Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/43498
Title: Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices
Authors: Bose, Subir
Renou, Ludovic
First Published: 3-Oct-2014
Publisher: Econometric Society
Citation: Econometrica, 2014, 82 (5), pp. 1853-1872 (20)
Abstract: This paper considers mechanism design problems in environments with ambiguity‐sensitive individuals. The novel idea is to introduce ambiguity in mechanisms so as to exploit the ambiguity sensitivity of individuals. Deliberate engineering of ambiguity, through ambiguous mediated communication, can allow (partial) implementation of social choice functions that are not incentive compatible with respect to prior beliefs. We provide a complete characterization of social choice functions partially implementable by ambiguous mechanisms.
DOI Link: 10.3982/ECTA10285
ISSN: 0012-9682
eISSN: 1468-0262
Links: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA10285
http://hdl.handle.net/2381/43498
Version: Publisher Version
Status: Peer-reviewed
Type: Journal Article
Rights: Copyright © 2014, Econometric Society. Deposited with reference to the publisher’s open access archiving policy. (http://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved)
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Management

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