Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Problems and pseudo-problems in understanding cooperation in social dilemmas|
|Authors:||Colman, Andrew M.|
Pulford, Briony D.
|Publisher:||Taylor & Francis (Routledge)|
|Citation:||Psychological Inquiry, 2012, 23 (1), pp. 39-47|
|Abstract:||The principal aim of this article is to clarify what is and what is not problematic in understanding co- operation in the dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemma game and in multiplayer social dilemmas. A secondary aim is to provide a brief overview of the most important propos- als for solving the genuine problems. Our commentary on the very interesting target article (Krueger, DiDo- nato, & Freestone, this issue) is embedded in a more general critical review of explanations for cooperation in social dilemmas. We hope to clarify some of the issues that are commonly misunderstood in the wide- ranging literature on cooperation in social dilemmas. [Opening paragraph]|
|Rights:||Copyright © 2012, Taylor & Francis (Routledge). Deposited with reference to the publisher’s archiving policy available on the SHERPA/RoMEO website.|
|Appears in Collections:||Published Articles, School of Psychology|
Files in This Item:
|Problems and Pseudo-problems in Understanding Cooperation.pdf||Post-review (final submitted)||126.84 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
Items in LRA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.