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|dc.identifier.citation||Res Publica, 2005, 11 (3), pp.235-249||en_GB|
|dc.description.abstract||What does it mean to claim of law that it is a normative discipline? Can the answer be so simple that one need merely refer to law’s normative object of study and the conclusions that the legal participant must allegedly draw from this? What, in any case, is a ‘normative discipline’? The essay attempts to address these questions by analysing Hans Kelsen’s ‘normological’ theory of law through his work on sovereignty and especially by focusing on the normative character of Kelsen’s epistemological claims regarding law. A theoretical critique of Kelsen is offered through Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological account of logic as a normative discipline.||-|
|dc.title||Why Is Law a Normative Descipline? On Hans Kelsen's 'Normology'||en_GB|
|Appears in Collections:||Published Articles, School of Law|
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