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Title: Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria
Authors: Colman, Andrew M.
Körner, Tom W.
Musy, Olivier
Tazdaït, Tarik
First Published: 25-Feb-2011
Publisher: Elsevier
Citation: Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 2011, 55 (2), pp. 166-175
Abstract: The Berge equilibrium concept formalizes mutual support among players motivated by the altruistic social value orientation in games. We prove some basic results for Berge equilibria and their relations to Nash equilibria, and we provide a straightforward method for finding Berge equilibria in n-player games. We explore some specific examples, and we explain how the Berge equilibrium provides a compelling model of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that the Berge equilibrium also explains coordination in some common interest games and is partially successful in explaining the payoff dominance phenomenon, and we comment that the theory of team reasoning provides alternative solutions to these problems.
DOI Link: 10.1016/
ISSN: 0022-2496
Version: Post-print
Status: Peer-reviewed
Type: Article
Rights: Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Inc. Deposited with reference to the publisher’s archiving policy available on the SHERPA/RoMEO website.
Appears in Collections:Published Articles, School of Psychology

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