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Title: Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
Authors: Renou, Ludovic
Schlag, Karl H.
First Published: Oct-2009
Publisher: Dept. of Economics, University of Leicester
Abstract: This note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of "-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in "-minimax regret equilibrium for all " ∈ [0, 1).
Series/Report no.: Papers in Economics
Type: Report
Appears in Collections:Reports, Dept. of Economics

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