Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/33035
Title: Obligation: A Legal-Theoretical Perspective
Authors: Bertea, Stefano
First Published: 2015
Publisher: Springer
Citation: Bertea, S, Obligation: A Legal-Theoretical Perspective, in 'Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following' ed. Araszkiewicz M; Banaś P; Gizbert-Studnicki T; Płeszka K, Springer, 2015
Abstract: In this study, I intend to contribute to a better understanding of what kind of thing an obligation is and what its defining features are. Central to the conception I will put forward is the idea of obligation as having two essential aspects: one of these lies in the internal connection of obligation with moral practical reasons and is accordingly rational and moral; the other one instead lies in the conceptual link between obligation and requiredness, or mandatory force. In combination these two aspects, which interlock to form what I would call the duality of obligation, frame obligation as a rational and morally justifiable categorical requirement.
DOI Link: 10.1007/978-3-319-09375-8_11
ISSN: 1572-4395
ISBN: 978-3-319-09375-8
Links: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-09375-8_11
http://hdl.handle.net/2381/33035
Embargo on file until: 1-Jan-10000
Version: Post-print
Status: Peer-reviewed
Type: Chapter
Rights: Copyright © 2015, Springer International Publishing Switzerland.
Description: The file associated with this record is under embargo. Full text may be available in the Publisher links above.
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Law

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