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dc.contributor.authorDhami, Sanjit-
dc.contributor.authoral-Nowaihi, Ali-
dc.description.abstractThe celebrated relation between inequality and redistribution is based on selfish voters who care solely about own-payouts. A growing empirical literature highlights the importance of other regarding preferences (ORP) in voting over redistribution. We reexamine the relation between inequality and redistribution, within a simple general equilibrium model, when voters have ORP. Our contribution is five-fold. First, we demonstrate the existence of a Condorcet winner. Second, poverty can lead to increased redistribution (which implies a countercyclical social spending to GDP ratio). Third, we show that disposable income 'strongly median-dominates' factor income. Fourth, we show that fair voters respond to an increase in 'strong median-dominance' by engaging in greater redistribution. Fifth, an illustrative em- pirical exercise using OECD data points to the importance of fairness in explaining redistribution.en_GB
dc.publisherDept. of Economics, University of Leicesteren_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPapers in Economicsen_GB
dc.subjectOther regarding preferencesen_GB
dc.subjectSingle crossing propertyen_GB
dc.subjectIncome inequalityen_GB
dc.subjectDifference dominanceen_GB
dc.subjectMedian dominanceen_GB
dc.subjectAmerican Exceptionalismen_GB
dc.titleInequality and size of the government when voters have other regarding preferencesen_GB
Appears in Collections:Reports, Dept. of Economics

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