Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/7472
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dc.contributor.authorDhami, Sanjit-
dc.contributor.authoral-Nowaihi, Ali-
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-04T14:21:58Z-
dc.date.available2010-02-04T14:21:58Z-
dc.date.issued2007-10-
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/discussion/papers2007.htmlen_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2381/7472-
dc.description.abstractThe recent experience with low inflation has reopened interest in the liquidity trap; which occurs when the nominal interest rate reaches its zero lower bound. To reduce the real interest rate, and to stimulate the economy, the modern literature highlights the role of high inflationary expectations. Using the Dixit-Lambertini (2003) framework of strategic policy interaction, we find that the optimal institu- tional response to the possibility of a liquidity trap has two main components. First, an optimal inflation target given to the Central Bank. Second, the Treasury, who retains control over fiscal policy and acts as leader, is given optimal output and inflation targets. This keeps inflationary expectations su¢ ciently high and achieves the optimal rational expectations pre-commitment solution. Simulations show that this arrangement is (1) optimal even when the Treasury has no inflation target but follow's the optimal output target and (2) 'near optimal' even when the Treasury follows its own agenda through a suboptimal output target but is willing to follow an optimal inflation target. Finally, if monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank with an optimal inflation target, but the Treasury retains discretion over fiscal policy, then the outcome can be a very poor one.en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherDept. of Economics, University of Leicesteren_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPapers in Economicsen_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseries07/15en_GB
dc.subjectliquidity trapen_GB
dc.subjectstrategic monetary-fiscal interactionen_GB
dc.subjectoptimal Taylor rulesen_GB
dc.titleAlice through the looking glass: Strategic monetary and fiscal policy interaction in a liquidity trapen_GB
dc.typeReporten_GB
Appears in Collections:Reports, Dept. of Economics

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