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Title: Evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity in repeated dyadic games.
Authors: Browning, Lindsay
Colman, Andrew M.
First Published: Aug-2004
Publisher: Elsevier
Citation: Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2004, 229, (4), pp.549-557.
Abstract: A genetic algorithm incorporating mutation and crossing-over was used to investigate the evolution of social behaviour in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken (Hawk-Dove), Battle of the Sexes, and Leader games. The results show that the strategic structure of an interaction has a crucial determining effect on the type of social behaviour that evolves. In particular, simulations using repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken (Hawk-Dove) games lead to the emergence of genes coding for symmetric reciprocity and the evolution of mutual cooperation, whereas simulations using repeated Battle of the Sexes and Leader games lead to near-fixation of genes coding for asymmetric strategic choices and the evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity. A mechanism is suggested whereby, in games with asymmetric equilibrium points, coordinated alternating reciprocity might evolve without insight or communication between players.
DOI Link: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.04.032
ISSN: 0022-5193
eISSN: 1095-8541
Version: Post print
Status: Peer reviewed
Type: Article
Rights: Copyright © 2004 Elsevier Ltd. Deposited with reference to the publisher's archiving policy available on the SHERPA/RoMEO website. NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Theoretical Biology. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2004, 229, (4), pp.549-557, DOI#: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.04.032
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Psychology

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