Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Modelling imitation with sequential games.
Authors: Colman, Andrew M.
First Published: Oct-1998
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Citation: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1998, 21 (5), pp. 686-687.
Abstract: A significant increase in the probability of an action resulting from observing that action performed by another agent cannot, on its own, provide persuasive evidence of imitation. Simple models of social influence based on two-person sequential games suggest that both imitation and pseudo-imitation can be explained by a process more fundamental than priming, namely, subjective utility maximization.
DOI Link: 10.1017/S0140525X98241744
ISSN: 0140-525X
Type: Article
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Psychology

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Modelling Imitation in Sequential Games.pdf31.21 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in LRA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.