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Title: Labor Migration Policy and the Governance of the Construction Industry in Israel and Japan.
Authors: Bartram, David
First Published: 2004
Publisher: Sage Publications.
Citation: Politics & Society, 2004, 32 (2), pp. 131-170.
Abstract: Significant “guestworker” immigration occurs when the state lacks the capacity to inhibit rent-seeking by private interests that benefit from imported labor. Policies allowing imported labor result in government subsidies for employers‟ profits. These subsidies are usefully conceived as rents. A developmentalist state (e.g. Japan) will constrain the creation of such rents, especially because imported labor carries long-term costs not borne by employers and inhibits productivity growth and positive structural change. A clientelist state (e.g. Israel) falls prey to this type of rent-seeking because of a weaker institutional capacity for creating conditions that make alternative solutions feasible and profitable for employers.
DOI Link: 10.1177/0032329204263068
ISSN: 0032-3292
Type: Article
Description: This is the author’s final draft of the paper published as Politics & Society, 2004, 32 (2), pp. 131-170. The final published version is available at, Doi: 10.1177/0032329204263068.
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, Dept. of Sociology

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