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Title: Stackelberg reasoning in mixed-motive games: An experimental investigation.
Authors: Colman, Andrew M.
Stirk, J.A.
First Published: 1998
Publisher: Elsevier
Citation: Journal of Economic Psychology, 1998, 19, pp.279-293.
Abstract: The Stackelberg heuristic is a simulation heuristic in which a player optimizes against best-reply counterstrategies, and a game is Stackelberg-soluble if the resulting Stackelberg strategies are in equilibrium. To test the hypothesis that players use this heuristic in Stackelberg-soluble games, 100 subjects played all 12 ordinally nonequivalent 2  2 games, nine of which (including Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt) were Stackelberg-soluble and three (including Battle of the Sexes and Chicken) were non-Stackelberg-soluble. Subjects significantly preferred Stackelberg strategies in Stackelberg-soluble games, and a protocol analysis of stated reasons for choice showed that joint payoff maximization and strategic dominance were given as reasons significantly more frequently in Stackelberg-soluble than in non-Stackelberg-soluble games.
Type: Article
Description: This is the author's final draft, not the version as published in Journal of Economic Psychology This article was awarded the Citation of Excellence by ANBAR Electronic Intelligence.
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Psychology

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