Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/471
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dc.contributor.authorColman, Andrew M.-
dc.contributor.authorBacharach, M.-
dc.date.accessioned2007-06-21T09:17:03Z-
dc.date.available2007-06-21T09:17:03Z-
dc.date.issued1997-
dc.identifier.citationTheory and Decision, 1997, 43, pp.1-19.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2381/471-
dc.descriptionThis is the author's final draft. 'The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com.' http://www.springerlink.com/content/h46232710q241451/fulltext.pdfen
dc.description.abstractPayoff dominance, a criterion for choosing between equilibrium points in games, is intuitively compelling, especially in matching games and other games of common interests, but it has not been justified from standard game-theoretic rationality assumptions. A psychological explanation of it is offered in terms of a form of reasoning that we call the Stackelberg heuristic in which players assume that their strategic thinking will be anticipated by their co-player(s). Two-person games are called Stackelberg-soluble if the players' strategies that maximize against their co-players' best replies intersect in a Nash equilibrium. Proofs are given that every game of common interests is Stackelberg-soluble, that a Stackelberg solution is always a payoff-dominant outcome, and that in every game with multiple Nash equilibria a Stackelberg solution is a payoff-dominant equilibrium point. It is argued that the Stackelberg heuristic may be justified by evidentialist reasoning.en
dc.format.extent166729 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringeren
dc.titlePayoff dominance and the Stackelberg heuristic.en
dc.typeArticleen
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Psychology

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