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|Title:||Ethnic fractionalisation, governance and loan defaults in Africa|
Baltagi, Badi H.
|Publisher:||Wiley on behalf of University of Oxford, Department of Economics|
|Citation:||Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 2016, in press|
|Abstract:||We present a theoretical model of an imperfectly competitive loans market that is suitable for emerging economies in Africa. The model allows for variation in both the level of contract enforcement (the quality of governance) and the degree of market segmentation (the level of ethnic fractionalization). The model predicts a specific form of non-linearity in the effects of these variables on loan default. Empirical analysis using African panel data for 110 individual banks in 28 countries over 2000-2008 provides strong evidence for these predictions. Our results have important implications for the conditions under which policy reform will enhance financial development.|
|Embargo on file until:||1-Jan-10000|
|Rights:||Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Deposited with reference to the publisher’s open access archiving policy.|
|Description:||The file associated with this record is under a 24 month embargo from publication in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. The full text may be available through the publisher links provided above.|
|Appears in Collections:||Published Articles, Dept. of Economics|
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|ldia12_OBESaccepted.pdf||Post-review (final submitted author manuscript)||2.12 MB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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