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Title: "Rule Rationality"
Authors: Heller, Yuval
Winter, Eyal
First Published: 9-Aug-2016
Publisher: Wiley for 1. Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 2. University of Pennsylvania, Economics Department
Citation: International Economic Review, 2016, 57 (3), pp. 997-1026
Abstract: We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one's opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player can earn from playing first).
DOI Link: 10.1111/iere.12183
ISSN: 0020-6598
eISSN: 1468-2354
Embargo on file until: 9-Aug-2018
Version: Post-print
Status: Peer-reviewed
Type: Journal Article
Rights: Copyright © (2016) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association. This version of the article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives License ( ), which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
Description: Following the embargo period the above license applies.
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, Dept. of Economics

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