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Title: Voting as a signaling device
Authors: Aytimur, R. Emre
Boukouras, Aristotelis
Schwager, Robert
First Published: 18-Jun-2013
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Citation: Economic Theory, 2014, 55 (3), pp. 753-777
Abstract: In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefit of voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively related to the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit bandwagon effects and small changes in the electoral incentives may generate large changes in turnout due to signaling effects. (iv) Signaling incentives increase the sensitivity of turnout to voting incentives in communities with low opportunity cost of social interaction, while the opposite is true for communities with high cost of social interaction. Therefore, the model predicts less volatile turnout for the latter type of communities.
DOI Link: 10.1007/s00199-013-0764-0
ISSN: 0938-2259
eISSN: 1432-0479
Version: Post-print
Status: Peer-reviewed
Type: Journal Article
Rights: Copyright © the authors, 2013. This version is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives License ( ), which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, Dept. of Economics

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