe et Je Mate (I Zap and I Stare)' was released as the first commercial single, leading to the album release. It seems systematic, but the above case perhaps is one of the most flawless examples, so much so that many informants referred to it frequently and, in reality, as Grevery (1998) argued, “I don't think there's a well-pressed, genteel way to get there, like you pay for a week of street promo and then go on to radio. It happens a little bit at the same time. You start the machine a little and you see what happens: it goes more or less well and you adjust or
change your strategy". What is important is the fact that without 'street' acceptance, even a major artist can fail in hip-hop culture.

As street promotion becomes a profession on which people begin to live, the 'street' becomes rationalised: 'street' is no longer any street – there is a very specific set of 'strategic points' that re-appropriate the urban geography. Its tie with hip-hop culture – "the strict origin" (Grevery 1998) – is reorganised as a network in which the cutting-edge hip-hop sound circulates, prescribing its meanings and values in the elect few circles of the initiated. Most of the street promoters and marketing/promotion personnel in the recording industry I interviewed pointed out that a set of areas in Paris, such as Châtelet-les-Halles, Pigalle or Bastille, are more important and efficient than the dispersed banlieues where there is nothing but vacant shopping malls and very few nightclubs specialised in rap and hip-hop. Châtelet-les-Halles, at which three suburban RER railway lines intersect, is often considered as the most important of all in Paris. Texaco (1998) for Wicked argued:

In Paris, you've got les Halles, of course. It's 'the' strategic point. You've got Bastille, to reach not particularly a hip-hop audience but people with ears, with one ear open to hip-hop, who have perhaps more buying power than those in les Halles. You see, in fact, les Halles is much for creating a base. You have all [specialist] record shops there, whose sales don't enter the official sales chart because these are either imports or vinyls but, at the same time, those who buy vinyls there are the tastemakers, by definition.

Street promoters, in this way, mediate artists and audiences in the Parisian urban geography, all in constructing the 'street' legitimacy of French hip-hop in which they operate and to which hip-hop's tastemakers are invited.

The appropriation of urban landscape as a signboard and the parasitic, yet organised institution of 'street' promotion network in Paris are, however, laden with confrontation with the authorities. From 1996, the City of Paris formally banned billing in intra-muros Paris in the name of environmental maintenance. Namely, it is no longer legal to put up posters anywhere in Paris without authorisation. Small stickers had been tolerated for a moment, but is subject to a penalty today. Some of the major recording companies become more sensitive to the escalated 'vandalism'. An insider told me that some labels that would occasionally ask artists to tuer (kill: draw a graffiti piece on) an RER train or a motorway wall began finding it too risky. Significantly, in the banlieues, once you've crossed the périph, "you can stick anything wherever you like" (Grevery 1998). All of a sudden, the line between beautiful Paris and its vulgar banlieues is re-established. Like many other sectors of hip-hop intermediaries, as we will see shortly, street promotion as a profession is menaced by the authorities, against which the shape of the 'street' is more or less defined: if Tokyoite rappers come to Shibuya to represent Shibuya, Parisian rappers come from the banlieues to les Halles to represent the banlieues. While street promoters continue to try new strategies for billing announcement for record releases or concert dates, the other operationality – disseminating information through a particular network of mediation – regroups various intermediaries external to the recording industry and mediate these institutions, each of which gives a particular set of values and meanings to the product distributed. In what follows, I would like to explore the mediatised and geographic distribution of hip-hop intermediaries in Paris and the ideological construction of 'street' as a distinctive cultural space.
Field of Media Institutions and Street Intermediaries

Television and Radio
Terrestrial and Satellite Television

Sell-out Space

Terrestrial television proposes a space accessible only by selected mainstream genres and artists, accepted by and attractive to the vast nationwide spectators and advertisers. The selective tendency is furthered as the number of musical programmes on television decreased in the course of the 1990s, apart from video programmes on M6 and occasional interview, concert or musical-award programmes on other channels. Chazelle (1998) for Shaman suggested:

Television is not open to young and new artists, because, naturally, they worry about their audience ratings. So, they want, if you like, from the popularity of the artist featured, to attract more spectators. So, it's hard to get to television, even if there remain some specialised programmes.

The higher costs required for television production, which is often shared with or sometimes entirely covered by recording companies in order to promote their artists, also keep new and unestablished genres and artists from television exposure. Azoulay (1998) for Polydor argued that "unfortunately, television doesn't play an impulsive role. It plays a role of solidifying the reputation once an artist who has achieved distinction somewhere else and established oneself with the public". Namely, "it is rare to see an artist at 20:30 on television who is not programmed at least five times a week on the radio".

Apart from a handful of established names, such as MC Solaar and IAM, television is hardly accessible for rappers. Most often, they are rejected being too vulgar, aggressive and inadequate and, when they are accepted, they are subject to be caricaturised as "banlieusards [suburbanites]" (Sear 1995, 7) or ridiculed as "les enfants de Sidney [children of Sidney]" (7). Sear (1995) for Get Busy dismissed television from his own experience of a television appearance, as follows:

Those who think that I had better be conciliatory, cite the references that sound "cultivated" and be smiling on television.... Of course! Great! But, I'm sorry, I have nothing to show. I've never listened to Gainsbourg or Léo Ferré [sic.]. I've never read Raymond Queunot (spelling?) [sic.]. If I appear on television, it's to toss off the maximum of truths in the minimum of time given to me. It's not to please the middle class Gaulish or to let whichever bloody presenter to put a hand on my shoulder (not to mention my bum), [...]. (7)

According to Malherbe (1998) for Chrysalis, NTM, similarly, "would not do promotion on television apart from some exceptions, for, otherwise, they'd be considered that they were selling themselves out," yet, as he continued, "it is even more interesting because it is NTM, you know, because the group is so polemical – it's so polemical that it sells". 'Hardcore' rap takes its position in the field of media institutions through its rejection of, and by, the nationwide mass medium, which in fact grants it cultural legitimisation and economic recuperation.

However, the rejection as above did not in fact dissuade some from embarking on emergent satellite and/or cable television channels that tend to favour young and new genres and artists in their
quest for niche markets. Grevery (1998) for Double H Productions argued that he did not automatically consider television appearances as a sell-out. LBR (1998) for Delabel considered that a regular hip-hop programme or even a non-stop hip-hop channel on cable television would be nice providing it is produced by the people in the scene. Chatillon (1998) who runs an underground ‘videozine’ called FBS (standing for Fuckin’ Bullshit) told me that he had been eagerly proposing his films to some of the emergent satellite and cable stations. The satellite/cable television markets are relatively restricted in size in France. According to Audicabsat survey conducted by Médiamétrie, the French audience rating service, the number of subscribers to satellite- and cable-based television services as a whole increased from 7,365,800 in January 1998 to 10,977,000 in November-December 1999. Yet, apart from the two leading musical channels of MTV and MCM that reach almost 80% of the total satellite/cable television service subscribers, most of the satellite/cable music channels in France did not surpass 30% even by the end of 1999 (Audicabsat). Satellite/cable music channels, as many suggested, “have not yet attained a revolution” (Gomis 1998) and “remain a very urban phenomenon” (Chazelle 1998).

Garcia (1998) for Radio France argued that the emergence of satellite/cable stations and their thematic specialisation might be comparable to what had happened to the périphérique radio stations and the thematic FM radio networks, in that “in one fine day, dominant television stations like TF1 may diminish in the face of the multiplication of these small channels just as big radio stations like Europe 1 or France Inter that are irritated by stations like NRJ, etc today”. It is true that satellite/cable music channels share much in common with FM radio networks in terms of niche marketing and formatting strategies. Not surprisingly, apart from MTV and its offsprings (they are declared as foreign channels, like CNN or BBC, and not subject to the francophone song quota), satellite/cable channels are often invested in by FM radio networks in their pursuit of larger market clusters for advertisers, of which recording companies occupy a large part and which results in numerous tie-in compilation CDs. Fun Radio launched Fun TV. RFM launched RFM TV. Radio Nostalgie licensed Nostalgie TV to exploit its brand (Radio Nostalgie, targeting the over-40 age cluster, is mostly owned by NRJ). Rumours have been heard elsewhere that NRJ was attempting to buy into a satellite operation. In the case of M6 Musique, it is launched by the terrestrial station M6. The market leader, MCM, derived from TMC (Télé Monte Carlo), launched Muzzik in 1996, a channel specialised in classical, jazz, world music and dance, to cover another cluster of spectators and advertisers in and beyond France.

Infatuation and Immigration in Media Space

Richard (1998), MCM’s music programming director, identified his audience as “principally 15-34, of which the heart of the target is 15-24”. Rap, particularly French rap, is considered to be a genre that “corresponds to their taste” and takes “an important position in our station as the programme that turned out to be most popular in the latest survey was Blah Blah Rap [a 26-minute rap programme at 17:00 everyday], our first rap programme”. Like Japanese Spaceshower TV, facing its closest rival MTV, MCM (MTV attained 84.5% of the total satellite/cable television subscribers as opposed to 76.8% of MCM in November-December 1998 (Audicabsat)) is obliged, and willing, to favour new and trend-setting French titles:
The artists that sell a lot are systematically programmed on [terrestrial] M6. Some artists in development may also go to M6, but, as we’re the first French music channel, if we didn’t play videos of artists in development, they’d have a problem. Because most of the musical programmes on MTV don’t play French artists, apart from IAM, Niagara, Vanessa Paradis and everything that is exportable. Apart from [satellite/cable] M6 Musique, which has a much smaller audience, and Nostalgie, which plays music from the 70s and the 80s, there isn’t much room for music in France. (Richard 1998)

MCM “is appreciated, among other reasons, because it plays French music”. It “plays less US rap than MTV, but covers almost all the French rappers providing their videos are interesting”. On the contrary, MTV, reaching 40-some countries and about 60,000,000 households in Europe, produces most of the programmes for France in London with very little localising post-production, which, unlike in Japan, practically eliminates French rappers from its programming policy. Even if MTV rivals MCM closely in France, it cannot implement its acclaimed localisation policies in France because of the reluctance of satellite and cable services in the market (according to MTV’s PR brochure, French subscriptions remain 1,100,000 households, as opposed to 17,500,000 in Germany and 5,300,000 in the UK at the end of 1996).

MCM’s acclaimed inclination towards domestic titles (it programmes up to 60% of French titles) does not limit its market to France. Much to the contrary, it is expanding to a vast area on the globe consciously and systematically. Along with Muzzik channel, MCM Euromusic today has a set of subsidiaries in Europe, Africa, Latin America and Asia regrouped as MCM International, whose ownership is shared by MCM Euromusic (51%) and governmental SOFIRAD (49%) to realise, as its PR brochure says, “an ambitious politics of international development of the French music channel”. According to Richard (1998):

In Europe, in the world, we cover 69 countries. So, there are 2,000,000 households in Belgium, and depending to the area, we have the programmes that vary a bit. That is, MCM Europe is slightly different from MCM France. There is MCM Africa concerning black francophone African – it’s a channel available [in France] today through Canal Satellite Digital in option – which gives different programmes. MCM Asia has just launched in South East Asia, Japan, Hong Kong, etc. There are different programmes.

Now we’re reaching cable and satellite in South America....

While defining its position in opposition to MTV’s anglophone programming, MCM adopts a similar attitude to its anglophone rivals in the foreign markets. Its French production is centralised in Paris. Its international network operates also from Paris, with the centre of focus shifting from French artists to francophone artists. In 1998, MCM launched its multi-equipped live venue/transmission studio, MCM Café, in Pigalle, Paris, to interconnect its programmes with the scene. Yet, for some independent and small hip-hop producers, in the end, “[MCM]’s a bit like MTV à la française, but without pretensions because there isn’t much to watch on it. The French are very different from the British, there’s nothing to compare” (Chazelle 1998).

Certainly, satellite/cable music channels in France, as we have seen, are more receptive to new and unestablished genres of popular music, including rap, than terrestrial television stations. Yet once
in a wider configuration of the field of media institutions and compared with other cheaper and more specialised media that street promoters consider as hip-hop's 'tastemakers', their claimed 'trend-setting role' can be felt rather deceptive for those in the 'hardcore' and 'underground' hip-hop scene. Above all, satellite/cable music channels assume their role not to compete with radio stations but to depend on them, for "radio stations receive promotional singles before us, because videos are very often made after the release of singles and it's extremely rare that a single arrives simultaneously with its video" (Richard 1998). More significantly, there is an acutely different, if overlapping, identification of a rap audience between satellite/cable music channels that seek to construct it in a-geographical, generational terms, entangled with the state's cultural politics and the global economy as in the case of MCM and MTV, and 'hardcore' rappers, producers and promoters for whom hip-hop culture is essentially rooted in the geographically specific banlieues. Richard (1998) explained why *Blah Blah Rap* was programmed at 17:00 as follows:

Because... rap culture is about schoolboys and schoolgirls. They leave their schools at around that time. [...] so, if we play it too late, then the youths no longer have the control over remote controller. [...] So, it has to be programmed late enough so that the kids are back home from their schools, but not too late otherwise it's either blocked by their mothers who don't like rap or by the parents who don't want to watch a music programme but a terrestrial channel.

For Sear (1995) of *Get Busy*, the incorporation of some French rappers on television is "comparable to immigration: instead of wanting to make themselves accepted, they are 'delighted' with the integration (always rhyming with assimilation) that the Gaulish system offers 'generously'" (7). For many recording industry personnel working on hip-hop, television, terrestrial or otherwise, is still considered as a classic means for crossover success, whereas radio is seen as an indispensable medium to reach the fan base. It should be noted that this topology of 'immigration', 'crossover' or 'street' are translated and lived in the utterly mediatised space.

**Radio Stations**

*Generalist Stations and Generalist Listeners*

Radio has been struggling to define its position amongst other broadcasting media through the 80s and 90s in France. Television has grown rapidly after decades of state monopoly before the 1980s. Pirate radio stations in the 70s, too, have attained not only their legal but also economic and cultural status. In parallel with radio's specialisation, television also extended to more thematically specific satellite and cable-based services, as we have seen above, which furthers the market competition. Unlike the pre-1960s "when it was a huge receiver like today's television placed in a sitting room," radio today offers far more specialised programmes for targeted segments of the market. Listening habits, too, changed drastically. Garcia (1998) for Radio France observed:

The listeners before were loyal to their station: if they listened to one station, they didn't listen to other stations. Today, it isn't rare that a listener tunes to France Info to hear the news, Skyrock to have some rap, then – as they don't only like rap – so, suddenly, he's with his girlfriend, and then they can listen to Chérie FM to have older titles.

He continued:
What happens is that radio takes fewer risks. So they say to themselves, "I know that our listeners liked this song before, so we're not going to take a risk of playing new releases, we're not going to take a risk of playing other songs from the same album that I find interesting artistically". What happens is that radio, all the same, becomes a bit narrow.

The radio market is not declining. On the contrary, as he pointed out, "today, 80% of the French population listen to radio regularly. The average number of radio sets per household reaches 5 or 6 [6.2 in 1998, according to Médiametrie]. Radio is very present and withstands [the competition] very well". Only that the severe competition brings about more or less conservative formatting strategies.

For the recording industry, radio remains the most important medium for artists' exposure to the market, which is all the more so with regard to rap and hip-hop as television only admits artists, after radio, aiming at crossover commercial success.

As I pointed out earlier, there is a set of institutional and operational categories of radio in France depending on the size of the area covered, the character of financial resources and the relationship with other stations that form a national network. So-called 'generalist' stations, including the public service France Inter and private périmérique stations such as RTL and Europe 1, broadcast nationwide, catering for the 'general' interest of the nation. The thematic stations, or FM networks, that more or less cover a nationwide audience through franchising and networking of a number of key stations/programme suppliers, include, among others, Fun Radio (heard in over 100 cities), NRJ (over 100 cities) and Skyrock (83 cities) targeting 15-25 age group; Europe 2 (over 100 cities) and RTL 2 (85 cities) targeting 25-35 age group; Chérie FM (82 cities), Radio Nostalgie (over 100 cities), RFM (91 cities) and Rire et Chanson (41 cities) targeting 35+ age group; etc. Local stations, divided into independent commercial stations, such as Radio Nova, Oui FM or Voltage, and non-commercial associative stations such as Ado FM, Aligre FM, FPP, Générations/Paris Jazz, Radio Droits de Cité, Radio Libertaire, TSF or Vallée FM, envisage more detailed local audiences and cater for their communal, cultural, ethnic or other specificity. In 1999, in Paris and the Ile-de-France region that surrounds it, there are 35 associative stations and 20 independent commercial stations, 14 stations that relay the networks, 11 thematic network key stations and three generalist stations, in addition to four national public service stations (France Inter, France Musiques, France Culture and France Info), two 'decentralised' public service stations (Radio Bleue and FIP) and one international public service station (RFI) competing on the frequency dial (CSA).

"The programming of radio," Garcia (1998) suggested, "is linked to the audience at which the station aims". Music, often, is an instrument to construct a space in which to communicate with listeners and, in this light, the distribution of various musical genres in social space can be understood as that in the programming grid of each station. Garcia, for example, positioned rap in radio space as follows:

It is that rap is more appreciated by an audience which consists predominantly of men rather than women, and which is rather an audience of the coarse people, I'd say, of the banlieues, to come out with a caricature. Well, obviously, here, too, depending on the type of population, it can be brought to.... If, for example, it is a radio, like Radio Droits de Cité in Monte-la-Jolie [a northern banlieue of Paris], it appears obvious that the
station entails a large proportion of rap. Now, in a chic banlieue of Versailles, it's not as much.... Maybe they lack an audience. In fact, each station tries to serve a part of the audience, because today radio stations have increased.

Rap, as is often remarked, is a music that “is a bit – how to put it – exclusive, that interests a particular audience that rejects others”. It is considered, as in the above quote, to attract a masculine, working class, banlieusard and young audience rather than feminine, chic, western Parisian and adult audience.

In generalist stations like France Inter, Europe 1 and RTL, rap has little space. According to Garcia (1998):

> Hip-hop is not [France Inter audience's] culture – put it in this way. Every time we play rap, particularly when it is too aggressive.... Evidently, if it's a melodic and poetic rap, if it's MC Solaar, that's fine and then there are rap songs, groups that have attained popularity like IAM, or even NTM whose discourse is quite radical, it goes better. But we have a lot of problems with rap artists in general. So, in this station, rap is very absent.

Amiaud (1998) for RTL, the market leader that France Inter rivals, suggested that its music programming should be very eclectic and regional difference must be smoothed away in order to serve its 8,000,000 daily listeners of all age and all styles. He argued that “[music on RTL] isn’t divided by ghettos. It’s all mixed, it’s a mixing of things all the time. After a French chanson, we may hear an Anglo-Saxon tune, and then French chanson or classical music. Everything is mixed and balanced”. Nonetheless, the French variétés genre dominates this ‘mix’, because “we continue to believe that we reach a larger audience by programming francophone music rather than Anglo-Saxon music”. RTL played over 60% of francophone titles regularly even before the quota. Non-francophone titles, predominantly Anglo-American rock, tend to be played in evening programmes, when it presupposes a younger audience. “[RTL] doesn’t have a hip-hop programme,” admitted Amiaud. “There are some rap records that we play in some programmes”. Hip-hop does not, or as yet, institute its own space - a dedicated programme – in any of the generalist stations’ timetables. According to Garcia, “there’s a problem of language [in terms not only of the French language, but also of its legitimate usage and accents] and that of an adversity – our listeners would say rap is not music, it’s aggressive, etc”. The absence of rap in these stations is importantly linked to their identification with their respective audiences.

**FM Networks and Dislocation of French Rap**

If the generalist stations, serving “the largest possible number of people” (Amiaud 1998), hesitate to programme rap and hip-hop, some of the ‘thematic’ stations, particularly NRJ, Fun Radio and Skyrock, see rap music as a means to attract their targeted youth listeners. NRJ, launched as a pirate station in the Porte des Lilas quarter in the east of Paris in 1981 by J.-P. Baudecroux, has remained and still is the market leader in this category (According to Médiamétrie, its national weekday audience rating remains stable from 7.08% (1997) to 6.78% (1998), and 7.45% (1999) to 6.98% (2000)⁶. Fun Radio, created by a group branched from NRJ in 1984, lost its listeners slightly

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⁶ Because of the modification of the sampling methodology of Médiamétrie, data before and after January 1999 are not compatible. Médiamétrie publishes national, Ile-de-France and Paris and its small crown audience surveys on a quarterly basis. Thus the figures presented here are the average of Jan.-Mar., Apr.-Jun., Sep.-Oct.
from 3.23 (1997) to 2.85% (1998), then stabilised at around 3.48% (1999) and 3.53% (2000)). Skyrock, today's no. 1 rap station, was launched in 1986 by Pierre Bellanger, an ex-militant ecologist, collaborating with a variety of pirate Parisian stations while arguing for market competition in order for his station to be 'revolutionary'. Its national audience ratings remain fairly stable from 3.30% (1997) to 3.33% (1998), then from 3.70% (1999) to 3.86% (2000). However, it marked an aggressive audience growth by +28.43% in the Ile-de-France region and by +67.92% in Paris and its small crown (92 (Haute-de-Seine), 93 (Seine-St.-Denis) and 94 (Val-de-Marne)) between 1997 and 98 (as opposed to NRJ (-4.24% nationally, -0.74% in Ile-de-France and +4.17 in Paris and its small crown) and Fun (-16.79% nationally, -39.81% in Ile-de-France and -35.48% in Paris and its small crown)). Adult oriented station Chérie FM also marked +52.38% increase in the same period in and around Paris, but it is rather a result of its overall national development (+30.08%) in the same period. The 1998 'upsurge' of French rap, often associated with Skyrock, was very sharply a Parisian phenomenon.

What concerns 'hardcore' producers is not that Skyrock simply dilutes hip-hop culture, but that it transgresses the previously well defined boundary between mainstream variétés and underground hip-hop. Skyrock attained almost 3 million listeners by the end of 1998, of which about a third since its adoption of 70%-rap-only format in 1996-7. It was a result of conscious calculations and sophisticated marketing strategies. Some 'hardcore' artists and producers, as I argued earlier, were explicitly suspicious of Skyrock's hip-hop legitimacy. Mande (1998) for Payback Recordz considered Skyrock indispensable for promoting his artists, while remaining somehow sceptical of the 'professional quality' of the station as "they don't listen to rap at the foundation". Sear (1998) for Get Busy argued that "[Skyrock] pretends to be the no. 1 rap station, but they have nothing to do with this culture. They needed to find a niche to promote their image and all that and, if the accordion were more popular, they'd invest in that instead". A music journalist, de Bure (1998), pointed out in an interview with Bouneau, Skyrock's music programming director, that "Bouneau does not wish to create a rap radio. He adapted rap to Skyrock and not the inverse – its DJs remain unchanged, its programmes, too" (84). Bouneau, in the same interview, openly admitted that "we opened ourselves to [hip-hop] culture, but we have know-how of a radio that valorises our audience and that allows us to be a commercial station" (84). Skyrock, and NRJ and Fun Radio for that matter, are parts of larger conglomerates: NRJ group controls NRJ, Nostalgie, Chérie FM, Rire et Chanson and a part of RMC; CLT-UFA group controls RTL, RTL 2 and Fun Radio; and Europe group controls Europe 1, Europe 2, RFM and a part of Skyrock, offering a wide audience range to their advertisers (the potentially reachable population in France being 110 to 120 million for each of the three groups (CSA)). The youth FM networks are, in this sense, predisposed to defend the young listeners, for what they sell is their audience sliced by a-geographical generation as in the case of satellite/cable thematic television channels: Skyrock is most listened to by 8-19 year-old and 55% male audience nationwide (Dauncey and Hare 1999, 97; de Bure 1998, 84).

Local Radio and Street Connection

According to the CSA, local associative stations serve the cultural and other interests of local communities and are financed by state subsidies, with brand-name advertising or sponsorship limited and Nov.-Dec. data of each year.

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to 20% of their income. Local or regional independent stations serve to co-ordinate their economic zone and contribute to local expression, and are financed by advertising revenue that must be of local nature. Unlike the generalist stations and the commercial FM networks, local independent and/or associative radio stations are disposed to define themselves in terms not of age, but of political, cultural, communal and other dispositions. Both financially and geographically restricted, their programming policies are, therefore, deeply inscribed in locally available human, cultural and technical resources. Gombert (1998), director of Vallée FM, an associative station in Marne-la-Vallée, a ville nouvelle to the east of Paris (see Map 4 (p. 64)), claimed that the goal of the station “is to allow as many people in the region as possible to express themselves on the air” and that he would appoint DJs and producers who “principally originated from the area [the station] covers” and “who are enthusiastic, even if they make some syntax errors – we’re not France Info [the public news station]”. Mars, a well-known hip-hop producer who is in charge of Vallée FM’s Hip-hop Non-Stop programme, is from the neighbouring community of Noisel. Another hip-hop programme, Strictly Hip-hop, was launched as a by-product of its Culture Caraïbe programme, taken care of by the Caribbean community in the ville nouvelle of Marne-la-Vallée. The musical selection is often linked to the idiosyncrasy and personal connection of these volunteer employees. “As far as the music programming of Vallée FM is concerned,” Gombert proclaimed, “we prefer to make listeners discover. So we often play titles that we don’t hear anywhere else and we may not listen to ever again”. “Very often,” he added, “there are groups [programmed on Vallée FM] that don’t achieve anything later at all – but who cares?”

As was often expressed by small and/or independent hip-hop producers and street promoters, there is an issue of auto-censorship, or more precisely a tacit co-optation linked to the standardised format and marketing imperative of the large-scale commercial FM stations, resulting in “a flood of rappers on the radio who just don’t say anything meaningful” (Guyot 1998). Many pointed out the difficulty in accessing the play-lists of commercial FM networks unless pushed by one of the transnational major labels. Mande (1998) for Payback Recordz suggested that “Skyrock, NRJ, Fun, […], it’s recording companies. It’s labels that call them and say, ‘hey, play my record, play it, play it!’ Frankly, it’s pretty hard because, being independent, we need our label to be influential enough to convince them”. To plug on a local radio station, on the contrary, personal acquaintance with its DJ or producer seems much more important. Mande continued, “at [local] stations like Ado FM or Générations, there are people specialised in rap […]. So once you make your music, you approach these people, […] they program it easily”. This certainly is not to say that the local stations are free from censorship of any sort. Associative stations are constantly monitored by the CSA by means of taco-graph, a slowly turning magnetic tape that records all the programmes, that Gombert (1998) called “a pair of big ears”. Yet, denigrating the large-scale commercial stations and remaining autonomous, if only relatively, of the marketing imperatives, the local stations tend to take position on alternative, marginalised music, culture and identities. Groups like Massilia Sound System, one of the Occitan rap/ragga groups, attained “no. 5 behind Bjork and Portishead” (Chazelle 1998) in some nationally compiled associative stations’ charts such as Rock 30 and Féarock (Fédération des Radios Associatives Rock), despite the refusal by the larger networks because of the content and format.
Local independent and/or associative stations and the interconnecting organisations such as Rock 30 or Férarock can be very influential on the shaping of the meanings and values of a particular range of genres, artists, their recordings and their professional career.

Financial limitation seems another issue that shapes particular dispositions of the local associative stations. Most of the associative stations rely on the public supporting fund, but it is often largely insufficient to maintain facilities, materials, employees and other necessities. FPP, for example, according to Clarel (1998), was involved in a lawsuit with SACEM because it could not pay the broadcasting rights. For Gombert (1998), economic and material constraints have a clear repercussion on the quality of programmes on Vallée FM. The lack of a computerised and automated studio obliges the station to rely on the availability of its three appointed technicians (weekday transmissions only start at around noon because of this). The incompatibility with digital technology limits the possibility to exchange programmes with other likeminded stations in France and abroad by way of programme banking services such as EPRA (Echange de Production Radiophonique). The restriction as such urges some stations to seek for advertising income, sponsorship or collaboration, but an obvious hurdle is that once competing with other larger commercial stations, due also to the size of the area they cover, their presence is rather inarticulate and not quite attractive to advertisers. Stations like Ado FM, TSF, or Générations/Paris Jazz, adopted 100% hip-hop or 100% jazz formats in their attempt to differentiate, yet other stations see it suspiciously as a mimicry of the commercial networks, or even as a perverted deviation from the concept of associative radio. “It is true,” Gombert argued, “that when we want to develop an advertisement sector, [...] then the station has to have a certain visibility from outside. Well, we’d rather say that even this is not a problem because where we don’t have a large visibility, we have a strong identity”. That is, “those who know and listen to us [such as local cafés, restaurants, entertainment venues, etc] would agree that we’re a good medium for them”. By the same token, hip-hop programmes on local independent and/or associative stations, like Mo’Bass by LBR on Radio Libertaire, Hip-hop Non Stop by Mars on Vallée FM or Clarel Avenue by Clarel on FPP, assume a distinctive influence in the Parisian hip-hop scene. “Hip-hop Non-Stop by Mars is emblematic,” Gombert (1998) claimed. “It allows the station to have a larger exterior influence, so much so that Vallée FM means something in a certain slightly specialised milieu [beyond the reach of its airwave].”

Recognition in the hip-hop milieu, as it were, does not lead to any straightforward economic gain. For those in charge of musical programmes, the problem is serious because, beside the obsolete hardware such as the ‘rotten’ turntables in FPP, they have to get hold of software – records. “Few [recording companies] send us CDs,” Clarel (1998) argued. “It’s rare, because we’re not known enough. [...] We’re not as known as Skyrock”. Yet, the struggle to overcome the disadvantaged economy stretches their realm of activities out to a space often referred to as the ‘street’.

What we do here, us, for all the programmes we do, is to see record shops, you see? At Châtelet, there are some small record shops. We see them and make a partnership deal. They give us some records, and we do some publicity for them. It’s indirect. It’s not an advertisement. It’s an exchange, if you like. I say, “Okay, I’ll announce your name and address and you may sell some records”. We do it like this. It’s rare that labels...
are very few.... Frankly, I don’t know how many labels exist in Paris, but there are at best five that send us records regularly. Only five. Otherwise, we have to call them each time and we have no time – we have our own jobs, too. Then we come here and we call labels.... We prefer to deal directly with record shops.

If larger commercial stations can assume that samples are automatically sent to from recording companies, small stations and their DJs have, and prefer, to go down in the ‘street’, devoid of complicated interference with recording companies.

This explains why street promotion companies consider it essential to ‘leak’ some not-for-sale promotion samples to the small specialist shops in the Châtelet-les-Halles district. Texaco (1998) for Wicked suggested:

Theoretically, it’s forbidden, but we always put some [samples] in shops because.... Well, we gave them 10 copies each, like a month before the [official] release, because these are bought by people who are, maybe, less important than professional DJs, but nonetheless important.... It is already important to expose new titles in these shops. They also serve as a poster, you see? At times, we even leak a test pressing, so that they play it in advance, you see, like in Saturday afternoon they play it, and guys would ask them when it’ll be out, etc. Then once it’s released, they buy it straight away.

In other words, while promoters from the major labels restlessly court Skyrock to have their rap products played or artist interviewed with various degrees of success, they cannot easily reach small but influential local stations and their DJs unless they are active enough in the scene to discern these stations and to know the DJs and producers specialised in hip-hop in these stations. “In France,” claimed LBR (1998) for Delabel, “hip-hop promotion takes place, first of all, in the street. So it’s easy for people like me”. The difficulty, on the contrary, is that “people [in the major labels] know little about it, therefore they call independent companies who are closer to the street. It’s always the same thing: it’s about being closer to the street”. There seems a clear relationship among production cost, audience size and the socio-cultural distance each television or radio station takes to rap music and hip-hop culture. The lower end of the scale stretches out of a transmission studio to embrace a set of geographical relations inscribed in a specific topology of Paris. Specialised record shops play an important role in this radiophonic construction of ‘street’ legitimacy. Yet, again, to maintain a small record shop in France is in itself a survival, menaced by supermarkets that “sell a record like a pack of peas” (Grenfeld 1998).

Record Retailers
Supermarkets

Unlike in Japan where there is a retail price maintenance system applied to domestically pressed records, the price of records varies from one shop to another in France. It has a fairly straightforward consequence of market monopoly wherein those with a stronger ability to buy in quantity from labels gain better wholesale price quotes and retail at lower price tags with bigger margins. The parties often referred to as responsible for destroying the diversity of record retailers are large shopping/cultural malls generally called hypermarchés (hypermarts) and slightly smaller but numerous supermarchés (supermarkets), such as Carrefour, Auchan and Leclerc. According to the statistics compiled by the
SNEP, the market share these shopping malls and supermarkets hold has grown from 34.4% (57.8% if including department stores and wholesalers (those who supply allocated shelves in supermarkets) in 1993 to 40.8% (60.8% with the department store and wholesaler) in 1999. There are, according to the SNEP, more than 1,000 hypermarchés and 7,000 supermarchés in France, with or without shelves dedicated to CDs or cassettes, with or without what Baudrillard (1986) calls “culturalised” (21) spaces for books and records. “France is very particular,” argued Barré (1998), PDG of Bluesilver, an independent label and distributor dealing, among others, with Cheb Mami, one of the leading RAI singers. “60% of records sell at the large shopping surfaces – in department stores and supermarkets. 60%. That is, one out of two French people does not buy records in a record shop”.

While the shopping malls and supermarkets sell almost half the records commercialised in France, the record sales, however, count only 1 or 2% of their entire turnover. Records, as Hidoux (1998), director of FNAC’s music section, argued, are only “loss leaders”. That is, as he continued, “for them, a record is something that brings customers in and draws them to other products beside it”. Records dealt with in supermarkets are ones carefully selected to attract a vast majority of their daily customers, while allowing to construct a culturalised ambience inside. Grenfeld (1998) for XIII bis Records pointed out:

What enter supermarkets are specific products. [....] At any rate, a product appears in record shops first, and then, only if it goes well, it accesses supermarkets, unless it’s a big artist by major companies, like Johnny Hallyday. Apart from them, it’s only after getting a gold disc, etc, and depending on the relationship between the label and the distributor, too. It’s something we’d reach later.... Because, for them, records mean everything that is well known.

Supermarkets sell only commercially successful titles, and that accounts for almost 60% of all the records released in France. This obviously influences the production strategy of recording industry that “has gone way too far in their policies of volume and sales figures in the short term” (Hidoux 1998), while privileging established variétés artists. For small and independent labels and distributors, a further difficulty is that, as Barré (1998) for Blue Silver reckoned, “we could not open an account with supermarkets. So we had to change our [independent] attitude, completely”. Today, for an expected large audience of Cheb Mami, he relies on a major company, Virgin, whereas “for products of their origin, for the specialised markets, we deal with them by ourselves. The Arab market, Barbès in Paris, it’s us ourselves that work directly with it, it’s been like this from the beginning” (Barré 1998).

There is more than one channel in which records are distributed in France. The music and audience they mediate do not seem identical: on the level of product formats, if hypermarchés, supermarchés and department stores sold 45.6% of singles and 40.2% of albums pressed in France in 1999 (SNEP), albums sales are more significant in the specialised megastore chains such as FNAC and Virgin Megastores (selling 16.4% of singles and 37.8% of albums).

**Megastore Chains**

According to the 1999 edition of *L’Officiel de la Musique*, there are 47 FNAC shops (13 outlets in Ile-de-France region, of which seven are in Paris), 55 Madison/Nuggets shops (16 in Ile-de-France of which two are in Paris), 50 Starter shops (nine in Ile-de-France of which two in Paris) and nine Virgin
Megastores (four in Ile-de-France of which three are in Paris) in France. The concentration in the capital (12.3%) is not as high as in Tokyo (16%: see p. 128), nor is the competition: the market is uncontestedly monopolised by FNAC (it accounted for 23.3% the entire record sales, which means 78.5% of the records sold by the megastore chains, in 1999 (SNEP)). "Regarding music, we emphasise on our wide range," said Hidoux (1998) of FNAC, "which must be the largest in its catchment area in any given city". Concerning Paris, which accommodates 14 megastores in total, the market is basically shared between FNAC and Virgin Megastore. There are three FNACs and two Virgin Megastores in and around the 8th arrondissement that covers the St.-Lazare station, the Louvre Museum, the Avenue des Champs-Elysées and the Arc de Triumph. In the south, the Montparnasse district contains a FNAC, a Virgin Megastore, a Madison/Nuggets and a Starter stores. The Place d’Italie holds a FNAC and a Madison/Nuggets. In the east, there is a FNAC at Bastille. In the north, there is a Starter shop at Montmartre. In the centre, finally, there is a FNAC in Forum-les-Halles.

In-shop space, as in Japan, classifies and rationalises the external musical space for product management. Besides a utilitarian taxonomy, there are two intersecting strategies that shape in-shop space. On the one hand, there is a set of general directions common to all the chains as a means to construct their corporate identities. Hidoux (1998), for example, explained FNAC's strategy as follows:

When you enter our shop, whether you like classical music, rock or chanson, we defend all kinds of music. So, we want our customers to circulate freely and calmly. We privilege their comfort. We don’t have the strategy, like Virgin, for example, which puts on music quite loudly. It is not our strategy. Moreover, it is true that in a shop, we have what we call a ‘hot zone’ and a ‘cold zone’. [...] So, we actually organise the distribution of our sections accordingly so that there is logic and progression. Whether it is towards the calm – that is, we enter from the noise and we walk towards the calmness as we approach jazz, world and classical music. Or, effectively, we enter the calm and we move towards the noisy side.

Virgin Champs-Elysées promotes a dynamic, festive image with its late-hour and Sunday opening policy and often organises live events concerning products or artists in its spacey entrance hall. FNAC Forum-les-Halles demonstrates its conscientious image with multiple in-shop listening systems that read barcodes of every record in the shop and play extracts from it. Each FNAC shop contains a space called a ‘forum’ to facilitate small concerts, conferences or exhibitions. Most of the FNAC shops deal with books, hi-fi, camera etc, on top of the records that in fact represent only about 25% of its annual turnover.

On the other hand, the megastores, particularly FNAC, emphasise what Hidoux (1998) called “a strong responsibilisation of each buyer". Each FNAC shop assumes a relative autonomy with regard to their selection of commodities and cultural actions – “a shop doesn’t have the freedom to say, for example, ‘we won’t do classical anymore,’ or ‘we won’t do techno’” because “our policy is to have the largest choice not only in the number of references but also the cohesion of genres“ (Hidoux 1998). Each FNAC shop is thus disposed to mediate between the centralised directives and local consumption patterns, while buyers have a relative freedom to choose what to buy in, which as a whole defines and
re-defines the shape of their stores. FNAC Forum-les-Halles, for example, has the greatest and most visible space for rap of all the outlets in Paris. Along with other FNACs in Toulouse, Marseilles and Lyon, it has also organised a series of rap workshops called Prose Combat, in collaboration with an independent association, Droit de Cité, from 1996. Alliance Ethnik's DJ/producer, Fast Jay, had been a buyer in FNAC Bastille until their record debut and is claimed to be responsible for having brought vinyls back to FNAC's shelves (see Bocquet and Pierre-Adolphe 1996, 165-6). A buyer in FNAC at Cergy, a northern banlieue of Paris, observed that "because of our clients, our shop has bigger funk and world music sections" and "as funk becomes important, as in our shop, the genre can be extracted as a single category, even if it used to be classified in 'international'".

In some FNAC shops in Paris, including the one at Forum-les-Halles, French rap is classified with US rap under one category of rap, while in others, as in FNAC Champs-Elysées, French rap is classified in the French variétés genre, separately from US rap shelved in the international variétés section. Hidoux (1998) argued this is "a big discussion for which there wouldn't be a clear-cut answer". There are two opposing dispositions conflicting even within himself regarding French rap which "today, in our sales statistics, is becoming extremely important" and US rap whose sales "have a tendency to decline in our company". He continued:

I'd rather think that, without playing with patriotism, which is not the point, I think French rap today ought to be shown as a new French expression [...] Me, I tend to say to myself, "Okay, there' was Brel, there was Brassens, there was Gainsbourg, etc [...] but today, there is French rap, there is French techno and I think that we ought to work with them in the same spirit". Well, this is my point of view. Now, there are others who say – from a marketing point of view – those who buy rap like to find French rap with US rap, rather than with Gainsbourg or Brassens. It's true. So, there is a little cultural, maybe intellectual aspect and there also is a more marketing aspect.

Perhaps it is interesting to note recursive assimilationalist rhetoric in the quote above. It is all the more problematic because, here, assimilation is associated with the 'cultural' and the 'intellectual', if not 'patriotism', whereas the dislocated identification towards US rap is associated with 'marketing', that is to say, with the commercialism.

In the 'street', the logic is the opposite: CDs sold in the megastores or the supermarkets are commercialised for a wider audience, whereas vinyls available in small, specialised shops are for a limited number of authentic hip-hop people. "FNAC does its own business," claimed Malherbe (1998) for Chrysalis. "It's not where you go to find bootlegs. You go there to buy CDs. Vinyls are to reach DJs, [...] CDs, on the contrary, are to reach the mass audience – no, a little wider audience – to reach the audience that does not have turntables, who is not a rapper or a DJ". Certainly, FNAC, or any other megastore chains for that matter, deal increasingly with vinyls, but their nationwide distribution structure is almost entirely adapted to CDs. SNEP's statistics referred to earlier reveals that, in terms of the ratio, independent record shops (singles 4.6% as opposed to albums 6.2%) are clearly more single-oriented than the megastores, if not as single-oriented as supermarkets. An economic reality is that an increasing number of independent shops are obliged to deal with vinyls to survive in the market monopolised by supermarkets and megastores. Kponton (1998) for Chronowax pointed out,
for independent CD shops, it's too hard. It's too much waste, no need to rival FNAC. They have to be specialised, they have to be ultra-specialised, be it in house, techno, rap, etc. It's for them that we have to stand". The overall importance of independent record shops in France declined from 9.8% in 1993 to 6% in 1999 (SNEP), with their number decreased from some 3,000 in 1972 to some 300 today in all of France (Lefeuvre 1998, 124).

**Specialist Shops and Vinyl Format**

Like in Japan, the rapid growth of megastore chains based on CDs has forced small independent record shops to deal with vinyls and specialise either in specific musical genres, or in the second-hand or collectors’ record market in France. The number of such shops has been drastically decreasing in general, but some of them still manage to resist in Paris because the capital is “big enough – with its 8,000,000 to 10,000,000 population, of which 300 may come to buy 500FF of vinyls, etc” (Grenfeld 1998). Unlike in Tokyo where record shops concentrate in the Shibuya (dance) and the Shinjuku (rock) areas today (see Figure 17 (p. 133)), spatial distribution of musical tastes in Paris seems more even and stable in reproducing its continuum for at least half a century. Figure 20 illustrates that the Grand Boulevard area is still very active musically; classical music and jazz remain centred in the intellectual Latin Quarter on the left bank; and rock – since BLOUSON NOIR – remains Montmartre. World music has two peaks: the northeastern areas around Barbès and Belleville gather Arabic, African and French Caribbean record (and cassette) shops, whereas the southern Place d’Italie area, Chinese, Cambodian or Vietnamese shops. Dance music is present in most of the neighbourhoods, of which techno, house and their derivatives concentrate in the central eastern area, stretched from Châtelet-les-Halles through the Marais to the Bastille districts, connected by as many as two métro lines and two RER lines today.

There are six shops in Paris, seven if including the banlieues, specialised in rap and hip-hop. There are also some stands in flea markets – notably that at Clignancourt, compiled as ‘Others/All Genres’ of the northern suburbs in the figure – that serious DJs ‘dig’ and where some graffiti artists sell their pieces on weekends. Clearly, where there are what street promoters denote as ‘strategic points’ – Châtelet-les-Halles, Montmartre and Bastille – there are specialist record shops. Given the dispersed nature of the two Montmartre shops – one at the north and the other at the east of the 18th arrondissement, we can note a relative concentration of hip-hop record shops in the Châtelet-les-Halles district. Fourneur (1998), manager of Ticaret, the first Parisian hip-hop boutique started in the area of la Chapelle/Place de Stalingrad explained why he moved to Châtelet-les-Halles in 1995 as follows:

The first three years I was without competition, and then I stayed [at Stalingrad] for another three years to keep the flame, but all the hip-hop shops opened [at Châtelet-les-Halles] one after another, and the new generation of people who don’t know about Ticaret began things here – there are many record shops and plenty of choice. At [the Place de] Stalingrad, you’ve got Ticaret, but that’s all. There was no café, no bar. There were no longer walls to tag either....

Ticaret is now closed, as Fourneur wanted to concentrate on his music career as a part of his legendary rap group, Moda et Dan, and developing Ticaret as a clothing brand. Yet, regarding the density of
shops not only dealing with records, but hip-hop outfits, accessories, mix-tapes and flyers, the area is safely considered as the hub of today's hip-hop scene in Paris. Groups of young breakdancers have appropriated the façade of the municipal music library as a dance floor, at the Porte St. Eustache, inside the subterranean Forum des Halles shopping centre. There is also always a flock of street teams distributing flyers and stickers at the top of the escalators from the Forum des Halles to rue Pierre Lescot, where there are the two most referred-to specialist record shops: Urban Music, more open to French rap titles, and Sound Records, more exclusively US and UK import titles.

Both of the two shops deal with vinyls imported directly from the USA or the UK that can be available a couple of months before their official French release. An average US 12-inch is proposed at around 40 to 50FF, while a French one at a slightly higher price tag between 50 and 70FF. Unlike in Japan, France has a sufficient number of analogue pressing factories, but the size of its analogue market and the recording industry's reluctance to commercialise vinyls, as we have seen earlier, keep the price "way out of reality" (Kponton 1998). Kponton (1998) for Chronowax that distributes exclusively hip-hop vinyls to small specialist shops in France and beyond, observed:

The big problem of the majors is that they don't have any strategy regarding vinyl. For them, it is a piece of shit. I mean, why is it that the majors sell a vinyl more expensively than indies? Because the majors think of nothing but one sole mode of function – the maximisation of profit. Today, in the USA, or in some other countries, even the majors understand that they have to release 12-inches and to reduce the price. A vinyl should be released before and be cheaper than a CD because it solidifies the base. In France, they don't understand this because, most of the time, a vinyl is released a month after a CD. The situation is a bit dramatic.

The price difference is often considered as inversely proportional to that of quality – "with US vinyls, you can scratch" but French vinyls are either "incredibly thick and heavy" or "too thin and too fragile" (Kponton 1998). Some independent labels prefer to press in the USA or in the UK. Dislocation to the USA and the UK is intrinsic to hip-hop legitimacy for the independent producers, small radio stations or illicit mix-tape DJs who are out of the list of prominent radio programmers and DJs to whom the major labels distribute their free 12-inch samples.

A certain quantity of not-for-sale French 12-inch samples, as in Texaco's (1998) comment quoted earlier, make their way to these shops. "It's a bit the rules of the game," Kponton suggested. "It's all about small shops, and FNAC wouldn't do it". Very often, it is under the table: employees of the labels bring some vinyls in to make some pocket money. However, increasingly, they 'leak' samples consciously, as it 'solidifies the base'. Kponton took a major label as an example:

> When they release promo vinyls that are not for sale, they call us and send us some in saying, "make a good use of it". They know that we'll sell them, but they know that their name will be the winner in the story. They know that we'll sell them in a good specialist corner, and they know that it'll make a good fan base.... So these are small shops, and it's not a big quantity. 50 copies max. It's quick. First of all, we take a copy for each of our employees, and then we send the rest to two or three clients, you know? And then you're not going to give these to shops in which vinyls are not immediately visible. You give them to good shops that are known, that you know that the owners will put them on their turntables so that their customers can listen to it....

The hip-hop record shops as well as hip-hop clothing shops at Châtelet-les-Halles also deal with mix-tapes, not only US but also French ones. The problem, again, is authorisation and clearance of concerning rights, and most of them are pressed and distributed by DJs themselves. "It is a service that we cater for [mix-tape] DJs," an assistant in a shop at the Châtelet-les-Halles area that proposes some 50 mix-tape titles said, "because otherwise they don't have the rights and they cannot make living. It is also for our customers, because they love to have some cassettes, and for us, too, because it keeps us busy". Collaboration is complicit, as doing so means attracting new customers, not only through the connection of the DJs, but also through their exposure on 'street' media such as associative radio stations or specialist fanzines or magazines. The shop assistant reckoned that "there are some who do mix-tapes and they say [on the radio] their products are available in our shop. It happens, but it only happens in underground programmes". It works fine, or at least for the moment. When I interviewed Fourneuf (1998) a few months before the closure of Ticaret shop, he reacted strongly, "in my opinion, it will pose a problem, but not today. It's inevitable – I don't know any activity that makes money that doesn't involve the state. It doesn't exist".

**Music Press**

**Hip-hop Journalism and Local Scene**

Hip-hop journalism in France, as in Japan, is instituted against the established rock and mainstream journalism that tended to treat rap as a fashionable fad. Sear (1998) who started *Get Busy* explained that he and two other guys (including Texaco for Wicked) started the pioneer hardcore hip-hop fanzine in France:
Because at the time there were a lot of articles [about rap and hip-hop] on the rock press or the general press in which people wrote nothing but bullshit and we got fed up after a while. We’re sick of them all and decided to do our own proper magazine, in the understanding that it ought to be people in the hip-hop milieu that should talk about it. [...]. So we started it like that, with means like photocopies, etc. Little by little, it grew in size. We appeared on television. We left a mark in the spirit of people. Little by little, it progressed, its quality improved. We imposed a radical tone that made the reputation of the magazine.

At the time when Get Busy started, there were almost only rock and world music magazines that dealt with artists like MC Solaar, while few channels were available for ‘hardcore’ artists. Before 1996, apart from some amateurish fanzines, L’Affiche was the only specialised magazine with national distribution that dealt with rap regularly, but its chief editor, Olivier Cachin, who also presented M6’s Rapline programme, was a controversial figure as a hip-hop insider, and, in all cases, it was and still is, as its subtitle suggests, a ‘magazine for other musics’ and inclined towards various alternative musics other than rap and hip-hop. Get Busy, thus, was considered as the most influential printed medium of the French underground hip-hop community so much so that, at least for a while, it managed to obtain advertisement from recording companies and attain some professionalism and quality. “Gradually, we discovered that we had to work with a computer, page layout, etc. We learnt things as time went by to improve the quality. And then we had to get money out of advertisement, so it was necessary to improve the presentation” (Sear).

The situation changed after the ‘upsurge’ of French rap: 1996 and 1997 saw a rush of new rap, black music or hip-hop magazines, such as Groove, Radikal and RER, each with national circulation of around 20 to 40,000 copies. Obviously, most of these titles are a part of larger publishing corporations for which rap is a means to reach a specific fragment of consumers – often characterised as a young male readership. L’Affiche is published by les Editions Larivière that proposes an authoritative rock magazine, Rock & Folk, and a techno magazine, Remix, together with an assorted titles on aeroplanes, cars and motorcycles. Groove is, like its fellow reggae/ragga publication Ragga, heavy-metal Hard & Heavy, alternative Rock Sound, techno Trax and world-music World, one of the music titles that Freeway Multimedia (XO Publishing from 2001) proposes with a sampler CD, based on so-called ‘plus product’ strategy to target low- to middle-teen without enough pocket money to buy every commercialised CDs reviewed in the magazine. Les Editions du Bruit proposes a rap and ragga magazine RER and an alternative rock magazine Rage, together with some pedagogical titles such as Guitar & Bass and Play Record. Radikal maintained its independence from the major press corporations, yet announced its association with Magic!, an equally independent rock magazine and Vibrations, a highbrow rock/world music magazine from 2001. The prevailing understanding among the recording industry personnel I interviewed was that fanzines, even Get Busy, were losing their influence in the face of the commercial magazines. “They could not survive in Paris,” argued Azoulay (1998) for Polydor. “They’re all dead, and today, there remain some of them, but a bit more institutionalised, a bit more commercial”.

Fanzines were then urged to redefine themselves and their hip-hop legitimacy. The necessity
seems all the more urgent given some of the emergent commercial magazines began claiming hip-hop authenticity in much similar terms in a national arena. It is not very difficult, for example, to identify similarities between Sear's claim quoted earlier and following comment by Milton (1998), publication director of *Radikal*.

In fact, at the base, we wanted to do a fanzine. We wanted a fanzine because we have friends who were into rap in Lyon and in Bordeaux, and that the only magazine that was in the market did not satisfy those in the province. There was no magazine that was really hip-hop. [....] So, in the beginning, we're talking about a fanzine, but gradually, given that there was no hip-hop magazine, we realised that we could well do one. Although it requires more work, it's easy to do so without much trouble. The thing was that we didn't have the money for it. So, willingly, we tried to find all the possible systems to launch it without spending money. We started it with 10 employees, in an eleven-square-metre room.

For *Radikal*, the rivalling magazines are either flirting with other music or neglecting the DJing, breakdancing and graffiti art that, with rap, constitute hip-hop culture. "We're not a rap magazine," claimed Milton:

We're a hip-hop magazine. [....] All the disciplines of hip-hop are transcribed in this magazine. We're the only one in the world, even in comparison with the US market, to have a dedicated dance section every month. Equally, we're the only magazine that has so many pages on graffiti. We put out five pages in the first year. In the second year, we extended them to seven. Now, we'll have ten. Even magazines like *The Source* [a US rap magazine] have no page on graffiti. We have ten pages. Why? Because in the hip-hop community, graffiti is important.

In admitting that "we obligatorily depend on advertisement, because without it, we cannot exist," Milton claimed that "it's not that we sell advertisement space that we do such and such type of interview or report" and "if we put an artist on the front cover, it's because we want it. It's not because there is a backdoor deal with a label". "The big problem of *Radikal*," he went on, "is that, given that we're completely independent, before getting to a label, we contact artists directly, which upsets the label seriously because they cannot manage the artists' images".

One big difference between underground fanzines and commercial magazines is their size of readership (*Get Busy* circulated around 3,000 copies irregularly, whereas *Radikal* around 30,000 monthly). The press distribution system in France is a typical oligopoly by three leading companies (NMPP (*Nouvelles Messageries de la Presse Parisienne*), MLP (*Messageries Lyonnaises de Presse*) and *Transports-Service*). The commercial press's reliance on the national press distributors, argues Sear (1998), predetermines their contents and editorial disposition.

To be distributed to kiosks and newsagents, you have to join NMPP, a press distribution company. They take 60% off you. On 20FF, you have to give them 12FF. Namely, they leave you with 8FF to pay your printer, journalists and all other expenses. To manage this, you need a big circulation, something like 20 to 30,000 copies minimum. Printing them costs around 200 to 300,000FF. That means that it's not from what you sell that you can
survive. You'd have to survive with advertisement, practically 80%. That is, recording companies make you survive. [...] So, all the magazines in kiosks are the pets of the recording companies because they are so much obliged to be so. So, independence does not exist.

Indeed, on *Radikal*, hip-hop legitimacy is translated as a professionalism that urges the magazine to “reflect what is happening in the scene”. Namely, “it’s true that we did the front cover with Stormy [Bugsy], with Passi. It’s because they are really trendy in the scene. And our profession is to speak about it,” whereas on *Get Busy*, Sear is “happy to call hopeless artists hopeless because there must be someone who tells them the truth”.

Their hip-hop authenticity seems legitimised only relatively to the structure of the field and dispositions of its participants at a given time. In the process of differentiation, fanzines and magazines become increasingly complementary, each assuming its role and specialisation. In many ways, it looks as if *Radikal’s* current struggle with other commercial rap magazines is to define and maintain hip-hop culture as opposed to others, notably against the mainstream culture, whereas *Get Busy* was urged to re-define ‘underground’ authenticity within that hip-hop culture, in order for it to exist meaningfully in the field that is becoming autonomised and professionalised. Each in its own way claims its editorial autonomy and hip-hop legitimacy, and equally each in its own terms is eager to be recognised politically, economically and culturally by more people, to be exposed to a larger market. Sear was, at the time of the interview, quite eager to explore alternative ways to distribute *Get Busy* nationwide and told me about his potential collaboration with FNAC “because, it’s a good challenge. I can sell as much as other [commercial] magazines without passing through NMPP, while remaining independent”. Chatillon (1998) for the underground video-zine, *FBS*, too, told me about its distribution projects with FNAC or Virgin Megastore chains, while maintaining its tie with the underground scene and emergent cutting-edge artists. For *FBS*, above all, to shoot videos with artists is not to examine them: “it’s a camera and we don’t intend to question – it’s the groups that do their promotion…. That’s the primal concept”. Other titles like *Da Niouz* or *Down With This* became available in kiosks by 1999. After a long silence for more than a year, *Get Busy* released its first ‘restored’ issue available in kiosks in March 2001.

The difference is increasingly inscribed institutionally, each assuming and confirming its own role in the construction of hip-hop scene. Regardless of their editorial policies and artistic selections, both magazines and fanzines propose different readerships for labels to expose their artists. Commercial magazines feature, with degrees of spontaneity or reluctance, leading artists and their records as doing so responds to their readers’ expectations and attracts them further. “In a fanzine,” as Azoulay (1998) for Polydor pointed out, “they have a real editorial choice. If they don’t like a group, they don’t talk about it. If they talk about it, it’s because they like it”. Namely, once it is about the artists they like, fanzines defend them, not only economically, but also often culturally, politically or sometimes even emotionally. In marketing terms of hip-hop, winning support from the ‘street’ is crucial and having a fanzine on their side does not do any harm to the marketing personnel of the labels. Sear, for example, collaborated with NTM and Epic Sony for a free magazine, *Authentik*, from April 1998. He commented:
NTM is a group that we have been defending and pushing from the beginning. It has never been imposed by the label in whatever way. [...] Get Busy is an independent magazine. Even for Authentik, I'm very independent from the label. I choose the content with NTM and, frankly, I decide 98% and they always say, "that's fine". They trust me. I don't advise them how they make music, so they don't intervene in my domain.

The solo careers of the ex-Ministère A.M.E.R. rappers, too, are said to be largely facilitated by a local fanzine. Gomis (1998), Stormy Bugsy's A&R, pointed out that "fanzines have an importance with which we don't have problem, concerning our artists". There is no apparent creative control as far as fanzines are for their artists. Otherwise, as Mande (1998) for Payback Recordz argued, "it's nothing but personal connection. That is, if one guy knows a rapper X, he features this rapper, claiming him to be the best and all that. It's not professional. So, I would not base my press campaign on fanzines because it's not clear. If they like us, and if we don't have any conflict with them, they do a good trick, otherwise they ruin everything”.

The US scene is eagerly referred to in fanzines, yet when it comes to US artists, fanzines have to rely inevitably on recording companies and here, the lack of readership and economic relationship with recording companies can be a problematic restriction. The hip-hop press is indispensable for recording companies to promote US artists because, unlike the broadcasting media, the written press is not subject to the francophone song quota. “For international promotion, we have to arrange interesting press coverage” (Beguin 1998) and “the general media, like radio, show perhaps 1/10 of US rap releases. In the press, there are more chronicles and reviews of US rappers” (Azoulay 1998).

According to Malherbe (1998) for Chrysalis:

Technically, it's very easy. Now, for example, we foresee that the next album of Gang Starr would be out in December and there is a release party in New York, with DJ Premier and all that, who would play some titles from the new album, we ask them to receive some journalists and they agree. So, we send three magazines, L'Affiche, RER and Groove.

As Malherbe (1998) suggested, the marketing strategy for US rappers in France is more in terms of their crossover exposure to rock magazines such as Vibrations (in the case of Gang Starr) and Les Inrockuptibles (in the case of Rakim) than their insertion in fanzines that "are more important regarding domestic rappers". US artists are important references for the hip-hop legitimacy and there often are record reviews and other small articles in various fanzines, yet their exposure is quite limited in these pages. Even Get Busy has to “depend on opportunities because recording companies don't pay us the trip to the USA – we aren't considered as important, we aren't important enough for them to pay the press trip – so we have to wait until the artists come to France for concert or promotion” (Sear 1998).

Instead of confronting with recording companies and rivalling commercial rap and hip-hop magazines, fanzines seek to establish their street legitimacy in dealing with authentic French artists, introducing new talents and announcing the latest up-dates in a very specific locality. It seems almost as if there were a mutually complicit division of labour regarding US and French rap. Namely, on the one hand, Milton (1998) argued:
Here, the front cover of this summer was Rakim. He's the living god of hip-hop who has done so many things. So we talk about US rap for the old [fans], but equally for the youths because, of the new generation that buys us because it likes French rap, there are some who are interested in US rap. So, it's for them, too, that we do a bit of history.

On the other hand, Sear (1998) argued:

Today, if you make a fanzine, French rap must attain at least the half of your magazine, [...] You see? We know that our readers want more and more of French rap. The scene has developed and articles on the French scene have become more relevant. [...] But I don't feature a group for money. What counts is the talent. Out of four equally talented artists that need promotion, if one cannot afford a huge media campaign, I can help this guy, obviously.

To tell the good talent from the bad, fanzines have constantly to get down to their street neighbourhoods – “like there's a concert, you see the artist who says, ‘Look, I got this album out. Have you got any space to help me out?' ‘Okay, we'll stay in touch’”. In the case of Chatillon (1998), the activities for FBS often stretches out from just shooting videos, to advising some groups concerning street promotion and designing stickers, logos and record sleeves for them, as his first involvement in hip-hop culture was through graffiti. Fanzines, with or without aspiration to national circulation, are reliant on and disposed to represent a locally specific 'street' – they are distributed through a so-called 'underground network' – independent record shops, clothing shops, nightclubs and mail-order service in Paris and other larger cities and their banlieues, unlike commercial magazines for whom "it's too complicated and too painstaking to send magazines to lots of different specialised places and take the inventory every month" (Milton 1998).

Nightclubs

Dance Regulation, Banlieues and Identification

As we have seen in the previous chapters, pressing of vinyls is indispensable for hip-hop artists to reach radio and club DJs. Increasingly, recording companies are becoming aware of the importance of reaching mix-tape DJs or so-called street DJs directly or indirectly. "I am as much committed to club DJs as street DJs," LBR (1998) for Delabel told me. "My role is to send vinyls to DJs concerned, so that they can play them in parties or on street tapes or on the radio, according to the specialised programmes, concerning all dance music, including hip-hop". Mande (1998) for Payback Recordz suggested:

Today, we have a sufficient number of DJs to press promotional 12-inch singles that we give them. Before, there were only two or three DJs but today there are thousands of them. So you press vinyls and send them. They'll play them in their parties. It's quite pinpointed today. It's quite specific and small labels as well as the majors approach intermediary companies that do it.

Each street promotion company has its own list of DJs and other 'tastemakers', the quality of which "more or less defines the quality of the company itself" (Nicola 1998). That is, "according to their power in the scene, they see more or less people, it depends on the risk they have, their connection to the milieu. A good promoter has a long list. Smaller ones have small lists. And then, it depends on
the quality of relationship” (Nicola 1998). Club promotion, comprised of distributing flyers and stickers in and around given clubs and, equally importantly, seeing DJs and handing sample 12-inches to them in such places, is thus very important not only for the recording companies and DJs, but also for the street promoters that mediate in between.

Nicola’s (1998) remark above is a logical one, given, as street promotion becomes recognised by the recording companies and the number of street promoters augments, that each is drawn into competition with regard not only to the quantity of contacts but also to the quality of connection to the scene. Texaco (1998) for Wicked claimed that he had more than 100 names in his tastemaker files embracing “hip-hop people, music industry people or fashion industry people who like hip-hop”. He has “a tight connection with DJs who spin in their parties” who are “VIPs of each city”. In a nightclub, knowing a DJ is just not enough: it requires a very specific skill to negotiate with the DJ, the organiser, the audience and the record the promoter brings in. Grevery (1998) for Double H Productions, for example, explained:

You can use a nightclub to contact DJs, you see, give them your products etc. The only thing we do is to distribute new releases, promo copies, so that the guys have them for sure. It's not immediate, it's not an effective means. The point is that there is a way, in that we shouldn't push our product too much. We should not force DJs to play a tune such and such times in a party. [...] Of course, for certain, they play our music, but concerning the audience, maybe, it's not efficient, given that, you know, if you hear a same song repetitively in a same party. Well.... We cannot really focus only on our song.

“If flyering is well done, if you have a good system of street promotion,” Nicola (1998) assured, “by the end of the party, it would be totally packed”. Hip-hop parties I attended were often crowded, particularly those with well-known DJs, with various degrees of dress codes and mixture of male and female audience. Equally often, around the pinnacle of the party, groups of street promoters began distributing flyers informing the latest releases of albums, singles or sometimes mix-tapes, or next parties by the same DJs or related artists and groups. The effervescence is thus projected to and reproduced in the future.

The problem, however, is that “there isn't any H.I.P. H.O.P. club, as far as I know, like, at the time, there was le Globo, which was really HIP-HOP” (Grevery 1998). More precisely, “a [hip-hop club] cannot exist” (LBR 1998) because of the damage – and the images – of the violence involved. Many insiders told me of violent incidents involved in hip-hop shows either patronisingly or regretfully. Chazelle (1998) for Shaman argued that “in general you cannot complete a [hip-hop] party without a problem, [...]. It's stupid. Little by little, because of these small problems, [the authorities] can succeed in moving people away from rap, you know, there is a phenomenon of refusal and rejection”. Fourneuf (1998) for Ticaret argued, “there have always been conflicts of groups and, the city is large and if you have a conflict with some guys, you don't know where they live [...] but hip-hop clubs, you know, everyone goes there. So, there they settle the scores”. Only once during my field research, I came across such a scene, triggered by an open-mic freestyle in which one of the participants 'dissed' the featured DJ and rappers who were from a neighbourhood other than his. The DJ tackled him, but the manager quickly intervened and brought him to the staff area. LBR (1998)
explained that "those who listen to hip-hop are cool, but besides that, there are so many social problems in the cités and the banlieues, which is very hard. So, they sometimes react violently in parties, and because of this, hip-hop clients are difficult to manage". I cannot tell if hip-hop is really violent. At least I do not have such an impression from my own experience. Yet it is also true that violence is often too easily associated with hip-hop and its milieu – the street and the banlieues – by the mainstream media and, from around the 'upsurge' of French rap, ironically, hip-hop is no longer a good idea for nightclub managers and event organisers.

In political and economic terms, club owners and event organisers have their own good reason. Since 1945, show business in France, except cinema, has been classified into the six categories of 1. national theatres; 2. other fixed theatres; 3. theatrical tours and mobile theatres exclusively devoted to dramatic, lyrical or choreographic art; 4. symphonic or other concerts, diverse and choral orchestras; 5. marionette theatres, artistic cabarets, café-concerts, music-halls and circuses; and 6. fairground attractions, song and dance exhibitions in public places and any curiosity and variety shows (Pontier et al. 1996, 205). Unlike the first four categories, the last two, less consecrated culturally, require prior authorisation, hence are subject to surveillance by the police, although censorship on show performance has been formally abolished since 1906 in France. According to an insider:

It's very difficult to organise rap shows in Paris, particularly in certain arrondissements. [...]. Generally, a concert is authorised before its date, but for certain contents, notably hip-hop ones, the police doesn't authorise them in time – sometimes we receive an authorisation the day after. That means, if there were the smallest of problem, the concert organiser runs a risk of having their license withdrawn. In consequence, it happens that tour promoters and concert organisers [...] prefer sometimes not to take a risk. Because, these concerts are very likely to degenerate for reasons linked to the hip-hop audience, the rivalry among small groups, etc. [...] Tour organisers do not want to take responsibility because they have the right to refuse, and it's normal. Because, imagine, someone is injured during the concert, the next day....

The difficulty is that the law dictates that an event organiser is responsible not only for what is inside a nightclub or concert halls, but also what is outside – not least concerning neighbourhood disturbance with noise and lighting level, but also damage deriving from the queue and clients refused at the door. Renard (1999), a business school student and ragga musician of West Indian origin, who was organising some concerts as the working experience project for his school, explained that the difficulty derived not directly from the police but from "the people who come to the party. Even if we refuse to let them enter, they would break everything outside, like cars or cash distributors. So, clubs are now refusing anything named 'hip-hop'".

Another problem linked to the refusal of hip-hop in Paris is that of insurance covering the potential damage concerning a show or a party, which is one of the conditions to obtain the authorisation. Specialised insurance companies study a project disposed, and, as Renard (1999) argued, there is a "very systematic rejection of hip-hop projects" and event organisers, such as him, have to fuse different musical genres or use different descriptive terms to realise their project such as 'vieille école (old school)', 'groove', 'black', '80s funk', etc. In Renard's case, it is 'Universoul', which
puts together “reggae, ragga, funk and above all, soul” and in which “hip-hop appears in small letters, which is already quite risky”. There is practically no nightclub specialised in hip-hop in and around Paris. There are a few regular hip-hop parties in some Parisian nightclubs, some irregular ones and many eclectic clubs and parties that “mix customers and genres” (LBR 1998). Figure 21 depicts the occurrence of nightclub events in terms of musical genres and days of the week in and around Paris in the four weeks starting from 1 March 1999, based on the listing pages on Nova magazine. It clearly shows that House/Disco genre dominates Parisian night of the sampled period with 90 events, together with Latin genre (mostly salsa) with 54 occurrences and Groove with 42 occurrences. Hip-hop is very absent (only 17 occurrences). The tendency is further acute in weekends, in which the hip-hop occurrence does not surpass that of Wednesdays in which LBR spins at les Bains, one of the trendiest nightspots in Paris. Given the importance of Friday and Saturday nights for nightclub business, hip-hop seems to be considered not effective to attract clients, or not desirable to be programmed on the days when a larger number of clients are expected. The former is less likely given the popularity of rap music in terms of record sales in France.

Despite the ‘upsurge’ of French rap and institution of hip-hop as an autonomous art and culture in France with its own ‘street’ aesthetics and authenticity, and specialised critics, journalism and other intermediaries, the space in which it is practised is diminishing in geographic terms. Figure 22 rearranges the data from the same period in terms of location of events in Paris. It is easy to grasp a correspondence to the geographic distribution of specialist record shops (see Figure 20 (p. 200)), except the Champs-Elysees area that accommodates all that is fashionable for mass and tourist consumption. Rock events tend to concentrate in the Pigalle/Montmartre area whereas house, techno and their derivative genres in and around the Marais and Bastille/Oberkempf area. Hip-hop parties, as hip-hop record shops, are not very present in Paris. There is, together with posters and stickers, a peculiar erasure of hip-hop from Paris. Mande (1998) for Payback Recordz claimed:

We don’t have the right to bill in Paris, apart from its gates, as they are not Paris, and in the banlieues. [...] It fucks up small labels and small music a bit. And then, many concert halls and music venues were closed, as much because of the decibels as because of the same story [of the authoritarian interdiction]. [...] The government does not care about the youths: the more there are young people, the more there is insecurity. The more there is this, the more there is that. So, concert venues are closed, [...]. They closed halls and clubs. However, everyone knew what was going on in the clubs. It was not because of the music or the people, it was because of another problem that comes from
the state and the way it sees tomorrow's politics and the way it sees Paris. They want Paris to be only offices and grand avenues of beautiful things for tourists. They don't want people to enjoy themselves, which is not very logical because when there are inhabitants, they have to enjoy themselves. Otherwise, they'd start a war.

It does not mean that hip-hop is more present in the banlieues either. Certainly, specialist hip-hop magazines and fanzines list a few other events in the banlieues in the same period sampled, yet, as LBR (1998) pointed out, “there are clubs in the banlieues that are more funk and R&B, because there are many beurs. There are clubs like Nelson or Triangle in the banlieues, but they attract customers who are not particularly into hip-hop and they don't play hip-hop all night”. Hip-hop in Paris is a phenomenon of the banlieues, but it is misleading to assume that the banlieues are an autonomous and homogeneous entity: it intrinsically needs Paris. The banlieues’ political, economic and cultural significance for hip-hop is only defined and constructed through its insertion into – and rejection by – Paris.

What remains arguable is that whether hip-hop is really a simple product of resistance against authoritarian censorship and nightclub or billing regulations. The banlieues, in plain terms, are not so coherently against Paris, nor are they so homogeneously hip-hop. The same can be said of the Tokyoite hip-hop scene and the Entertainment and Amusement Trades Control Act, in that, as we have seen, the club space turned out to contain rather incoherent clients with regard to hip-hop’s street legitimacy. In Tokyo as in Paris, both within recording companies and in other related industries outside of it, we have seen a series of divert, unmatched and contested taxonomic assumptions and practices that are confronted and negotiated to define and circumscribe the 'street' of hip-hop culture. It seems insufficient to explain the relationship between hip-hop and the authorities as a Foucauldian disciplining of the deviance by the modern power. Stuart Hall (1996b), with whose quote I have started this thesis, argues in reviewing Foucault’s earlier and later writings that “it is not enough for

Source: Nova (1999)
the Law to summon, discipline, produce and regulate, but there must also be the corresponding production of a response (and thus the capacity and apparatus of subjectivity) from the side of the subject" (12). Certainly, various forms of regulation on dance, graffiti, music and noise in Japan and in France categorise the social space, label the deviances, restrict the bodies and channel the pleasure. Yet, it is also true that the 'street' is constructed, maintained and reproduced by various mediation strategies, not only to act against the moral and public order that the regulation advocates, but also to make their living out of the opposition. It is as subjective and spontaneous an experience as an objective and professional one, so much so that, as Renard (1999) grumbled on the terrace of a café, "can you imagine the consequence? If hip-hop dies tomorrow.... How many people live on that culture today?" Hip-hop, as many people I interviewed in the two cities claimed, 'saved their lives'. Literally, it saved them from being homeless, alcoholics or, for better or worse, just ordinary salaried workers. Yet again, once instituted, the 'street' can be obstinate, and needs to reproduce the institutionalised deviance for and on which they live, in the face of relatively – only relatively – newer and more authentic definitions of the 'street' (as we have traced its transformation in Part II), because cultural identity is never simply reducible to the material conditions in which it is produced.
Everywhere, the 'street' is considered the ground and guarantee of all reality, a compulsory logic explaining all Black Music, conveniently mishearing antisocial surrealism as social realism. ... Techno Theory, CultStuds et al lose their flabby bulk, their lazy, pompous, lard-arsed, top-down dominance, becoming but a single component in a thought synthesizer which moves along several planes at once, which tracks Machine Music’s lines of force. ... But machines don’t distance you from your emotions, in fact quite the opposite. Sound machines make you feel more intensely, along a broader band of emotional spectra than ever before in the 20th century.

Eshun 1998, 00[-004-2]

Thesis, a thesis asserted by urban people starting in 1789, all through the nineteenth century, and in the great revolutionary uprisings at the end of World War One: the streets belong to the people. Antithesis, and here is Le Corbusier’s great contribution: no streets, no People. In the post-Haussmann city street, the fundamental social and psychic contradictions of modern life converged and perpetually threatened to erupt.

Berman 1983, 167-8

For example, when a cité remains unchanged in terms of its axiological disposition while its ville transforms drastically in terms of its physical reality, the urbanity is impoverished. This is exactly what was happening in Japan during its high-growth period: While highways were constructed above the Nihon-bashi [a symbolical centre of Tokyo], salaried workers hung picture scrolls of phoenix on the alcove walls in their homes. Or, when a society fixes its urban structure maintaining its ostensible stability, despite its own specific changes, it also ruins the urbanity. This is what was happening in Paris during the same period: hidden behind the Haussmanian impeccable urban planning are social and economic realities that today have little to do with the era of Haussmann.

Berque 1993, 73-4

So, what has been changed? Such may well be the question that this conclusive chapter ought to answer. To do so, I would like to inspect what we have seen in Part II and III in the four terms with which I designed this research in Part I: globalisation, localisation, production and consumption.

At the level of globalisation, neither French rap nor Japanese rap seems to question, subvert or transform the de facto global domination of Anglo-American popular music that has been established in the course of the twentieth century with the development of the modern, disembedded industrial music production system based on the media technologies. In many ways, the US supremacy in hip-hop culture is further reconfirmed, reproduced and reinforced through its globalisation to and localisation in Japan and France. It is hardly possible, and few professionals envisage, as we have seen, that a French rapper or a Japanese rapper reaches the international markets without passing through the USA. The best known French rapper in the world is unfailingly MC Solaar, whose popularity is linked to their collaboration with US rapper Guru. Microphone Pager or Scha Dara Parr may be known in the world, whose popularity, similarly, cannot be explained without, for the former, the participation in Tommy Boy’s Planet Rap (1993) compilation album and, for the latter, the collaboration with De La Soul’s Bahlöön Mind State (1993) album. Most often, as it were, French and Japanese rappers are deprived of the voice as they globalise, as in the cases of DJ Honda, DJ Cam or DJ Krush (see Yasuda 2000). The USA, from the sound engineering to artist management, from
marketing methodology to the quality of pressing 12-inch vinyls, is often considered superior and more authentic.

The hierarchic sense of being in this global systemicity is intrinsically implicated in the local field of popular music production in the two countries: it is a highly motivated process derived from a systematic downgrading of what is available in the local space. The following two reflections should be revealing. In Le Rap ou La Fureur de Dire (Rap or the Rage to Say), Georges Lapassade (1990) argues:

Contrary to what happened in the United States, French rap did not start in the street. The American rap model was transported there when it had already been passed from the street to the cultural industry. In France, from the beginning, one almost always rapped in English and was oriented toward the media and show business, [...]. (10-1)

With a striking similarity, Japanese hip-hop critique Atsushi Innami (1996) observes:

[...], hip hop that had originally been a street level music brought forward by underclass blacks, somehow managed to be consumed as "the latest trend," in crossing the ocean eastwards. Behind this tendency that coincided with the decline of new wave music, was a scheme of a class of people in search for a substitution for rock style, who turned to hip-hop. So, naturally, immediately after its importation, it was in no way established as a culture rooted in the street. (200)

Hip-hop's 'street' legitimacy in the two cities, as we have seen, derived from the denigration of the 'media', the 'show business' and the 'fashion'. Namely, US hip-hop authenticity was not forcefully imposed in the two markets, but was seen authentic precisely because the way it was introduced in the two markets by the fashion industry and the large-scale show business was found deceptive. It is through such processes that the opposition has been localised, hip-hop's street legitimacy instituted and hip-hop meaningful and valuable in France and Japan.

At a local level, however, as the French and Japanese hip-hop scenes attain autonomy and as their 'street' logic becomes inscribed in the local social spaces, the 'black' and the 'America' of hip-hop become highly ambiguous. Black America, seen from the French and Japanese scenes of the 1990s, is at once hip-hop's authentic origin and the symbol of its commercialisation. On the one hand, as we have seen, local artists are striving to differentiate their art - rap in French or rap in Japanese - from deceptive French rap or Japanese rap, with their identification dislocated towards the origin of their art. On the other hand, hip-hop's black nationalism was denounced as a 'gadget' in France, and 'hip-hop journalism' was differentiated from existing 'black journalism' in Japan. By the same token, collaborations between French or Japanese artists and US artists both legitimise local artists' hip-hop authenticity and give rise to their deception towards US artists who do not do anything unless money is involved and who more often than not despise local talents and scenes. A Japanese rap group asked US artist to produce an album but was responded with a contract suggesting that the group pays a certain percentage of all its future record sales to the US artist. A US artist invited by a French rap group to their recording session ruined the project as the artist failed in the first take, and demanded an extra charge for the second take. There have been many rumours of the kind heard during my field research, and, at each occasion, the 'purity' of the local scene is reconfirmed. It is not unusual, nor
surprising, to find anti-Afrocentric and/or anti-American rap in the French and Japanese hip-hop scenes as they become more significantly inscribed in the local social space and increase their local autonomy.

Then, have the inscription and autonomisation of the hip-hop legitimacy in the local social spaces undermined or transformed the local social order? Here again, the localisation of hip-hop in France and Japan does not seem to have altered the logic of cultural distinction among the legitimate, the mediocre and the vulgar within the local field of cultural production, as it has not been throughout the twentieth century. The social reproduction of the three hierarchical classes of culture is also clearly internalised in the process of the local autonomisation of hip-hop culture in France and Japan, in that the process entails the three dispositions to distinction – among 'LB', 'hardcore' and 'sell-out' in Tokyo and 'cool', 'hardcore' and 's' in Paris. The Parisian opposition between the legitimate and the vulgar has been clearly reproduced and is embodied by hip-hop in the same way as CHANSON, jazz and rock. The same is observed of the Tokyoite hip-hop scene, and of ENKA, jazz and rock. We also have seen clearly the difference between the two local scenes, linked to urbanisation and suburbanisation proper to the two cities. The opposition between the intra-muros and the extra-muros remains central in the Parisian construction of hip-hop 'street', while the geographic fluidity of such opposition informs the Tokyoite construction of it. In Paris, hip-hop’s ‘street’ may be used interchangeably with ‘cité’ or ‘quartier’ where communal dance parties and gatherings of neighbourhood youngsters are held. In Tokyo, on the contrary, hip-hop’s ‘street’ is constructed on the deprivation of the neighbourhood community and the distrust of dance, which dislocates the ‘street’ to the central entertainment districts. This all said, however, it must be quickly stated that the difference I have highlighted above should be understood above all as a product of a deliberate comparison. It should not be conflated with transhistorical notion of what Paris and Tokyo are seen in anytime, nor with transgeographic notion of what Paris and Tokyo are seen from anywhere. That is, neither Paris nor Tokyo as we have seen them emerged from an internal, essentialistic logic with a coherent objective and intention. They are not closed to external, hybridising influences.

That hip-hop’s globalisation has given rise to its localisation and subsequent autonomisation in Paris and Tokyo as a means even to challenge hip-hop’s black and American origin seems to invalidate the argument of American cultural imperialism. Yet, then again, the post-modern disappearance of centre does not hold to explain the phenomena we have observed, for what is increasingly striking are, as globalisation and localisation undergo, similarities, despite the difference outline above. This is not to say that a dominant global culture has overridden local cultures, but to say that the institutional structure of musical production, relying on recording technologies and processes of recording, manufacturing, distribution and consumption, all in securing local differences, become increasingly transcending conventional political boundaries and mostly exchangeable in the globalising market place. Figure 23 shows, compactly, sequential extension of the media institutions on per capita basis in France and in Japan during the century I dealt with in Part II. Despite the pronounced national differences, such as Japan as an electronic superpower (cf. Yoshimi 1999) or France as an obstinate guardian of literary or theatrical creativity (cf. M. Mattelart 1988), the sequences are more or less orderly and synchronised, while the music industries are clearly reproduced on an enlarged scale. It
seems to underwrite, among other things, Giddens’ (1990) argument that “the globalising tendencies of modernity [...] connect individuals to large-scale systems as part of complex dialectics of change at both local and global poles” (177).

Globalisation and localisation of hip-hop is governed by a modern systemicity as such. ‘Street’ authenticity of French and Japanese hip-hop cultures is neither reducible to immaculate continuum of black and/or American culture(s), nor can it be explained in terms of equally essentialist notion of Japanese or French cultural and musical heritages. Geographically, the ‘street’ not only extends to the South Bronx, New York inner-cities or even more overriding entities of black and America, but also to the impoverishment of the Parisian banlieue or to the collapse of communal space in the Tokyoite suburbs. Historically, it not only refers back to the bitter memory of black slavery in America(s), but also to the rejection arose from the authoritarian production of industrial work forces in Japan, or to that arose from the mainstream ghettoisation of immigrant youths in France. In so doing, hip-hop shapes a transnationally disposed space, intrinsically inscribed in its own mediatisation, that interconnects and hierarchises disperse places on the globe, while instituting a particular network of intermediaries that lives for and on this culture. In this light, hip-hop’s street must be seen in its relation to the industrial cultural production and dislocatedness of ‘street’ that it brings about. As we have seen in Part II, ‘street’ has been an integral part of the music industries since an early stage of their inception. Mingled with some populist discourses, ‘street’ has been a place in which popular music is ‘discovered’ and diffused ever since.

At the level of production, Adornoian denunciation of the culture industry clearly does not hold as far as what we have seen is concerned. Commodities the cultural industry produces are not all identical: what we have seen is a ceaseless competition of differentiation and distinction. It does not
produce 'eternal consumers' uncritically submitted to 'the false society', for, as in Hall's (1996b) passage I quoted towards the end of the last chapter, construction of identity is not a product of domination, but the "corresponding production of a response" (12) to such domination. Hip-hop, itself clearly dependant on the culture industry and the technologies of mechanical sound reproduction, is sharply, sometimes even militantly, reactive against its intellectual abstraction and commercial incorporation as the 'fake' and the 'sell-out'. Moreover, what we have seen are processes in which hip-hop has transformed the administrative and management structure of music production in the two countries. In this light, instead of being tamed and controlled, hip-hop culture has been challenging, transgressing and altering the conventional political, economic and cultural practices of the popular music industries.

However, at the same time, it does not qualify the arguments around consumerism, active audience and symbolic resistance, either. As in Hall's (1996b) argument, "the corresponding production of response" coincides with that of "the capacity and apparatus of subjectivity" (12). Namely, cultural resistance inherently seeks to organise and materialise its offence and defence. It is true that hip-hop in Tokyo and Paris is, as we have seen, lived by its 'hardcore' community as a resistance not only against the mainstream values, audience or music production system but also against their ignorance or rejection of this street culture. Even the 'black America' is locally re-appropriated to challenge the legitimate national culture in France and Japan. Yet, we have also seen that the street resistance is inherently instituting, structuring and networking the 'street' both to the globe and to the local. Precisely, 'street' cannot be intelligible as such unless it is organised in and articulated to the modern taxonomic social space. Hip-hop is about this quintessentially modern struggle of social insertion, rather than striving to stay outside of modernity. Only inside the modern taxonomic space that one can claim to be outside of it. In other words, as Berman (1980) argues, "to be fully modern is to be anti-modern" (14).

Hip-hop's street as a position of resistance therefore is not before or after nor left or right of modernity, historically, geographically or otherwise. It is a position inscribed in modernity, disposed to produce its own difference in such space. Bauman (1990) argues that modernity is this taxonomic system that surveys, identifies and defines friends and enemies in eliminating ambiguity.

Order is not aimed against an alternative order; the struggle for order is not a fight of one definition against another, of one way of articulating reality against a competitive proposal. It is a fight of determination against ambiguity, of semantic precision against ambivalence, of transparency against obscurity, clarity against fuzziness. (164) If order is music, alternative order is noise, and ambiguity, silence. Hip-hop is not silent, or it was silent before it becomes hip-hop when, as I argued in the beginning, street was simply ubiquitous. What we have seen throughout this thesis is the process of rationalising and ordering of the local hip-hop scenes despite their acclaimed resistance against the order. Instead of remaining silent, hip-hop is disposed to strictly anti-social manifestation and uncompromisingly anti-order position-takings. In this light, those who are on the 'street' – i.e. underground radio programmes, hip-hop journals, nightclubs and specialist record shops (instead of mainstream television, generalist radio stations and high-street CD megastores) – are not only disposed to the hip-hop distinction with a given spatial
strategy embodied in each city, but also the most visible and important fan-base for many independent specialist labels. The network of street intermediaries is in no sense ambivalent. It is a modern apparatus to author, define and maintain the order they construct, and expand it where possible. This apparatus is inherently globalising its realm of authenticity. While it took almost two decades to institute hip-hop's 'street' in France and Japan since 'Rapper's Delight' in 1979, the same 'street' seems transnationally aligned today when a critically acclaimed US group, Anti Pop Consortium — which "is the anti-stench spray on the deflowered state of commercial hip-hop" (Tate 2000) — released its first album, Tragic Epilogue, copyrighted by Anti-Pop Recordings International. The anti-pop 'street' here is readily abstracted as international before being local.

Here are the changes. Hip-hop accelerates modernisation and its enlarged reproduction (and that of the transnational recording industry (see Figure 1 (p. 12)). Hip-hop's struggle cannot be blindly configured as one between the modern and the pre-, post- or anti-modern, the capitalists and the proletariats, the white and the coloured, the global economic oppression and the local ghetto resistance, the producerculture manipulation and the consumerculture appropriation and so on and so forth. It is also not reducible to any kind of determinism, such as that of economy, ethnicity, history, geography, law, race, technology, etc. It is rather, as Gilroy (1993) puts it drawing on Leroi Jones, "a changing same" (xi, 101), or "an infinite process of identity construction" (223), and in that light, as he claims, "the history of blacks in the West and the social movements that have affirmed and rewritten that history can provide a lesson which is not restricted to blacks" (223). Hip-hop, or other emergent post-hip-hop, post-black music positioning in the 'street', can have this disposition in non-Anglo-American spheres, yet the bridging roles the recording and other media industries play in such process has been little investigated, when "the industrialisation of music cannot be understood as something which happens to music, since it describes a process in which music itself is made — a process, that is, which fuses (and confuses) capital, technical and musical arguments" (Frith 1988, 12)

The present thesis, therefore, does not pretend to be anything more than just an immature attempt for further inquiries in this direction. It should be instructive for this purpose to point out some objective and subjective shortcomings. First of all, there is a limitation derived from my focus on the capital of each country, hence impossibility to take into account internal hierarchic tensions between the centricity of the capital and the development of regional hip-hop movements such as those in Osaka, Nagoya or Sapporo in Japan and Marseilles, Toulouse or Lyon in France, or hip-hop's articulation to various forms of regional nationalism such as those in Bretagne, Catalonia, or Languedoc in France and Aiu or Okinawa in Japan. Secondly, there is a perceived lack of support, financial or otherwise, to pursue the kind of research, which resulted in a manifest delay in completing it. It may sound personal, but I think also involves some epistemological issues, not simply in terms of regional cultural studies and nihonjinron, but also for further construction of the knowledge in this perspective. Finally, and obviously, my being Japanese in the Anglo-Franco-Japanese trajectories have altered parameters in both Japan and France. As I have claimed on the very first page of the thesis, the outcome and analysis presented here is inherently subjective. In Japan, I was seen as a Ph.D. student studying in the West, which can generate an unwanted distance to interviewees. In France, I was seen as an Asian and thésard (Ph.D. student), which can also create an unnecessary
misunderstanding. Despite the pronounced multi-ethnicity in French hip-hop, Asians are very absent in the French hip-hop scene, apart from a few exceptions. Yet, all this remains only insignificant and I was well accepted as I learnt their symbolic and ritual codes and as I came across them frequently in 'street' institutions.

I have learnt many things through dialoguing with them. The entire process has been one that demands reflection on my own position and disposition as well as theirs. Texaco (1998), the president of a street promotion company, Wicked, made a shrewd remark when explaining what makes a tastemaker:

It's just like yourself. In your university in England, you love hip-hop but people in your class may not. They want to see you for it. So, you're linked, too, in that account. In you're milieu, you're a hip-hop tastemaker. People approach you to ask what they should buy concerning hip-hop now. People like you are very important for my business. That's a promo you do, in spite of yourself.

This is crucial. I think it is crucial in two accounts. Firstly, it questions quite a few ethnographies of popular culture, either ignorant of or unreflective on the intrinsic liability of their academic practices to the network of cultural and economic production (and reproduction). Secondly, and this is my concluding note, the conscience of the blur between an academic researcher and a cultural intermediary involved in a field research demands ceaseless reflection on one's own identity and identification strategy. Production of knowledge is a relational process that solicits one to take one's position in the field that one is describing.
APPENDICES
Methodological Notes

The research was held in 1996-98 in Tokyo and 1997-99 in Paris. 1999-2001 was spent between the two cities to follow up the precedent findings, while writing up. The field research was comprised of interviews with recording industry personnel and other music-related intermediaries in the two cities (see Part III), whereas it was crucial to establish the findings on the historical and geographic account of their institution in the two cities (see Part II) as this allows not only spatial comparison (i.e. between Paris and Tokyo) but also temporal one (i.e. between the past and the present).

The central focus of the field research is how hip-hop in each city constructs its autonomous 'street': how locally specific history and geography of popular music production intermingles with the black American 'street' music and how local construction of its scene is mediated by a set of intermediaries in and around the music industries. Thus, the first task was that of identifying whom to interview. For this, I started with contacting A&R, marketing and promotion personnel in recording companies. They were expected to lead me to a wider cultural space extending beyond their offices to many other intermediaries in the two cities. Doing this, I am not assuming a sort of top-down, unilateral model of popular music production in which everything started in recording companies and then passed onto diffusion media and then to consumers (see Figure 8 (p. 33)). These interactions happen simultaneously and interposedly. My task instead is to follow the network of interactions and describe how it understands and constructs hip-hop cultural space in the two cities.

As Negus (1999) illustrates in his Music Genres and Corporate Cultures, larger labels adopt 'portfolio management' developed in the United States in the 1970s which "provides a way of viewing the company's labels, genres and artists by dividing them into discrete units (strategic business units)" (47). A skim through various music industry directories, of which I found Musicman: A Cross-network Music Industry Guide for Japan and L'Officiel de la Musique: Guide Annuaire des Musiques Actuelles for France indispensable, reveals that most of the so-called 'major' recording companies in both countries adopt a similar management approach, which may be depicted as the organigram below.

In most cases, and in all the major labels in France and in Japan, a corporate space is divided into financial and administration department, distribution department, marketing and promotion department and creative department. Smaller and independent labels rarely have all of the four sections, and may often rely on other firms for distribution, sometimes for marketing and promotion and, rarely but increasingly, for finance and/or management.

I picked up, from these industry directories, A&Rs and label managers who are in charge of hip-hop acts, then tried to trace the webs of intermediaries in which hip-hop culture is produced and consumed. Certainly, the administrative division varies from one company or one territory to another and is indeed transforming and transversing at any given moment, and it is not my aim here to examine the role of each employee in a recording company. Rather, I tried to identify the logic that induces the very transformation and transversion and the way, as lived experiences, such an
administrative division may or may not restrict networking of hip-hop production in the two cities. A&Rs may well be a DJ, a magazine contributor or an artist outside their formal status in their companies, as much as a rapper may well launch one's own label, nightclub, record shop or restaurant, etc. Some hip-hop A&Rs may feel more at ease with other hip-hop intermediaries from other companies than with a mainstream A&R from his or her label.

Generally, I employed three ways to contact informants. The first and most important is by means of a formal letter, in which I specified that this interview is exclusively for an academic research, that I may publish his or her name publicly but am ready to do otherwise if preferred, that I cannot provide reward other than acknowledgement in concerning publication and, perhaps most importantly, that I would call eventually to arrange the date of interview as appointments are hard to obtain without rigorous phoning (see below for sample letters). I found word processor's mail merging function very useful, as I needed to mail many people at once. It not only produces a pile of 'personalised' letters in one go, but also provided me with a handy sheet of names and addresses. I initially would attach a three-page presentation summarising my research project but later stopped this, as it turned out to induce to interviewees a scepticism or phobia for intellectuals. Instead, I decided to send one-page summary, rewritten in a different style, only when asked. The second way of contacting informants is to be introduced to them via a person interviewed, which is indeed the easiest way of all. The third approach is to interview people on the spot, which turned out to be useful in small record shops and nightclubs, but at the same time the most risky approach of all, for when failed to retain a trustful relationship, there would be no further chance for a next trial.

I consider interviewing not so much as a tool to unfold objective reality otherwise concealed, but
as a moment in which a given interviewee and myself construct a subjective reality that is not simply governed by material objectivity. There is an issue of selecting and approaching informants, as above. There also is an issue of symbolically non-violent language and gesture with which to retain credible relationship with the informant. Where we talk affects the content of our interview as much as how I talk. Interviews tended to be held in interviewees’ offices, in cafés or sometime in recording studios. I have little chance to intervene in these choices, but it is often more engaging and interesting to do it in their working environments. In this light, I fully agree with what Keith Negus (1999) argues – "interviews are very specific social encounters between individuals which occur at particular times and places. The relationship which is established and which develops (or does not develop) during the encounter will decisively influence any material derived from an interview" (11).

Sometimes, I deliberately spoke to people who were bitterly critical of hip-hop or, better or worse, almost totally indifferent of it, so as to grasp different views with which each constructed one's meaningful world and one's position in it. These might be – and often they were – contradicting from not only what others said but also what I assumed from various other 'hard' sources, such as statistics. In such cases, I let the contradiction talk. I tried to mediate it in presenting other views I knew and other stories I heard, or in confronting and being confronted by the interviewees. In any case, the role of a social science interviewer is not so much to impose, insist on and promote a particular value instead of others as to understand the relation between them and “confront them as they are in reality, not to relativise them [...] but, on the contrary, to make clear, by the simple effect of the juxtaposition, what results from the affrontment of different or antagonistic visions of the world” (Bourdieu 1998b, 13). To do so, I have kept in mind Bourdieu's formation: "not to deplore, not to laugh, not to hate, but to understand" (10).

Key Questions

Instead of structured questionnaires, my interviewing focuses more on open questions and regulated improvisation based on key questions listed below. These are translated into an appropriate language and, where necessary, posed with more concrete examples that I find are at stake at a given moment and place.

General Questions

Is there any particularity for you to work for a corporation of foreign origin or domestic origin?
Which difficulties and facilities do you feel are there about producing, promoting and marketing foreign and domestic artists?
Do you find any hierarchic conflict of different genres internally? If yes, along which line do you think it articulates, and where does the US and domestic hip-hop fall?
Do you think that you have an idiosyncratic preference in terms of selecting products you deal with? How and why?
Which degree of priority is allocated to hip-hop?
Who do you consider are hip-hop audiences? Why?
How do you position both the US and local hip-hop concerning them?
When and why have you been convinced of saleability/popularity of hip-hop?
How do you relate the US hip-hop to the social and generic dynamics?
How do you relate the domestic hip-hop to the social and generic dynamics?
How do you relate the domestic hip-hop to the US hip-hop?
Where in Paris and Tokyo do you think represents hip-hop culture?
Do you go there often? Why?
What does hip-hop mean to you?

In Recording Companies

Which means do you use to diffuse hip-hop, why?
Which strategies do you use to promote local hip-hop acts? Are they same as the ones employed for the US hip-hop? Why?
Is there any sign that your domestic products go abroad and which genre and how is it brought about?

In Media Institutions

Which interaction do you have with the recording industry?
Is there any difficulty or facility in diffusing the US and local hip-hop artists? Why?
What do you think is the specific role of your institution and products in relation to other institutions?
How is this specificity reflected on the way you conceive your product?

Sample Letters

<<FAMILYNAME>> <<FIRSTNAME>>

您社様の御盛栄の趣、お慶び申し上げます。
突然おしつけにお手紙を差し上げますが失礼をお許しください。

イギリスのレスター大学で、日本とヨーロッパの音楽産業と大衆音楽文化をテーマに、特にラップ音楽の周辺に注目して博士論文のための調査をしている安田と申す者です。日本の音楽産業と文化についてお話を伺いたく、御社にご連絡いたしました。<<FAMILYNAME>>様おかれましては<<COMPANY>>の<<DEPT>>で<<STATUS>>としてご活躍中と存じておりますが、日本にラップ音楽が輸入されてから現在に至りますまでの貴社の業績と方針、または<<FAMILYNAME>>様御自身の御仕事ぶりなどお聞かせいただければと考えております。
具体的には、ラップ音楽がどのように日本に紹介され、理解され、ついには昨今の所謂 J - R a p ブームに至ったかという経緯をレコード会社、制作会社だけでなく、製品を実際に消費者のもとに供給する放送局、音楽雑誌、レコード小売店、カラオケ、ナイト・クラブ等の媒体及び消費者の動向にも注目して調査してみたいと思っております。上記の各々が縁切に関係しあった結果として、音楽の地域的な意味、つまりラップ音楽の日本での意味が形成されるのだと考えています。調査の詳細については同封の要約をご覧ください。

ラップ音楽ももちろんそうですが、昨今の音楽文化の地球規模での展開には目を見張らせるものがあります。そして地球的な視野でレコードの流通構造を描いたとき、日本という市場の特殊性は非常に際立ったものとなって来たように思われます。その一方で、日本のレコード市場、消費パターン、音楽産業の構造や先に述べた特性について体系的に研究したもののが少なく、ある意味でそうした音楽交流の幼さになっていることも否めないように思っております。特に外国語で書かれた資料は数えるほどしかなく、海外のカタログの輸入または日本のカタログの輸出の際に大きな障害となっているように聞いております。
博士論文などというと、また使い物にならない学者達のお遊びかと思われるでしょうが、小生の真意はむしろ「使える」研究
Veuillez pardonner ma lettre décontractée et soudaine.

Je suis japonais et je fais une recherche doctorale sur les industries et cultures musicales, à Leicester, en Angleterre. Ma préoccupation centrale est celle des musiques et des styles locaux du rap/hip-hop en France et au Japon. Ainsi, je vous écris parce que je souhaiterais vous rencontrer pour connaître vos activités et conceptions à propos de cette musique depuis qu'elle a été introduite en France, et de stratégies appliquées pour la développer. D'autre part, je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir m'envoyer quelques échantillons de votre produit, si possible.

Plus concrètement, je m'intéresse à analyser comment ce genre de musique est communiqué aux audiences compte tenu non seulement des sociétés du disque, mais aussi des intermédiaires comme le gouvernement, la radio, la télévision, la presse, les magasins de disques ou les boîtes de nuit. Je pense que le sens d'identité hip-hop, par exemple, est conçu comme une interaction d'intérêts économiques, politiques et culturels de chaque acteur.

Etant donné qu'aujourd'hui les produits culturels se distribuent si mondialement et si simultanément, il semble que des études assez profondes de la structure industrielle de la production de la musique soient nécessaires, pour que nous nous comprenions mieux par une culture musicale.

Une recherche universitaire, cela peut paraître inutile, mais mon intention est de contribuer aux échanges globaux de la musique. Etant un chercheur universitaire, je ne pourrais qu'offrir des remerciements dans mes prochaines publications.

Alors, j'aimerais que vous me donniez un rendez-vous bientôt, et veuillez me permettre de vous appeler. Je me tiens à votre disposition pour d'autres renseignements si nécessaire. En espérant que vous accepterez de m'aider, je vous prie d'agréer, [if <<SEX>>='m', 'Monsieur' : if<<SEX>>='f', 'Madame' : otherwise, 'Madame/Monsieur'], l'expression de mes salutations respectueux.

Masahiro YASUDA
Glossary

Asakusa opera: is an appropriated version of operetta, mostly those composed by Offenbach and Bizet. Performers were almost exclusively Japanese, of which some were trained by the Italian choreographer for the Teikoku Gekijo (Imperial Theatre), Giovanni Vittorio Rosi, who left Japan in 1918. Asakusa opera, at the time, also attracted many of the leading Japanese talents in singing and dancing, studied or worked in Europe and in the United States. There were many troupes of Asakusa opera actively performing from 1917 until the decline of Asakusa itself resulting from the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923. Despite the appellation, their performance could be seen in many parts of Tokyo, and beyond, on their regular tours.

Blouson Noir: is the way teenage rock 'n' rollers were called in France, after the black leather jackets that symbolised their tough posture. From the mid-1950s to the beginning of 1960s, France saw a sharp rise of juvenile delinquency, which curiously corresponded to its economic prosperity. In chronological terms, Lagréé (1982) categorises rock movement in France as the Blouson Noir era (rock 'n' roll: 1955-61), the Beatnik era (Folk song: 1962-65) and the Hippie era (1966-68).

Boso-Zoku: is a group of young people, mainly teenagers from working class families who, in the 1960s to the 70s, rode or drove their specifically customised loud and showy motorbikes and motorcars nightly. Their posture was a typical bravado against the authorities, with a particular stylistic reference to the extreme right, such as military flags and 'kamikaze' attitude. In 1978, the police authority reinforced the traffic regulation to get rid of them (see Oyama 1998, 2000; Sato 1984).

Chanson (artistic): is a tradition in French popular song that emphasises on lyrical text more than music, conveying often satiric, subversive and political messages. It is a transformative term per excellence, in that it incorporates many literary and musical influences in its development, yet all under one generic term as such. Its modern form dates from the end of 18th century, with the emergence of caveau, goguette and other enclosed venues. Its literary heritage and geographic tie to cabarets in the Montmartre quarter became distinct when commercial development of variétés in café-concerts and music-halls became significant in the fin-du-siécle France. It would be reinvented in the 1950s, integrating jazz, as chanson rive-gauche. (see Attali 1985; Calvet 1981).

Chanson Rive-Gauche: is a new category given to describe artistic chanson from the 1950s when most of the pre-war cabarets in Montmartre were replaced by those located in and around the Latin Quarter, the left bank of the Seine. Unlike its direct concurrent, yéyé, most of the rive-gauche artists would write, compose and sing their own songs, with simple accompaniment of a guitar and, less often, a piano. Poesy and political engagement were the centrality of this genre of music.

Chosaku-ken: is the Japanese term for copyright and/or author's rights.

College Folk: is a Japanese version of American Peter, Paul and Mary or the Brothers Four. Its emergence was linked to fashion trend (some of its leading artists contributed to a fashion magazine, Men's Club) and to independent music publishers (the first successful college folk hit, 'Bara ga Saita (My Rose Flowered)'), was simultaneously the first song recorded by an independent music publisher and pressed and distributed by a major label.

Enka: is as problematic a generic term as chanson in France. It is the genre described today as 'the heart of the Japanese', while its first appearance on the media dates back only to the early 70s.
When Japanese musicians began adapting Anglo-American popular music styles which sharply put into question the conventional star system based on exclusively contracted composers and songwriters (see senzoku-sei). Enka is in fact an offspring of kayo-kyoku, deposed to justify this star system. Enka reinvented the musical tradition of Japanese 'people', in incorporating songs by enka-shi in the Meiji period, Japanese minor pentatonic scale (1, 2, b3, 5, b6, 1) which was invented in the Taisho period (1912-1926) and jazz and blues of the pre-war Showa period (1926-1989).

Enka-shi: is a political activist and street singer, influenced by the Movement of Civic Rights and Freedom in the 1880s. It is today often associated with broadside singers in England. They were often young students. Music was considered as a necessary means of disseminating political ideas to illiterate people. Gradually, their activities became inclined to sales of their music, and eventually their recordings. Their music is called soshi-enka.

Fifties, the (50s): is a group of rock 'n' roll dancers, appeared in the late 70s in hoko-ten, Harajuku. Some of them also participated in boso-zoku groups. Influenced by the film American Graffiti released in Japan in 1974, their appearance was slightly earlier than takenoko-zoku, but the two zokus (tribes) cohabited most of the time in the same street. The fifties would get together in hoko-ten on Sundays with greased up hair for men and ponytail for women. They would wear black leather jackets, blue jeans or co-ordinated uniforms of a 'team'. They danced to American fifties in public.

Gidayu: is a school of joruri, established by Gidayu Takemoto in Osaka in the seventeenth century. While it shares its origin with bunraku, gidayu may embrace larger domain as it may accompany kabuki performance or may be performed autonomously.

Group Sounds: is a Japanese version of the Mersey beat style.

Hayari-Uta: literally means a popular song before the 1930s, incorporating quite a few kinds of music in and out of Japan, be it jazz, operetta, soshi-enka, etc. It is said that Nihon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) refused to use the term 'popular' to describe a song that was not yet even popular. Hence their coining of a new term, kayo-kyoku. See also kayo-kyoku.

Kabuki: is a major classical theatrical art in Japan. It originated in the seventeenth century by troupes of bohemian entertainers, almost entirely women. Because of prostitution it involved, the shogunate banned women from appearing in kabuki, which gave rise to onna-gata, or transvestites. Its first stylistic sophistication was brought about in the Genroku era (1688-1704). Upon the Meiji Restoration, kabuki tried to integrate some of the Western art of story telling and costumes, only to return to the repertoires from the Edo period.

Kayo-kyoku: is another confusing term to describe the mainstream music in Japan. It is derived from Hayari-uta and initially designated the same thing (see Hayari-uta). The word, kayo-kyoku, was coined by Nihon Hoso Kyokai's programming chief to avoid commercial implication of hayari-uta (popular song). Subsequently the term was mobilised by the military government to designate the songs that people must like. The term, however, became more commonly used after World War II. As American influence began to be felt, kayo-kyoku quickly incorporated some of its elements, which would give rise to autonomisation of enka as a distinctively Japanese art form (see enka).
the 1970s and 80s, kayo-kyoku came to designate songs by so-called 'idol' singers. From the 80s to our day, its usage is getting more and more blurred. Especially its connection with new music singer-songwriters becomes remarkable.

Mambo, Cha Cha Cha, Rock 'n' Roll and Twist in Japan: are examples of the series of dance steps promoted by the recording industry between 1955 and 1965. The Japanese post-war youths' revolt started, as it were, with mambo. As a continuity of the jazz boom in and around 1952, the music was radical. "Unlike the jiruba [a 'Japanglish' word for the jitterbug], a man and a woman have to dance exactly the same step. That is, the attractive new feature of mambo is that one could dance by oneself, and because of this it appeared strange for those who had learnt and got used to social dance where role for each sex was distinctive" (Across 1995b, 45).

Musette: is a dance-hall music characterised by the use of accordion and the triplet rhythm, emerged in belle-époque Paris. 'A musette, originally, is a bagpipe-like instrument from the Auvergne region brought to Paris by its emigrants whose dance parties turned to dance-hall business. Accordion was brought about by Italian immigrants. Cheap but loud without amplification, accordions replaced musettes, while keeping it as a generic term. By the 1930s, it integrated some of the jazz influences. A legendary gypsy guitarist, Django Reinhardt, started his career as a musette banjo player.

Naniwa-bushi: is a vulgar street entertainment of story telling, emerged from Osaka. Facing the consecutive wars Japan had had (the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5)), its feudalistic moral and loyalty became favoured by upper class nationalist, and became nationally prosperous. Kumoemon Tochuken and Naramaru Yoshida were the central figures of the art, and were the first popular entertainers who took advantage of phonograph technology to its maximum.

New Jack Swing: originally derived from a musical style developed by Teddy Riley, popularised in around 1988 then associated with success of highly visual dance of Bobby Brown and MC Hammer (see George 1998, 114-28). The style was quickly incorporated to mainstream television in Japan, whereas not much so in France, which explains the on-going popularity of the style in the latter.

New Music: is an offspring of American folk music, or singer-songwriter movement in the 70s. The term 'new music' is a total invention by the recording industry and record shops that could not classify and shelve this 'new' music. "Outside the established [kayo-kyoku] hit chart, it created an alternative scene out of which many stars [...] rose to prominence in the 1970s) (IASPM-Japan 1991, 18). Today, many artists from this category would compose, arrange or produce kayo-kyoku songs, too.

New Rock: developed against commercial pops mass-produced by the recording industry in Japan. Toward the end of 1960s, the site of authenticity settled around whether one could rock in Japanese or not. Even, at least initially, a perfect technical duplication of Anglo-American rock tunes was considered more authentic than Japanese-singing originals. To sing in English in fact was to be recognised in the USA and to be recognised there was directly linked to the rock authenticity. This imagination would gradually be transformed as new rock artists searched for their proper identity.

Pop, in France: is the way Anglo-American rock was called in France in the late 1960s and the early
1970s, the term ‘rock’ contaminated by Johnny Hallyday and other yéyé singers. It refers more particularly to a class of rock music called pop progressive (progressive rock) in the 1970s. French artists were rare in this field, apart from those highly artistic and intellectual, such as Gong, Ange or ZnR, which were, so different, known more outside France than inside.

Pops, Japanese: is a category of songs entailing the strong influence from the American popular songs of the 50s and the 60s. They were either Japanese cover versions of American pops by the likes of Connie Francis or Elvis Presley, or original songs by Japanese composers. In some cases, foreign singers, such as Nat King Cole and Neil Sedaka, would sing in Japanese for better acceptance in the market.

Rai: emerged in cabarets, bars and other venues in and around Oran, Algeria, in the 1920s. It is also an important part of wedding parties. Its present form dates from the independence of the nation, which gave rise to “the influx [...] of Western popular music” (Warne 1997, 141). The influence went beyond a simple musical adaptation, and entailed a development of its recording industry. The electrified form was to be called ‘love rai’ or ‘pop rai’, as opposed to ‘acoustic rai’, which was to be brought to France with Algerian labour migration. Its ‘progressive’ outlook, often compared with ‘backward’ Islamic fundamentalism, became favoured and overemphasised as it is mediated from Algeria to France (see Warne 1997). Today, we see a new generation of rai artists, such as Cheb Malik and Faudel, born and raised in France.

Senzoku-sei: is a form of star system in Japan in which recording companies employ songwriters and composers exclusively, and pay them monthly. Best known combination would be Shimpei Nakayama with Nippon Victor and Masao Koga with Nippon Columbia.

Shin-Geki: literally, ‘new theatre’, as opposed to traditional and mainstream kabuki theatre. Geijutsu-za, which produced Tolstoy's Resurrection in 1914, was one of the shin-geki troupes.

Surprise Party: is a new partying practice à l'Americaine in France in the 1920s. Instead of conventional formal gathering whereby one invites guests beforehand, a group of people casually visit one of their friends’ without due notice and with foods, drinks and maybe some records. The boom extended quickly, and, with imaginable destruction to hosts' houses, formalised equally quickly (see Joannis-Debeurne 1999).

Takenoko-Zoku: is a group of teenagers who, in the beginning of the 80s, gathered in hoko-ten and danced to disco and techno pop from a portable radio-cassette player. They cohabited with the fifties. While the fifties tended to confine their style and their dance to American youngsters of the 1950s, takenoko-zoku style was marked by more clueless, ad-hoc appropriation of available fashion materials. Their particular dress was particularly eye-catching. Their images can be found in the video of 'Once in a Lifetime' by Talking Heads.

Underground Folk: emerged against college folk in Japan. Compared with stylish and commercially driven college folk genre, it was more explicitly anti-establishment, political and hand-made. Unlike new rock that consumed itself around authenticity of the language with which to perform, underground folk settled much easier with the Japanese language, in order to convey their messages to Japanese audiences.

Variétés: is a shifting classifier that designates the mainstream music in France. It was derived from
music-hall attraction that would combine a variety of spectacles. In the 1950s, its closest concurrent was chanson rive-gauche, then in the 1970s, pop.

Yéyé: is a French version of Anglo-American rock 'n' roll in the 1950s, derives from an English refrain, 'yeah, yeah, yeah'. Initially, most of the yéyé artists emerged as working-class idols for blouson noir (both male and female artists claimed to be 'rockeurs') and promoted by ex-jazz impresarios, but they were gradually inclined to a more middle-class, so-called BCBG (Bon Chic Bon Genre) taste as the music industries realised the potential size of the teenage market.

Zouk: is a dance music derived from French West Indian territories of Martinique and Guadeloupe that juxtaposes Caribbean, French, African and other musical elements "strategically" (Guilbault 1993, 37) into its textuality.
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