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Title: Problems and pseudo-problems in understanding cooperation in social dilemmas
Authors: Colman, Andrew M.
Pulford, Briony D.
First Published: 19-Mar-2012
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
Citation: Psychological Inquiry, 2012, 23 (1), pp. 39-47
Abstract: The principal aim of this article is to clarify what is and what is not problematic in understanding co- operation in the dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemma game and in multiplayer social dilemmas. A secondary aim is to provide a brief overview of the most important propos- als for solving the genuine problems. Our commentary on the very interesting target article (Krueger, DiDo- nato, & Freestone, this issue) is embedded in a more general critical review of explanations for cooperation in social dilemmas. We hope to clarify some of the issues that are commonly misunderstood in the wide- ranging literature on cooperation in social dilemmas. [Opening paragraph]
DOI Link: 10.1080/1047840X.2012.658003
ISSN: 1047-840X
eISSN: 1532-7965
Version: Post-print
Status: Peer-reviewed
Type: Journal Article
Rights: Copyright © 2012, Taylor & Francis (Routledge). Deposited with reference to the publisher’s archiving policy available on the SHERPA/RoMEO website.
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Psychology

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