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Title: Depth of strategic reasoning in games
Authors: Colman, Andrew M.
First Published: Jan-2003
Publisher: Elsevier (Cell Press)
Citation: Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2003, 7, pp.2-4.
Abstract: Orthodox game theory assumes indefinitely recursive reasoning (‘I think that you think that I think . . .’), but human decision makers, who are limited by bounded rationality, cannot handle limitless layers of complexity. Recent research corroborates earlier findings that human players tend to operate at only one or two levels of strategic depth.
DOI Link: 10.1016/S1364-6613(02)00006-2
ISSN: 1364-6613
eISSN: 1879-307X
Version: Post print
Status: Peer reviewed
Type: Article
Rights: Copyright © 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. Deposited with reference to the publisher's archiving policy available on the SHERPA/RoMEO website.
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Psychology

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