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Title: False memories and real epistemic problems
Authors: Brown, Steven D.
Reavey, P.
First Published: 18-May-2017
Publisher: SAGE Publications (UK and US)
Citation: Culture and Psychology, 2017, 23(2), pp. 171-185
Abstract: The dichotomy between ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ in relation to memory is difficult to clearly sustain. The veridicality of memory is typically established by drawing on the local, normative procedures that operate in a given setting (e.g. legal, clinical, social). Since all procedures are strictly relative, all memories are technically either ‘relatively falsified’ or ‘relatively as-yet-unfalsified’. False Memory Studies claim to be able explain the production of false memories, but do not offer criterion to effectively differentiate populations of so-called ‘true’ and ‘false’ victims. The narrative of the discovery of the ‘false memories’ themselves is inconsistent and demonstrates a significant level of imagination inflation and suggestibility to dominant narratives in post-war Psychology. In attending to the setting-specificity of memory, researchers may wish to consider how their work impacts on the experience-ecologies to which they contribute.
DOI Link: 10.1177/1354067X17695764
ISSN: 1354-067X
eISSN: 1461-7056
Version: Post-print
Status: Peer-reviewed
Type: Journal Article
Rights: Copyright © 2017, SAGE Publications (UK and US). Deposited with reference to the publisher’s open access archiving policy.
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Management

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