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|Title:||Ambiguous games: evidence for strategic ambiguity aversion|
|Authors:||Pulford, Briony D.|
Colman, Andrew M.
|Publisher:||Taylor & Francis|
|Citation:||Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2007, 60 (8), pp.1083-1100|
|Abstract:||The problem of ambiguity in games is discussed, and a class of ambiguous games is identified. A total of 195 participants played strategic-form games of various sizes with unidentified co-players. In each case, they first chose between a known-risk game involving a co-player indifferent between strategies and an equivalent ambiguous game involving one of several co-player types, each with a different dominant strategy, and then they chose a strategy for the preferred game. Half the players knew that the ambiguous co-player types were equally likely, and half did not. Half expected the outcomes to be known immediately, and half expected a week's delay. Known-risk games were generally preferred, confirming a significant strategic ambiguity aversion effect. In the delay conditions, players who knew that the ambiguous co-player types were equally likely were significantly less ambiguity averse than those who did not. Decision confidence was significantly higher in 2 × 2 than in larger games.|
|Rights:||Copyright © 2006 The Experimental Psychology Society. Deposited with reference to the publisher's archiving policy available on the SHERPA/RoMEO website. This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2007, 60 (8), pp.1083-1100, copyright Taylor & Francis, available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/17470210600866354|
|Appears in Collections:||Published Articles, School of Psychology|
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