Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/475
Title: Stackelberg reasoning in mixed-motive games: An experimental investigation.
Authors: Colman, Andrew M.
Stirk, J.A.
First Published: 1998
Publisher: Elsevier
Citation: Journal of Economic Psychology, 1998, 19, pp.279-293.
Abstract: The Stackelberg heuristic is a simulation heuristic in which a player optimizes against best-reply counterstrategies, and a game is Stackelberg-soluble if the resulting Stackelberg strategies are in equilibrium. To test the hypothesis that players use this heuristic in Stackelberg-soluble games, 100 subjects played all 12 ordinally nonequivalent 2  2 games, nine of which (including Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt) were Stackelberg-soluble and three (including Battle of the Sexes and Chicken) were non-Stackelberg-soluble. Subjects significantly preferred Stackelberg strategies in Stackelberg-soluble games, and a protocol analysis of stated reasons for choice showed that joint payoff maximization and strategic dominance were given as reasons significantly more frequently in Stackelberg-soluble than in non-Stackelberg-soluble games.
Links: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/475
Type: Article
Description: This is the author's final draft, not the version as published in Journal of Economic Psychology www.elsevier.com/locate/joep This article was awarded the Citation of Excellence by ANBAR Electronic Intelligence.
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Psychology

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