Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/475
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorColman, Andrew M.-
dc.contributor.authorStirk, J.A.-
dc.date.accessioned2007-06-21T09:50:22Z-
dc.date.available2007-06-21T09:50:22Z-
dc.date.issued1998-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Psychology, 1998, 19, pp.279-293.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2381/475-
dc.descriptionThis is the author's final draft, not the version as published in Journal of Economic Psychology www.elsevier.com/locate/joep This article was awarded the Citation of Excellence by ANBAR Electronic Intelligence.en
dc.description.abstractThe Stackelberg heuristic is a simulation heuristic in which a player optimizes against best-reply counterstrategies, and a game is Stackelberg-soluble if the resulting Stackelberg strategies are in equilibrium. To test the hypothesis that players use this heuristic in Stackelberg-soluble games, 100 subjects played all 12 ordinally nonequivalent 2  2 games, nine of which (including Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt) were Stackelberg-soluble and three (including Battle of the Sexes and Chicken) were non-Stackelberg-soluble. Subjects significantly preferred Stackelberg strategies in Stackelberg-soluble games, and a protocol analysis of stated reasons for choice showed that joint payoff maximization and strategic dominance were given as reasons significantly more frequently in Stackelberg-soluble than in non-Stackelberg-soluble games.en
dc.format.extent193613 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.titleStackelberg reasoning in mixed-motive games: An experimental investigation.en
dc.typeArticleen
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Psychology

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Stackelberg Reasoning in Mixed-Motive Games.pdf184.66 kBAdobe PDFView/Open


Items in LRA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.