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Title: A foundation for the conception of law as practical reason
Authors: Bertea, Stefano
First Published: 12-Nov-2013
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Citation: Law and Philosophy, 2015, 34 (1), pp. 55-88
Abstract: This essay discusses a foundation of the connection argued to exist between law and practical reason that has proved to be highly influential and debated in contemporary legal philosophy - Alexy's. After reconstructing Alexy's conception of practical reason as well as its foundation, I criticise the weak transcendental-pragmatic argument Alexy uses to ground the authority of practical reason. This argument, I argue, can only show why occasionally, as opposed to necessarily, we ought to follow the guidance of practical reason, and consequently makes the authority of practical reason ultimately dependent on an individual decision. By building on this criticism, in the second part of the essay I introduce and discuss an alternative argument that, by appealing to the idea of constitutive necessity, can provide a non-contingent basis for the validity of practical reason. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
DOI Link: 10.1007/s10982-013-9198-x
ISSN: 0167-5249
eISSN: 1573-0522
Version: Post-print
Status: Peer-reviewed
Type: Journal Article
Rights: Copyright © 2013, Springer Verlag. Deposited with reference to the publisher’s archiving policy available on the SHERPA/RoMEO website.
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Law

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