Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty
Authors: Renou, Ludovic
Schlag, Karl H.
First Published: Jan-2008
Publisher: Dept. of Economics, University of Leicester
Abstract: This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).
Series/Report no.: Papers in Economics
Type: Report
Appears in Collections:Reports, Dept. of Economics

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
dp08-2.pdf349.22 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in LRA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.