Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Learning to cooperate without awareness in multiplayer minimal social situations
Authors: Colman, Andrew M.
Pulford, Briony D.
Omtzigt, David
al-Nowaihi, Ali
First Published: Jul-2010
Publisher: Elsevier
Citation: Cognitive Psychology, 2010, 61 (3), pp. 201-227.
Abstract: Experimental and Monte Carlo methods were used to test theoretical predictions about adaptive learning of cooperative responses without awareness in minimal social situations—games in which the payoffs to players depend not on their own actions but exclusively on the actions of other group members. In Experiment 1, learning occurred slowly over 200 rounds in a dyadic minimal social situation but not in multiplayer groups. In Experiments 2–4, learning occurred rarely in multiplayer groups, even when players were informed that they were interacting strategically and were allowed to communicate with one another but were not aware of the game’s payoff structure. Monte Carlo simulation suggested that players approach minimal social situations using a noisy version of the win–stay, lose–shift decision rule, deviating from the deterministic rule less frequently after rewarding than unrewarding rounds
DOI Link: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2010.05.003
ISSN: 0010-0285
Type: Article
Rights: This is the author's final draft of the paper published as Cognitive Psychology, 2010, 61 (3), pp. 201-227. The final version is available from Doi: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2010.05.003
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Psychology

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
minimal-social-situations.pdf470.13 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in LRA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.