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Title: Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
Authors: Renou, Ludovic
Schlag, Karl H.
First Published: 4-Jun-2010
Publisher: Elsevier
Citation: Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 71(2), pp. 527-533
Abstract: This Note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of ε-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in ε-minimax regret equilibrium for all ε∈[0,1).
DOI Link: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.010
ISSN: 0899-8256
Type: Article
Rights: This is the author's final draft of the paper published as Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 71(2), pp. 527-533. The original published version is available from the publisher's website: doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.010
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, Dept. of Economics

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