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Title: A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
Authors: Chun, Y.
Mitra, M.
Mutuswami, Suresh
First Published: 15-Apr-2015
Publisher: Elsevier
Citation: Games and Economic Behavior
Abstract: We characterize the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem using the axioms of outcome efficiency, budget balance, equal treatment of equals, Pareto indifference, together with a weakening of strategy-proofness, upward-invariance.
DOI Link: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.04.001
ISSN: 0899-8256
Version: Post-print
Status: Peer-reviewed
Type: Journal Article
Rights: Archived with reference to SHERPA/RoMEO and publisher website.
Description: JEL classification C72; D63; D82
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, Dept. of Economics

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