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Title: Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty
Authors: Renou, Ludovic
Schlag, Karl H.
First Published: 2010
Publisher: Elsevier
Citation: Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, 145 (1), pp. 264-286.
Abstract: This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).
DOI Link: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.005
ISSN: 0022-0531
Type: Article
Description: This is the author's final draft of the paper published as Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, 145 (1), pp. 264-286. The final version is available from Doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.005
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, Dept. of Economics

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