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Title: A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting
Authors: Dahm, M
Glazer, A
First Published: 29-May-2015
Publisher: Elsevier
Citation: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2015, 116, pp. 465-480
Abstract: This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in the future. Legislators may therefore approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that benefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust. But institutional arrangements (such as entitlements) can reduce the agenda setter's power by reducing his discretion to reward and punish legislators, and rules (such as sequential voting) can increase a legislator's ability to resist exploitation.
DOI Link: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.012
ISSN: 0167-2681
Version: Post-print
Status: Peer-reviewed
Type: Journal Article
Rights: Copyright © 2015, Elsevier B.V. Deposited with reference to the publisher’s open access archiving policy. (
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Management

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