Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/32794
Title: The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control: Strategic Delegation and Polarization
Authors: Boukouras, Aristotelis
Schwager, R.
Aytimur, R. E.
First Published: 2016
Publisher: Wiley for Canadian Economics Association
Citation: Canadian Journal of Economics (In press, accepted)
Abstract: We present a modified citizen-candidate model where the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the two-candidate equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: however small the cost of candidacy, the distance between the candidates’ policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Moreover, there may be one-candidate equilibria in which the only candidate is not the one most preferred by the median voter. Both results point out that, even with negligible cost of entry, there are limits to strategic delegation.
DOI Link: TBA
ISSN: 1540-5982
eISSN: 1540-5982
Links: https://economics.ca/cje/en/forthcoming.php
http://hdl.handle.net/2381/32794
Version: Pre-print
Type: Journal Article
Rights: Copyright © Wiley, 2015. This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: [FULL CITE], which has been published in final form at [Link to final article using the DOI]. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. Deposited with reference to the publisher’s open access archiving policy, available at http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-820227.html
Description: JEL classification: D72, D78
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, Dept. of Economics

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