Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/3074
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dc.contributor.authorMinkkinen, Panuen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-08T16:20:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-12-08T16:20:01Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_GB
dc.identifier.citationRes Publica, 2005, 11 (3), pp.235-249en_GB
dc.identifier.issn13564765en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11158-005-1484-5en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2381/3074-
dc.description.abstractWhat does it mean to claim of law that it is a normative discipline? Can the answer be so simple that one need merely refer to law’s normative object of study and the conclusions that the legal participant must allegedly draw from this? What, in any case, is a ‘normative discipline’? The essay attempts to address these questions by analysing Hans Kelsen’s ‘normological’ theory of law through his work on sovereignty and especially by focusing on the normative character of Kelsen’s epistemological claims regarding law. A theoretical critique of Kelsen is offered through Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological account of logic as a normative discipline.-
dc.formatMetadataen_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.titleWhy Is Law a Normative Descipline? On Hans Kelsen's 'Normology'en_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11158-005-1484-5-
dc.relation.raeRAE 2007-
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Law

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