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Title: A Representation Theorem for Guilt Aversion
Authors: Jensen, Martin Kaae
Kozlovskaya, Maria
First Published: 5-May-2016
Publisher: Elsevier
Citation: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2016, 125, pp. 148-161
Abstract: Guilt aversion has been shown to play an important role in economic decision-making. In this paper, we take an axiomatic approach to guilt by deducing a utility representation from a list of easily interpretable assumptions on an agent's preferences. It turns out that our logarithmic representation can mitigate the problem of multiplicity of equilibria to which psychological games are prone. We apply the model in three well-known games and show that its predictions are consistent with experimental observations.
DOI Link: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.02.001
ISSN: 0167-2681
Version: Post-print
Status: Peer-reviewed
Type: Journal Article
Rights: Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. After embargo this will be an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives License (, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
Description: The file associated with this record is under a 36-month embargo from publication in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. The full text may be available through the publisher links provided above.
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, Dept. of Economics

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