Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/43498
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dc.contributor.authorBose, Subir-
dc.contributor.authorRenou, Ludovic-
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-04T10:36:51Z-
dc.date.available2019-03-04T10:36:51Z-
dc.date.issued2014-10-03-
dc.identifier.citationEconometrica, 2014, 82 (5), pp. 1853-1872 (20)en
dc.identifier.issn0012-9682-
dc.identifier.urihttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA10285en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2381/43498-
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers mechanism design problems in environments with ambiguity‐sensitive individuals. The novel idea is to introduce ambiguity in mechanisms so as to exploit the ambiguity sensitivity of individuals. Deliberate engineering of ambiguity, through ambiguous mediated communication, can allow (partial) implementation of social choice functions that are not incentive compatible with respect to prior beliefs. We provide a complete characterization of social choice functions partially implementable by ambiguous mechanisms.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEconometric Societyen
dc.relation.urihttp://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000342905900008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=8c4e325952a993be76947405d4bce7d5-
dc.rightsCopyright © 2014, Econometric Society. Deposited with reference to the publisher’s open access archiving policy. (http://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved)en
dc.subjectSocial Sciencesen
dc.subjectScience & Technologyen
dc.subjectPhysical Sciencesen
dc.subjectEconomicsen
dc.subjectMathematics, Interdisciplinary Applicationsen
dc.subjectSocial Sciences, Mathematical Methodsen
dc.subjectStatistics & Probabilityen
dc.subjectBusiness & Economicsen
dc.subjectMathematicsen
dc.subjectMathematical Methods In Social Sciencesen
dc.subjectMechanism designen
dc.subjectambiguityen
dc.subjectcommunication deviceen
dc.subjectmultiple priorsen
dc.subjectBELIEFSen
dc.subjectUTILITYen
dc.titleMechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devicesen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/ECTA10285-
dc.identifier.eissn1468-0262-
dc.description.statusPeer-revieweden
dc.description.versionPublisher Versionen
dc.type.subtypeArticle;Journal-
pubs.organisational-group/Organisationen
pubs.organisational-group/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIESen
pubs.organisational-group/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIES/School of Businessen
dc.dateaccepted2014-03-
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Management

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