Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction|
|Publisher:||Dept. of Economics, University of Leicester.|
|Abstract:||If valuations are interdependent and agents observe their own allocation payoffs, then two-stage revelation mechanisms expand the set of implementable decision functions. In a two-stage revelation mechanism agents report twice. In the first stage - before the allocation is decided - they report their private signals. In the second stage - after the allocation has been made, but before final transfers are decided - they report their payoffs from the allocation. Conditions are provided under which an uninformed seller can extract (or virtually extract) the full surplus from a sale to privately informed buyers, in spite of the buyers’ signals being independent random variables.|
|Series/Report no.:||Discussion Papers in Economics:|
|Appears in Collections:||Reports, Dept. of Economics|
Items in LRA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.