Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/32129
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dc.contributor.authorAdriani, Fabrizio-
dc.contributor.authorSonderegger, S.-
dc.date.accessioned2015-05-07T09:29:32Z-
dc.date.available2017-05-02T01:45:06Z-
dc.date.issued2015-05-02-
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Economic Review 77 (2015) 102–116en
dc.identifier.issn0014-2921-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2381/32129-
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292115000598-
dc.descriptionJel Codes: A13, C73, D02, D03, D82, Z1.en
dc.description.abstractPeople often form expectations about others using the lens of their own attitudes (the so-called consensus effect). We study the implications of this for trust and trustworthiness in an evolutionary model where social preferences are endogenous. Trustworthy individuals are more “optimistic” than opportunists and are accordingly less afraid to engage in market-based exchanges, where they may be vulnerable to cheating. Depending on the distribution of social preferences in the population, the material benefits from greater participation may compensate for the costs of being trustworthy. By providing an explicit account of how individuals form and revise their beliefs, we are able to show the existence of a polymorphic equilibrium where both trustworthiness and opportunism coexist in the population. We also analyze the effect of enforcement, distinguishing between its role as deterrence of future misbehavior and as retribution for past misbehavior. We show that enforcement aimed at deterring opportunistic behavior has ambiguous effects on social preferences. It may favor the spreading of trustworthiness (crowding in), but the opposite (crowding out) may also occur. By contrast, crowding out never occur when punishment is merely intended as retributionen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.relation.urihttps://4197424035712287217-a-1802744773732722657-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/fabrizioadriani/Evolutionary_submission.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cqRdGs2iSQwwkOJQIlVp4_fY0CbSbbFCs1nz0dwgK1ypa5Hgp7qEpW1dfejleLv_GZ__xMctfhQRGW9zSQgeqZxxygYU3ZrSaE1USxiNl6ahZ4GSqZ9vvo4aCcmwahkLGvESCOF1RxCK0HXm4rBz0j3NcmyHl_5BVfkNBNkVIojN44IHPPbX-H_-HynuwYgUqn7jPkINu9mR1PWm5kgyI3XC95R8GdSXTAjpefJt_iziL1hTXA%3D&attredirects=0-
dc.subjectEndogenous Preferencesen
dc.subjectTrusten
dc.subjectConsensus Effecten
dc.subjectDeterrenceen
dc.subjectRetributionen
dc.subjectCrowding Outen
dc.titleTrust, Trustworthiness and the Consensus Effect: An Evolutionary Approachen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.04.003-
dc.description.statusPeer-revieweden
dc.description.versionPost-printen
dc.type.subtypeArticle-
pubs.organisational-group/Organisationen
pubs.organisational-group/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCEen
pubs.organisational-group/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE/Department of Economicsen
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, Dept. of Economics

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