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|Title:||Reasons for Cooperating in Repeated Interactions: Social Value Orientations, Fuzzy Traces, Reciprocity, and Activity Bias|
|Authors:||Pulford, Briony Dawn|
Colman, A. M.
Lawrence, C. L.
Krockow, E. M.
|Publisher:||American Psychological Association|
|Abstract:||Many human interactions involve patterns of turn-taking cooperation that can be modeled by the deeply paradoxical Centipede game. A backward induction argument suggests that cooperation is irrational in such interactions, but experiments have demonstrated that players cooperate frequently and earn better payoffs as a consequence. We formulate 6 competing theories of cooperation in Centipede games and report the results of 2 experiments, based on investigations of several closely matched games with different payoff structures and different methods of reaching decisions. The results show that turn-taking cooperation does not appear to be explained by reciprocity theory, activity bias theory, or a motive to maximize relative payoffs, but that collective rationality, in the form of a motive to maximize joint payoffs, and fuzzy-trace theory can explain cooperation in interactions of this type. Reciprocity increases cooperation across repeated games between fixed player pairs, but there is no evidence of reciprocity influencing cooperation within games.|
|Rights:||Copyright © 2016, American Psychological Association. All rights reserved. This article may not exactly replicate the authoritative document published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record. Deposited with reference to the publisher's copyright and archiving policy.|
|Appears in Collections:||Published Articles, Dept. of Neuroscience, Psychology and Behaviour|
Files in This Item:
|Pulford DECISION 2016.docx||Post-review (final submitted)||1.16 MB||Unknown||View/Open|
|Pulford DECISION 2016.pdf||Post-review (final submitted)||1.71 MB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
|Supplemental_Materials_Time Series_Analysis.pdf||Post-review (final submitted)||726.2 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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