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|Title:||Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria|
|Authors:||Colman, Andrew M.|
Körner, Tom W.
|Citation:||Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 2011, 55 (2), pp. 166-175|
|Abstract:||The Berge equilibrium concept formalizes mutual support among players motivated by the altruistic social value orientation in games. We prove some basic results for Berge equilibria and their relations to Nash equilibria, and we provide a straightforward method for finding Berge equilibria in n-player games. We explore some specific examples, and we explain how the Berge equilibrium provides a compelling model of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that the Berge equilibrium also explains coordination in some common interest games and is partially successful in explaining the payoff dominance phenomenon, and we comment that the theory of team reasoning provides alternative solutions to these problems.|
|Rights:||Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Inc. Deposited with reference to the publisher’s archiving policy available on the SHERPA/RoMEO website.|
|Appears in Collections:||Published Articles, School of Psychology|
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