Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/7523
Title: Bilateral commitment
Authors: Bade, Sophie
Haeringer, Guillaume
Renou, Ludovic
First Published: Jun-2008
Publisher: Dept. of Economics, University of Leicester
Abstract: We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of implementable profiles and provide a simple method to find them. Profiles implementable by bilateral commitments are shown to be generically inefficient. Surprisingly, allowing for gradualism (i.e., step by step commitment) does not change the set of implementable profiles
Series/Report no.: Papers in Economics
08/20
Links: http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/discussion/papers2008.html
http://hdl.handle.net/2381/7523
Type: Report
Appears in Collections:Reports, Dept. of Economics

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