Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Existence of a Condorcet winner when views have other-regarding preferences|
|Publisher:||Dept. of Economics, University of Leicester|
|Abstract:||In standard political economy models, voters are 'self-interested' i.e. care only about 'own' utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often have 'other-regarding preferences'(ORP), i.e., in deciding among alternative policies voters care about their payo¤s relative to others. We extend a widely used general equilibrium framework in political economy to allow for voters with ORP, as in Fehr- Schmidt (1999). In line with the evidence, these preferences allow voters to exhibit 'envy' and 'altruism', in addition to the standard concern for 'own utility'. We give sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have ORP. This could open the way for an incorporation of ORP in a variety of political economy models. Furthermore, as a corollary, we give more general conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have purely selfish preferences.|
|Series/Report no.:||Papers in Economics|
|Description:||Updated June 2008|
|Appears in Collections:||Reports, Dept. of Economics|
Items in LRA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.