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|Title:||Signaling about norms: Socialization under strategic uncertainty|
|Citation:||Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2017|
|Abstract:||We consider a signaling model where adults possess information about the dominant social norm. Children want to conform to whatever norm is dominant but, lacking accurate information, take the observed behavior of their parent as representative. We show that this causes a signaling distortion in adult behavior, even in the absence of conflicts of interest. Parents adopt attitudes that encourage their children to behave in a socially safe way, i.e. the way that would be optimal under maximum uncertainty about the prevailing social norm. We discuss applications to sexual attitudes, collective reputation, and trust.|
|Embargo on file until:||1-Jan-2020|
|Rights:||Copyright © 2017, Wiley. Deposited with reference to the publisher’s open access archiving policy.|
|Description:||JEL codes: C72, D83, D80, Z13.|
The file associated with this record is under embargo until 24 months after publication, in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. The full text may be available through the publisher links provided above.
|Appears in Collections:||Published Articles, Dept. of Economics|
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