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Title: Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
Authors: Boukouras, Aristotelis
Koufopoulos, Kostas
First Published: 14-Jul-2016
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Citation: Economic Theory, 2017, 64 (1), pp. 75-98
Abstract: We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multidimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the realized frequency of types (the exact number of agents for each type) is common knowledge, then a mechanism exists, which is consistent with truthful revelation of private information and which implements first-best allocations of resources as the unique equilibrium. The result requires the single-crossing property on utility functions and the anonymity of the Pareto correspondence.
DOI Link: 10.1007/s00199-016-0993-0
ISSN: 0938-2259
eISSN: 1432-0479
Version: Publisher Version
Status: Peer-reviewed
Type: Journal Article
Rights: Copyright © the authors, 2016. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, Dept. of Economics

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