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|Title:||Labor Migration Policy and the Governance of the Construction Industry in Israel and Japan.|
|Citation:||Politics & Society, 2004, 32 (2), pp. 131-170.|
|Abstract:||Significant “guestworker” immigration occurs when the state lacks the capacity to inhibit rent-seeking by private interests that benefit from imported labor. Policies allowing imported labor result in government subsidies for employers‟ profits. These subsidies are usefully conceived as rents. A developmentalist state (e.g. Japan) will constrain the creation of such rents, especially because imported labor carries long-term costs not borne by employers and inhibits productivity growth and positive structural change. A clientelist state (e.g. Israel) falls prey to this type of rent-seeking because of a weaker institutional capacity for creating conditions that make alternative solutions feasible and profitable for employers.|
|Description:||This is the author’s final draft of the paper published as Politics & Society, 2004, 32 (2), pp. 131-170. The final published version is available at http://pas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/32/2/131, Doi: 10.1177/0032329204263068.|
|Appears in Collections:||Published Articles, Dept. of Sociology|
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