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|Title:||Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium|
Schlag, Karl H.
|Citation:||Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 71(2), pp. 527-533|
|Abstract:||This Note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of ε-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in ε-minimax regret equilibrium for all ε∈[0,1).|
|Rights:||This is the author's final draft of the paper published as Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 71(2), pp. 527-533. The original published version is available from the publisher's website: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825610000990 doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.010|
|Appears in Collections:||Published Articles, Dept. of Economics|
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