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Title: Ambiguous games: evidence for strategic ambiguity aversion
Authors: Pulford, Briony D.
Colman, Andrew M.
First Published: 16-Jul-2007
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Citation: Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2007, 60 (8), pp.1083-1100
Abstract: The problem of ambiguity in games is discussed, and a class of ambiguous games is identified. A total of 195 participants played strategic-form games of various sizes with unidentified co-players. In each case, they first chose between a known-risk game involving a co-player indifferent between strategies and an equivalent ambiguous game involving one of several co-player types, each with a different dominant strategy, and then they chose a strategy for the preferred game. Half the players knew that the ambiguous co-player types were equally likely, and half did not. Half expected the outcomes to be known immediately, and half expected a week's delay. Known-risk games were generally preferred, confirming a significant strategic ambiguity aversion effect. In the delay conditions, players who knew that the ambiguous co-player types were equally likely were significantly less ambiguity averse than those who did not. Decision confidence was significantly higher in 2 × 2 than in larger games.
DOI Link: 10.1080/17470210600866354
ISSN: 1747-0218
eISSN: 1747-0226
Version: Post print
Status: Peer reviewed
Type: Article
Rights: Copyright © 2006 The Experimental Psychology Society. Deposited with reference to the publisher's archiving policy available on the SHERPA/RoMEO website. This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2007, 60 (8), pp.1083-1100, copyright Taylor & Francis, available online at:
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Psychology

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