Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Information Use and Acquisition in Price-Setting Oligopolies
Authors: Wallace, Chris
Myatt, David P.
First Published: 6-Aug-2016
Publisher: Wiley
Citation: Economic Journal, 2016, in press
Abstract: Asymmetric price-setting multi-product suppliers have access to multiple sources of information about demand conditions, where the publicity of each source corresponds to the cross-industry correlation of signals received from it. A signal’s influence on suppliers’ prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its precision. The emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller suppliers who control narrower product portfolios. When information is endogenously acquired, suppliers listen to only a subset of information sources. This subset is smaller when products are less differentiated and when the industry is less concentrated. Smaller suppliers focus attention on fewer information sources. The inefficiencies arising from information acquisition and use are identified. The associated externalities depend upon the extent of product differentiation, the concentration of the industry, and the degree of decreasing returns to scale.
DOI Link: 10.1111/ecoj.12410
ISSN: 0013-0133
eISSN: 1468-0297
Version: Post-print
Status: Peer-reviewed
Type: Journal Article
Rights: Copyright © Wiley, 2016. Deposited with reference to the publisher’s archiving policy available on the SHERPA/RoMEO website.
Description: The file associated with this record is under a 24-month embargo from publication in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. The full text may be available through the publisher links provided above.
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, Dept. of Economics

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
bertrand-manuscript-2016-may.pdfPost-review (final submitted)405.99 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in LRA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.